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*23 Primrose Gardens, London NW3*

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# The Paradox of the Psychoanalyst,

by Jacques Alain Miller

It is ten years since the dissolution of the Ecole Freudienne de Paris. In "Le Monde" of 12 January this year, the lawyer Soulez-Lariviere, who represented the opposition analysts at the time, wrote: "Surely idealism was never taken so far as in that Lacanian school in which, as in Plato's Republic, political power was not distinguished from knowledge. The school had three categories of citizens: practising analysts (AP), analysts who were members of the school (AME), and the school's analysts (AE), with the latter ordered in a hierarchy according to their degree of initiation. The logic was clearly that of dictatorship, since the subject supposed to know was Jacques Lacan....".

No. Lacan's republic had no such "three categories of citizens": Its beauty and its paradox was that it had only one category. Founded on "a distinction of hierarchy and gradus", on a separation of power (pouvoir) and knowledge (savoir), it conferred the same rights on all, regardless of their seniority in the association and of any claims they might have by virtue of their competence and performance in the field of psychoanalysis.

The system that Soulez describes, where three levels of initiation entail different rights within the community, exists: it is the system of the "Psychoanalytic International" (IPA). Superimposing hierarchy on rank has the advantage of stability, the disadvantage of leading to ossification. Lacan's school is stimulating precisely because it is a little unstable. Its logic, far from being that of dictatorship, is that of dissolution. To what purpose do its members, who are equal in rights, tolerate distinctions of rank? They consent to it only so long as they respect the agency which evaluates and which guarantees. If that agency flags even slightly, they break loose, the tamer is devoured.

You do not have to be Montesquieu to understand that this little republic, unique of its kind, where the mainspring is respect (that of the "verum index sui"), is structurally unstable: as long as it lasts it is in a perpetual ferment, hard for the citizens to endure, and particularly exacting for the first among them. With Lacan gone, none of the groups which function in his name has shown itself equal to this exaction: some have renounced all gradus, others have surreptitiously merged it with hierarchy; everywhere those with responsibility have found ways of protecting themselves. Who, since Lacan, has dared to take the whole of his authority on a teaching dispensed to all comers (a ciel ouvert)?

Nowadays in France the Lacanian nebula consists of some twenty groups. That means disorder. Whence the idea of an Order, a coming together of the nebula.

To disagree with Serge Leclaire when he recommends that psychoanalysts perform a self-definition, setting themselves in a certain opposition to national states, is to fail to see that his idea is in the best Freudian tradition: it proceeds from the same inspiration which brought Freud to create his "International Association", an association that still exists today.

An Order of psychoanalysts exists, the experiment has been carried out. The result is clear. It has ended in failure. Legally, no state has ever recognised the IPA's pretensions to a monopoly in psychoanalysis. The fact is that non-IPA practitioners are by far the more numerous, in France and in the rest of the world. On the theoretical level, finally, the IPA, committed since Freud's death to the dissemination through the world of Heinz Hartmann's Ego-Psychology as the new psychoanalytic Gospel, is today a sad Babel, relying on formalism of standards, not on doctrine; strange "lacanoiacs" are ever appearing within it.

The correct analysis of Leclaire's project, then, is as an offer, made to the IPA in the name of the nebula, of a New Deal: a deal designed to take account of a situation that is changing all the time to the detriment of the old foundation (which knows it).

The fact that the French IPA rejects the "historical compromise" completely, and that the Nebula and the public authorities take the same attitude, leaves Serge Leclaire and his friends isolated. Nonetheless, there is comfort for them in a number of hopeful signs from around the world. In the United States a legal action recently forced groups affiliated to the IPA to negotiate with the independents; in Great Britain, the British Society has long been obliged to coexist with Jungians and "Lacanians" in the Rugby Conference in West Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland, official recognition for psychotherapeutic organisations takes no cognisance of analytical specificities; in Italy, the Ossicini law, which was passed in the wake of the Verdiglione affair, and comes into force soon, will create an association of psychotherapists to oversee training; etc.

The explanation of the French exception is Lacan. For one thing, his work has assured that the analysts of our country will be doing good business for some time to come: it has had a subtle educative influence on the public, which is more willing than in other countries to admit the specificity of psychoanalytic practice, and would not tolerate interference from the state, which, in its wisdom, would not dream of such interference anyway. Further, the Paris branches of the IPA number a few embittered analysts, who, wounded beyond repair by their encounter with Lacan,



will exact vengeance from his memory and from his pupils till their dying day; and younger analysts sometimes resent their more successful competitors. All the same it is not unthinkable that pressure exerted at government level between different countries might one day bring even the most reticent to sit down at one table. That occasion will require the skills of a very accomplished diplomat: someone of the calibre of Roland Dumas, intermediary at the negotiations on the future of Cambodia...he was once also in the opposite corner from Soulez, representing Lacan.

What is crucial in all this? Not the petty intrigues. The question at the heart of the debate started by Leclair is this: "What is a psychoanalyst? And how are they recognised?"

It is as necessary to ask that question as it is impossible to give it an answer which will be valid for all, verifiable by all, and objective, if not scientific. How could it be otherwise if it is true that the analyst is the product of his own analysis, of a confiding of secrets which is unequalled, and which can only be made to one person? Therein lies the tragedy - and the comedy - of the practitioners of analysis.

Psychoanalysts are in no better position than anyone else when it comes to saying what the psychoanalyst is as such. If the impossibility of answering this question is a matter of experience, it is also a structural impasse: the psychoanalyst does not exist - but that does not prevent psychoanalysts from growing and multiplying. Lacan revealed that secret, and gave it a clinical expression, based on pure logic and curiously identical with that of the feminine position.

Does anyone really think that the failure of the Freudian Order, the dispersion of the "Lacanian", are due to the foolishness of the ones, and the knavery of the others? The truth is that there is no essence (or ideal type, or universal) of the analyst. Appeal to Plato, pace Soulez, doesn't help us here, (appeal to the Heterity of the Parmenides, as made by Lacan in this very newspaper on 26 January 1980, excepted): there are never "all the analysts", there is no "analyst of analysts" - rather there are analysts, one by one, each authorised by themselves alone, making up a series, but not a universe. In Bertrand Russell's terms (1901): the class of analysts is a class "as multiple" not "as one".

On the one hand this absence of essence makes for a plethora - a plethora of analysts: how is the wheat to be separated from the chaff? On the other hand it makes for a lack, and, when the logic of this lack is not understood, for uneasiness - among analysts, in the first place, who then come out with various masks to conceal it. The fashionable theory in the fifties defended the analyst by their

identification to the analyst: a neat example of a vicious circle. While the IPA analyst plays at superficial conformity, the Nebula-analyst behaves like a mirror-image and plays at non-conformity. The first, parasitical, pretends to respect the ritual; the other, their own panegyrist, flaunts their beautiful soul. But they cannot bring it off: the lack breaks through all concealments. These robes of office are vain attempts to bandage an irreparable castration.

I am not unaware that by putting things like this I am fomenting a riot. "Look! The psychoanalyst doesn't exist! Who are they then, these people who....? Who gives them the right to....? Themselves? But which are the good ones? How are we to know? Which ones are fakes? Aren't they...dangerous? To arms, citizens!

Peace, citizens! A professor of philosophy is to be recognised by the qualifications they have obtained from the University, but what exactly is a philosopher like? Clearly they are not always that different from a rascal, even if the two classes have quite different definitions. That is what Raymond Queneau brought out in his sensational fable "Philosophers and Rascals" (recently republished by Gallimard, 1986). "Analysts and Con men" is a formula often used of Freud, of Lacan..and, certainly, one is never too sure: one must examine them closely, very closely, one by one...After all, the art of the psychoanalyst begins with making the patient forget that it is all just words.

Teasing the psychoanalyst is never difficult, whether they are the sort who strut around with their chocolate medals and fancy-dress uniform, or the sort who recline on the soft pillow of ignorance. Knowing that they do not know doubtless gives the Lacanian a head start, but one that they would be unwise to abuse: it does not protect them from cynicism or conceit.

The lack of quality-control makes it easy to satirise the appearances which go proxy for it; but it in no way invalidates psychoanalytic practice: all it does is to radicalise the subjective responsibility of anyone aspiring to dispense it. No pity for psychoanalysts!

To say that the responsibility of each is without appeal is to say that it cannot be shared, but also that no one is entitled to refuse to prove himself. That is how it has always been since the beginnings of psychoanalysis (Freud..): it has never been possible to test suitability for analytic training by a preliminary public examination, indeed it is unthinkable. What is possible is a retrospective guarantee by an analyst's colleagues, on the basis of the length and regularity of their practice: that occurs behind the closed doors of small communities, access to which is limited - small villages where everyone knows each other.



And it cannot be otherwise...unless we follow Lacan's proposal to his School (9 October 1967) that a subject, at the moment when he "authorises himself", on the basis of the analysis he has undergone, to begin to practice, may, if he so wishes, pass on his case and reasons, what he makes of what he has been through, to selected colleagues, who will then make his testimony the object of a minute and scrupulous examination, intended not only to confirm that his symptoms have indeed been decoded, that his "primary fantasy" has been brought to light, that he has, as a subject, crossed his fantasy, that what he enjoys (jouit) no longer interferes with what he hears (ouit), and that he is therefore ready to psychoanalyse properly, - but also intended to enrich by its own unique contribution the ever open file on the question "What is an analyst?".

I conclude. Is it meant that on the ruins of the IPA we should celebrate the marriage of psychoanalysis and the state? But the corpse still shows signs of life, the bride is too fair, and the groom otherwise engaged. A School of psychoanalysis whose members are resolute workers, able to enter debate with all comers and maintain dialogue with the Public on what, in the discovery of the unconscious, is of general concern - is this not preferable to an Order of psychoanalysts whispering at the ears of the Powerful? Does such a school already exist? It ought to. Such an initiative, scientific in character, is the only one worthy of the Cause and the Field which, since Lacan, bear the name of Freud.

Post-scriptum. This text had been with the editor of Le Monde for a few days when my attention was drawn to the article by Mr Green in the 10 February issue.

1. Mr Green takes issue with Lacan for having formulated the "precept" according to which it is laudable "not to give up on one's desire" (ne pas ceder sur son desir): Mr Green sees in it a threat to public morals. In l'Ethique de la Psychanalyse, Lacan's seminar which I prepared for publication, we find this: "I suggest that the only thing one can be guilty of, at least in the perspective of psychoanalysis, is to have given up on one's desire" (p.368). I think I have shown in my lectures at the Department of psychoanalysis (University of Paris 8) that Lacan is here simply echoing Freud, who, in "Civilisation and its Discontents", wrote "Every renunciation of drive (of drive-satisfaction - J Alain Miller) now becomes a dynamic source of conscience and every fresh renunciation increases the latter's severity and intolerance". [\*] Which is to say that, according to Freud, and contrary to the expectations of common sense, the feeling of unconscious guilt is never so strong as when the subject sacrifices his enjoyment (jouissance) to the moral ideal; so the "Superego" feeds off the very renunciations that it demands.

Freud presents this formula, in his chapter 6, as the specific contribution of psychoanalysis to the question of ethics. Lacan's "to have given up on one's desire" at once translates and transposes Freud's "Triebverzicht".

Certainly, no one is forced to agree with the position of Freud and Lacan here. But if, with the help of one of those fictions that logicians call "possible worlds", we imagine Mr Green as a turn of the century Viennese, we have to suppose that he would have invoked upon Freud, as he now does upon Lacan and his pupils, the censure of "right-minded people": those people whose number and influence in 1990 has happily decreased due to the impact on civilisation of psychoanalysis.

2. Mr Green favours medical qualifications as the guarantee of psychoanalytic competence, in which he is in line with positions repeatedly defended by the IPA, in defiance of the express, and frequently repeated, wishes of Freud himself. This point was the main reason for the split in the psychoanalytic movement in France, which pitted Lacan, among others, against the teachers of Mr Green. That battle has been lost by the IPA everywhere in the world. Freud would be glad of it.
3. While judging the activity of Lacan detrimental to psychoanalysis, Mr Green boasts of having been "one of his collaborators" (sic) in calling, in fine, upon "competent and honest Lacanians" to work together for a "renewal". Claims which are baffling in their incoherence.
4. Finally, while Dr Green is entirely at liberty not to follow Freud in every part of his work, and not to read Lacan as I do, it is to be feared that if he perseveres with couching his pronouncements in the language he has used for some time now, he may cause anxiety in people better disposed towards him than I am, by offering them a spectacle of pain and rage exacerbated by impotence.

[\*]: The Pelican Freud Library, vol. 12 p321.



The question of the end of the treatment  
lecture given in Rennes 16/5/87

by Francois Leguil

I have been asked to speak about the end of the treatment over a period of three years. This is the length of time set by the procedure which confers the title of A.E to whoever is put forward, on condition that this person can demonstrate that those who nominated him were right to do so.

So the title in question is not just a hollow one, of the kind which might offer the subject only the prospect of eventually no longer being obliged to hold it; it is a title which has value solely in terms of the degrading it promises. What is more, as opposed to other titles, it requires the subject to start work, instead of dispensing him from it, which is a second reason for it not being just a title.

What I would like to say today is that the end of analysis involves the emergence of a certain pathway. Firstly, what was at issue at the beginning shows itself to be at an end, and secondly, the end of an analysis allows us to see the dividing of the dimension of work on the one hand, and that of the act on the other.

The question of the end of analysis has been posed as a problem from the beginning: a discussion of it should therefore start from simple ideas.

The fact that the question of the end of analysis has arisen is noteworthy in itself; analysis is also a form of treatment, people go to an analyst because all is not well, so it follows that the end of a treatment means the cure has been found.

Raising the question of the end of analysis is itself a way of saying that the cure constitutes a problem, so the notion of treatment must also be problematic. We can no longer be content with parading the claim that there is no relation between therapeutic and analysis, not that there is one, but we can no longer simply fall back on this claim for it to be a sufficient argument; we must show in what way analysis is something other than therapy, because not to do so would simply be making a mockery of everyone; people who come to see the analyst do so because they are not well, because all is not well, because some 'thing' is suffering.

But the fact is, often they don't realise that if they have reached the point of consulting an analyst, they have taken one step beyond the treatment, and they have taken it themselves. They do not come to see the analyst just

because things are going badly - if they do they won't be coming for long. They come because, without knowing it, they start an analysis when the questions they are asking themselves about their suffering, are connected to other questions they are putting to themselves, concerning what they are.

Analysis is therefore begun at the axis joining these two kinds of questioning, between this suffering which can only be said in words of complaint, and the question concerning what that means about being. So analysis will permit them to follow a certain path indicated by our very conception of the symptom as a gagged word, a message which has not been allowed to reach its addressee, which has therefore been denied its function of reaching its destination; such is the way we can conceive the symptom today, thanks to Lacan, by coupling it with the figure, the trope of metaphor.

This conception of the symptom as a signifying substitution is what permits us to ascertain that if the analysis begins, the subject can be relieved of a certain number of symptoms. There comes a time when the subject, might decide things are fine as they are; this happens 75% of the time; he decides that things are fine as they are, that his analyst has done him an admirable service, and that they can now go their separate ways.

This is a legitimate end of analysis. We can say, nevertheless, that in a small but significant number of cases, people are not satisfied with stopping there.

So the end of analysis starts off again at that moment, in one of two possible directions, to put it schematically. One possibility consists in a self-propelling maintenance of the treatment where what has been discovered in the treatment becomes necessary to the upkeep of a new subjective position; but as it is not possible to go on with the treatment unless demand is kept up, and, as this demand is a complaint for what has motivated it, we realise at this point that maintaining the treatment amounts to what Freud called a negative therapeutic reaction.

There is a second possibility where we can note a certain number of phenomena, a new clinic, which obliges us to propose that beyond a certain point which might be termed therapeutic, there is an end of the treatment which is not the self-maintenance of the latter in the form of a negative therapeutic reaction, which Lacan calls, 'the arrogant demand to suffer', and which involves the upkeep, in the part of the subject, at this moment of his failing ideal, by laying claim to suffering. There is another possibility, and Lacan tries to pin it down in a certain number of formulas which now appear to us as syntagms which must not be allowed to become fixed, a certain number of formulas by which we can learn to construct a theory of what is at stake in this procedure of the pass ('passe').



I shall list these formulas together: Subjective destitution, crossing the fantasy, falling of the presumed subject of knowledge, coming about of being. Here are a certain number of enigmatic-sounding formulas which I should simply like to comment on today, in order to show how we might make of them something other than slogans or rather flashy landmarks which would allow us to formulate the fix we are in, in a different way.

Subjective destitution, what does it mean for a subject to be destitute? It's an expression whose meaning we can grasp through its opposite; what might subjective institution be? This formula of Lacan's permits us to get to the heart of the matter straightaway, which is that if the subject came to see us because he was suffering, and because he'd had enough of suffering, it's because what seemed as subjective institution for him was not doing its job anymore; and we know what seems as subjective institution since Freud showed us that the position of the subject in the fantasy is assured by his identification - what seems as subjective institution is a fantasy. That is to say a scenario, or even a phrase, something which gives the subject an assurance which permits him to get by with regard to everything in the world which is of a heterogeneous nature, with regard to everything in conflict with what suits him. So we call subjective institution this sort of 'mental formation' which allows the subject to remain just a little bit beyond what Freud called the edge of the 'pleasure principle', which allows him to be bordering at a point beyond which he is in danger. So this fantasy is what allows the subject to be able to adjust, in the optical sense of the word, to be able to adjust his relation to a real; and everything leads us to believe that, if he has begun an analysis, it's because it is this Unconscious fantasy which has been put into question. It's because, due to a letting-go, an identification, or a particularly unexpected encounter, or because of an alteration in what he had to deal with, this unconscious fantasy came to question the subject in such a way that his symptoms, at that moment, caused him to suffer.

We can see that, beyond therapy, the treatment is no longer about what would relieve the subject, but about what he may become once it is the fantasy that is put in question.

At this point we can establish a hypothetically determinable and locatable pathway in which there would be the therapy, and after that an enigmatic pathway where what is at issue is the becoming of the status of the subject: that happens the minute the question of the fantasy has been put in the context of work. These are dangerous things to say because you have to tell yourself that you can teach the subject who comes to see you a lot about this therapeutic horizon, but there is one thing you will never teach him much about, which is what is the best therapy for him. There is a sense in which 'everyone knows what's good for him', which is

indeed an ethical definition of the subject, who has a certain number of habits and who knows, as children know, that touching the stone hurts more than touching the sink.

The subject who comes to see you was trailing around with him his little therapy the one which suited him best because he had got it from his own personal history. And whatever you say and do, you won't find a better one. This therapy was the assurance given him by his fantasy.

So the treatment is paradoxical to the extent that, at the end of the day, an effective treatment is one that puts the patient back on his feet, so that, after the failure of a certain number of identificatory solutions, it allows the subject to re-establish himself within his fantasy.

It's from his fantasy that the subject gets his assurance vis-a-vis existence; his fantasy tells him what to do in relation to anything foreign to him, anything he might find disagreeable. This fantasy frames the subject's relation to reality, this is what is in question each time one of your patients tells you he's been dreaming about looking at something through a window; this is really to tell you what the status of the subject vis-a-vis reality is - framed by a signifying apparatus which demarcates a certain number of points on the horizon, which the subject can grasp thanks to the intervention of this apparatus.

But taking a subject beyond the point where he knows what is good for him presupposes the entry at that moment into a zone of uncertainty, presupposes a point in analysis beyond which it gets dangerous. We all know that it can get dangerous as early on as the first session.

But another set of difficulties can arise at the moment when a treatment had given no indication of the fact that, until then, things could go wrong. What is at stake at the end of the treatment is that there comes a moment when the subject is invited to go beyond a certain point, to embark on a journey where he no longer has at his disposal the co-ordinates he needs in order to know what's good or what is bad for him. Literally. The treatment at that moment brings the subject to the point where he needs advice, because that is what you need when you no longer know what is good or bad for you. The problem is that if, at that moment, the subject takes advice, he's no longer in analysis because psychoanalysis was invented by Freud from the moment he decided to give up suggestion for the subject to have passed beyond this point, means he is in serious danger if he does not have, at that moment, the advice of an enlightened master, but if he does, analysis is no longer taking place, so we might say that analysis is indeed a wonderful adventure, the greatest of all, surely, in that there comes a moment when anything could happen. Starting from the fact that this subject is going to come a cropper



This is exactly what Lacan proposes - that we make the subject go beyond this point and right to the end of the path which is possible for him, without it (being) for that the equivalent of a total catastrophe in reality from which he would never recover. Because basically, what Lacan establishes, is that when you take up this bet (and it is indeed a bet since you no longer have the coordinates which tell you what is going to happen), if the analyst has the means to sustain it, what emerges at the end is certainly a man or a woman who has lost much of what gave him or her their assurance in life, but also what emerges at the end is an analyst.

That means that at the end, an analyst is produced by this path, beyond the point which was set by what it was that gave a subject his subjective assurance, beyond a point called subjective destitution. In crossing the fantasy, the destitute subject will only find his way out by taking the place, not of a subject, but of an object. So the subject, on his way to being an analyst, is going to be brought to find a way out, and here we can see that, looked at in this way, Lacan's mathemes are a simplification of experience.

What do you know about your analyst? A certain number of things, such as where he lives, when he wishes to see you, what, up to a point, his tastes are, according to whether the walls are bare; if there is some indication of knowledge to be had in the room or not, you can find out a certain amount which young analysands set great store by. But you have nothing in the way of a sign which would tell you what the analyst wants of you, what he wants for you and what he wants to tell you. This means that the person of the analyst is defined from the first by a certain number of entirely negative attributes. The analyst doesn't define himself in the same way that I'm speaking to you now, that is, by way of a certain number of words, of signifiers which he produces in order to present himself to the Other. This is precisely how the analyst can be defined as the one who tries, as far as possible to elude any definition which might permit the patient to know what he has to say in order to reach him. If he wishes the rule of free association (without which there is no analysis) to function, the analyst must give his patient no signifier which might lead him off in one direction rather than another. So for analysis to function, the analyst must not be defined or represented for the patient by something of the order of the signifier; this authorises Lacan to propose that this analyst, who is thoroughly enigmatic in terms of what he wants, occupies the place of this object called the object 'a', inasmuch as this object is not of the same 'nature' of the signifier.

This is how Lacan writes the discourse of analysis:

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He puts this object 'a' in the place of the one who carries out the operation, he puts over here his famous split subject, and he presumes that the analytic act is this operation performed by the analyst on a subject who is working.

I have just let two words slip out here: act and work; these are the only way we can express in its simplest form what is at stake at the end of analysis. What is at stake can only be determined by separating what falls within the scope of the act from what falls within the scope of work.

