


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The Uncanny by Tom Baker

Psychoanalysis and literary criticism have always been uncomfortable - if frequently willing - partners. Ever since Freud, whose texts are packed with references to Shakespeare, Schiller and Goethe, declared himself accomplice with the poet in the matter of the Unconscious, it has been apparent that the two disciplines share a common interest in the field of aesthetics. Hence, psychoanalysis has been in a position for appropriation into the discourse of literary criticism. Indeed, in many respects it has been dependent upon the popularising achieved by this discourse in order to make itself heard. This has been especially the case with Lacan. I should make it clear at this point that I believe the greater part of the work done in the name of so-called "psychoanalytic criticism" to have been characterised by a fundamental muddle concerning the nature of psychoanalysis.

What, then, is the relation between literature and psychoanalysis? Hitherto the conspiracy has centred on their supposedly shared concern with interpretation. Critics have leapt at the possibilities afforded by the arrival of new hermeneutic tool, bringing with it further the advantage of theoretical rigour. But psychoanalysis is not a hermeneutic tool, and if anyone has demonstrated this then surely it is Lacan. Lacan has shown that interpretation is a resistance. It is something that blocks the emergence of truth.

The founding error of so-called psychoanalytic criticism is precisely this - it believes that literature is the product of the unconscious and that psychoanalysis is the tool for interpreting the unconscious. It confuses the unconscious with the symptom.

This paper takes its cue from a remark made by Lacan in the seminar of 1974, Les Non-dupes errent: "interpréter l'art, c'est ce que Freud a toujours repudié; ce qu'on appelle psychoanalyse de l'art est encore plus à écarter que la fameuse psychologie de l'art, qui est une notion délirante. De l'art nous avons à prendre de la graine, de prendre de la graine pour autre chose."

(to interpret art is what Freud has always repudiated, what is called psychoanalysis of art is to be avoided even more than the famous psychology of art, which is a (delirious) notion. From art we have to take a leaf, we have to take a leaf out of its book for another purpose).

"Prendre de la graine pour autre chose" - to take a leaf out of its book for another purpose. Instead of interpreting, Lacan asks us to learn. Psychoanalysis is not a method, not even a privileged method, for interpreting art, but rather a particular way of learning from and profiting by it. Psychoanalysis, learnt from hysterics precisely by taking a

leaf out of their book, naturally privileges listening over interpretation and resistance. If we fail to bear this in mind, we will be doomed to repeat the worst errors of literary criticism, whether analytically inspired or not. Psychoanalysis is concerned with knowledge. Therefore, when its interest is turned to aesthetics the question is the same question that lies behind Plato's dialogue, *The Ion* : not "what is beautiful?", but "what do poets know? Of What kind is poetic knowledge?"

My thesis here is that there might be a notion of psychoanalytic criticism of art which learns its theory from its texts as much as from its mis-construction of the discourse which lends it its name. Such a criticism would be continually pushed up against the limits of its own silence, and forced to further its own knowledge of itself at every encounter. Such a criticism, instead of seeking to interpret in a demonstrative fashion, thereby reducing the text to evidential status, would concentrate on creating the best conditions under which the work might speak for itself, and be prepared to take it at its word. I shall add here in parenthesis the further reminder that Lacan once said that it seemed to him more profitable to read literature in terms of the symptom than in terms of the unconscious or the fantasy.

So much for preliminary remarks and caveats. Suffice it to say that I wish to read Freud's paper of 1918, The Uncanny, not as a work of literary criticism but as a work of psychoanalysis. That ought not to be too controversial a decision, yet this strategy has not been the one taken by the many analytically-inclined literary critics who have turned their attention to the essay. What I want to explore is just what profit Freud draws from his readings of literature in this essay, and further what reverberations this has within the wider context of psychoanalytic theory. The question, then, is not : "what does Freud, as a psychoanalyst, teach us about a class of literature called the Uncanny?" but : "what can we, as students of psychoanalysis, learn from Freud's essay on the Uncanny?"