Lacan says two things concerning the analytic act: the conception of the tool which we call the act, stems from the category of act called 'passage a l'acte', which means the conception of the act stems from the notion that the act goes beyond the knowledge which thinking permits us to have about a situation. The 'passage a l'acte' demonstrates that at a given moment a breach occurs, something happens in spite of a certain knowledge, producing something new; Lacan thinks that this conception of the act allows us to grasp what is at issue in the treatment.

The analytic act is, firstly, what allows us, at the beginning of an analysis, to set the subject to work. In calling this an act then, Lacan considers that it doesn't happen by itself, but that to speak of an act means that something is the cause of a change in something else, in a person.

So to speak of an act is to demand heterogeneity in the very movement of the treatment, the subject must be in the presence of something which makes him change, which, initially, makes him work; this presupposes that a change takes place; that this change has a cause external to the subject, so we have also reason to think that this change has a beginning and an end, since we call it an act, and since the act is not indefinitely repeated, like the creator and what he creates, and it follows from that that this act can only take place if cause and effect, the cause and what it applies itself to, are, if I can put it like this, made present.

This means that an analysis does not take place after the analysis is over, after the analyst has been taken leave of.

So the analytic act, which at the end of the day amounts to the subject finding himself occupying the place of the object, is a very curious act. The subject finds himself in this position because, in the course of his analysis, he has lost what established him in life the master signifiers, the identifications to which he subjected himself in order to claim some knowledge about what he was starting with "I am the son of so and so..."

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Losing these means the subject is propelled to a place where he defines himself no longer according to all his signifying characteristics, but according to the extremely enigmatic category of the object. So, having reached this point through his work, the subject testifies to the singular nature of this act which is accomplished by the analyst, but whose path is travelled by another.

This act, which does not operate autonomously, is one that aims to answer to the subject in a certain way, aims to give a certain sort of answer to the Subject; the only answer an act can give to a question has a name: this answer is a realisation, here act means realisation.

So the analytic act should propose to the subject the prospect of Subjective realisation. We are accountable for this whether the subjects who come to see us realise themselves in the process of the treatment or not. I'm labouring this point by using everyday terms which are open to criticisms as soon as they are examined more closely, because most of the time, it's by wanting the subject to realise himself in the treatment that he ends up wondering if he's going to realise what is happening to him, to use an everyday expression "how am I going to fulfil myself in life". If psychoanalysis neglects this question, it will not hold out for very long.

So there is another way of grasping this subjective realisation; the subject who comes to see you is a subject suffering from the fact that the signifier does not tell him everything about what he is, and that the signifier does not tell him everything he has to do in order to know what he desires, especially in order to know how to deal astutely with the other sex. Because the signifier does not tell him everything about what he is, Lacan has defined this subject as "subject of the want-to-be".

Something about being is not said in the signifier, and the end of the treatment, if it is not a fraudulent end, if it wants to offer the prospect of realisation, must, of necessity, see the way to a prospect of being.

This being which we know is not said in the signifier, is believed by the subject to be on the side of the object, and he believes this to the extent that he has made a companion of the object, which is what Lacan calls the fantasy; this means that the subject finds in the real object a supplement of being.

We call it a fantasy when the subject of the want-to-be, subject of the signifier, comes to cling to, to correlate himself with a real object which is not defined by the signifier, but which is defined in fact by what the signifier does not say. The subject makes his complement of being act of this object.

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This means that he can go ahead with life without suffering too much because of his solitude; the subject has succeeded in hooking himself onto this object by way of the sum of a certain number of procedures, and psychoanalysis is the operation which attempts to break that by inverting it. The analyst takes the place of this object about which the subject knows nothing except that he cherished it more than the apple of his eye.

The end of analysis is precisely, says Lacan, when the question of being loses all its substance of object (cf L'acte analytique). The end of an analysis is precisely allowing the subject to give up that which gave him the impression, in his fantasy, of offering him this complement of being. This is also what is called the stake in crossing the fantasy, and at this part, patients let you know when a signifier falls, they say "it's as if I were in a phase of 'denuclearisation'"; one patient recently evoked the impression that there was a core in his family that he was in the process of repelling like a putrid organ.

Why is it necessary, at the end of the analysis, for the subject to stop thinking that with this object he will know a little about what he is? It's because his fantasy is an impasse which can only permit him to orient himself in life by virtue of a misrecognition. So the end of analysis proposes, as subjective realisation, destitution, which is the moment when the subject, having lost all the master signifiers (S1), which told him who he could claim to be, and having separated himself from this object out of which he made the substance of his being, is visited by the tangible feeling, that people tell you about, that nothing can henceforth mask for him what Freud called castration; that nothing can henceforth mask that it was by way of an illusion which he wants no more of because it has become a lie for him, that it was by way of an illusion that this subject had the idea that in correlating himself with this object, which is to say with his fantasy, he escaped his nature of being fundamentally divided of being crossed by something which splits him in two and which means that as soon as it is a question of his desire, without his embarking on it, no subterfuge will tell him what he ought to do.

So why so much futile effort it might be asked: it might after all have been much better to stop before this point? Well, no, we could not stop before, firstly because we have no choice in the matter, something obliges us to go this far, but also because this far is exactly what is demanded of the analyst.

The latter, if he wishes to have some chance of setting the subject to work, some chance of the subject's at last knowing what illusion he had fallen prey to, must not, as is crudely stated and put in the silliest way by a fair number of the analytic community, must not project onto his patient his own problems. As it seems too silly to put it like



that, people say that this is what happens when the analyst analyses the counter-transference. Lacan does not take up this position: the analyst has some chance of the subject's reaching the end of the path he has to follow, if he, the analyst, has been to the end of his path; which means only if he has had the experience of what he is as an object the minute he is separated from it.

So this is a condition; there is no possibility of taking up this position in analysis and of occupying it as "semblance" if one has not been 'thus far'.

Why is there no possibility? Precisely because for the psychoanalyst, it is a question of pretending to be this object because it is impossible really to be it, unless the analytic act is envisaged in a perverse way.

So it is not a question of really being this object which is putrid because it cannot be said in words, because if the analyst really is this object, it will not work. It will not work for the reason that if he really is it, he will be it on his own account, and the object 'a', this is where things get complicated, is different for everyone since it is deduced from a particular signifying conjunction derived from his own history, by each subject; consequently this object does not lend itself to being exchanged. If Psychoanalysis could produce knowledge about the object 'a', there would be no further need for psychoanalysis. What was at issue as real object, cause of your desire, you can deduce only at the end of a treatment, even if this object is imaginarised in the register of the drives, around a certain number of objects cut from the rims of the body.

The object 'a' has logical consistency, is a real object which can be deduced from all the statements of the patient.

So, for the analyst, it's a question of reaching the point where the patient is as divided as he can be, where he is dissected by a cut that no identification can close. The implication is that the practice of analysis requires you to be so docile that, whatever the subject says, you will never get in the way of what he has to say next by reason of some particularity of your personal equation. To put it another way, your experience of the object should never get in the way of the subject finding the path of his own desire.

You see, then, that the question of the end of analysis is a question that gets posed automatically since analysis isn't a cure, the cure is the fantasy, and the subject goes beyond it; and the analyst, if he wants an analytical act to happen, if he wants the subject to work, must occupy the position of the object. Lacan says as much in 1958, in "The Direction of the Treatment": "The analyst is more effective in his action for being less involved in his being (Etre)." Indeed, if the analyst wants the issue in his treatment to be what the patient has to say, he cannot be involved in it,

become something other than what it once was, that is plain to see. Work used to live up to its etymology of torture and torment: today it is that which permits a subject to maintain himself in his identifications. It's what permits the subject to be a worker. And the master is no longer idle; what we ask for nowadays from the Other isn't a guarantee of the means of subsistence - that situation belongs to a bygone unlamented age, nowadays that guarantee is pretty well assured, so long as one has the good fortune not to be born in the Sahel. Nowadays we ask the Other to guarantee us work. This gives a whole particular category, characterised by a refusal of this demand of the master, by a refusal to resemble him in our work; what's produced is the clinical picture of hysteria.

So, the "work" that's meant when we talk of asking someone to get to work in psychoanalysis is quite a different thing from what that word denotes in the community.

The first thing to notice is that all the patients who come to see you for one reason or another, who speak to you of the analysis they have done, are going to do, or are doing - they all have the idea that they work and their analyst produces nothing. And the fact is that their suspicion is justified. The analysand's suspicion that he is the only one who works up a sweat is a suspicion that the facts confirm in every session.

The analytic act has a scandalously ataraxic side: you put a subject to work precisely by means of sitting and twiddling your thumbs. This brings out a complaint from the hysteric which is fuelled by the hysteric's refusal to start work: "why should it be me who does everything?", "ask me some questions", which means "put yourself to the trouble of doing a little thing." The analysands cope with this suspicion about the analyst by asking themselves what exactly the analyst does. Clearly, he does nothing.

This is one of the first ways in which the patient comes to wonder what the analyst wants of him, and clearly, the best way to spare the Other a questioning of what Lacan calls the desire of the Other - in the analytic situation, a questioning of what you, the analyst, want - is to start work yourself. When you work for someone, except on rare occasions where it might be said "He's doing me down" - just what the analyst does, incidentally, it's his job...when you work for someone, that someone is usually gratified. Sometimes so gratified that they take advantage of the situation to exploit you while they have the chance. And when the analyst does nothing, he thereby immediately provokes an enigmatic question from the analysand: "what does he want with me, perhaps his intentions are bad?"

So the analyst, by his act of putting someone to work while himself remaining idle, introduces the patient to a questioning of what is wanted of him. As regards work, what immediately comes into view is a demand for a guarantee: and



in his being. The analyst's involvements mustn't be at issue.

That's a little bit about why the question of the end of the treatment has to be raised in the form of a methodological distinction between act and work. By accomplishing an act where the work is done by another, the analyst will be able to see that patient himself find the horizon of the act at the end of his work, and see the patient himself occupy this place. You see, then, how Lacan resolves the impasse: the last word on the right action to take can't be reached by thought alone - and the discourse on the right actions to take is called ethics. Ethics tries to tell us how to act, as opposed to morality, whose job is to tell us how to behave.

The act of putting the subject to work requires the analyst to possess some means of stopping the patient backing down. "It's good to make advances, but sometimes one has to take breath" - i.e. one has to go back to the cradle, to the fantasy. The fantasy which has the power to reassure the patient, which institutes him subjectively. All that the patient can count on over against this reassurance is the analyst's certainty. It is essential that this certainty be there, in the analyst's possession: I referred earlier to a danger-zone, a zone of high winds - if the analyst lacks certainty about a way out for the patient the analysis will founder.

If the analyst is a Lacanian, he can guarantee the function of this certainty in two ways. The first way is if he has himself reached this place at the end of an analysis: in that case he can place himself there as a "semblant" - he has the certainty that it is this point in the real which has to be aimed at.

Often though, the analyst hasn't waited for that before setting up in practice. In which case he can occupy that place in another way, which works just as well - by continuing his own analysis. What Lacan has to say gives the secret as well as the legitimisation of this gap between setting up as analyst and the moment of the act. How is the subject who sets up as analyst a bit too soon (and everyone does the same, it's anticipation) going to operate as analyst? By continuing to leave his position of subject at work, the work of supplying signifiers, in the care of an analyst - whereby, in his treatments with his patients, he can occupy that place. So, you see, I am not defining the end of analysis as any kind of ideal point: what I've been saying goes to show that the pass shouldn't be made into an ideal, it is more a means for trying to find what, exactly, is taking shape.

We have got as far as the distinction between work and act. There's a point here that rouses a very tangible complaint in the treatment, and which is an object of mockery in society at large. We live in a century in which work has

memory. It's a simple story I've told you, and I'm sure that none of you will doubt the genuineness of that man's suffering: his child provoked a question, "what is my position in the desire of the Other", and the memory which immediately presented itself was of an exclusion from the Other, (you will hear no more of me), felt as a definite threat by the obsessional subject.

Certainty relates to what is between two signifiers, it relates to the bringing into play of a desire, and this desire is caused by something real - something to which hatred, for example, can bear witness.

We analysts aren't the only people who can be certain, nor the only people who tie their act to the notion of certainty. But it should be pointed out that the analytical act isn't simply a commitment, and the conviction which accompanies a commitment isn't certainty. Commitment is often confused with the act for a perfectly good reason; to commit oneself is to enrol oneself - one might say that it is to enrol oneself under a master-signifier, but that is too easy to say. To commit oneself implies separation: separation from one's friends, from one's village, in order to cross the Channel and follow a pariah; or leaving friends, brothers and sisters in order to cross the Sea of Galilee and follow someone who is going to finish up crucified...it is submitting oneself to a bad business. Committing oneself rests on a separation, on a gift: one makes a gift of that which one holds most dear to a cause that one decides to serve, and that gift separates one from an environment that had an eminent signifying value. The analytical act has to do with separation-therapy of a different nature. The analytical act makes its certainty depend, not on what has been given by the subject, but on what has been lost.

When someone commits himself, it is conviction that does the office of certainty; but the gift he has made of what he holds most dear deprives him of all knowledge about what he has left on one side. Which is to say that the most courageous man, the most enamoured of justice, with the most noble ideals, can have a fantasy that differs rudely from what he imagines himself to have served all his life. I am reminded of someone who came to see me, who had been in the resistance during the war, and subsequently devoted his life to international law - to the movement which strives for a technical change in the status of a certain number of people oppressed by dictatorships. He came to see me because he was at the end of an psychosomatic illness which hadn't cleared up despite several years of analysis, until a fantasy came to light, "getting the skin of a blackman", prompted by a dream that he had in which he was with an afrikaner. His skin complaint spoke volumes about that fantasy.

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We cannot rely on commitment in the practice of psychoanalysis: much as we respect commitment, it doesn't

help us in practice. The conviction that the subject can pride himself on what he has given is one thing. The certainty that he can't pride himself on anything any more, because he has lost that which was his "pride" is quite another.

Lacan correlates this business of the act to certainty; this certainty bears on what the subject has lost, the object which divides him.

Clinical experience of the act doesn't make what I was saying a moment ago obvious; a subject who passes to the act ("passage a l'acte") will spend the rest of the time assuring himself that he is uncertain as to where the act gets him. Anyone who has met people who have committed the supreme act (after suicide, that is, but we don't meet people who have committed suicide), i.e. murder, is aware that these people are convinced, really convinced, that they had no part in what happened. I mean, there is a protestation of innocence in these cases such that after the act, if it was a "passing to the act", the murderer's certainty simply isn't in evidence: on the contrary, he is uncertain - "I don't know what came over me."

When Lacan says that the analytical act is an invitation to knowledge, he is saying that it is an act which requires that certainty be correlated with a knowledge of what happened. There can't be any certainty on the level of "I wasn't feeling well that day, and I got carried away". No: the subject has to know why, how, and where it happened. Lacan has an idea about this as early as the 50s.

He writes at the end of "La Chose Freudienne": "..a new generation of practitioners and researchers is recovering the meaning of the freudian experience and its motor. Thereby this generation will also find the means of protecting itself from psycho-sociological objectification, a condition where psychoanalysis in its uncertainty goes in search of what it does: the only possible result of such a search is an inadequate abstraction into which psychoanalysis gets bogged down and gets dissolved." (Ecrits, p.435)).

Lacan notes that a certain number of practitioners will try, by a psycho-sociological objectification, to defend themselves from their own uncertainty about what the analytical act leads them to; and he pronounces a certain number of words: uncertainty, abstraction - in a little "tour de force" he says that any objectification in analysis is an abstraction - and substance. Here we have three words in a row that will enable us to see what is at issue in the analytical act.

I am going to write them out along with their opposites:

UNCERTAINTY	:	CERTAINTY
ABSTRACTION	:	MATERIALITY
SUBSTANCE	:	ACT



Opposite "uncertainty", "certainty" - no problem. Opposite "abstraction" there is no choice: it can't be "objectification", because Lacan makes objectification an abstraction - it has to be "materiality". And opposite "substance" you can only put "act", since Lacan effectively ridicules the substance of the act by saying that it is an abstraction.

So, the certainty of the analyst is the certainty that allows him to regulate his act according to the materiality of the letter. The materiality present in the treatment is nothing to do with what defines the subject's behaviour psycho-sociologically. It is the instance of the letter, i.e. the power which inflects the subject's destiny.

I'd like to finish off by saying that there is another way to pin down this certainty. Lets consider the doctor's certainty. You know that doctors talk about the medical act, of the diagnostic act, the therapeutic act - these are all words they use. You know too that the easiest mistake to make when someone uses a word is to think that he has got it wrong. But it's always salutary to take the view that he is using that word very well. That's what we do as analysts: we never think that the subject is wrong - the analyst's stance is that all the words the subject uses are the right ones. So lets do the same for the rest: when a doctor talks about a "medical act", he is talking about an act. It is an act which doesn't get judged according to its results. As you know, a doctor is under no obligation to achieve results; his obligation is to the certainty of the relation between the doctor and his knowledge, (1) to the certainty that the doctor disposes of all the knowledge which has been put at his disposal by the Other. That is the criterion on which a doctor gets judged before a medical tribunal. It is a serious point: a doctor cannot be reproached for failing to achieve a positive result with his patient, but he can be reproached for failing to use all the knowledge which the Other put at his disposal.

The first definition of the analytical act is just the opposite. An analytical act is judged by its results: what subject has it produced? How has it change the person? That is a more daunting outcome than a cure. You know that Lacan's phrase "In psychoanalysis a cure is a bonus" is so incisive that it's easy to wish he hadn't said it. In the seminar on anxiety he also says that "it is precisely because we aren't responsible for effecting a cure, that we are responsible for nothing less than the position of the subject at the end of the treatment." This is what I was alluding to earlier on when I spoke of the danger-zone: the analyst's responsibility doesn't concern his relation to "total knowledge" but his relation to something that Lacan, referring to knowledge, called the "not all".



and you see that it is a gamble, a risk, but that it is also an appeal to a truth which would satisfy the hope for a match between knowledge and the thing - the medical thing, I mean.

The medical act, the technical act, the suspension of knowledge, goes to the limits of knowledge - not in order to experience the radicality of this limit, but to push it back a little further. It is a moment of suspension, a moment that aims to make more space for knowledge. What the doctor calls his act is a point where he distances himself from what he knows in order to try something new. But, in medicine, the act cannot be performed, the risk run, except in the name of knowledge: it is a testing of the limits of knowledge.

How about the religious act, the act of faith - why is it an act? It is an act that produces a certainty, what has been known since Saint Thomas as the certainty of credibility. It is a mistake to think that men of the church are just people who believe: if they were just people who believed they would be simple neurotics, there would be no good reason why they should be unanalysable, which Lacan asserts that they are. A man of faith is animated by a certainty derived from an act that modifies his life, that enables him to risk his life, to go and convert people on the other side of the world. He has an unshakeable certainty: more than mere belief because this certainty will reject all the proofs to the contrary which the world might supply.

The act of faith is a separation from the knowledge that tells you about the world. To believe in God you have to abandon the idea that he is perceptible in the world of visible things: the subject renounces something essential to him - his relation to perception and to the knowledge which it furnishes him. This is a case of certainty precisely because the subject takes the risk of never being vindicated by facts.

The certainty of the believer stems from an act of separation from knowledge about what the world is about the nature of intra-mundane objects. It is a different certainty from analytic certainty: it is a certainty that there is something which is completely taken care of by God.

The certainty of the man of faith comes from the reading of perceptible signs: he sees the signs of God, either in himself or in the world. He knows that these signs can be refuted by established knowledge. But he won't let that knowledge get in the way of his certainty that, for example a miracle is a sign of divine action. And he won't let that knowledge prevent his whole being from submitting to the will of God in virtue of that certainty. He won't let it prevent his whole self being invested in the signifier, because in the Other someone is sure of the reciprocity that exists between him and the Other. To be one of God's children is to think that God can say everything there is to



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be said about us without remainder. It is to think that "who has seen the father has seen the son".

So the certainty of the act of faith is certainty because the act in this case is one of replacing the signs of a presence, there where we psychoanalysts aspire to set up an object with a purely logical consistency.

Because we know that we have to push psychoanalysis to the point at which a certainty is acquired: a certainty that no Other responds to the call, since that Other was somehow produced by it.

That is what I wanted to say towards putting the end of analysis into context.



## Problems arising from 'the pass'

by Anne Dunand

The problems I want to talk about and to set before you tonight are not easy to delimit and define in a short period of time. I will try to give you the essentials this evening. They concern two major issues in the field of psychoanalysis:

- 1) What can be termed the end of the analysis?
- 2) Is the process of analysis, i.e. what actually happens in a cure, transmissible?

In other words, what those two questions point to is an important, crucial third question: the question of the transmission of psychoanalysis itself. What goes into the making of an analyst? How can there be proof that analysis has been terminated and that the subject who has undergone this ordeal will make a proper analyst?

So much for the first term of my title. Now for the second term: the pass. In French, "La Passe". The word has been used by Lacan in his Proposition of October 1967, (Scilicet 1), to define, to cover, to put into one word, a special situation of the subject during analysis, marking the end of analysis, and the device Lacan constructed to try and make this moment, this last phase, conveyable to others.

The word pass, in English, can be put to many uses and express different meanings, such as in pass-word, pass-key, to come to pass, to pass by.

It can be a verb or a noun: that is an advantage over the French language, where the verb is "passer", different from the noun, la passe. But the noun itself is used in French always within a certain context, that gives it a different meaning from all those we can find in the dictionary. Lacan really creates a new word with an old one. What can convey an idea as to the choice of such a word is to look for its opposite. Passé can best be opposed, I think to impasse: meaning a dead-end, a dead-lock, no through road. The pass therefore points to a certain peculiar passage, a way-through in the analysis. We get this sense in English too, for in the Oxford dictionary, we have a choice of ten different meanings for the word pass, out of which we may single out the one that will impart best the particular situation of the subject we intend to describe: "Narrow way over or through mountains"; because there is then, as in a mountain pass, no other way through, and, at the same time, the configuration of the land or the structure of the analysis entails a decision on the part of the way-farer, not to

side-step it or give up. I think I will also give another definition: "Navigable channel esp. at river's mouth"; because it also illustrates the fact that one has to be guided through, has to be helped not to flounder and wreck on low water at that point, and this gives furthermore the assumption that one's analyst can point out the rocks on which the analysand may come to a stop, halt and sink. It also denotes the fact that such a passage exists, even if one has no map to provide the bearings.