Listen carefully to the way that he opens the paper:
"It is only rarely that a psycho-analyst feels impelled to investigate the subject of aesthetics, even when aesthetics is understood to mean not merely the theory of beauty but the theory of qualities of feeling. He works in other strata of mental life and has little to do with the subdued emotional impulses which, inhibited in their aims and dependent on a host of concurrent factors, usually furnish the material for the study of aesthetics. But it does occasionally happen that he has to interest himself in some particular province of that subject and this province usually proves to be a rather remote one and one which has been neglected in the specialist literature of aesthetics..."

Freud's opening move, then, is at once to distance himself from and involve himself in aesthetics. He concedes the

rarity of the analyst's interest and then, in the very next clause, widens the definition of the other's territory. From being a theory of beauty, it becomes the theory of the qualities of feeling. Then he points to a province within this newly-expanded territory which previous prospectors have either failed to notice or simply ignored. In accordance with my argument, Freud's interest in literature is not the result of a feeling that he has in psychoanalysis a brand new hermeneutic tool. Rather he writes: "It does occasionally happen that he has to interest himself in some particular province of that subject..."

Freud's thesis, stated early in the paper, is that: "the Uncanny is that class of the frightening that leads us back to what is known of old and long familiar." This he argues following two courses; the first a linguistic analysis of the German word 'heimlich' (the negative of which, 'unheimlich', means 'uncanny'), the second a collection of examples drawn from literature and experience, both clinical and otherwise.

Looking into the dictionary, Freud notes that, further to 'heimlich's references as 'homely, intimate, comfortable, friendly and tame', we find 'secretive hidden', and even, 'die heimlich kunst', meaning not domestic science but rather the black arts. 'Heimlich' also has the meaning of that which is obscure, inaccessible to knowledge. It is thus a word whose meaning, says Freud, "develops in the direction of ambivalence, until it finally coincides with its opposite, 'unheimlich'."

Let us return for a moment to that opening paragraph of Freud's paper and look once more at his expressed motives and justifications for this enquiry into the Uncanny. For Freud's reference in the essay to his unpublished treatise on the Wiederholungszwang, or repetition compulsion, marks a closer relationship between psychoanalysis and the uncanny than might appear at first. Not only does Freud suggest that it is repetition that characterises the uncanny. In that paragraph in which he alludes to the forthcoming masterwork, Freud writes: "For it is possible to recognise the dominance in the unconscious mind of a 'compulsion to repeat', proceeding from the instinctual impulses and probably inherent in the very nature of the instincts - a compulsion powerful enough to overrule the pleasure principle, lending to certain aspects of the mind their demonic character, and still very clearly expressed in the impulses of small children; a compulsion, too, which is responsible for a part of the course taken by the analyses of neurotic patients. All these considerations prepare us for the discovery that whatever reminds us of this inner compulsion to repeat is perceived as uncanny."

If whatever reminds us of this inner compulsion to repeat is perceived as uncanny, then surely the uncanny can now be claimed as the province of psychoanalysis, since it is precisely this Wiederholungszwang that is to become, in just one year's time, one of the fundamental concepts of

psychoanalysis. What Freud seems to be hinting at here is that the repetition compulsion, "proceeding from the instinctual impulses and probably inherent in the very nature of the instincts", which he will be discussing the next year in Beyond The Pleasure Principle is itself uncanny. Certainly, like the word 'heimlich', its meaning develops in the direction of ambivalence - on one level it seems to be an agency which strives for mastery, beyond the pleasure principle inasmuch as it represents the condition for human progress; while on another it appears to be a mechanistic and regressive tendency, illustrated in the examples Freud draws from biology.

But the question to ask here is : does Freud mean to say that it is the reminder of what has to be repeated - the unpleasant or painful material - or the reminder of the compulsion itself that generates the feeling of the uncanny? Or, to put it another way, is Freud trying to tell us that the theory of the repetition compulsion - as a theory - is uncanny? And thence psychoanalysis? Is Freud the psychoanalyst driven into aesthetics in search of an aesthetic that psychoanalysis can call its own?