Now after this brief introduction to define the problem and its place in an analysis, the way that transmission itself is linked with what, for want of a better expression, I will call a special type of analysis and what one can expect from it, before examining the pass in the Lacanian theory and experience, I will make a brief survey of what Freud and his followers, and what today in the IPA, has been termed and described as the end, or termination of analysis.

In his article "Analysis terminable and interminable" (S>E.23,p.209) written in 1937, Freud examines the causes for analysis lasting so long and what are the main resistances encountered towards the end.

I cannot give you here more than a very partial account of this extremely profound and broad summary by Freud of the question. In other articles, such as "The Question of Lay Analysis", for instance, Freud reflects on the theme of the formation of the analyst. But here, what he points out, is the difficulty for an analysis to provide security against all possible future traumas. To prepare the analysand against the unforeseen, the not dealt with beforehand, the new conflicts that might be his plight later on, either because of new difficulties arising later in his life, or because of a stronger demand made by instincts (the translation by Strachey of the word *Trieb*.) Internal or external demands may compromise the results obtained from the previous analysis. Freud suggests, as a possible solution the undertaking for the analyst of fresh bouts of analysis every five years or so. He seems to think that the profession itself is particularly prone to building a number of defences as a reaction to the exposure of the analyst to the demands of the patient's id.

Concerning the termination of analysis itself, he goes back to certain cases he has treated and shows what he tried to do and what his conclusions are. For instance, in the case of the "wolf-man", he recalls that this patient had settled so comfortably in the analytical situation and partnership that he, Freud, gave him an ultimatum, a year to end his analysis. This had a number of positive results, some unconscious material was remembered and brought to light. But the negative side of this decision, the reappearance of "paranoid pieces" of



the neurosis later on were to Freud's judgement one of its consequences and prompted him to forgo this technical stratagem.

In another case, that has been surmised to be the case of his disciple Ferenczi, he was told afterwards by the analysand that he had neglected to analyse the negative transference. Freud argues quite clearly that no conflict can be artificially summoned into the transference if it is not brought up by the analysand. He points out, as an analogy, that it would have the same effect as telling a child the facts of life: he will go on believing his own certitudes about sexual matters and what he has been told will remain a purely intellectual piece of knowledge.

Freud, in this article, discusses at length the many psychical instances that are at play. But what he underlines as the main difficulty is a resistance against getting well. What seems a most unnatural phenomenon, most uncalled for, is brought back to a question of structure. For Freud, the principal difficulty the analyst has to battle with, or to bring the patient to get to grips with, is what he calls "the repudiation of femininity". The wish for the female to have a penis, and, in the male, the struggle against his passive or feminine attitude towards another male.

It therefore brings the analysis to a dead-end, for neither of these wishes, in other words the denial of castration in the different guise it assumes for both sexes, seems to be abated or modified. A certain quality of renouncement seems to be at best the kind of result to be hoped for. But Freud insists on the fact that such a resistance does not spring out of biological factors, they are of a psychological nature. It is therefore very strange to perceive, to have to accept the statement, that although the stuff this resistance is made of consists of thoughts, signifiers and their grammatical construction, it should remain untouched by the analysis. This shows in a way that something real is circumvented, unattainable with the classical method of analysis based on the interpretation of significance, interpretation understood as a means to convey sense of what is senseless. What it adds up to is that, in order to prevent this dead-lock from happening at the end of analysis, the whole of the procedure from the very start has to include this problem. You can gather from this situation that what is understood as a special difficulty towards the end of the analysis is really there at the beginning and that this has to be taken into account right at the first session; it will modify the course and the technique of analysis, the strategy itself.

I think that is one of the reasons for Lacan transforming analysis and giving this dead-lock a structural place, when he stated that there is no sexual

rapport : the rock of castration, as it has been termed, does not arise from a misunderstanding, a lack of adaptability on the patient's part, it is embedded in a fact: the non inscription of the sexual rapport. It cannot be inscribed. Man and woman are not the complementary parts of an ideal whole. Something else can be expected of analysis and this was worked out by the pass. We will come back to this after we have seen what this ideal conjunction, as embodied in the termination of analysis by those who still believe in it, leads to.

I will refer to an article in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis (IJP, vol 69, 1988, p.495) by Jonathan R Pedder, from London, to give a short survey of the termination of analysis according to the members of the community of analysts known as the IPA. You will find a good list of references at the end of this article, should you want to go into the question in more detail. Pedder cites Freud and goes on to Balint. Michael Balint is someone Lacan refers to often, precisely in relation to the end of analysis; for instance, in the Ecrits (p.681) in the article called "Remark on the report by Daniel Lagache". Balint's article "On the termination of analysis" can be found in IJP (vol.31, 1950, pp.196-99) with further references to his own work. Balint, with great honesty, underlines the fact that very little is actually known about the end of analysis and mostly through the cases of training analysts that is, through their reports on their own candidates. And this information is, for obvious reasons, not available to outsiders. It is interesting to note that what Balint comes up against in this investigation is the problem he states as a fundamental question: "What is health?" How can it be defined? Does it just happen by chance, or can it be sought after and brought about? Which shows that the problem really goes much further than stating what results can be expected or hoped for through and after having achieved an analysis. Freud had also asked himself whether health was a natural gift and if analysis merely tried to achieve what normal development attains. He had wondered if analysis merely supplied something that the individual had been thwarted of. But he answered that dilemma by stating that whoever may seem normal can come to fall prey to neurosis, or even psychosis, to fall under their sway inadvertently in later life.

Lacan's view on this question is that the encounter with sexuality is always traumatic and can never be assuaged by development and so-called natural means: it is not inscribed in the subject's programme. The taming of the real by the symbolic has forever to be repeated, undertaken again and again, and is never totally accomplished.

What Lacan retains of Balint for his own purposes is the description of the end of analysis, the affects that



Balint has underlined as typical of this last phase: an oscillation between manic and depressive moods. Lacan ascribes this manic-depressive reaction to the fact that the object is discovered as lost, which accounts for the depression: it is a real loss, so much for so that the subject never really had the object wholly at his disposal. At the same time a separation from this object is attained, which accounts for the manic attitude, it also means the subject is no longer burdened by holding on to the object at all costs.

Now, in the article by Pedder, it appears that analysis is considered as analogous to a phase of development. The theory rests on the hypothesis that psychical disturbances and deviations stem from an arrested or thwarted development. Analysis itself is compared to the natural process of pregnancy, suckling and weaning. Its termination is compared to an organic process coming to end. Well, I would not discard this with a hasty shrug, because such an approach does put in relief the connections between the first attachment to an object and its persistence, and that the individual has to let go, as it were of something of an archaic past, a currency that has lost its value and has been hoarded away uselessly.

In the same trend of thought, we may consider what Pedder points out as the principle obstacle to getting well: the cases in which neuroses have their root in early infancy. In other terms, what is considered as an indomitable obstacle are the pregenital fixations.

This has the merit of putting in the foreground what both Lacan and Freud have sustained: that sexuality is linked to partial objects, to parts of the body where early libidinal investments have been attached.

But we have to draw the line there, because the authors Pedder cites all believe that these attachments have to be subdued under the heading of infantile behaviour in order to achieve the genital maturity; they remain invested only in sexual foreplay, and the aim is to achieve so-called genital love.

The criteria for the termination of analysis is the strength of the ego: "The business of the analysis is to secure the best possible psychological conditions for the functions of the ego; with that it has discharged its task". (S.E.23, p.250).

This statement of Freud's has been slightly altered by his followers into the mastery of the ego over the instincts, something Freud himself said was an impossible task. He advocated rather the motility, the inventive and ingenious qualities of the ego (its function), active in coming to terms with the realm of the id. This, you will note, is a very different proposition from that of a domineering ego.

Now another important and unavoidable argument is discussed by Pedder in his article and by several of his colleagues. They proceed to discriminate what is at stake at the end, or termination of analysis, according to whether it is applied to would-be-analysts or to non-analysts, they divide the procedure according to two categories: the candidates for the practice of analysis, the future practitioners and their other clients.

The non-analyst, the patient with another profession, another calling, another situation in the world, can be happy to leave his analyst when his symptoms do not bother him or his circle of friends and acquaintances any more, or at least, when the symptoms are no longer crippling, a hindrance to his activities and to his emotional ties. The candidate must achieve a deeper insight as to what caused his troubles. But, as a matter of fact, the candidate to the position of psychoanalyst is chosen before-hand, before entering the analysis, according to criteria of normality and suitability that are difficult to define.

This distinction crystallises two different types of demand. Here again, we have to emphasise the difference with Lacan's views. For to Lacan, the decision of becoming an analyst is not discriminating at the beginning of the cure, and the so-called desire of the analyst takes shape at the end of the analysis; furthermore, anyone who finishes an analysis must have access to a certain position as subject in the discourse, and this does not forcibly coincide with his entering the profession of psychoanalyst.

Let us examine how the end is programmed in the IPA. Roughly we can put it under two general headings:

- 1) The mourning of the object comes to an end. A normal process of mourning sets in and is carried out to its natural end.
- 2) The process of analysis is internalised. The individual sets up within himself the capacity to analyse his feelings.

Say the analysand stops going to see his analyst and a so-called normal process of mourning sets in. The ties that linked the analysand to the analyst are gradually loosened. You will note that this is not what in Lacan's teachings is called the separation from the object.

The object is not separated from or mourned, if by the object we mean the cause of desire. Take for instance the gaze.

What is mourned is here a person, the loss of a person, of a relationship to a person, with the many traits he



Lacan's proposition, that at the end of the analysis the phantasy has been laid bare, gone through, "crossed" as he said and in this going-through we have the passage of the pass, reverses the position of the object and the situation of the subject:

$$\frac{a - \$}{S2 // S1}$$

You will note that what acts as agent is the object, and what is in the place of truth is no longer the divided subject, but a form of knowledge that has been brought to light, that of castration. S2 really means that there is no inscription of sexual rapport.(a) in the discourse of the master drops out of discourse, a product to which the subject remains linked by desire. So where the end in one theory writes S2

a in the other it writes  $\frac{a}{S2}$  ; S2 on top

of (a) really means that the subject is still expecting the sexual rapport to be inscribed in the Other.

Its reversal means that no such thing can be expected.

Now, to come to the second point extolled in Pedder's article: the internalising of the process of analysis. What it really adds up to is that analysis never ends. The analysand is now able to go on analysing himself on his own for ever. I will not go over this point lightly because to a certain extent it is true in any case. The insight a patient has gained about his symptoms and his conflicts may be a real help and have therapeutic effects. But if it is not by any means negligible, if it reduces exaggerated demands and impossible hopes, it leaves the cause of desire buried under imaginary life-goals.

This is where Lacan steps in with another solution and gives us the reason for his isolating the pass as a particular encounter with what is the cause. The pass turns the process of analysis round 180 degrees.

Something is brought here to the forefront that is otherwise expelled or ignored.

Analysis, said Lacan, can go on forever on the side of metonymy, speech has no end and can be interpreted on and on. He also said: "La fin des moyens n'est pas les moyens de la fin" (Ecrits, p.681).

The beginnings use means that come to an end - precisely because there is something that resists those means. And so other means have to be used towards the end. Lacan also remarked that he was again and again going through the pass, "repassing the pass" were his terms. Can this

be thought of as, in our previous definition, an internalisation of the process? It is different, to my idea, because of the process involved.

It does not mean one goes on interpreting one's actions to find their meaning. A habit a lot of ex-analysands can carry to a disturbing pitch.

It is not to be put alongside the explanations and excuses or accounts one can use to justify one's choices and one's decisions. It is an encounter with the real, the inexistence of the Other, and no signifier can be adequate to denote it. It has no signifier. You realise how difficult it is to speak about it. Jacques-Alain Miller, in one of his first articles on the pass (Quarto No7, p.15, expose du 26/6/1981) asks whether it is not like feminine jouissance, having a structure akin to that of feminine jouissance, that makes it impossible to talk about. S(∅).

But since it is at the core of what Lacan proposes to be the analysis, it cannot be eluded. Writings and discussions on the pass have engaged a good number of people in the School during the past six years; For those of you who are specially interested in this theme there are about seventy articles that can be consulted, apart from Lacan's writing on the subject and the courses and seminars in the School and at the University.

To make things simpler and more concrete, one can distinguish two instances in the pass:

- 1) the moment. It happens in analysis.
- 2) the procedure - the device Lacan invented to capture and transmit this moment.

The moment in the analysis comes up after identifications have been discarded, after the phantasy, in its fundamental aspect of an axiom guiding the subject's life, has been revealed, after an identification with the symptom has been accepted. Then what? It is a plunge into nothingness. I don't like the almost mystical and fetishistic attitude that tends to converge on this experience. It has been described in terms of encountering the utmost horror. The difficulty seems to me to spring from the fact that the unknown always receives an imaginary coating, and is therefore still a way of side-stepping what is at stake by using analogous situations and a likely terminology. This gives its rendering a somewhat untrue, insincere twang. But I will try to illustrate it by an image: it is like entering an area where no laws abide - such areas existed in Europe in times long past, and the anthropologist Arnold Van Gennep uses this comparison to illustrate what happens during rites of passage - no truth can be sustained, no feelings seem sound, no desire remains to be fulfilled. As you can



judgement on the pass-farer, but to give the fairest and most accurate account of what he has heard, what was told to him but also what was withheld, the unanswered questions, the uncertainties and contradictions as best he can remember. There are two pass-bearers for each pass-farer so that their two renderings will be analogous and different as well.

The cartel hears them and then decides. Now, opinions in the cartel may not be unanimous and in some cartels there has been a vote, in others a vote is seen as a way of not bringing up all that had to be discussed.

If the candidate has been judged as having done the pass, he will be nominated analyst of the School, abbreviated: A.E.

This nomination is made to last for three years, during which the new A.E will give a testimony of what he has learnt and discovered: he will contribute in his own way to the transmission of the analytical experience.

It really boils down to a lot of hard work because he has to bring a new focus to psychoanalysis. Lacan even used the word invention connected to the pass. The A.E is not to be confounded with the A.M.E analyst member of the School; that is a different position in the School and this title is given to people who have proved they are good analysts and also good teachers. It depends on another commission in the School, the "Commission de la garantie" I will not go into that matter just now.

I have given you only a short summary of the procedure, because it can be found in the statutes of the School and because I find it more interesting to concentrate on the problem of the transmission of psychoanalysis. But I will yet add another remark: one has to notice that in other institutions, it is the analyst who makes a report on the candidate, and that such a candidate has already been chosen as apt to make an analyst. With the pass, the process is reversed. Any person who starts an analysis can become a candidate for the pass. And he will be the one to report on his analyst, on his way of analysing, on its effects and the means he used. The only time the analyst has a say in the procedure is when he chooses an analysand to be a pass-bearer. This does not mean the analysis is over for the pass-bearer, merely that he has reached a certain point in his analysis.

To make all this sound a bit more clear I have devised a little scheme that should put in evidence the different functions of cartel, pass-farer and pass-bearer. I have

<u>Cartel</u>	<u>pass-bearer</u>	used the scheme of the four
pass-farer	product	discourses to do so. The
<u>agent</u>	<u>other</u>	cartel is in place of agent,
truth	product	it provokes work with its
		very existence, it expects
		the pass-farer to ask to be
		heard. The pass-farer is
		is in the place of truth,
		with the story of his
		analysis, and its omissions.

As you know, truth is only half-said, cannot be totally said; this also accounts for the difficulty of telling something about the pass. But if he puts it into his own words, he should be able to draw around it, circumscribe it, say how it was before and after. The pass-bearer is nothing more but the place of other he occupies.

He has not finished his analysis, he is just something, a moment, the pass, that the pass-farer has gotten over. However, as I have said before, he is there to mark that area where nothingness abides.

The product is twofold. On the one hand, the cartel has to say yes or no, the pass has been effectuated or has not; and its consequence is a nomination, A.E., or no nomination. On the other hand, it has to produce work, discussions, reunions, on the pass, allowing non-analysts and analysts alike to partake in the experience, to draw conclusions, to make new suggestions. And the cartels have done a lot of work over the past six years.

But the problem - there are of course a lot of questions you may want to ask at this point, and I will be glad to hear them - to me the problem was very specific. How can a person ask to testify on analysis, his or her analysis, believing she or he has done the pass, and find himself or herself told she or he has not passed. (I have emphasised the masculine and feminine in this question because I believe the passage is marked very differently in both sexes, women having an almost uninterrupted confrontation with S(A), men having a tendency to lay it aside). How can one imagine this, believe one has lived it, and find out that it was not so? And, for such was one of the cases I heard of, after having been an analyst for over a decade?

Is it because the pass-bearer has not known what to listen to, what to gather from the encounters with the pass-farer? Is it because the cartel has not got a set of rules to go by in order to decide? What is the rule, where are the criteria? All this has been studied at length during those years. There have been attempts at fixing a certain number of topics that should be brought up in the encounters between the pass-farer and the



pass-bearer. Such as:

- 1o Dropping of identifications
- 2o Going through the Phantasy
- 3o The separation from the object
- 4o The identification to the symptom

Lessons have been given repeatedly during courses on such themes and you probably recall some of them.

But the main obstacle seems to be, as pointed out by people who have worked on the pass, that oblivion comes over the pass; the process of repression seems to cloud over this moment and is accompanied, as all repressions are, by the extreme reluctance to remember it, its circumstances, the affects it mobilises, the destabilising and destitution of the subject and even how it was before and after, meaning that precisely the gain, the certainty that it brought, is there but with a veil over it, often leading to the obliteration of how it came to pass. Which is exactly what is wanted, what one would like to hear, what, in fact, the cartel asks, to be able to work over this data.

Now one of the possible explanations is of course that it has been taken over, caught in repression.

Another explanation, if we go back to Freud's text on the end of the analysis, is that the analyst has elaborated defences around this particularly difficult and disagreeable moment. You realise it is different to repress a memory or to build defences against it. In the first case, it is the id that swallows up the undesirable recording together with all the other dislikable events. In the second case, it is the ego that protects itself from an intrusion into consciousness. I would say that in the case of the moment of the pass, both instances are at work and prevent the wished for elaboration.

This would lead us to a better understanding of the difficult sessions between pass-bearer and pass-farer, and the deviations of both functions.

The pass-bearer is the pass, he therefore represents to the pass-farer a situation he has overcome. But he has met with it in other circumstances and other trials: so it cannot be the comparison between two encounters with the nameless real that could be of avail. Rather the pass-bearer must listen, as Lacan stated it, to the truth that is concealed in the plainte (complaint), he must open an ear to that. But the complaint is stated with the pass-farers own signifiers, and that part of the message must be faithfully recorded. Therefore the message will be conserved in its own particularity; what the pass-bearer knows, his own particular knowledge, has to recede and give place to a new and different (to him) series of statements; what he can recognise as similar to





same time its demands are transferred to psychoanalysis as such, demands that cannot exist without transmission.

Indeed, culture itself does not exist without transmission and the postulate of our civilisation is that it has to be available to the many. With psychoanalysis, the same thing happens, it has to be practised to exist and it has to be available to the many. So here, one is confronted with an ethical choice. Either to keep it alive, or to let it go. Either to want it to be, or to turn one's back on it, once it has been used to sedate one's symptoms and make one's life more livable.

The choice is there, it is no longer an imperative to enjoy, but a possibility of making an offer, as an analyst, or as a researcher, to give it a chance of being continued.

If we go back then to what the myth of the analysand is, we can say that in the pass, as a choice to transmit, what is passed on is what has been passed through.

S2 ---a The relation of (a) to  $\$$  is no longer the S1 /  $\$$  relation of a subject to his phantasy but the telling of the subject's division caused not by language but by object (a), and (a) and  $\$$  are separated.

The narrative gives up this operation as having been accomplished. Now, in this discourse, the Other is not really represented one could say. But the Other, if it is language, consists of the chain of signifiers.

Instead of being linked together as in the discourse of the master S1 - S2, they are separated S2; but there is a S1

fundamental change in the fact that S1 stands no more for identification traits with people from the subject's past. S1 stands for the signifiers of Lacan and Freud that go into the making of psychoanalysis. S2 is no longer the belief in the existence of the sexual rapport. It has become the substitutional narrative that tells of the absence of such a rapport. It really is a creation on behalf of the subject as pass-farer. As agent in the discourse, it produces the semblant as such and the subject that will, as analyst, let himself occupy the place of object (a).

The major difficulty resides in the creation of this S2. For it is tempting to use the theory of the pass with its theoretical construction to construct it, instead of the plain and equivocal terms that have marked the subject's analysis.

Instead of hearing a particular and special series of

embodies, the support he has given to identificatory, symbolic traits, signifiers.

What can happen then is merely a substitution. As you know, in mourning, the object-person cannot be loved anymore, it is identified with, it is taken into the psychic organisation and assimilated, introjected.

This kind of termination brings an identification with the analyst. The love, or the hate, towards the analyst, is gradually brought into the ego, trait by trait, until the ties that were formed with a person out there are established within the psyche.

To understand this in Lacanian terms is to make a distinction between the symbolic, the real, and the imaginary. Identification is a symbolic process. The subject's lack of being gives it a trend towards identifying with others, the more spontaneous manner of complementing this lack of being. Identification has a pacifying effect.

It really allows the subject to get inscribed in the discourse of the master, or re-inscribed :  $\frac{S1}{(\$)} - S2$

The subject becomes fixed under a number of traits (S1) by which he recognises himself as being identical with what he has lost: in this case the analyst. The result of this inscription has a number of favourably looked upon effects: adaptation, sociability, good work, pleasant heterosexual relationships and so forth.

One can also discern why it does not work with so-called borderline cases. An here we have to revert to the previously mentioned pregenital fixations. Since the object (a) in an archaic fixation, is not singled out as a cause, as the cause of desire, inasmuch as it is what a subject has been in the Other's desire - it cannot be separated from. Object (a) is what those psychoanalysts reprove as being preoedipal, something that always makes the analysis fail, relentlessly. It does not in fact obey the laws of signifiers, it does not answer, or come under the regulation of the name-of-the-father, it forever causes trouble and induces inertia, imposing its own type of jouissance.

What happens when termination is equal to identifying with the analyst, is that the object-cause is merely shifted onto the next new love, or the new analysand in the case of the candidate to the profession of analyst, that will support it. Under the discourse of the master, the phantasy is still active and unconscious:

$$\frac{S1}{\$} - \frac{S2}{a}$$



events, or chain of signifiers, one has to listen to a long and often emphatic exposition of the pass-farer's choice of excerpts from Lacan's writings.

So far there are very few examples given of what was particular to a subject's analysis. The actual trend in the School is to try and get down to working in this direction. The problem is to get this kind of information, exposing the stories one could collect just like case histories, without exposing the person who has told them, without saying publicly what should remain anonymous. Private matters have to remain private. It is the same problem one has to face when speaking of cases. It should not however be impossible to do so, but so far no solution towards this particular difficulty has been found.