Indeed, it seems so. Earlier in this paper, Freud cites Schelling's formulation of the Uncanny:

"Everything is uncanny which ought to have remained hidden and secret and yet comes to light."

This may remind us of the discoveries made by Freud and Breuer in their treatment of hysterical patients, the discoveries that led to the invention of the psychoanalytic discourse. They found that each individual symptom disappeared as soon as they had brought to light the memory of the 'event' by which it had been provoked. Similarly, writing on the case of Little Hans, Freud comments: "a thing which has not been understood inevitably reappears; like an unladen ghost, it cannot rest until the mystery has been solved and the spell broken."

Freud is not the only person to perceive the links between psychoanalysis and the uncanny. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, he speaks of people "unfamiliar with the analysis who feel an obscure fear - a dread of rousing something that, so they feel, is better left sleeping...what they are afraid of is the emergence of this compulsion, with its hint of possession by some daemonic power."

I shall be returning to Freud in a moment, but first I want to approach the rest of the essay through a literary text. This text will not be Hoffmann's, The Sand Man, but Oscar Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray. In this book, what sets out in the Preface as no more than an aesthetic thesis - that it is the spectator and not life that art really mirrors - unleashes a tragic narrative around the subject of art, culminating in the vindication of another of Wilde's great aphorisms, that each man kills the thing he loves.

From the minute that he enters the world of art, the core of Dorian's being is elsewhere, in the portrait painted by the artist Basil Hallward. From the first page it is already elsewhere, for we meet the painter and his painting before we encounter its subject. Before he enters the narrative as an actant, Dorian already exists as an image for others. Hallward describes him as "simply a motive in art". He goes on: "He is never more present in my work than when no image of him is there. He is the suggestion, as I have said, of a new manner. I find him in the curves of certain lines, in the loveliness and subtleties of certain colours." It is as if Dorian's sinful wish to exchange places with his image so as to realise his youthful genius is in fact predetermined for him by the action of the artist in representing him. He would not have exchanged his soul for eternal youth and beauty had the artist not presented him with such an utterly new and captivating image of himself. The picture changes according to its own logic, because to be represented in the image is to surrender your identity to it.

In Wilde's novel then the key element of the uncanny lies in the capture of identity - of the soul - in the image. What the drama hinges on is precisely this relation between the image and its subject, from a motive in art to the final figure, "withered, wrinkled and loathsome of visage", that he assumes from the impaled portrait. At some point, Dorian and his image must reunite.

I hope you will bear all this in mind while I return, as I promised, to Freud's paper on the uncanny. Given the nature of his subject, it is hardly surprising to note that Freud has something to say about doubles. The idea of the double is associated with the stage of primary narcissism. It is pointless to paraphrase, so I shall quote:

"But when this stage has been surmounted, the double reverses its aspect. From having been an assurance of immortality, it becomes the uncanny harbinger of death."

The idea of the double does not necessarily disappear with the passing of primary narcissism, for it can receive fresh meaning from the later stages of the ego's development. A special agency is formed there, which is able to stand over against the rest of the ego, which has the function of observing and criticising the self and exercising a censorship within the mind, and which we become aware of as our conscience. In the pathological case of delusions of being watched, this mental agency becomes isolated, dissociated from the ego, and discernible to the physician's eye. The fact that an agency of this kind exists, which is able to treat the rest of the ego like an object - the fact, that is, that man is capable of self-observation - renders it possible to invest the old idea of the double with new meaning, and to ascribe a number of things to it - above all, those things which seem to self-criticism to belong to the old surmounted narcissism of earliest times."

Like all the phenomena of the Uncanny, the double represents the recurrence, the return of something that has been repressed. Hence the anxiety provoked by its reappearance, Freud: "the quality of uncanniness can only come from the fact of the double being a creation dating back to a very early mental stage, long since surmounted."

Just a few pages further on, Freud relates a curious example from his own personal experience, the story of his own encounter with his double. It comes as an afterthought to a footnote. Once again, I apologise for quoting at such length, but to paraphrase Freud seems to me both pointless and potentially dangerous.

"I was sitting alone in my wagon-lit compartment when a more than usually violent jolt of the train swung back the door of the adjoining washing cabinet and an elderly gentleman in a dressing-gown and a travelling cap came in. I assumed that in leaving the washing cabinet, which lay between the two compartments, he had taken the wrong direction and come into my compartment by mistake. Jumping up with the intention of putting him right, I at once realised to my dismay that the intruder was nothing but my own reflection in the looking glass on the open door. I can still recollect that I thoroughly disliked his appearance. Instead therefore of being frightened by our 'doubles', both Mach and I simply failed to recognise them as such. Is it not possible though that our dislike of them was the vestigial trace of the archaic reaction which feels the double to be something uncanny?"

Freud failed to recognise his double as such; he failed to recognise himself in an image. Now, we know from the rest of this paper that the feeling of the uncanny witnessed here was generated by the return of something that was once familiar, a vestigial trace of an archaic reaction. What had returned was something from the stage of primary narcissism which had been given fresh meaning by the later stages of the ego's development.

One thing that we know about the Uncanny is that its occurrence is always accompanied by anxiety. In fact, we can say that the Uncanny is precisely that which returns to cause anxiety. It shows us why, as Freud tells us in Inhibitions, Symptom, and Anxiety, it is possible to describe the object of anxiety - precisely because there is no anxiety that does not mark the return of something familiar. Anxiety is not the fear of nothing, the fright or the flight before the void; rather it is the encounter with the object (a), cause of desire, that marks the spot where there is a lack. In the anxiety that we encounter in the field of the Uncanny, what happens is that, in Lacan's formula, the lack comes to lack ("la manque vient a manquer"). For example, in the case of the first of the objects (a), it is not nostalgia for the maternal breast that causes anxiety in the subject, but rather its imminence.

In his discussion of primary narcissism and his relation of his own encounter with his double, Freud concerns himself with the image of the body, and with the notion of separation. Lacan has shown that separation is not from the body of the mother but from the subject's own body. The object (a), cause of desire, is that whose loss gives rise to the subject. All those objects listed by Lacan as objects (a) are lost objects: the breast of the body which was once the subject's own, bound to the subject and detached from the mother, the look, the voice, faeces..That is precisely why the object (a) is the cause and not the object or goal of desire. It is instead the residue of the division which occurs when the subject is inscribed by the signifier in the field of the Other.

In his seminar of 1962, L'Angoisse, Lacan says:

"L'homme trouve sa maison en un point situe dans l'Autre, au delà de l'image dont nous sommes faits, et cette place represente l'absence ou nous sommes. A supposer - ce qui arrive - qu'elle se revele pour ce qu'elle est : la presence ailleurs qui fait cette place comme absence, alors, elle est la reine du jeu. Elle s'empare de l'image qui la supporte et l'image speculaire devient l'image du double, avec tout ce qu'elle apporte d'etrangete radicale."

(Man finds his home in a point situated in the Other, beyond the image of which we are made, and this place represents the absence in which we are. Supposing - which can happen - that it reveals itself for what it is: the present elsewhere which makes this place an absence; then, it is master of the game. It takes hold of the image which supports it and the specular image becomes the image of the double, with all that it brings in the way of radical strangeness.)

What is it that returns in the Uncanny to provoke anxiety? From the mirror stage, something will fall. There will be a reservoir of libido which is not invested in the specular image because it remains elsewhere, at the level of the body, and of primary narcissism. There will also, inevitably, be a remainder of the image which will resist substitution, a remainder which has not been libidinalized. It is the return of this remainder that teaches us that not all of the libidinal body from the stage of primary narcissism can be captured in the image. Anxiety is what occurs when "la manque vient a manquer". It is the return of this "presence ailleurs qui fait cette place comme absence." Thus the Uncanny lies not only in the appearance of the double but in an attribute which was lacking from the constitution of the ego and appears independently of the subject. In his railway carriage, Freud does not simple fail to recognise his double. He also fails to recognise himself.