It could be circumvented by stating what the subject's particular jouissance was and how his position to this jouissance has changed, how this was brought about in the analysis. To take a simple example, let us choose a subject whose attitude was predominantly masochistic, the classical example of being beaten that Freud uses in his article on "A child is being beaten". It is replaced by "I don't have to be a victim anymore". Now that is just a statement. What the sieve will bring up, is a certain number of signifiers out of the subject's past, showing how his jouissance was linked to the cruelty of the Other.

This Other has lost its cruel vindictive appeal. Therefore the signifiers have changed their meaning. They do not carry any more a demand from the Other linked to a demand on the subject's part, to be the sufferer. They have no significance. It is this senselessness that can be said; the loss of significance can be historically recalled and traced back to episodes in the analysis. It does not mean desire ceases but it merely takes other ways and means.

If the pass has been gone through, the whole emotional charge has been shifted onto other relationships and therefore it can be told like "a story, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing". If it has not been carried through, it will stir up an emotional turmoil. But somehow there is still the feeling that the subject is only demonstrating how stupid he has been, he wants to demonstrate that it really is the Other's fault. An analysis that comes to end with that kind of feeling is not terminated; if in the subject's history the guilt, either of the Other or his own, still shows up, the aim has not been achieved. Guilt and shame are part of the analysis until one gets to that point where responsibility for one's actions are on the side of the subject, with failure always possible. On the side of the Other, what is to be deplored is a lack of any guarantee of success, of any recognition and fulfilment of desire.

P E R V E R S I O N





This does not lead to a happy end. But it leaves open an area for creative thinking. The very factor which makes the neurotic so un-happy, is what gives him a chance to go on desiring and inventing new solutions. The forsaken and terrible state that has been described as the pass, where nobody tells you what to do or who you are, where all the sign-posts have been uprooted, if not exactly describable as a blessing, can turn out to be what has been the most sought-after territory of all humanity: that of freedom. I am using here a most harried and hackneyed term. But it is for want of a better worn-out one. When all is told, one had better go back to this moment again and again, if one is to be able to create, to invent, to find new paths.

Keeping in mind, of course, that we do not create out of nothingness, since language is there, and that what we invent will have to be carried out through signifiers.

This is the one condition that is imposed by the Other's jouissance having no signifier. It means we have a task to bear out. To explain this, to make it plain, to build it up into a knowledge available to all, means unloosening, un-tying the illusionary burdens that weigh heavy on every human life; namely, in the case of the transmission of psychoanalysis, that the final goal cannot be an ideal of human happiness, of holding up the model of the human couple in the garden of paradise, the ideal of genital love.

Instead, love for truth, for stating the knowledgeable part of truth, will have to do. Pointing out what we do not know and what we cannot achieve is just as important. In this domain, Lacan and Freud have shown the way; they have come up with statements that have had to be revised and modified. They remain as models in that sense especially: they have left us a method, a way of appraising psychical facts, a series of clinical structures. But in one area they have left a lot of work to be done: the question is, what are the methods and the means through which psychoanalysis's truth, its partial truth, can be extended and recognised? For today, in our own societies, even amongst people who recognise its place in culture, psychoanalysis is still considered to be merchandise, a superfluous toy, an opium for the people, or, at any rate, for those who can afford it.

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Seminar given at Ivy House, 29/2/1990.

Revisiting the "analysis of a case of exhibitionism"  
by Melitta Sperling. (IJP, 1947) - by Marc Dury

A. SUMMARY OF CASE

I. Facts and Figures

The patient was a 29 year old, single, professional man, his profession being unknown, except that he saw patients himself. As oldest of four children he had one brother, two years younger, and two sisters, six and eight years younger respectively. Without rational foundation he scorned his brother to the point of ignoring him altogether.

His only difficulty at school was mastering arithmetic but he completed both school and tertiary education successfully.

His parents were first cousins. He complained of his father's domineering attitude and frequent administration of punishment. He complained of his mother's reliance on him to do housework and mind the younger children on pain of the above-mentioned punishment. Their strict upbringing included a taboo on sex.

The patient was first apprehended about a year prior to analysis while exposing himself in a New York underground. At the police station he attempted suicide by hanging and was sent to hospital for psychiatric observation. He categorically refused the suggestion of analysis. There followed a year's probation during which he exposed himself once a week. On being apprehended once more he requested to see the same psychiatrist and accepted analysis about which he knew nothing.

The analysis lasted two and a half years at five times a week. The patient never overcame his reluctance about the length and intensity of the operation, but came out of it well. He married, at the end of it, a certain Kitty he had met during it a year before and who was very fond of him. He entered the army, was promoted several times and had a child. We do not know whether his acts of exhibitionism stopped altogether or were merely brought under control.

II. Main Themes

Sperling's copious documentation of dreams gives us the chance to isolate the salient and recurrent features which constitute the backdrop to the exhibitionary act.



1. The patient frequently confused one sex with another, something not unrelated to the mechanism Freud points as common to all cases of perversion: disavowal. In dream #3 his analyst has 'breasts abnormally high and not quite full; she also has a penis and scrotal sacs'. In dream #7 'it seemed as though I was in bed with a girl. I was there feeling for her genitals...She turned round. But now it seemed to be my brother'.
2. The patient exhibited a strong fear of women to which was added a fear of losing his penis in a vagina, a fear of lions, dogs and vampires and with which he associated a fear of being abandoned by his mother. In dream #4 the woman was a devouring lion(ness). Dream #2 had: 'A man sold vacuum cleaners. He said 'With this kind of container you can put your hand inside'. At first I saw it was a hole. Then the hole got smaller and smaller and finally there was no hole at all. The man put his hand in and then I put my hand in. Then I tugged and tugged; it was frozen cold inside and I got my hand out finally, except for the right index finger. I tugged again and then got my finger out. I was worried that it might be frozen and gangrenous and afraid that it might break off.' The patient had a marked inclination to avoid intercourse while always professing himself eager to have it.
3. The patient maintained a singular equation between penis and breast. In dream #15 someone made breasts out of wax and said 'it's a candle factory' to which he associated 'candles are what girls use when they masturbate'. Sperling tells us: 'He likes to suck Kitty's breasts, to place his penis between them, and to look for hair there. He was conscious of a desire to have her suck his penis. When Kitty sucked his breasts he had a very tender feeling for her and at the same time was usually so stimulated that he came near to or did have an orgasm'. The patient also evinced an obsessive concern with the size of his penis the measuring of which occurred in many dreams, just as he did not tire from criticising breasts which were too slack or soft.

Finally we can note that within the intersubjective economy the patient's relation to his counterparts was one of extreme resentment at having to give. He quite happily expected to be on the receiving end, a hungry infant attitude which is one of those infantile traits Stekel finds in all perverts. Concomitantly his earliest

(and unhappiest) memory was seeing his younger brother preferred and protected and the mother's breast being given to all of his younger siblings, something which led him to think of jumping out of the window.

### III. The Act of Exhibitionism

If what Lacan calls the primary fundamental has to be constructed in an analysis and if the scenario of the perverse act can be seen as its enactment we should start with this latter in our elucidation of the singular structure which binds our subject to his object; but unfortunately in this case, which in conformity with analytic tradition does not analyse the chief symptom directly or exclusively, information about the act is rather scant.

The main facts are these:

1. The patient exhibited in places such as crowded underground stations and said he was 'attracted to the danger'.
2. The thing started for him when at 15 year of age he was pushed against a girl in a packed train and felt great excitement. He gradually developed a technique for touching any unknown girl's arm, proceeding to her breast, her thigh and finally genitals. Then followed the moment of exhibitionism.
3. The patient had a memory of his sister asking him to show her his penis in the bathroom. He greatly resented the fact that, when, unsolicited, he tried to do so on another occasion she went and told their grandmother.
4. During the first sessions, while talking about his relations with girls in detail, the patient also exhibited himself.
5. The first time the patient was apprehended his mother was away in the country; thereafter he enjoyed the idea that she would worry if he did not come home on time.
6. He exhibited himself without fail after a session in court or after having paid a parking fine.
7. The patient disliked his woman, Kitty, 'exhibiting' her breasts by wearing low-cut dresses.



8. In the analysis the patient said 'instead of indulging in exhibitionism I now indulge in food'. Whenever he felt exhausted by giving to Kitty in the way of intercourse he had to compensate by eating more.
9. The patient tried to avoid his act in a train by looking for 'left-over newspapers' because:
  - a) 'they were left there specially for him' and
  - b) he was 'getting something for nothing'.

There are two associations he has left us concerning his act.

10. He felt similar excitement when seeing young girls suck lollipops in the street and, at the same time, a strange longing, all the while thinking how deprived he had been of candy as a child.
11. Spurling: 'he told me that when on his way to my office, while thinking of a nice piece of work he had done for a patient, he had noticed an acceleration of his pulse and an excited feeling like he had preceding exhibitionism, especially exhibitionism to a girl interested in the act. He understood this to mean that she wanted something which she would not get and that he was in this way expressing his feelings of resentment towards me for not being appreciative'.

The only interesting reason for his own predicament the patient has given is that his middle name, Percy, is 'girlish'. Nothing shows that he was aware of its slang meaning: penis. (1).

## B. (RE)CONSTRUCTIONS.

### I. Verleugnung

To break down the question as to how castration has operated for this subject we could begin by noting certain pre-oedipal qualities. The sexes are far from clearly differentiated and often interchangeable. The subject feels very little 'emotion', as he calls it, in his relationships with either sex, at least before the analysis. During it, of course, things are stirred up somewhat, and Spurling documents well, not only his sudden Oedipal interest in women belonging to other men, as well as the open homosexual ideas and dreams he entertains when tired of his ambivalent attitude to women, but also how, in Freud's words, he saved himself from homosexual object-choice in the first place by endowing the woman with acceptable phallic attributes: her breasts. There are moreover no obvious neurotic symptoms

and the subject certainly has not foreclosed the fear of castration; that is, the fear of loss of jouissance, altogether.

No, as already evidenced by his attribution of phallic features to the woman, the problem here is one of Disavowal.

The very first dream shows us something of the dilemma it poses.

'Gypsy Rose Lee, two friends and I were involved in some sort of kidnapping. We were led through several rooms to a short man with a beard, whose name was Gypsy Rose Lee. I escaped somehow. I was in the company of a girl, the real Gypsy Rose Lee, and I had the feeling that she needed a job. Now I was back at the same place. I asked her to sit down and I asked for the boss. When I saw the girl, I told her to show me her stuff, to show me what she could do.'

Sperling contents herself with seeing here a resistance to analysis and herself as Gypsy Rose Lee; and for want of the subject's associations around this first well known American stripper, (1), somebody who got well paid for exhibiting a shapely lack, we have to remain schematic. Here, then, the penis, the 'short man', is with the woman, or bears the name of the woman. From this contradiction, which perhaps knots what is impossible in his desire with what is inadmissible, he 'escapes somehow', by means of disavowal, for when he is back with the real girl, perhaps anatomically real, she is lacking something, which is hardly more desirable. Hence he comes back to the same place with the same question: 'Where is the boss?', who has the phallus? The last sentence, in which he throws down his characteristic challenge to women, poses the problem; 'I told her to show me her stuff', for we don't yet know whether he is testing for the presence of a penis or its absence, nor do we know the relation between what the subject, at least in dreams, is looking for, and what, in his act, he compels others to look at. Does he exhibit his lack or his plenitude?

How can one simultaneously affirm and deny the same thing? is the logical problem of Disavowal. Or if two separate moments can be isolated, since an avowal precedes its cancellation, how does one rationalise the fact that one no longer believes one's eyes, for example? By denying the actuality but admitting the possibility? or by avowing the particular but denying the universal? The displacement effected by the latter could be brought into relation with the particular challenge any pervert continually addresses as exception to the law as universal in his seduction or 'corruption' of the Other, that is, the attempt to vindicate his already constituted 'knowledge', the rationalisation



referred to above. It is also not incompatible with the irrelevance of the difference between the sexes. It is present in Freud's description of the look passing from mother's genitals to mother's foot. But if disavowal is common to all perversions, as Freud maintains, how does each one differ? For in this case no fetish is created; the breast is not a fetish which shelters the possibility of a penis; the breast here is like a penis, or rather, it is in a relation of symbolic equivalence, but to such an extent that he can look for hair on the breast as if it were one, without it becoming exclusively the 'cherished object' of the fetishist.

For now we can at least glean from this case the condition which may have facilitated the moment of disavowal. This is the fact that the mother, though acknowledging the father's authority, does not relinquish her own; rather she uses the father's as a support for her own, as if he were the 'strong arm' of her law. He 'dishes out terrific punishments' if she tells him the subject has not done the household tasks she set for him. The relation between father and mother is one of completely overlapping sets. One can substitute for the other. To use Lacan's words: 'The mother is not seen to be deprived of the phallus by the father.' We have the peculiar situation where the father is an agent of punishment but not of castration, which, in dream upon dream, is definitely female.

If the difference between the sexes, on one level of the two created by disavowal, is marked merely by what kind of penis one has, 'high up or lower down' to quote from the second dream, any phallic signification supporting an economy of exchange or dialogue between the sexes is liable to confusion. The penis per se has not been symbolically invested with the help of father as marking a difference per se, that is, there is no fixed position, masculine or feminine to which the subject adheres, in relation to the phallus. It is as if the uncompleted dialectic of the elevation (aufhebung) of the penis to the level of signifier which would have consigned this penis to latency not to be unveiled as phallus without shame (Signification of the Phallus, Ecrits), necessitates precisely an unveiling of the penis without shame in order for the shameful look of the other to elevate it to the power of the phallus. The actual penis, then, is rather more contingent, something one has or doesn't have, as the case may be, but certainly not possessed with inalienable right of ownership. It can be lost at any moment, in a vagina for example, since this locus of disavowal is also where what is vehicled on the other level returns to. This is the level, as Freud said concerning fetishism, on which castration is affirmed. It is here that we can place the subject's attraction to danger, his preference for exhibiting in a crowd. Here too belongs his unfailing provocation of the institutionalised

legal order and its 'strong arm' each time it has let him off, and, not least, his utter inability to tolerate surprise or uncertainty, paradoxical for someone who banks on the surprise of his victim, his inability to tolerate the fear of the fear he never resolved, something which comes to a head in such ideas as cutting off his own penis, saying: 'If it has to be done, let's get it over with'.

## II. Intersubjectivity

What is the subject's mode of enjoyment? Let us rather first ask what is exchanged in the trying relationships the subject forms with his women, other than a desperate love on the part of the latter. Judging from the way he studiously avoids giving satisfaction, especially via intercourse, not even a penis for a breast. When he does have intercourse, he either suffers from ejaculation praecox or impotence, and in any case masturbates both before and after the event. He is easily exhausted and seems not to break out of the narcissistic economy of the pleasure principle.

For Sperling all this is ranged under the heading of 'frustration' and certainly the subject makes much of his imaginary castration, that is, what Lacan calls the imaginary lack of a real object - he thinks his penis is too small and fears comparison with Kitty's former husband. But this is more a fear of frustration as a form of castration, perhaps covering a privation, than the actual thing which is rather found in the woman cheated of her satisfaction. The subject remains in possession of his enjoyment. Sperling further sees one of the roots of perversion in an identification with a mother who doesn't give. But while a subject who mothers himself, who takes over his own mothering and manages the little that he thinks he has, defending it in this case from someone who may have her own anyway, while such a subject can be a paragon of selfishness, it is not clear why he should also be a pervert. His relationships, then, with his mother, the analyst, Kitty, the absence of none of whom he tolerates easily, if at all, seem stuck on the level of Demand.

One clue concerning his desire is found in one of the few associations around the perverse act. It is his desire to 'get something for nothing'. This is what he enjoyed in the left-over newspapers he looked for in the train to fend off his urge to exhibit. As such, on its own, it could express a wish to have had something from his mother for which he didn't have to pay with menial work; or the wish to have been given a penis (breast) which did not carry so many duties along with it, or even to have been given a penis which his mother did not begrudge him, for it seems to function as focus of the unpayable debt he has with his mother rather than with his father, something she ignored or negated in her demand for him to be a working copy of her



around the home. We note that at the same time as she maintained a puritan exterior, she was more than free and easy with her body within the home, a feature of more than one case of exhibitionism (2).

Equally important is the fact that these newspapers have been left by another for him. They are a gift of love. For this subject, however, it is precisely the first gift of love, the breast, which has been soured retroactively, for him having been compelled to look at it being given again and again to a preferred brother and younger sisters.

Could it be that one factor of the perverse act, on the imaginary level, is an attempt to seduce the mother, to deflect her gaze from the rival by showing what makes him worthy of love? Or is it rather a defiant demonstration that he has his own breast? We have to suspend the question of desire and enjoyment here.

### III. Object

At any rate, the picture of the infant at the breast, the well-known Augustinian model of envy Lacan invokes so often, presents us with two objects: the breast and the look. The oral drive, which includes the demand for love, dominates over the scopic, in the analysis at least. Here we find his gross obsession with food which he will try, consciously, to substitute for his exhibitionism (cf. III, 9 earlier), the food he was so overjoyed to have found his mother left him before going off into the country, though a joy diminished, let it be said, by the thought of having had to share it with his father. Here too is situated his belief that the emissions he begrudged Kitty were so copious he could sell them, or again his attempts to put his own penis into his mouth while a boy, or even his treasuring of the story that some men were paid by others for letting them suck on the former's nourishing sperm.

The having-oneself-sucked Lacan characterises as the aim of the oral drive, which includes both sexual enjoyment and love in the form of nourishment seems to sustain this strange equation of breast and penis. For not only does he ejaculate when Kitty sucks his own breast, but he had to do his utmost, while baby-sitting once, to refrain from putting his penis into the crying baby's mouth as if it were a breast.

We could also tentatively invoke the object 'nothing', which Lacan in Seminar XI invokes as corollary of the breast, to further elaborate what sustains the equation between breast and penis. It is both what the breast becomes when separation from it, weaning, is completed and the subject can say: It is nothing to me now, and the particular reading of what the Other wants as the desire for the subject's own

disappearance (Lacan will say the anorexic eats this 'nothing'). This is seen in his suicidal tendencies, not by chance first provoked when seeing his brother at the breast, the moment in which the object which was 'nothing' to him changes its value to an object of desire. The subject is given nothing twice, neither the breast nor any clues about the maternal desire, that is, some recognition of his malehood, which seems to be 'nothing', not only to the mother, perhaps an inevitable state of affairs, but to the father as well, so that he may well draw conclusions concerning his standing in the parental desire. This brings us back to the question of how the subject experienced lack and I can do no more than use distinctions (3) Lacan never developed much and say that frustration, perhaps even privation, but not castration was the privileged mode. When in the moment of disavowal the breast becomes like a penis on the level of its symbolic or phallic significance (just as the penis becomes like a breast, as much a potential object of desire for the mother as the breast is to him), nothing is lost symbolically as no lack is given a meaning, but something is lost on the level of the imaginary in so far as the real object is withheld by the inscrutable symbolic agent (both mother and father). The subject is frustrated, both of a real object and of the phallus.

Sperling leaves it at that and concludes: 'Oral fixation would seem to be the most important determinant for the origin of exhibitionism'.

Our main question is posed via Lacan's rereading of Freud in Seminar XI where he asks how one passes from: 'To look at a penis oneself', or 'to look at oneself in one's own penis' to 'to cause one's own penis to be looked at by another'. How does the subject frame the other in his fantasy so that the drive returns to himself in this particular way? The second and last clue to give an indication as to how the subject might have answered the question of the mother's desire is the strange phrase (quoted in III, II): 'I understood that she wanted something she would not get'. In its context nothing tells us whether the 'she' refers to the analyst, or to the subject's own patient whom he has done 'a good turn' the thought of which brings him the excitement he knows as prelude to the act of exhibiting, or to a more unspecified 'she'. But there is no mistaking the homology in structure with 'she looked at something she did not want to see (recognise)', in which I allude to Lacan's distinction between the object looked at and the person seen. In this form is caught the constraint which characterises the position of the victim and to which corresponds the aggressor's fear and punishment of women. Indeed, we should invoke here that particular dimension of the look called 'invidia', embedded, as it is, in the naked voracity which gives an eye its 'evil' aspect. Then it would be as if the subject were saying to his mother; 'Just



as you aroused my look (envy) by exhibiting your breast without giving it to me, so now I will make you look at (envy) what you can't have.'. One could even detect in the act a current aimed not only at soliciting the look but at appeasing the evil eye, in the way one holds up a crucifix to a vampire (of which he is so afraid, II,2), in which manner the penis would function as, precisely, a phallic charm.

#### IV. Fantasy.

But what, in this economic overdetermination, is the share of the fantasy as guarantor of enjoyment? How does the look which the victim produces in being compelled to look at what she cannot see, that is, cannot speak about (if she did, if no shame indicated the victim was 'caught' looking, the subject would have failed and flee), satisfy the subject? It is not, perhaps, sufficient to note the compelling nature of this drive, to indicate that the subject's being is at stake in so far as Lacan tells us that the look 'constitutes' the subject in the field of the visible. For we have to see what the subject in his determination as object recuperates in the way of Lustgewinn or Plus-de-jouir. Could it be that in the momentary encounter with the look he has regained that blissful possession of the object which he imagined his brother experienced at the breast?

We have already seen how the penis as breast has the same relation as this latter to the object 'nothing', to the extent that it, the penis, is taken as an object of demand, demand which, when coming from the Other in the place of desire is all the more resisted as it is experienced as potential frustration (demand of mother that he be her working appendage, non-recognition of his penis in relation to her lack, etc). The same thing happens from the point of view of desire with the breast as penis, in relation to the object 'look', to the extent that the penis functions like the imaginary phallus (mother's), more specifically, to the extent that this phallus is the decoy which causes the real object, cause of desire, to emerge as look. For this look rejoins his own, when he passes from the place from which he looked, in shame once this look was returned, at the other, bearer of the luring object, (breast) looking at the look of the one enjoying the object (a) (look) in complete possession (memory of mother and brother), to the place (exchange of places with both mother and brother) from which he looks in vindication as possessor of the luring object at the look of the other produced in confrontation with this imaginary object (penis) of enjoyment, look of an other who knows herself looked at in turn in her shame at being reduced to this look; look, therefore, which reproduces his own, that is, which returns him to the object he is in the fantasy as cause, of his own desire (to have oneself looked

at in one's organ), and as plus- de-jour, in so far as that desire is also the desire of the Other (to look at oneself in one's own organ). This is the sense in which the loop is closed, in which the object cause of desire is the fish in the orifice of the hoop-net (Seminar XI, ch 11) and becomes at the same time the object of plus-de-jour. In freudian terms, the object of the drive (look) here rejoins the source (eye), object which in non-perverse situations is always missed.

But, to conclude, if we find here one sense of Lacan's question of Seminar XI posed earlier when we say that the subject looks at his own penis via the look of the other just as his mother looked at her breast via his look (or his brother's), that he realises himself as object in both movements of the drive, looking and looked at, what Lacan wrote as a <> \$, the question whether the analysis was 'successful', whether a perverse structure has been changed or whether the perverse act belonged to a different structure from the start must here be left as a question.

#### NOTES

This paper has benefited from the discussion which followed its presentation and I thank the participants accordingly. Bice Benvenuto, Val Hill, Tine Norregaard, Ben Hooson and Philip Boxer.

- (1) I thank Val Hill for this information
- (2) Wilhelm Stekel, Patterns of Psychosexual Infantilism, Grove Press, NY, 1959
- (3) CASTRATION: symbolic loss of an imaginary object by a real agent  
FRUSTRATION: Imaginary loss of a real object by a symbolic agent  
PRIVATION: real loss of a symbolic object by an imaginery agent



# INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PERVERSIONS

by Patrick Valas

I shall elaborate this study around five points:-

- 1) The drive is not perversion
- 2) The perverts fantasy is not perversion
- 3) The subjective position of the pervert in fantasy
- 4) The pervert's strategy
- 5) The perverse subject and the analytical cure

You know that, surprisingly, the study of perversions has been approached very little by the psychoanalyst, when fundamentally, the red thread of its conceptual elaboration runs through Lacan's teaching, in the same way that the diversity of their manifestations had allowed Freud, since 1905, in his "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality" to provide a fresh clarification concerning human sexuality through introducing a notion unthought of until then: the drive becoming a fundamental concept of psychoanalysis.

Freud's procedure, from 1900 onwards, is to make an effort to define perversion as a subjective position. He attempts to free it from its contemporary conception, which was given special attention in all scientific circles of the time, a conception, which continues to persist in contemporary analytical doctrines. He seeks, therefore, to free perversion from what it was - defined as an expression of degeneration, the manifestation of an unbridled, animal sexuality. In contrast, he tries to define it as a subjective position.

Meanwhile, all things considered, the extraordinary polymorphism of human sexuality brings up, due to the very fact of its original - intrinsically perverse - disposition, the question of knowing whether perversion can really be isolated according to a specific subjective position in a structure which would distinguish it from neurosis, even from psychosis; on a simple phenomenological level, this distinction seems to be impossible to make.

## 1. The Drive is Not Perversion

To say it in this way today may seem obvious, but all the same, it has to be recalled, for you know that in Freud, the construction of the famous sado-masochistic drive, which does not exist....but, this sado-masochistic drive, as understood by the post-freudians, has given rise to quite a number of confusions, whereas in fact, a careful reading of his text cannot give rise to any confusion.

Since 1905, in effect, as Freud has difficulties in clarifying perversion from a phenomenological point of view, he writes

"It is perhaps in connection precisely with the most repulsive perversions that the mental factor must be regarded as playing its largest part in the transformation of the sexual drive. It is impossible to deny that in their case a piece of mental work has been performed which, in spite of its horrifying result, is the equivalent of an idealisation of the drive. The omnipotence of love is perhaps never more strongly proved than in such of its aberrations as these."

So you see that:

- a) On the one hand he underlines that the drive in perversion does not escape idealisation. It is an idealisation which would bear on the drive's actual method of operation. He does not provide further explanation. In any case, here the opposition of a real or crude sexuality over against an internal psyche is already denounced.

Moreover, Freud thus invalidates the idea of an immediate satisfaction of the drive. It must be realised that at the time, this is a major contribution. I must point out that nowadays reiterating the above in certain circles would be considered revolutionary. In any case, it should incite those who claim a boundless jouissance, to be a little more modest.

- b) On the other hand, in this quotation we can already see how through speaking of the idealisation of the drive's actual mechanism, and not of the idealisation of the object as in the case of sublimation, Freud makes an attempt to raise perversion to the dignity of a subjective position. Since Dora's case in 1900 until 1915, he will constantly try to elucidate this.

For example, in 1915, in his Metapsychology, when he speaks of the scopophilic drive, he states that the pleasure of looking does not occur without the pleasure of showing. So Freud, think carefully, in the bringing into play of the scopophilic drive, is not without producing the division of the subject in its intentionality, that is to say, that looking, or rather, wanting to look is also wanting to be looked at, wanting to show. But is it sufficient to define perversion, as some have tried to do as "voyeurism-exhibitionism? Well, not at all.

I shall start again from the sado-masochistic drive, which does not exist, but as Freud makes it exist, let us follow it. This drive originates from the need to



feed oneself. This is according to the principle in Freud which says that the drives rest on the function of need from the start. As a consequence, the need to feed oneself requires the domination of the prey, but it does not have as an aim the infliction of pain...this is what Freud states.

The aim of inflicting pain appears secondarily and it is only when the closing of the drive circuit is accomplished that sadism proper constitutes itself. Hence he contrasts the bringing into play of the drive as a going there and back, dividing the subject in its intentionality, to look - to be looked at. To torment is wanting to be tormented. He distinguishes it from perversion proper which begins from the moment when the drive circuit returns to the subject. And we can clearly see that he does not confuse the bringing into play of the drive with the practice of a perversion. He says in Metapsychology of 1915:

"...Providing these pains for others, one enjoys oneself in a masochistic manner through identification with the suffering object".

Therefore the subject is not interested in the torments or the pain provoked in the other, but rather in the erotisation of this pain which he himself experiences in his identification with the subject. This is a very important point. In other words he "jouit" through the procurement of the other, identifying himself with the other, and to confirm this distinction which he makes, between the bringing into play of the drive in perversion and in neurosis, a few lines earlier Freud takes the example of the obsessional and here is what he states in relation to this latter:

"The need to torment becomes a torment inflicted on oneself; self-punishment and not masochism. From the active voice, the verb passes, not to the passive voice, but to the reflective middle voice"

Notice that he insists in making this distinction between the sadistic constitution, which is in fact a masochism, and then eventually the functioning of the sado-masochistic drive in the obsessional.

So I do not think it necessary to remind you that the drive is not the instinct and that on the other hand, as I have already stated, its bringing into play assumes the subject as divided in its intentionality. Of course there has been a whole debate which is still continuing concerning the famous translations as "Instinct " or "Trieb" in Freud, something which has made quite a number of authors hesitate before translating it as instinct or drive. It must be understood that in German, the word has two roots: one Latin, which is "Instinct" and one Germanic which is "Trieb", but without ambiguity, even when Freud uses one or

the other alternatively, he indicates what he is aiming to construct: the drive as a fundamental concept. That is to say he will state it throughout his work, the term drive existed in physiology before his arrival on the scene, but from the moment he takes it aboard, he gives it the significance of a concept affecting all previous ones, becoming for us a fundamental concept of psychoanalysis.

Following what I have just mentioned, it is interesting to note in the distinction, concerning the drive, between neurosis and perversion, that Freud can define neurosis as a passive perversion, in order to oppose it to true perversion in order to oppose them to true perversions, which would be the active perversions. As for the definition that neurosis is the negative of perversion, we shall see later what its relevance is, but effectively it is a definition to be preserved.

Hence we can retain in our mind from this moment on, that Freud's aim is to define perversion starting from a subjective position, as he does for neurosis and psychosis. He does this precisely by starting from the fantasy through which the desire of the subject in relation to its object is sustained. In the analytic discourse, the clinic is a clinic of fantasy and not that of the symptom as in psychiatry. You are familiar with Freud's evolution in his views on fantasy: to begin with he spoke of the seduction trauma as the cause of neurosis, and then he changed his position, he introduced the dimension of fantasy. It is the fantasy of the primal scene, of what the subject can inject in it as signification, a real or imaginary scene, that determines the structure, yielding neurosis, psychosis or perversion in its evolution.

Virtually since the case of Dora it is quite important to see that Freud is already in the process of introducing the theory of the fantasy. He insists upon it in the Wolfman and articulates it in "A child is being beaten" in 1919. I am giving these references, because it is in these particular texts that you will principally find Freud's statements concerning perversion.

## 2) The Perverse Fantasy is not Perversion

Since 1905, Freud observes that all neurotics can dream of being perverts and this does not fail to disturb him. These neurotics can have not only perverse fantasies, as he thought initially, but perfectly conscious ones and even on occasion ones that are acted out. The affair becomes more complicated when we know that a perverse subject has the ability of realising his fantasy, not in active behaviour, but in being contented in the satisfaction obtained from its

subject, it is not at all around the active realisation of the fantasy that we can make a distinction.

I have been observing for some time cases of perversions presented by analysts, which are mainly cases of homosexuals who are manifestly obsessional neurotics, where what is in question is crossing over to the homosexual act, but where these subjects can absolutely not be called real perverts. It must be recalled that here too neither the perverse scenario nor its staging are relevant in isolating them. However, there is a small phenomenological detail without which nothing could be made out at all. For example, in a general way, the realisation of perverse fantasies is for the neurotics momentary and confused, whereas with other subjects the practise of their passion on a repetitive, stereo typical and fixed mode, rather evokes a structure which determines them as perverts.

To put it succinctly, let us say, that in this crossing over to the perverse act, the neurotic is clumsy whereas in contrast the perverse subject has a certain know-how.

Hence the Freudian definition that neurosis is the negative of perversion. He opposed them because of his initial statement that in neurosis fantasy is unconscious, whereas in perversion it is conscious. If we want to pursue it, insofar as, passivity and unconscious fantasy in neurosis, activity and conscious fantasy in perversion, insofar as this distinction is no longer relevant, if we absolutely want to preserve this definition keeping all of its value, then it might be expressed thus:

In reality, the neurotic crosses over to the act in order to sustain a declining desire, where his imaginary behaviour always causes a symbolic value. In other words when he crosses over to the act in the real, it is in an imaginary aim which should have a symbolic function.

The pervert on the other hand only pretends, in the staging of the scenario of his fantasy, in order to obtain an unavowable jouissance, promised to his 'decided desire'. Manifestly, in his stagings with his counterparts he deploys decisively a desire, without as such knowing what's going on with his own desire. You will see that this is so for structural reasons. In a certain way, his behaviour is a sort of pretending, he plays and that is given as if it were something symbolic.

The act of the neurotic, being imaginary, is the truly symbolic, whereas the pretending of the pervert, is the



imaginary given as symbolic. That is to say that there is a subversion of one in relation to the other. The neurotic sees to it that his behaviour has a dimension in the Law whereas the pervert subverts the Law in staging it on the imaginary scene.

In an initial approach to this phenomenology, the neurotic places himself on the side of the effect of desire in fantasy, where he shows himself as fettered, inhibited, repressed, clumsy in a certain way, whereas in contrast the pervert would rather place himself on the side of jouissance...seeks jouissance on the side where he can call on it, on the side of the object.

I shall clarify this by making a small jump from Freud to Lacan. Fundamentally, fantasy is what places, in a certain way, the subject in relation to the object. Before inventing his object (a) Lacan formulated fantasy as:  $\$ \langle \rangle a$  where (a) designates the other, the sexual partner. In an first moment we can consider that Freud and Lacan agree on the definition of fantasy, and they unite once more when they give a symbolic function to fantasy. It means that fantasy for Freud as for Lacan is a sentence whose signification completes a scenario. It is completely legible when we read the analysis of the fantasy "A child is being beaten": in the style of a sentence which has the meaning of a scenario. Hence fantasy as a scenario places the subject in relation to the object and can denote it as  $\$ \langle \rangle a$ . This mark ' $\langle \rangle$ ' shows nevertheless that the subject is in a problematic relationship to its object, a point which is evident in Freud when he states, in a surprised manner, that the object in the drive is indifferent, that it can be replaced in the function of its capacity to bring about the drive's satisfaction. That is, all the same, disturbing.

It could be thought that the sexual partner has a specific effect on the subject's desire. This means for Freud, that the status of the object is not as assumed as we would like it to be - even if those who hold to the view of genital love would like to think it so in all events - and that there are things in him that are not so neatly defined.

There is a problematic status of the object in Freud, the object being only the rediscovered object in relation to the lost object, rediscovered through the coordinates of its representation. We know that it is in the gradient of these two objects that Lacan will make the distinction between the object of desire, insofar as it is the desired object - the object of love, the narcissistic object, and then the object of desire insofar as it is the cause of desire, the object (a).

From this writing onwards, the neurotic is going to be placed on the side of the effect of desire, on the side of the barred subject. We rediscover what I stated just now, in relation to the division in the intentionality of the subject. The neurotic places himself on this side and shows effectively that he is quite embarrassed, that he is marked by the bar, by the castration which appears in the algorithm \$. Whereas the pervert places himself on the side of jouissance - in his activity, he will show himself to be on the side of the object. The whole secret of their respective positions in the fantasy depends on the signification of the small lozenge '<>'. Fundamentally this mark summarises the operation specifying the subject in his relation to the Other, be it denegation, disavowal or foreclosure.

Disavowal, denegation, foreclosure when I say that it is the specific relation of the subject in its relation to the Other, I refer to an operation which bears on representation and not on material reality. This is one of Freud's distinctions, the one between psychic and material reality.

3. The Subjective Position of the Pervert in Fantasy is what Conditions his Position.

The above is a point that occurs relatively late in Freud, as it is published in his study of fantasy. A child is being beaten of 1919 with the sub-title "contributions to the origins of sexual perversion". Hence at a belated date, Freud is able to assert for the first time that perversion is formed in the Oedipal passage. Of course he had already grasped this, but there he states that it is presented to him as formed in the accomplished Oedipal passage, that, therefore the perverse subject must always deal with castration, even if it is in a relation of "over the horizon". It is very important to underline this, because it is present without ambiguity in Freud and it radically undermines the position of those claiming that perversion would be a defence against psychosis.

What sustains the position of the subject in his fantasy is precisely the disavowal of castration in his relation to the other, something which is going to determine the subject's strategy.

In 1908, in "Theories of Infantile Sexuality", a very fruitful thesis will emerge. Freud will speak of it in terms of the subject refusing the material castration resulting, if it lasts, at the time when he is an adult, in the return of the repressed in the form of the fantasy of a woman with a penis, giving its origin to the phallic woman. At this time, he does not yet speak of the phallic woman but evokes the dream of an



adult dreaming of a woman with a penis and states that it is the return of the repressed. The refusal, when he was a child, to admit mother's castration.

The term "phallic woman" will appear for the first time under his pen in "Leonardo Da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood".

As soon as he makes this discovery, he does not let go of it and we can follow its conceptual development by going through various studies he made. False Recognition of 1914, by way of the Case of Fetishism which he explains in his evening lectures in Vienna in 1914, through a whole series of studies that lead to "A Child is being beaten" - A Case of a homosexual woman resulting in 1925, in to the specific definition of disavowal, the Verleugnung. That is to say that he names the child's refusal of the maternal castration in terms of disavowal in his Some Psychological consequences of the anatomical differences between the sexes which then reaches its climax in his text on fetishism in 1927. Besides he experiences a lot of trouble in distinguishing disavowal from scotomisation denegation and forclusion.

There are a whole series of texts which deal with this, such as Loss of Reality in Psychosis and in Neurosis where he tries to get away with those terms. Then the term 'disavowal' is once more taken on board and completed in 1938 in his text which has been translated as The splitting of the ego and the mechanism of defence.

Finally he more or less reaches this definition: the disavowal of castration is a particular mode of the subject's response to the unbearable horror which he experiences in discovering the maternal castration. In Lacanian terms, it is not an "I don't want to know anything about it", in the form of denegation - as in the case of the neurotic, or the verwerfung, that is to say the forclusion of its representation. In psychosis it is an "I can't know anything about it" due to the presence of a fault in representation. In perversion, the perverse subject's answer is not only a denial but a disavowal which finds support in the fantasy of the phallic mother stirred up by the subject. In other words the phallic mother must not be conceived to be on the side of the mother - As far as she is concerned, she cannot do anything directly, although indirectly she can nourish this fantasy. It is the subject who turns the phallic mother into what it is. In a certain way, by responding with a disavowal to maternal castration, the subject attributes a phallus to her in his fantasy, and through veiling in this way the maternal castration, with a fetish for example, a fetish which is not a phallus but a veil masking the



absence of the phallus in the mother, he hopes to lessen his own castration anxiety. "If she has got off lightly, me too, I'll be able to bypass it"

Freud puts in parallel the whole series of perversions, from homosexuality, by way of sadomasochism, exhibitionism, voyeurism, to fetishism, that is to say, as soon as he studies a particular case, describing the phenomenon, he puts in a series and tries to refer back to one structure, the various types of perversions, reaching a result with the subject's disavowal of castration.

I will quote you a passage from The sexual Theories of Children of 1908: "If this idea of a woman with a penis becomes 'fixated' in an individual when he is a child, resisting all the influences of later life and making him as a man unable to do without a penis in his sexual object, then, although in other respects he may lead a normal sexual life, he is bound to become a homosexual.."

This could equally well have been the definition of fetishism or voyeurism. One can see that it is in a disavowal of castration, whatever its causes, and modalities, that for Freud perversion originates, and that evidently fetishism, represents The cross-roads. One finds a part of fetishism in every perversion, as well as in human sexuality, which, it has to be said, has perverse tendencies. Fetishism is the cross-roads of all perversions just as one could say that phobia is the cross-roads for all neuroses. It is not by chance that Lacan studied the one in relation to the other.

Disavowal: what are the results which determine the position of the subject on the one hand and on the other the value of the object? This is what Freud tells us concerning disavowal: "Through the fact of his disavowal, the subject is divided between his recognition of the reality that the mother has no penis and the fact that he attributes a phallus to her all the same following his desire".

This is why Lacan prefers to translate the term denial by disavowal rather than by denial. We are fortunate to have these two terms in English and French, something which is not the case in Spanish for example. To deny is to affirm that one has had no part to play in the occurrence of an event, whether this event was real or not. To disavow is to recognise this event but by disapproving it, and thanks to the use of this term disavowal to translate Verleugnung one introduces the dimension of judgement given by the subject.

The result is this division of the subject and it is not really the splitting of the ego that Freud aims at

in his text of 1938. He speaks first about the division of the phallus in Fetishism(1927), then we will speak of the division of the ego but what he really aims at is not what he was aiming at, it is hard to see why he persevered so doggedly in searching for all the representations of castration in the fantasies of the perverse subjects he had in analysis, in order the better to show that it is operative in their dreams even if affirmed in a negative way.

In other words, it is to sustain his idea that perversion is a subjective position constituted during the Oedipus and responsible for the fact that the subject is taken up in it and has to deal with the castration complex. At the same time, following on his disavowal, the subject ignores his own division. It is veiled for him by the very veil with which he covers the maternal castration which is going to determine his strategy towards his partner. The subject, through the denial of his own castration which he obtained through the procurement of the Other, through the disavowal of maternal castration, is brought in doing so to identify with his partner. He adopts a feminine position by means of identification. Freud insists on it, in all perversion, whatever it is, there is a feminising of the subject. I'll take a quotation from Freud's Childhood Memory of Leonardo:

'The little boy represses his love for his mother by putting himself in her place, by identifying with her, and he subsequently takes his own person as the ideal in whose likeness he chooses his new love objects; he has thus become homosexual.'

In the beginning Freud classifies Leonardo as a homosexual but then he hesitates somewhat, speaks of sublimation and ends up calling him an obsessional neurotic. As to what interests us in this text, Freud speaks of the phallic mother and of the feminised position of the perverse subject; these are the two distinctive traits of all perversions; disavowal of castration and feminisation of the subject. One should insist on these when speaking of perversion. The trans-subjective formula of the pervert is related to that of the woman; in the imaginary he both has the phallus and he is the phallus. By identifying with the mother as uncastrated, he attributes a phallus to her while at the same time putting her in the position of being the phallus. By attributing the phallus to the Other he thinks to detain the power of the Law which in consequence will allow him to defy this Law by promulgating his own according to his fantasies. But at bottom, his partner is given over to his whims, it is he who decides whether she will be phallicised or not.

When a woman is seduced by a perverse subject, it isn't simple for her to extricate herself. He himself believing he can lay down the Law can defy her in exhausting activities. But in fact he shows that the Law he pretends to defy is obeyed by him, that his will to jouissance exhausts itself in the very exigencies and imperatives, always more cruel, of this Law, and all this, of course, despite himself, since he ignores his own division.

Sadian subjects, the persecutors, have an absolutely infernal ethical rigour; in their will to jouissance, the least wavering, the least manifestation of pathos from them, renders them completely unworthy of continuing in their way and they are eliminated, their exertions only result in a



demonstration ad absurdum of the imperatives of the communal law. They themselves pass by way of the superego which is of course rather less amusing.

The other point is the object and its value. I will give you the simple definition of the object; it is the sexual partner which means first of all the phallic mother for whom the subject will progressively substitute the other partners, in such a way, moreover, that the object is chosen with respect to its possibilities for being phallicised. So, for example, a partner of the same sex for the male homosexual, women idealised as 'The Woman' for the sadist or masochist. Justine is idealised as woman, Sacher-Masoch is 'the Venus in furs', etc...


It is not the object which will permit us to typify a perversion, even if it is not altogether indifferent, but precisely its possibility of being phallicised by the subject. In effect, a choice of object of the same sex can be a neurotic choice whereas a heterosexual object choice can mask an authentic homosexual perversion. This is just to recall the phenomenological difficulty of the situation.

#### 4. The Strategy of the Pervert

We will approach it by starting from the matheme of the fantasy. I economised on showing you how one passes from fantasies in Freud to the matheme of fantasy in Lacan, for that would need another paper. At any rate it took him a good ten years to integrate his famous object (a) with the place of the other partner.

The pervert, in his strategy, determines himself as object in his encounter with subjective division. When he discovers the mother's castration, as it tells him that he also has to submit to this fate, he identifies with her while disavowing castration, he determines himself as object in his encounter with what could be, for him, castration. And he will make the subjective division he avoids in this way, be borne by his partner. So in freudian terms, he identifies with the partner whose castration is disavowed and he offers himself to the partner as object in his action while letting this other support his own division.

In his encounter with subjective division he identifies with  $i(a)$ , while the partner is referred back to her subjective division, the idealised partner, because her castration is disavowed.



Here, the phallicised partner, S idealised, is the idealised woman; in masochism it is Wanda, for the voyeur, it is the woman seen behind the window; whereas on the side of the

object, in masochism, Sacher-Masoch tries to identify with somebody who would count for nothing, a complete non-entity.

In sadism, what does the sadist seek to become? He seeks to become the 'black fetish', pure instrument of the Being-supreme-in-evil. You can see how the positions of the sadist and masochist are placed on the side of the object; these positions are not inverted; they are both on the same side. They determine themselves as objects in their encounter with subjective division and let their idealised partner bear the actual division.

If I write it like this, it is because I told you earlier that the fantasy is a symbolic structure and you can see that this operation, at bottom, the subversion the pervert produces, is to bring back the fantasy to this imaginary dimension, whereas the neurotic does the opposite, from the imaginary he wants to return to the symbolic. That is why one speaks of the one as the negative of the other.

The pervert subverts the symbolic, turning it into an imaginary relation and he posits this imaginary as what constitutes the Law, defying the Law in a general way, whence his predilection for masks and simulacra, so often found in the literature of people who assert themselves as perverts.

For the pervert it is a question of constantly masking and alternatively unmasking the castration of the Other, and it is up to the partner to maintain this role. Either the partner is idealised as a goddess, Wanda, S, or, on the contrary, the partner is unmasked in his/her castration, that is, flouted, and the pervert makes the partner oscillate continuously between these two positions. From the phenomenological point of view the pervert, the voyeur, is not content with observing the woman behind the curtain: that is only the first stage in the process. He observes this woman and someone who stands in front of a mirror always participates in the complicity of being looked at, in a certain way. That is how he introduces a kind of imaginary complicity. He observes a woman in front of her mirror, and as she is looking at herself, a kind of imaginary complicity is introduced: 'It is that she wants me to look at her!' That is the first stage.

The second stage is letting himself be discovered. Every perverse subject must at some given moment be discovered by the partner, and it is the horror he then awakens in her which provokes the confusion and the shame: the horror of the partner, surprised in her intimacy, where she herself thinks to have let something be seen which shouldn't have been seen.

From the phenomenological point of view it makes sense to keep these manoeuvres of masking and unmasking, the veiling



and unveiling going on all the time. The partner is constantly in one of these positions and this means that the authentic pervert is not interested in pornography, which rather belongs to the neurotic. The neurotic subject wants to see absolutely everything, he wants to touch the body outside discourse, whereas the true pervert is not interested in this. What interests him is what he cannot see, and what, of course, is not to be seen in his partner: castration. Consequently he puts her on stage producing with his exertions a division of the subject: to provoke horror by passing through anxiety. It is not altogether the same with the sadist, the masochist, the voyeur or the exhibitionist, but that is what he seeks to provoke.

The perverse subject is in the position of object faced with his idealised partner and what he aims at is to attain his jouissance. He thinks to attain it by grasping it beyond castration, beyond the interdiction of the jouissance of the Other, and all his exertions show that he obtains nothing other than the avowal of the partner's castration, which is in fact his own as put on the stage. In wanting to obtain the jouissance of the Other, he ends up, like everybody else, with phallic jouissance, jouissance organised by the Law, and one could say that he fails in his enterprise.

I have said that his demonstration only aims to show that the Law is always there, that he only obtains an extenuated jouissance, the one avowed by the constrained partner, who is divided by an anxiety laden with horror, the horror he provoked by means of surprise. What returns for the pervert is his own message in inverted form. It returns to him by means of the procuration of the Other, to wit that the jouissance of the Other is forbidden to him who speaks and who because of this fact, in wanting to ignore it, pays the price of this doubly ignored ignorance in which is shown that he remains like any subject referred to the signifier and to castration.

His will to jouissance exhausts itself in tiring, monotonous and stereotypical exertions. If you have perverse subjects in analysis and they stay, you will see that even if they are 'professionals' in the field of sexual behaviour, they do not know how to enjoy, even if they have the illusion of sharing the secrets of the gods, whence their desire to be pedagogues in matters sexual. They have a certain know-how of sexual conduct and their conduct is intimately linked with sexuality. Whereas the neurotic in order to desire, asks permission from the Other, the pervert refrains from questioning himself concerning the desire of the Other and acts without permission. What he doesn't know is that his own desire is in question. He represses like the neurotic.

So in this will to grasp the jouissance of the unbarred Other, the pervert offers himself to it as object (a). This is the challenge he throws down. He offers himself faithfully to the ordeal of the Other and this is a



her penis-need: this is the hysterical position. I stress that it is not really settled, that Lacan gives other reasons for it. He says a woman doesn't need perversion because she satisfies herself naturally, or rather, she satisfies perverse tendencies with her children, because they are objects (a) in so far as they are detachable.

##### 5. The Perverse Subject and the Analytic Cure.

In general perverts have little recourse to analysis. Freud remarks on it by adding that, for him, it is because they are incapable of renouncing the pleasure that the exertion of their passion brings them, and he adds further that the cure would, with them, present very special difficulties, for it would be a question, not of curing symptoms, but of reversing a tendency as a whole.

A short parenthesis: at the moment he treats the case of Dora, Freud thinks, around 1900, that the Oedipus complex follows a natural course, that is, that a woman is to a man as a man is to a woman. In consequence, from the moment in her cure in which Dora's desire is really turned towards Herr K...even if the object causing this desire is Frau K.. Freud thinks it is enough to give a little push for it to go in the direction of a normal resolution. Evidently, as he overlooks what causes Dora's desire, the cure fails. In reality her desire is turned towards a man and she questions herself on what it means to be a woman for a man. Even if she questions herself via identification with a man she seeks to rejoin the position of being a woman.

In the case of the homosexual woman, Freud, in 1920, has elaborated the factor of contingency, of choice in the Oedipus complex. That is why he speaks of the choice of neurosis, psychosis or perversion. There is an ethical choice of the subject at stake. He thinks that at the moment of the cure, the young homosexual woman has definitively chosen homosexuality and as a result he drops her.

One cannot say that he is mistaken. He has followed both Dora and the case of the homosexual woman attentively, but the deeper reason lies in the conception of the Oedipus. First moment: Oedipus, natural course; Second moment: Oedipus, contingent choice. Perverts do not want to renounce this inclination. It is a question not of removing symptoms, but of reversing an inclination: he says that it is not possible to 'cure' them.

With Lacan one can begin to shed light on the treatment of perverts. He says in the seminar L'Angoisse (1962), almost the midpoint of his teaching, that homosexuals can be 'cured', which is a relatively rare statement in his work. Does that mean that in the treatment, a perverse subject would no longer be perverse? Or is it possible that, as the true end of the treatment should lead the subject to become

an analyst, that a pervert who has reached the end of analysis would remain perverse and could eventually become an analyst to the extent that a modification of his subjective economy has been produced, in such a way that he can hold the position in the treatment of renouncing the jouissance of the Other? It is a question I pose: could a perverse subject hold his ethical position within the analytic discourse?

I return to the pervert in the treatment. Loyal to his strategy, in the analytic set-up, the perverse analysand comes to occupy the place of the object (a), making the analyst support the function of barred subject.

$$\begin{array}{ccc} a & \text{-----}> & \$ \\ - & & - \\ S2 & \text{<-----} & S1 \end{array}$$

When you hear certain analysts speak in conferences about perverse analysands, you'll see that in telling his story the analyst enjoys. It is altogether striking. The perverse subject subverts the analytic relation, takes the place of the analyst and 'desupposes' in this way the analyst of any knowledge (Savoir) on jouissance. Contrary to the psychotic, who really comes to occupy this position of object (a) - which makes the treatment of psychotics so difficult - the pervert occupies the place of the 'semblant'. What he seeks in fact to produce is the weak spot of the analyst in order to dispossess him of his knowledge, it is to force him to reveal an inadmissible jouissance. This is translated by an interpretation of the meaning of the artefacts in his room, namely a number of rather surprising things which can lead the analyst to a 'passage a l'acte'...an inadmissible jouissance, and once this is obtained, of course, the analyst, in his eyes has become unworthy of occupying the place of the ideal figure of the non-barred Other, for that is what the perverse subject aims at, and then the analyst can be abandoned without further ado.

8 November 1986

## P E R V E R S I O N

By Darian Leader

In order to approach the study of perversion in Lacan's teaching, we can start by taking three perspectives, corresponding roughly to a stress on the importance of the imaginary, the symbolic and the real. These perspectives follow, approximately, the chronological development of Lacan's thoughts on the problem. From each of these angles the theory develops and changes. First of all, there is the place of the imaginary in perversion. Two references will situate this: firstly from Lacan's work in the 1940s and early 1950s when he was working on the predominance of the imago and the capturing effect of the image on the human subject. He connects the different pathologies, what he calls the different forms of inversion of sexual and cultural normalisation, with capture in the image. The key reference for this would be in the Ecrits p119/20, where he says that an introduction to his theory of narcissism will clarify the problems and the confusion due to the theory of the partial drives - in scopophilia, sado-masochism, homosexuality - and will allow us to understand the apprehension of the other in perverse practices.

The second relevant reference to the imaginary problematic is in the text on psychosis (E p554) near the end of section 6. "The whole problem of the perversions consists in understanding how the child, in his relation to his mother, a relation which is constituted in analysis not by his vital dependency, but by a dependency on her love, that is, the desire of her desire, identifies with the imaginary object of this desire to the extent that the mother herself symbolises this desire in the phallus". We have two poles then: the first reference in the Ecrits to do with the captivating effects of the image, and the second reference introducing the phallic object, and the dialectic between the mother, the child, and the phallus. Obviously the references serve merely as markers; Lacan's theory is much more complex, but we can say that these two references frame the imaginary perspective on perversion.

The second mode would take into account Lacan's developments in the 'Ethics Seminar' in 1959 and the discussion of Kant with Sade. The key references are Lacan's seminar on anxiety where he discusses sadism and masochism and their relation to anxiety, the text 'The Subversion of the Subject', the text 'Kant avec Sade' 1962 and 'The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis' Seminar XI, where Lacan comments on the relation of the phantasy and the drive to perversion. There is a tension elaborated in Lacan's work at this time, between the way the subject is situated in perversion and the drive. The problem in Seminar XI



concerns the object of the drive, the way the drive circles around the object and the fact that the subject seems to be eluded in the drive. In contrast to this, in perversion, Lacan tells us that the subject is placed. There is a contrast between the absence of the position of the subject in the drive, and the taking up of a position of the subject in perversion.

This links up with two things: with Lacan's earlier work in 1955 on the difference between neurosis and perversion - neurosis develops as a question whereas perversion is rather posed as a solution: where the mythic permutations are blocked, there is no longer the dialectical development we see, for instance, in Little Hans' phobia. Second would be Lacan's introduction in 1968 of what he calls the subject of the drive.

If the theorisation of perversion in Seminar XI revolves around this distinction between the absence of the place of the subject in the drive and the position of the subject of the perversion, how do we retheorise perversion given Lacan's thesis in 1969 that the subject is situated in the drive, that there is a subject of the drive as well as an object of the drive? This connects to the whole discussion of jouissance in Lacan's seminar in 1968 where instead of the structure of language forming the preliminary, in J A Miller's phrase, and Lacan making deductions from this (eg, as in the anxiety seminar where libidinal distribution is developed as a consequence of the original effects of language on the body), the jouissance is given a more preliminary status and the problem is how the structure of language is linked to this topologically. It is interesting to see how this effects a discussion of perversion.

The third mode of Lacan's teaching would be encapsulated in his remarks in the 1968-69 seminar 'D'un autre a l'Autre', where he discusses what he calls the restitution of the object to the Other. I'll discuss this a bit later on. Let's first try and see what sort of objects are at play.

It seems that with Freud the classic perversion is fetishism: the key here is the idea of splitting which he develops in relation to this. There is a problem from the start for it seems that the object is in fact an object that doesn't exist, the maternal phallus, that doesn't have existence in the everyday sense but nevertheless has effects; it can get frozen on a veil as we see in the fetish, in order to invoke the dimension of something that is beyond.

Lacan develops in his seminar of 1956-7 a clinic of different forms of perversion connected with different ways a subject will try and invoke this dimension of a beyond, different ways that the child will try and invoke what the mother has failed to do by her insufficient situating of the law of the father. The veil organises a relation to the beyond

and, like the screen memory, linked to the fetish by both Freud and Lacan, it functions as a sort of relay, as a betweenness. At the end of his article on screen memories, Freud notes that it is less a question of the content of the memory than of its position. The screen, memory he tells us, "takes on its value as a memory not because of its content but due to the relation existing between this content and another, which has been suppressed". Lacan links this access to the lack of the object to paroxysm: "Perversion has the property of realising a certain mode of access to this beyond the image of the other that characterises the human dimension, but it realises this only in a moment as it's always producing the paroxysms of the perversions". We could thus add the paroxysm to the list Lacan sketches in the 'Question Preliminaire' which links in a series desire, boredom, clausturation, revolt, prayer, daybreak (not, as Sheridan translates 'sleeplessness') and panic, which are there, says Lacan, "to bear witness for us to the dimension of this Elsewhere" (Ecrits p547).

Let's go back to the problem of objects. On Saturday Ben Hoosen gave a short presentation of the problem of nonexistent objects in philosophical logic, and he discussed Russell's 1905 essay on denoting. The question of nonexistent objects is connected to the problem of what specifies a trait, a detail, since it seems that the fetish, ie an object connected, for Freud, to the maternal phallus, is singled out in a very particular way. The problem is how to make something, how to construct something, how to organise the libidinal relations of the subject with a detail (slipper, ribbon etc). It would be worthwhile to make a distinction between a fetishism on the side of shoes and ribbon, and fetishism on the side of raincoats and so on. Freud's problematic - the relation of details to objects which don't exist - is discussed within a particular context, which he refers to at the start of "The Three Essays", and which he also discusses in something recently published in 'The psychoanalytic Quarterly' 1988 (material found in the US Rank archives). In these minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society of 1909 is a discussion of the fetish, a reference to Alfred Binet's charming book 'Le Fetishisme dans L'Amour'. Binet's problem is this: if normal object choice always has conditions, what Freud calls in the Minutes published last year 'prerequisites; if all object choice has certain signifying conditions like the predilection of Descartes for girls with 'des yeux louches', then what separates normal conditions and pathological conditions? What separates the fact that normal object choice will use certain features, perhaps resemblances to parents, from the focus on a detail which we find so dominant in fetishism?

Binet's theory is a continuum theory, arguing for a passage from 'little fetishism' (normal fetishism) to 'large fetishism' where the detail seems to predominate. There is a difficulty in Binet's theory in distinguishing structurally between the two different poles of this continuum. This is what he says: "the fetishist has a



tendency to detach completely, to isolate from everything which surrounds the object of his cult. And when this object is part of a live person the fetishist tries to make with this part an independent whole. The necessity to fix by a word which serves as a sign, these small, fleeting nuances of feeling, directs us to use the term abstraction. Fetishism has a tendency to abstraction. It is thus opposed to normal love, which is addressed to the totality of the person". Here is Binet's first distinction in this continuum between a little and a large fetishism, between the abstraction of a single trait and what is characteristic of normal love, addressed to the totality of the person. The problem here is a problem in the history of logic concerning the relation of a trait and a set. "The fetishist tries to make from this part (the abstracted trait) an independent whole". It is a question then, of being able to form a set from a trait: this is what Binet calls abstraction.

Not long after Binet's text, Russell elaborates what he called "axiom of abstraction", that is to say, that basically any property forms a set. When Russell realised that this led to contradiction he started to revise his notion of set membership and inclusion. It is curious that the two terms are juxtaposed there, in Russell and in Binet, both uses dealing with the abstraction of traits. It seems that it is a question of abstracting a trait and determining the relation of this trait to a set.

Binet talks about a case of a hair fetishist who goes to the Champs Elysees and cuts off bits of little girls' hair. He says: "Pour moi, l'enfant (whose hair he's cutting off) n'existe pas. C'est ces cheveux qui m'attirent". We see here the relation between the person and the trait. The focus is on the trait (hair) and he says that the totality (child) does not exist. What attracts him is in the trait. This implies a tension between the Russellian version of abstraction and Binet's version of abstraction, since for Russell a property forms a set, the abstraction of a property creates a set, whereas for the patient on the Champs Elysees the trait annuls the set, the set is reduced to a trait. It is not clear that this tension is an irresolvable one between what seem to be two different versions of the relation between the property and the set formation. There is a nice little story in Binet where he reads a book which goes against his thesis that a trait annuls a set, a book by Belot called La bouche de Madam X. He contacts the author and asks if the novel is biographical; the author admits it is and after getting permission Binet publishes certain quotations in his book. He says: "The isolation (in abstraction), of the loved object, which although it is only a fraction of the body of the person is constituted into an independent whole". Belot says that "the word mouth signifies for me a whole, a set made up of lips, the gums and the palate". So it seems that we can resolve this contradiction between two theories of



abstraction by seeing how the detail manages to create a set.

This idea of making a totality exist with a trait, brings us to a difficult question in Lacan. It is a question of his remarks about the Other existing, that both the pervert and the neurotic try to make the Other exist. What exactly does it mean to try to make the Other exist; if the Other is the storehouse of language surely the Other exists from the start? If Lacan then says the Other doesn't exist does this mean there is no storehouse of language? (The reference is to P819 of the French Ecrits). Let's link this question with a remark of Lacan in 'Television'. Lacan says: "The subject, in order to make the woman (La Femme) exist can only run aground in the field of perversion". In this late reference to perversion Lacan is connecting it again to the problem of making something exist, in this case 'La Femme'. We can try and understand this by way of an example, one that is referred to at the beginning of the Ecrits where Lacan refers to the memoirs of the Abbe de Choisy, who was a playmate of Phillippe, Louis XIII's brother.

The trust seems to have been a plot by Anne of Austria and Mazarin to feminise Philippe so that he wouldn't be a viable candidate for the French throne. He was feminised from birth and some historians tell us this was the reason why he was given a playmate in the Abbe, dressed up in women's clothes and made to wear earrings and speak like a woman. It is something which stays with this subject for all his life, and he even constructs a cogito around his position of being a woman, that is, a man dressed up in a woman's clothes. It illustrates, if we connect the Other with The Woman, that in perversion there is an attempt to make the Other exist. I will read you something from his memoirs. He is someone who left Paris, acquired a country house, and changed his name to the Madame de Sancy and then to the Comtesse de Barres. Everyone in the surrounding area believed that he was a woman and even marriage was proposed. He had little girls dressed as little boys brought to his chateau to continue this masquerade. If Lacan, following Joan Riviere, puts femininity on the side of a masquerade (The Woman doesn't exist, what does, is the masquerade), it seems that to force this, to go to its limits, we have this practise of the Abbe de Choisy who literally makes the woman exist, who becomes this signifier the Comtesse de Barres and creates a whole world around a chateau near Paris. Choisy says 'What's specific to God is to be loved. Man, as much as his weakness permits him, aims at the same thing, but since it is beauty which gives birth to love and which is normally women's lot (le partage des femmes), when it happens that men have or believe they have certain traits of beauty with which they can make themselves loved they try to increase this by the adjustments of women that are very advantageous. They then feel the inexpressible pleasure of being loved. I felt more than once what I'm talking about in a sweet experience when I've been at balls and at the theatre

in

beautiful dresses and diamonds, when I've heard someone near me say "voilà une belle personne". This is something that always punctuates the particular moments of jouissance in his life, when there is a call from the Other which situates the Abbe de Choisy in the position of the woman, completely in the position of the masquerade. The jouissance is attached to this falseness.

In Sacher-Masoch's work as well there is something which we can qualify as an attempt to make the woman exist. This is what he says in a childhood memoir: "Whether she is a princess or a peasant girl, whether she is clad in ermine or sheepskin she is always the same woman": so it is not a question of one by one, of the particular women he meets, but it is rather a question of the traits, the prerequisites, of being the same woman. "She wears furs, she wields a whip. She treats men as slaves and she is both my creation and the true samaritan woman used to reading legends of saints". We can also read here one of the famous legal contracts he establishes with his first wife, signed by both parties and a witness. This is a clause of the contract: "The subject shall obey the sovereign with complete servility, and shall greet any benevolence on her part as a precious gift. He shall not lay claim to her love nor to any right to be her lover. On her behalf Fanny von Postor undertakes to wear furs as often as possible especially when she is behaving cruelly".

This is something which is established legally in the life of this subject, a contract which Deleuze in his commentary on this text discusses. Lacan had referred to the masochistic contract in his 1960 seminar, and he argued that the masochist takes the place of the object of exchange, and contrasts the position of the sadist as that of the fetish. In a sense they are both in a position of an object but they are two ways of realising this situation. It is interesting to see how this notion is historically generated from problems of economic exchange. The notion of the fetish arose from the discrepancy between western systems of economic exchange and the supposedly irrational value given to certain objects by indigenous populations: refusal to accept the imported system thus "produced" the fetish. If we continue the correspondence Lacan suggests, this might imply that sadism is generated (via a drive structure) from masochism. Exchange generates fetish.

This social bond, the masochistic contract, can show a difference between the psychotic and the perverse relation to social bonds. With psychosis there is an extreme irony, there is the feeling that psychotics see through social sham, the masquerade of normal social games, and there's an uneasiness generated by this form of insight. As Jacques Alain Miller has pointed out, this irony is one way of saying that the Other doesn't exist (the Other being a social bond that comes from society, an ideal and irony being something that goes against ideals eg as in Courtly



Love literature). We can contrast the irony of the psychotic relation to the make-believe of the discourse of social bonds to the perverse relation which is the opposite, which sees, as with the psychotic, the notion of masquerade and of fabrication, yet instead of introducing an irony what the pervert does is precisely the opposite, he takes it seriously and hence invents new social bonds, new contracts (that is the generation of contracts in masochism) but this time contracts which are closer to the effects of language on the body.

Hence for example the predominance of whipping, of being beaten and the masochistic scenario. In 'A Child is Being Beaten' what beats the child, certainly at one moment of the phantasy that Freud elaborates is the signifier. It is the Other of language that beats the child, and hence you have an extraction, a separation, in the one object that Freud finds constant throughout all the various transformations of the phantasy. On the other side you have something that remains constant, something that has the place of a residue in relation to this transformation, which is the look. You have the signifying transformations on the one side and the look as an object which resists on the other side. We can then explain the remarkable predominance, noted by Loewenstein and Greenacre, of screen memories from early childhood in perverse cases, relating to injury or having an accident; these scenes function to cover the wound imposed by language.

To go back to the contrast between psychosis and perversion: with psychosis, in order to effect castration, in order to produce the effects of the symbolic on the body, we sometimes have the phenomena of automutilation. There is a limit, a barrier in perversion, which instead of producing auto-mutilation produces an imaginary scenario which is played out by the pervert. This raises the problem of how the imaginary can function as a limit. We might turn to certain areas of projective geometry to help us in answering this.

### Two Cases

I will talk about a case by Abraham Freedman in 'The Journal of the American Psycho-analytic Association', 1978, and then a case by Masud Khan on the role of the collated internal object which is in his book 'Alienations in Perversions'.

Freedman's patient had already had a short slice of analysis, and his presenting problem is severe anxiety which can only be relieved by a perverse practice followed by shame and depression. He phantasises, has daydreams, of living the life of a woman, and pictures himself as the wife of a movie star who does all the cooking in preparation for when the star gets home. To continue this phantasy, he goes to a doctor to ask about changing sex, and when the doctor refers him to a specialist who details what goes on in these



operations, he panics and runs out, having lost his imaginary moorings in the world. The specialist had described the process of amputating the penis, and in the street afterwards the subject feels disoriented and lacking the sense of time. A gap has opened up at some level. There is a contrast between the psychotic and perverse structure: the approach of the real has a strict limit here. This is his daydream and his problem when he approaches the limit of the real. After the failure to integrate the details of the operation, he makes a call to a knowledge, he goes to see an analyst. This is the description of the perversion which he eventually tells Freedman is the only way he can fully avoid anxiety. The subject leaves the store where he is the manager, as though he is going on a business errand in his car. He changes his route so that it takes him through a residential neighbourhood and looks for a barber shop in which there is only one barber. The barber has to conform to a certain preselected type (he must not be lean, have long hair etc). When the patient finds such a shop he returns there a couple of times, unless he becomes afraid that the barber suspects something. In a state of anxiety he enters the barber's shop, sits in a chair and asks to be shaved. "He sensed pleasurable excitement and anticipated relief as the barber draped the sheet around him, adjusted the towels and arranged the position of the chair. When the barber was almost finished shaving him he would rub his hand over his face and complain that it was not smooth enough. The barber would then relather and reshave him again." This continues. "He would notice that the barber was becoming annoyed and was breathing heavily. With the barber's increasing annoyance and his heavy breathing as he repeatedly had to draw the razor over P's neck again and again, he would have an erection and an ejaculation in his clothes under the barber's sheet." Then he would pay the barber and leave. There is a detail which is significant here: "Following each episode he felt mortified". Mortification being one of the results Lacan connects with the effects of language on the body, a way that the symbolic clips the body. This is perversion number one.

There is also what Freedman calls a secondary perversion. Correlatively to the first perverse practice he develops a relation with a girl and he goes to her place and they pet. (It's an American case.) "Then after kissing and hugging he puts his index finger in her mouth, making her gag, and he ejaculates". The two moments of ejaculation are connected firstly to the barber becoming more and more angry, and secondly to making the girl gag by pushing his finger down her throat.

The family history is a rich one. It is a subject who was born in Poland in the 1920s and his father was the representative of an American sewing machine company. (We could ask if the name of that company was Singer). The

father wants to lose his Jewish accent and to produce the perfect Polish accent. It is a relation to symbolic moorings, to an organisation of jouissance, which the father wants to change; he wants to force something in relation to the language which he is situated in.

As they move towns the father puts the subject in a private Polish school, for the Polish middle class, to separate him from his Jewish companions, in order to remove traces of his origins. The teachers in this school naturally treat this outsider cruelly and it seems that these teachers share the same traits as the barber in the barber shop. While the son is enrolled in this school which makes his life rather difficult, the father hires a Polish girl to teach him correct diction, to remove all traces of the mother tongue. The father, according to the son, sleeps with this language teacher, who, in order to improve his diction, puts a pencil in the father's mouth and manipulates it around in order to get the right shapes and sounds produced by the mouth. The father sometimes engaged the son in this latter practise. This is the trait we find in what the author calls the secondary perversion with a female partner. Concurrent to the stay in the school the subject has fantasies of shaving the heads of the teachers, and threatening to cut their throats. Sometimes he goes to the gentile side of town and looks at pigs having their throats cut by a butcher. Then when he spends the war years in the Warsaw ghetto, it seems he derives enjoyment from strangling German soldiers with a wire.

Investigating the roots of the perversion, the analyst manages to trace the following. After the war the patient is employed in Belgium and his boss wants to marry him to a daughter. He becomes engaged but breaks it off because he fears that he is not a real man. He meets some young homosexuals and in their company, we are told: "He grew disgusted with them and felt that he could never be one of them. He again became depressed and did not know what to do. When in a state of despair he happened to go into a barber's shop. While being shaved he felt strangely in control of his fate, gave the barber's explicit instructions suddenly felt an erection and ejaculated. That was the beginning of his perversion." It seems that at a moment of subjective disorientation, when the subject is divided between the life of the homosexuals and the life with the boss's daughter, he manages to find some point of stabilisation, a constant; we see that in the vicissitudes of his life there is always this one constant point, the perversion. Just as in 'A Child is Being Beaten' phantasy we again have this one point of constancy, the look, despite the various grammatical transformations. This point of constancy, produced in the moment of subjective division, where the subject manages to organise jouissance in a scenario, is an imaginary scene which connects the real, this alien erection and ejaculation, to a particular order. It is less a question of auto-eroticism than of

hetero-eroticism and the fact that the phallic jouissance isn't something that is non-alien to the body. Hence the problems caused in Little Hans' life when he begins to have his first erections; the problem being to situate the alien nature of phallic jouissance in relation to the mother's desire.

So we have the real nature, coming from the outside (ejaculation), we have the symbolic traits which specify the barber, and we have the imaginary nature of scenario that is organised by the subject. The subject puts himself in the position of the organiser, which is interesting because Lacan defines the phantasy as where the subject makes himself the organiser of his jouissance in order to avoid the fact that he is simply a puppet of the signifier. So we see the tension between the loss of the subject in the signifying chain, the fact that the subject is vehicled along by the signifier and how this loss of being contrasts with the subject who organises his own jouissance in the phantasy. This works well with perversion but it is not at all clear that this works with a neurosis, since Lacan says in 'The Subversion of the Subject', the neurotic identifies the demand of the Other with the object of the phantasy. Seemingly the neurotic replaces the phantasy with the drive. How can we say the neurotic has perverse phantasies when it seems that the neurotic phantasy is the structure of the drive, and in the drive the subject doesn't have a place but in perversion the subject does have a place. I don't have time to discuss these themes now.

I will come back to Freedman's case to compare it with Masud Khan's case, 'The Role of the Collated Internal Object in Perversion-formations' published in Alienations in Perversions and 'The International Journal of Psycho-analysis', 1969. Khan's case also starts with the subject being in the position of the organiser. A woman comes to see him claiming she has problems with agrophobia. She asks to be accompanied to the session by her au-pair, and Khan is rather surprised that she brings this au-pair into the consulting room itself. He says: "I was a bit nonplussed, but accepted the situation". Perhaps if Khan had noted the resonances of the signifier "au-pair" he would have been less nonplussed. After a number of months of analysis, where the subject seems to do what an analysand is supposed to do, and thus, as Khan says, things weren't so fruitful, he finds out that when her husband is abroad, she drives her sons away and on the way home, alone in the car, there is some problem, she finds a garage and while the man is looking at the engine she is very chirpy and excited and teasing. He tells her that he was going to gag her and tie her up so that he could get on with his work, that he had no intention of staying here until midnight with her. She says "Well, you try" whereupon he ties her hands and feet with rope and 'rapes' her.




This is the beginning of a relationship between the woman and the mechanic which continues sporadically for two years. It is interesting that her own masturbatory practices follow the same structure: "One of the gains to her from her affair with this garage man had been that when he had left, she found herself masturbating in a ritualistic way for the first time in her life". She would lie in the bath, tie herself up and arrange things so the tap-water ran over her genitals leading to a "sort of orgasm". It is an example perhaps of what Lacan refers to as "the pervert making himself the instrument of the jouissance of the Other". The problem is whose jouissance, what is the place of jouissance? Khan rightly notes the absence of phantasy activity in this ritual. Does the subject realise that it is the jouissance of the Other that is being served? Khan says: "She found herself masturbating", as if it is not a decision of the subject but as if there is an element of something opaque about this practice.

Like Freedman, Khan situates a second moment of perversion, again this time with a language teacher. The husband has told his wife they will be going abroad for some years, and so she decides to learn French. A language teacher is hired and before long the teacher starts telling her off and saying if she is not careful she will be spanked. Soon she is and the ritual takes on its consistency: the repeated practice of the introduction of an artificial penis, a third term, between the woman and the language teacher. A detail is interesting here, the patient "was sort of hypnotised and intimidated by the artificial penis. It had an inexhaustible potency".

One of her telling phrases here was how the presence of the teacher with the artificial penis "drove her out of herself". "Here her descriptions of the look and mood on the teacher's face were most instructive. She said that though the intercourse would always start very tenderly gradually she could watch a violent tension and dismay creep over the teacher's face, and it would fill her with helpless terror and acute concern. She would feel as if the teacher would either explode or exhaust herself to death." Also there was the panicky feeling that the teacher would go mad trying to reach a climax and in the process annihilate her.

The division suggested in the words "the penis would drive her out of herself", is not on the side of the subject and she serves the ritual very well by putting herself in the position of the victim; she is spanked by the teacher and organised in this scenario. It seems the division of the subject is on the side of the Other, the woman through whom a language is invoked, exactly as it was in Freedman's case where the key point, the moment he is about to ejaculate, is when the barber is about to get angry and lose control. Surely it is precisely at the moment when the barber is tempted to cut the patient's own throat with the razor, just as the subject had seen pigs throats being cut when he was

in Poland. In both cases we can see a subjective division, the point of splitting in the subject that is on the side of the Other. We can refer here to Lacan's schema from 'Kant avec Sade':



in what Lacan calls in Seminar XI "the inverse effect of the phantasy". Instead of ( $\$ \langle \rangle a$ ), we can write ( $a \langle \rangle \$$ ). In the encounter with subjective division the subject will situate himself as object. This is not to be confused with the analytic discourse in which the analyst isn't the object (a), he is not a real object but a symbolic version of this real object, a make-believe object. If the analyst takes the place of this real object the analysis would indeed be perverse. We noticed in our last seminar that Socarides ends his panoramic study of the perversions with the comment that "At the end of analysis the subject ought to realise that he is in a position of a victim of childhood circumstances, intrapsychic conflict etc". Socarides' situating of the perverse subject as a victim, an object, is in no way contradictory to the perversion itself; this is not the analytic way.

In both cases the division, the moment of paroxysm, is situated on the side of the Other, in the barber and the language teacher about to lose control: both these characters in a sense allow the symbolic to be made present. We will see that there are differences between the two cases. The patient of Khan says that what most preoccupies her in this perversion is the point where the teacher might stop and collapse into a dismayed exhaustion. This is a nice description of what Lacan calls in the Ecrits "the monotony of the relation of the subject to the signifier"; the signifier has an exhausting effect on the subject. Khan says that "this patient searched but never found a look of satisfaction from the teacher". It is not just a question of masochism; it seems that there is no look of satisfaction in the Other, only subjective division. Neither Khan nor Freedman situate themselves in relation to the treatment and say how their actions influence the development of the perversion. Nevertheless Khan makes an interpretation which seems imaginative: he claims that the artificial penis that structures what seems to be a triangle is the dissociated unconscious of the patient's mother. It is a very strange interpretation and it would be interesting to see how this fitted in to the cure of this patient.

One last point before comparing the two cases: the problem of subjective division and the Kantian moral law. With the Kantian moral law there is a division, Kant says, between the subject as subject of the moral law, acting in accordance with a particular maxim, and the pathological subject, ie "Today is a hot or cold day; this is good, this is bad"; that is the subject of the law and subject of feeling. In order to become a subject of the law, this

split is operated, says Kant. At the end of Khan's case, we read: "She remarked often in this context that all her life she'd felt that her way of experiencing was different from those of others. She could get very heated-up, passionate and interested about people and things, but it was always transient", it never really mattered. "If only I could at least hate someone" she said, because she did not. "Her whole life had been organised around libidinalised ego interests rather", Khan says, "than proper affects and feelings or object relationships. She'd always been fair to everybody but involved with no one. From all this material it was possible to see very clearly how throughout her life she'd been two persons. One who lived in reality, largely reactive to others, quite gay and with a tendency to get run down every now and then, and the other who had stayed very latent and unknowable to herself until these two affairs." There is the split, then, between the pathological subject, the subject of affects and passions, and the subject of the law. We can note this detail of her "always being fair". We see here the split between \$ and S, brute subject of pleasure.

It seems that in both of the cases there is an attempt on an immediate level for the subjects to situate themselves in the position of an object. It is not simply masochism, where we are dealing with a subject in this position. The subject goes into a barber's shop and the barber (a representation, an imaginisation of a symbolic Other, an agent of the symbolic) is someone who introduces the symbolic practice of shaving within a social set up. The barber puts the subject in the position of the object, although the difference is that the subject gives the orders. There is a problem here which was discussed a lot in the 1930s particularly by French analysts; why do these subjects organise their scenarios in this way? They said it is because in the encounter with anxiety the subject has to somehow libidinise anxiety in order to deal with it. It is an interesting perspective, particularly in Glover's paper on 'The Relation of Perversion Formation to the Development of Reality Sense'. The barber about to lose control, the language teacher about to lose control and become exhausted, show us this maintaining of division on the side of the Other. In both of those dimensions the division is connected to what the subject coordinates his jouissance to. This idea was perhaps perceived in a confused way by Gillespie in the 'International Journal' in his articles of 1940, 1952 and 1956. Gillespie is working in the Kleinian tradition, and he claims that it is not simply a splitting of the ego as Freud had argued in perversion, but rather a splitting of the object. He gives in the 1952 paper a discussion of different clinical examples of this splitting.

Let's try and situate a more precise diagnostic in these cases. Lacan gives two different formulas in his seminar on anxiety: it seems that what the masochist looks for is the jouissance of the other, yet this is in fact a sort of



alibi. The key to the masochistic phenomena, rather, is in fact the anxiety of the other. Secondly, it would seem that the sadist aims at the anxiety of the other, but in fact what he aims at rather is to realise himself as object (a)

jouissance of other  
anxiety of other

anxiety of other  
realisation of object

Therefore there is no symmetry between the sadist and the masochist. We have jouissance of the other over anxiety of the other, and then anxiety of the other not over the jouissance of the other but over the object (a). So there is an asymmetry between sadism and masochism even if both the sadist and the masochist aim to realise themselves as objects, (ie the rejected object of the signifying chain) but they do it via different scenarios. The approach is via the imaginary.

Now, why do we qualify Khan's case as masochism? Presumably Freedman's case is one of masochism as well? I would say that Freedman's is in fact a case of sadism. With the notion of the voice we have a clue as to how to make a differentiation between the two cases. The problem is that Lacan has argued that there is an asymmetry between sadism and masochism, indeed that there is no such thing as sado-masochism, that it is a myth of the sexologists and is not a pertinent clinical category. However he does say that they both attempt to realise themselves as objects. How can we make a link between the two? It seems that there is a clue in the 1968 seminar 'D'un autre a l'Autre' where Lacan introduces the sadomasochistic object, which is surprising after he showed us that sado-masochism was an invalid category. Now he introduces an object of the drive which he calls the sado-masochistic object and he situates the object as one of the four objects (a): the look, the breast, the excrement and the voice. Lacan situates the sado-masochistic object as the voice. It is a striking idea since in analytic literature on object relations and the role of objects in perversion, there are very few articles on the role of the voice, and the connection of the voice to the phallus. They are not linked to the development Lacan makes. When he introduced this it was really going against the standard theories of perversion, connecting it to the oral and anal object.

How can we use the idea of the sado-masochistic object, the voice, to differentiate the clinic? We can keep in mind the relation of the superego to the voice. The sadist tries to impose his own voice on the Other: an example might be in Sade's descriptions of the various orgies that have been organised where the whole text is full of long, boring speeches, discussions and dialogues. There is a constant imposition of speech on the other, the victim doesn't have a chance to speak in Sade, as we see very clearly in the history of Juliette. Contrast this to masochism where it would rather be a question of giving the voice back to the Other. Perhaps we could say then that masochism is really

the perversion of modern times, in the sense that what structures our world since at least the 18th century is the weakening of the position of the voice in the Other, ie the perverse and the nonperverse ways the voice can be situated in the Other. As the effects of science weaken the relations of the family the voice is given back to the Other. That is why whereas with Freud fetishism is the key perversion, with Lacan it is masochism. It shows us in an extreme way the situation of the subject as an object. On a phenomenological level it seems odd to say that sadists situate themselves as objects.

To go back to the two cases: what traits are shared between the barber's shop scene and the secondary perversion with the girlfriend in Freedman's case? He puts his pencil in the girls' mouth so she is unable to speak and is made to gag. We can say that this shows the imposition of the voice on the other, and connected to this, is the fact of the relations between the Polish and Jewish languages in the subject's history, and the father's problematic relation to language. Similarly in Khan's case the subject doesn't impose her own voice on the other but has a voice imposed. What she enjoyed about the perversion with the mechanic is being gagged, having her own voice taken away and giving the voice to the other. In this she continues, blindly, to operate as the instrument of the partner's jouissance in her masturbation. It is slightly opaque why she is doing this, but it seems she follows the edicts of this voice. Note also the fact that after her father became crippled in an accident, he would make her toys, using string adeptly to make them mobile. She is giving the string back to the father.

This allows us to situate Khan's case inside masochism and Freedman's case on the side of sadism, where it is a matter of giving orders to the barber; the barber isn't allowed to speak. The language comes from the side of the subject right until the point of division in the barber shop case, in the anxiety of the Other.

If perversion, in a very general sense, is a problematic relation with castration, if castration is somehow avoided in the perverse practices and we look at one of Lacan's later definitions of castration we can try and rethink the approach to perversion. We can understand by castration the effects of language on the organism and the resulting loss of jouissance: Lacan calls the Other "a desert of jouissance". Jouissance is emptied from the Other leaving a barred subject, divided by the structure of language, and a residue of jouissance,, the object (a). If in a lacanian sense castration means the emptying of jouissance from the place of the Other and the Freudian pervert denies castration, we can try to elaborate perversion as an attempt to reinsituate jouissance to the place of the Other, which is imaginised in Khan's case by the attempt to reintroduce jouissance in to that which presents language (ie the



teacher) and in Freedman's case the relation to the girlfriend.

There is a quote from Ecrits on page 823: perversion "institutes the dominance in the privileged place of jouissance of the object (a) of the phantasy, which it substitutes for  $\mathcal{A}$ ". Instead of  $\mathcal{A}$ , we put (a). Hence, on the graph, we would now read the matheme  $S(a)$ .  $S(\mathcal{A})$  has become  $S(a)$ . How do we understand at the top of the graph this first matheme? One way of reading it is that what bars the Other is the evacuation of jouissance.

What bars the Other is this loss of jouissance which is symbolised in the phallus. The phallus represents the part of jouissance which can be symbolised. Now, if in perversion there is a change to the graph, (a) is put in the place of  $(\mathcal{A})$  it indicates that there is an attempt to resituate jouissance in the place of the Other, where it had been evacuated. We can compare the different strategies of the neurotic and the pervert in relation to the jouissance of the Other, which ought to be, Lacan says "a desert". Note also that  $S(a)$  is a matheme of the voice.

Similarly (p824) Lacan says "To come back to the phantasy, let us say that the pervert imagines himself to be the Other to ensure his jouissance, and the neurotic shows this in imagining himself to be a pervert; he does this to ensure himself of the Other." This introduces problems: Lacan says the pervert imagines himself as the Other. The stress on action which we read in accounts of perversion does not always situate the place of the imaginary in relation to the symbolic and the real in perversion; we could also perhaps mark out a distinction with some forms of psychosis in that whereas the pervert "s' imagine etre l'Autre" in psychosis it is more a question of 'etre'. The verb "s' imagine" introduces the notion of a limit, it's different from "etre", and the "assurer sa jouissance" poses the problem of whose jouissance, and in whose service does the pervert jouit. If neurosis and perversion are both attempts to make the Other exist, two different strategies as Colette Soler has pointed out, the neurotic tries to make the Other exist via love, whereas the pervert tries to make the Other exist via jouissance. We could say that the love with which the neurotic tries to make the Other exist is the transference love, and there you have the big Other side of the transference as opposed to the object (a) side - via the love there is an attempt to make the Other exist, whereas with perversion there is a proof via jouissance, to make the Other jouir. Seeing the hour, I had better stop here.



by F Nakano

"Perversions are not fixations but the products of fear"  
Sandor Ferenczi [1]

An attempt will be made to cover both the structure of sexual development and that of perversion which was, for Freud, simply the persistence in adult life of elements of infantile (sexual) activities, which demonstrate the failure to succumb to the defence mechanisms that would have converted them into neurotic symptoms. Here is the origin of the formula that "neurosis is the negative of perversion"; in perversion the repressed phantasy remains capable of consciousness and is pleasurable [2] whereas in neurosis it remains unconscious and, grosso modo, unpleasurable. [3]

One's sexual life, unlike that of animals, is therefore able to cross the narrow lines imposed as the standard of normality. The origins of the so-called perversions are to be found in the undifferentiated sexual disposition of the child. Freud formulated at first a tripartite structure of his theory concerning sexual behaviour dealing with

- a) the source of the sexual impulse
- b) its aim; and
- c) its object.

The first was more or less parallel to his concept of drive, that is, the view that the (corporeal) organs developed tensions which required some form of release. These tensions, according to him, are clustered in certain areas of the body called "erogenous zones"; these restricted areas were later extended so that the whole surface of the body was capable of erogenicity. However, he retained the concept of what he called primary erogenous zones (the genitals, the mouth and the anus). The sexual drive was thus viewed as a bodily function which, essentially, was meaningless. Its meaning was to be found only via the later elaboration of its link with objects. We can therefore, note that at first the relief of these tensions was something without meaning and constituted an auto-erotic activity, which lasted until the object-seeking period began. This period, at first, was believed to start no earlier than around the third year - time when the genital zone replaced the previous fundamentally meaningless and auto-erotic ones, which, as not being subjected to inhibitions and, therefore, not sources of anxiety, resulted in no form of repression and consequently gave rise to no symptom formation of any kind. Inhibitions were only to emerge when the child reached the genital period.

Half way through the first decade of this century a new concept was introduced into this structure: narcissism. This came between the auto-erotic and the object related periods. There is the gradual emergence of a purely internal conflict together with the problem of what being masculine and feminine means. This shifted some of Freud's previous ideas, such as those related to homosexuality which, from something primarily a matter of object choice, became part of the narcissistic phase. [4] The overall concept of what he called benign perversions was that they were repressions of infantile impulses which resulted in the damming-up of libido which, by conversion, turned into symptoms and anxieties.

Freud first mentions perversions in his Draft K - The Neurosis of Defence (A Christmas Fairy Tale) [5] where he raises the question "How does it come about that analogous conditions sometimes give rise to perversion instead of neurosis?" He does not elaborate this question in the Draft itself, but he returns to it in a letter to Fliess [6] where he writes: "Perhaps I have recently achieved a first glimpse into something new. I am up against the problem of the "choice of neurosis"...my first crude answer was that I thought it depended on the age at which the sexual traumas occurred - on the time of the experience". In another letter to Fliess [7] we read: "The awakening at a later period, of a sexual memory from an earlier one produces a surplus of sexuality in the psyche which has an inhibitory effect upon thought and gives the memory and its derivatives a compulsive character, so that they cannot be inhibited". Following this line of thought, he wrote that up to the age of four years the sexual experience is untranslatable (into verbal images) so the awakening of a sexual scene from this period leads, not to psychical consequences but to physical ones, to what he called conversions, that is to say, a transposition of a psychical conflict into somatic symptoms, (operating mainly in the field of hysteria). However, he was aware that sexuality alone was not enough to cause repression: "the cooperation of defence is necessary", he wrote. The periods in which repressions occur (usually in the so-called transitional period - from 8-10 years and 13-17 years) are, according to Freud of no significance in the choice of neurosis. What is important is the time in which the events occur, together with the nature of the scenes, since it is able to give rise to defence.

In the 9.12.99 letter he comments: "The lowest of the sexual strata is auto-erotism, which renounces any psychosexual aim and seeks only local gratification. This is superseded by alloerotism (homo or heterosexual) but undoubtedly survives as an independent tendency".

In his letter of 6.12.1896 he comments that "another consequence of premature sexual experience may be perversion, the determining condition of which seems to be that defence either did not occur before the completion of

the psychical apparatus or did not occur at all". And he continues: "In order to explain why the outcome is sometimes perversion and sometimes neurosis, I avail myself of the universal bisexuality of human beings. [8] In a purely male being there would be a surplus of masculine release at the two sexual boundaries, consequently pleasure would be generated and at the same time perversion; in a purely female being there would be a surplus of unpleasurable substance at these two points of time. During the first two phases the releases would run parallel (ie. there would be a normal surplus of pleasure). This explains the preference of true females for the defensive neurosis"

In his paper "A Child is being beaten" (1919) we are able to follow a complete sequence:

The child being beaten or the person doing the beating is never the child producing the phantasy; the child being beaten does not, necessarily, have to be a brother or a sister, nor the adult the father or the mother. The main point is that the sentence: "He (the beater) does not love this other child" will, later, be completed by a more clarifying statement: "whom I hate". The beater, therefore - so the child thinks - by not beating him, is expressing his love towards him. No explicit (sexual) manifestation exist here, since there is neither a masochistic (for the child being beaten is someone else) nor a sadistic (since he is not the one mistreating the child) trait;

it is during the third moment that the (sexual) excitation emerges, for there is a sadistic strain present now; if, on the one hand the sadistic trait is placed in the form of the phantasy, the gratification is, however, masochistic.

The most important moment is, however, the second which, according to Freud, as a rule, never reaches the level of consciousness, probably due to the intensity of repression - a sense of guilt is to be found here together with the presence of a masochism (the statement, here, becomes "I am being beaten by my father"). The main characteristic of this moment is that it is a merely (re)construction which only takes place during the analytical treatment.

The emergence of a perversion (in childhood) can both persist throughout life or can be broken off and remain in the background of the so-called normal (sexual) development from which it can continue to withdraw a certain amount of energy. Normal defence makes itself felt only as a result of a generation of unpleasure; pathological defences occur only against a memory trace from an earlier phase that has not yet been, as Freud puts it, "translated". This notion refers to his idea that "successive registrations represent the psychic achievement of successive epochs of life. At



the boundary between two such epochs a translation of the psychic material must take place. Every later transcript inhibits its predecessor and drains the excitatory process from it. If a later transcript is lacking the excitation is dealt with in accordance with the psychological laws in force in the earlier period and along the path open at that time. A failure of translation is what he calls repression. This, according to him, takes place as a result of "a release of the unpleasure that would be generated by a translation". Even though sexuality in children can present numerous traces of what, in adults, is considered as a perversion, Freud felt it necessary to expand the concept of what was sexual until it conveyed more than the impulsion towards the union of the two sexes in the sexual act or provoking particular pleasurable sensations in the genitals. As a consequence, if the sexual behaviour could, therefore, be described as deviant but non-pathological or as pathological but non-deviant, we find ourselves facing the fact that, per se, the so-called norm cannot be taken as a criterion for the presence of what is called pathological, even more so because this norm would depend on which group or society we are considering.

In his "Three Essays..." Freud only considers as normal the heterosexual behaviour which culminates in "the union of the genitals in the act known as copulation, which leads to a release of the sexual tension and a temporary extinction of the sexual instinct...even in the most normal sexual process we may detect rudiments which, if they had developed, would have led to deviations described as perversions". And he concludes: "perversions are sexual activities which either

- a) extend, in an anatomical sense, beyond the regions of the body that are designed for sexual union; or
- b) lingers over the intermediate relations to the sexual object which should normally be traversed rapidly on the path towards the final sexual aim"

This aim, we should not forget, had only one meaning for Freud: reproduction. We therefore meet the case when we can have something which could be classified as perversion even though it is not necessarily pathological for it would be considered as such only when it becomes a constant pattern in the sexual repertoire in both sexes. There are, however, activities which are always classified as pathological.

We notice that this conception of what is to be considered as a perversion is, grosso modo, already found in (Western) antiquity, when any deviation from procreation was considered an act of rebellion against the social group (9). In his "Psychopathologia Sexualis" Kraft-Ebbing considers (any) manifestation beyond the natural objective of reproduction as "an anomaly of the sexual instinct", representing "ontogenetic troubles". It is, however, Binet who, really preceded Freud with his formulation that these

"ontogenetic troubles" were the result of an infantile experience strong enough to leave traces represented by mental associations.

These mental associations will later become information (both in the sense that they not only give the child a representation, a first draft, a form, but also an instruction, an education). The child, crossing this ambiguous region, where he finds himself in a position without any clear-cut distinction between himself and his mother will still believe, already accepting her existence outside himself, that they are similar in every detail. The mother thus continues to possess everything the child endowed her with, including the child's (imaginary) phallus. When confronted with its lack, the child will be faced with a problem. He has to separate the mother from all other females, for, in the child's conception, being a woman is not equated with being deprived of the phallus, so much so that the child imagines that only unworthy females do not possess one; those regarded with respect retain it for a longer period. Such is the case of the mother. Should the child be confronted with pregnancy and parturition he will sometimes link the mother with this absence. The real genitals of the mother, however, still remain a mystery, for the child believes that babies come into the world through the anus [10]. The loss, by the mother, of this object will, in certain cases, make the thought of a non-phallic mother intolerable since it automatically elicits an overpowering castration anxiety. The child, in this case, will choose a compromise regarding his sexual object: two of his options are fetishism and homosexuality. Where the homosexual is driven to seek objects which can satisfy his unconscious need for a woman with a penis (a transvestite or an feminized man who, each time, is there to reinforce his belief in the possibility of a phallic woman, who is merely a (sexual) object, *faute de mieux*), the fetishist continues to seek women, but, in order to be able to enjoy them, he is forced to equip them with this missing organ. Though Freud observed that this prevents the fetishist from becoming a homosexual, since the presence of the fetish allows the woman to remain a tolerable sexual object and that, in both cases, the child refuses to relinquish his first love object the phallic mother, this, nevertheless, prevents neither the fetishist from having sexual relations with both heterosexuals and homosexuals nor the homosexual from presenting traces of fetishism.

This castration is, however, not something "enfeoffing, but something which frees us from the dependency of the Other, which will make those who go through this initiation, who accept to submit to the Law, an equal to adults" [11] that is one who, once accepting not only that the mother does not possess the object, but that he himself is no longer that object, has to reassess his whole structure, not only in the sense of to be or not to be it, to have or to not have it, but, more importantly, in relation to the idea of knowledge

for now he has to recognise that he no longer is the one who holds all the knowledge that there is to know. He is then faced with the fact that somebody else knows. This somebody else, not, as he believed, being the mother, has to be the father. The position of the pervert is, then, that of never again being deprived of any kind of knowledge, in particular that concerning the difference of the sexes. He, so he believes, is one who has absolute knowledge. That is why Freud designated as the main characteristic of castration, the mastery of solving this mystery, that is to say, the acquiring of this knowledge about the lack, the knowledge which will enable him to become aware that only this lack can be the cause of desire; it is this knowledge which, through the process of disavowal (Verleugnung), the pervert wants nothing to do with. This has the result that, it is no longer a lack but a presence which becomes the cause of desire. That is why for the pervert the (a) (of the phantasy) replaces the lack in the Other: S[~~A~~]; that is, the process through which the pervert dismisses in terms of the relation to the Name of the Father, refuses to submit to his Law, thus, sidestepping the Law, becoming both an outsider and an outlaw. [12] That which the pervert sidesteps is also the process by which the father, by demonstrating, that though he is the putative possessor of the phallus he is not it, therefore reinstating it as the desired object of the (m)Other, allows the child to enter the dialectical relationship of having it through his identification with him, thus also becoming the possessor of it and, therefore, equally able to pass it on. He has to discover that, unlike the woman, in order to take the right position, he does not have to lose what he did not have. If he were not to submit to this symbolic castration, he will not be able to shift from the register of being (the phallus) to that of having (the phallus) or, in other words, there will be no shift from the imaginary father to the symbolic one - the one totally ignored by the pervert - one who institutes the difference of the sexes, thus placing the absolute jouissance, that is to say, one not subjected to castration, on the side of phantasy [ $\$ \langle \rangle a$ ]. The only Law accepted by the pervert is precisely that of jouissance for, as Lacan puts it, "he makes himself the instrument of the jouissance of the Other" [13]. This is how we are able to understand Lacan's statement that the pervert is not the one who wants to be one (this being the dream of the neurotic - the hysteric, who believes herself to be perverse, pays for this: the price is anxiety) but one able to be one.

What the pervert misses is the distinction between the different levels occupied by the father. The real father (biological) - the one who has nothing to do with the Oedipal process, since it is outside the realm of reality. The one responsible for this process is the imaginary father. The phallic intervention only takes place through the so-called symbolic father. The link between the paternal intervention and the child only takes place through the desire of the Other, that is to say, not in a direct



relation to the father but to his speech [non pas au pere, mais a la parole du pere], to his authority. [14] What the pervert seems not to understand is that one is only able to remain uncastrated as far as one is endowed with a phallic trait (which he, in reality, does not possess since, in order to possess it he had, paradoxically, to renounce it). In Lacanian terms this means that the only thing a man is able to give to a woman is precisely what he has not, a gift which, on the other hand, allows the woman to distinguish between the phallus and the penis, or, as he says in "The formations of the unconscious" "in order to have the phallus one must accept that one cannot actually have it". The missing point (for the pervert) is precisely that the Law is there to mediate between the Other and desire and that the role of the father is precisely to link the Law to desire. The pervert is perverse precisely because he is unwilling to shift from the imaginary where, so he believes, nothing is lacking.

This unwillingness to shift is the exemplification of the title of this text. The word perversion itself presents several possibilities to explain this unwillingness. PER(version) can, amongst other meanings, be understood as "on account of", "for the sake of", "under the sign of". The verb related to the word PERVERTO has, as one of its meanings, "to silence". PERVERSUS is something which has "turned the wrong way". PERVERTERE is "to throw back", "to go back", "to remain in the same place". Lacan's pun is illuminating, for it shows how, through his unwillingness, the pervert not only embodies the verb itself - refusal to "turn something away from a place" (AVERTO) but, to me, also allows the progression to other possibilities: PEREVERGE - in the sense of endowing the father not with the phallus (which is kept with the mother) but with the penis and, finally, PERE-VIERGE - for, in a sense, he has never been enlightened, one who, in a sense, never has a physical relation(ship) for, through his imaginary action he momentarily attains his ideal, one who, believes he is holding the imaginary certainty that this partial jouissance is proof that the sexual rapport exists, for instead of the Lacanian statement that "the sexual rapport does not cease not to inscribe itself" the pervert claims that "it does not cease to inscribe itself".

His sole consolation might lie in the fact that it was also Lacan who said that "the act of love is the polymorphous perversion of the male" for man mistakes the body of the woman for the object of his desire. In the act of love, says Lacan "he only broaches the cause of his desire, that which I have called the object a"; that, in a sense, ultimately we are all perverse, but some of us are more perverse than others.

- [ 1 ] "The Clinical Diary of Sandor Ferenczi". Harvard University Press, 1988, pg.172
- [ 2 ] Freud, however, wrote "...they have to pay most bitterly for the satisfactions they manage to procure with such difficulty"
- [ 3 ] One is the negative of the other because, like two sides of a coin, both, forming a whole, they are simply residues of infantile sexuality, so much so that there are known cases where for example, an alternation between neurotic phobia and perverse gratification can be found. One should also not forget that certain perversions are the negative of certain psychotic formations.
- [ 4 ] No major work of Freud's deals exclusively with (male) homosexuality, although this was an issue which engaged his interest throughout his life. The summary of his works on the various aetiologies of homosexual object choice can, for example, be found in his "Certain Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality" (1922). Throughout his career, he expressed an undecided opinion on the relationship between homosexuality and psychopathology. It is true that although he sometimes considered homosexuality one of the perversions, which, in his opinion, were clearly pathological, at other times he did not, for he did make a distinction between "perversion" and "inversion" (ie, homosexuality) - in both cases we have the Latin roots "turning away" and "turning inward". One would, perhaps, not be too far off the mark if one were to state that, in Freud's opinion, homosexuality was not a perversion: "...inversion is found in people who otherwise show no marked deviation from the normal" (1905, Three Essays...) And from 1935 we have his statement that even though "homosexuality is assuredly no advantage...we consider it to be a variation of the sexual function produced by a certain arrest of sexual development".
- [ 5 ] 1 January 1896
- [ 6 ] 9 December 1899
- [ 7 ] 30 May 1896
- [ 8 ] This idea comes from Fliess' monograph where after proclaiming the existence of both male and female periods, he went on to develop the theme of constitutional bisexuality.
- [ 9 ] In Greece it was the duty of every citizen to get married and produce new citizens and unmarried people had not only to pay heavy fines but, like exclusive homosexuals, were considered indecent, laughable and despicable. The sexual life of the couple, carried on, in the dark, with haste and shame, had but one purpose: reproduction; and until the woman produced a child, she was, by law, obliged to have intercourse with her husband three times a month. Pleasure per se, stated Plato in his Laws, is "a crime...people must live unpolluted...in a law-abiding way".

- [10] Ferenczi mentions a case where a patient believe that women had a short but thick penis with a very wide urethra whose lumen was large enough to allow penetration by the man's penis. In "Further Contributions to the Theory and Technique of Psycho-Analysis". Karnac (Books), London, 1980, p.315.
- [11] Françoise Dolto - "Seminaire de psychanalyse d'enfants" Seuil, 1985, vol.2, p.182
- [12] It is not because the child knows that the father is endowed with a penis that the child will, automatically, make him the possessor of the phallus. The homosexual is, in my opinion, one who both retains the phallic mother and eroticizes the penis of the father.
- [13] ECRITS, Seuil, 1966, p.823
- [14] Les Formations de L'inconscient. 22.1.58



## A NOTE ON PERVERSION

by D Machado

Perversion, in Freud's time, was placed either under the so-called LEGAL ORDER (delinquents) or under the MEDICAL ORDER (disease, degeneracy).

Freud held neither the one nor the other position. He would rather say that a structure is perverse (this would be confirmed by his postulate of polymorphous perversion). If the structure is perverse, then every object is a perverse object.

The subject in this perverse structure will anchor his metonymizing movements of desire on a certain object, which can only be identified through signifiers; certain marks which constitute a certain basic image. Therefore every individual has his objects par excellence, related to his own basic symptom. The Name of the Father is functioning, providing the subject with an S1 - each individual has a different taste, according to his own signifiers.

This is the original perverse moment. To choose one object is to obliterate the sliding, anchor the object in its signifier we could say.

Another thing is perversion itself, where the object is no longer metaphor of the Name of the Father. The Name of the Father stops functioning here and becomes the metaphor of the fetish. The Name of the Father is, therefore, pure metaphor of the object a, it becomes the object a. In a perversion itself, as opposed to perversion as a structure, desire is referred to that which is thought to be "the" metaphor and not "a" metaphor. In this sense the desire of the other does not emerge. There is no paternal metaphor but the metaphor is placed over an object.

In what we could call "normal" perversion, the ordinary one, an anchorage of the object takes place so that every subject has a fetish object which comes from his basic signifying structure (which, we could say, configures his symptom). In "normal" perversion the fetish is metaphor of the Name of the Father which functions through this fetish.

In the perversion itself the object comes as a substitute for the paternal metaphor. Hence the fetish object is no longer a mediator between the subject and the barred Other.

We could say that:





The way to deal with the pervert is through inhibition: anxiety appears to the pervert via the presence of the real and also via inhibition.

Contrary to the psychotic the pervert is the one who inscribes the signifier of the lack in the Other (S(A)) but he encapsulates it as an absolute object (structure of his fetishism). Therefore we can say that the pervert is himself as the Other of the other, that is, desired by the Other, since he considers himself as the "happy owner" of his fetish. There is an objectivation of the Name of the Father.

The pervert asks the question: why am I me? The symptom, therefore, is the guarantor of the pervert, is the "crystal ball" which would have solved, for him, all the problems. He is not persecuted by his symptom: The pervert is caught by inhibition and never through the symptom. In the case of the "voyeur" who is surprised seeing - this does not appear as a symptom, but as an effect of the surprise which inhibits him. It is only when the police are there that he becomes inhibited. If the police are not there he can't care less about the law.

The pervert begs for the police, the rule, instead of assuming that he already has a signifier which, metaphorised, would bring him the limits of his real configuration, the Law.

A Short Story by the Marquis de Sade:

'The Horse-Chestnut Flower'

A collection of short stories by De Sade has recently been published by Peter Owen and we are very pleased to be able to reprint one of them here. The stories are translated by Margaret Crosland and appear under the title 'The Gothic Tales of the Marquis de Sade' (Peter Owen, London 1990). Details of this and other books of related interest may be found at the back of this issue.

THE HORSE-CHESTNUT FLOWER

It is alleged, I would not vouch for it, but some learned men assure us that the flower of the horse-chestnut tree definitely possesses the same smell as that abundant seed which it has pleased nature to place within the loins of men for the reproduction of their kind.

A young girl of about fifteen, who had never left her father's house, was walking one day with her mother and a sophisticated Abbe down an avenue of horse-chestnut trees whose flowers filled the air with the scent which we have just taken the liberty to describe.

'Oh good gracious, mother, what an odd smell,' said the girl, not realising where it was coming from... 'what is it, it's a smell I know.'

'Be quiet, mademoiselle, don't make remarks of that kind, I beg you.'

'But why not, mother, I don't see what's wrong in telling you that I've smelt it before, and I definitely have.'

'But, mademoiselle...'

'But, mother, I recognise it, really I do; Monsieur Abbe, tell me, I beg you, what's wrong in my saying to mother that I recognise that smell?'

'Mademoiselle,' said the Abbe, adjusting his jabot and speaking in a piping voice, 'there is certainly nothing very wrong in the fact itself; but we are walking beneath horse-chestnut trees and we botanists admit that horse-chestnut flowers...'

'Well, horse-chestnut flowers...?'

'Well, mademoiselle, they smell of spunk.'



# Ivy House Seminars

1 9 9 0

All Ivy House Seminars are held on Wednesdays

- 25 April Source and Strategy in Lacan's Ecrits  
KATE FORD
- 2 MAY To SIR, with love  
DANUZA MACHADO
- 9 MAY Freudian Field Seminars, Commentary 1
- 16 MAY Shame  
BICE BENVENUTO
- 23 MAY Freudian Field Seminars, Commentary 2
- 30 MAY Ethics  
RICHARD KLEIN
- 6 JUNE Freudian Field Seminars, Commentary 3

## FREUDIAN FIELD SEMINARS

These seminars are this year on Lacan's text: THE DIRECTION OF THE TREATMENT. There is a theoretical and a related clinical part to each seminar, and no previous reading of Lacan will be assumed. The seminars will be held from 2 to 6pm as follows:-

- 21 April - Marie-Helene Brousse: (in room Herringham 43, Regents College, Regents Park).
- 19 May - Vincente Palomera: (in room Tuke 97 of Regents College).
- 23 June - Pierre-Gilles Gueguen (in Tuke 97).

The CHILD-ANALYSIS WORK-GROUP of the Centre for Freudian Analysis and Research will hold seminars on Melanie Klein's Narrative of a Child Analysis on May 29, June 4 and June 25, in the Freud Museum, 20 Maresfield Gardens, London NW3, at 8.30pm. Admission is £4 for each meeting. For further details phone 071-586 0992.

Darian Leader will continue his seminar on The Use of Alibis, on 17 and 31 May from 7-8.30pm at The October Gallery, 24 Old Gloucester Street, WC1. Admission is £3.

Bernard Burgoyne will give a seminar: INTERPRETATION OR INTERVENTION in the series Psychoanalysis Community, and Culture organised by the Philadelphia Association at 4 Marty's Yard, 17 Hampstead High Street, London NW3 at 7.30pm on Sunday June 3. Admission is £4. For further information on the Philadelphia Association's seminars telephone 071-794 2652.

Newsletter of the Centre  
for Freudian Analysis and Research,  
23 Primrose Gardens, London NW3 4UJ.

The Newsletter retails at £7.50 per issue. Subscription rates for one year are as follows:

	£
Individuals	20.00
Institutions	40.00

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE:

M Du Ry, D Leader, B Rasmussen, B Hooson, K Swarbrick,  
D Corfield

The editorial committee welcomes articles for publication in the journal. These should be typed on A4 with editorial margins of approx 1 1/2". Your article should be submitted to M Du Ry at Flat 3, 49 Queens Crescent, London NW5 3QG.

CFAR was founded in February 1985 with the aim of encouraging research into the work of Freud and Lacan. Regular lectures and seminars combine with study groups and smaller workgroups called cartels. A section of CFAR is devoted to child analysis, and study groups on psychosis and the foundations of logic and mathematics will be run from 1991.

CFAR provides a training programme for the formation of Lacanian psychoanalysts. There are two categories of membership, one of them designed for those who already have extensive clinical experience. Details of the training programme can be obtained by writing to the centre at its London address - Candidates are taken on in April and October of each year.

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