The paper on the Uncanny was published the year after the case history of the Wolf Man, and it may well have been the neurosis of Serge Pankejeff that drove Freud into that field. Certainly it is interesting to note the similarities between Freud's resume of Hoffmann's The Sand Man and the Wolf Man's story. Certainly, Freud does as good as declare the Uncanny the aesthetic of obsessional neurosis, in its ambivalence to

the father and its continued faith in the omnipotence of thoughts. Like the Wolf Man, Nathaniel, the hero of Hoffmann's tale, has a long running phobia of professionals who come to occupy the position of the Sand Man, or bad father. In the case of the wolf man, there is a long list of professionals who cut (doctors, tailors, barbers, psychoanalysts); in that of Nathaniel, it is anyone who deals with mechanics.

Serge Pankejeff has a dream, an anxiety dream. He dreams that he is lying in bed at night when suddenly the window in front of him opens of its own accord and he is terrified to see six or seven wolves with fox-tails sitting on a walnut tree. Naturally, he screams and wakes up. Six or seven wolves which are not really wolves at all - they repeat themselves, and perhaps, as Eugenie Lemoine-Luccioni suggests, they have no meaning but repetition itself. They multiply the first trait of the missing signifier and thus return as if from outside in a nightmare. But the two factors of the dream that make the greatest impression on Serge are the perfect immobility of these wolves and the strained attention with which they all looked at him. Suddenly with the opening of the window, Serge is confronted not with the desire of the Other but rather its demand. The window which opens announces something, and that something is the return of something familiar which causes anxiety. Anxiety, like desire, is bound to the Other, but to jouissance and the demand of the Other, to the terrible imperative of the father - "Jouis!"

Essentially, the Uncanny, as something so closely bound up with anxiety, must be a matter of concern for psychoanalysis. Yet psychoanalysis shows that the Uncanny is itself a fundamental condition of any representation, and as such, probably the aesthetic of all aesthetics, beyond the sublime and the beautiful. In this essay, Freud teaches the student of aesthetics something about his own craft by paying attention to a field that it has ignored.

I dealt earlier with Oscar Wilde's novel, The Picture of Dorian Gray, a work which enacts precisely this kind of conception of representation. In one of his letters Wilde writes that the book contains much of himself. Hallward, the artist is how he sees himself; Wotton, the wit and dandy, is how the public sees him; and Dorian is how he would like to see himself. What is at issue in the narrative of this book is precisely who shall have the picture, the image, the soul of Dorian Gray? Hallward, Wotton, or Wilde? And yet this personality "so fascinating that, if I allowed it to do so, would absorb my whole nature, my whole soul, my very art itself," soon becomes merely a motive in art, the curve of certain lines. When Dorian first sees his portrait, he says that he feels as if he is recognising himself for the first time, and it is this very moment of self mis-recognition that occasions the rest of the plot. Dorian's wish to exchange places with the picture is in fact a desire to be the picture, a desire to incorporate it, to be at one with this new and

beautiful image of his body. The tragedy is that he cannot. There remains a part of himself that cannot be captured in the image, a residue of the image which escapes his understanding. It is in this failure of representation proper to representation itself that the Uncanny lies.

The Ethics of Hysteria & of Psychoanalysis

by Vicente Palomera

With Lacan, we can read the Freudian texts using the principles they put forward. In his teaching, Lacan constantly returned to these texts to take Freud at his word. Darian Leader to whom I am indebted for this invitation to give a lecture in the CFAR, told me that thanks to the Middlesex Polytechnic and to its direction you have in public seminars, and open lectures, the opportunity to keep in close contact with the Lacanian teaching and what it means in the history of the psychoanalytic movement. As you know, the "return to Freud" is the effect of Lacan's transference on Freud, that is to say, a re-reading of the Freudian discovery which is not without consequences, because he renewed a theory and a practice that was beginning to flag.

It is well known that Freud inaugurated an entirely new mode of human relations from listening to hysterics. The birth of psychoanalysis depends on this encounter with hysteria, but we should actually ask ourselves - as Lacan himself did - where have the hysterics of yesterday gone? Those marvellous women, the Anna Os, the Emmy von Ns, etc., whose lives belong to a lost world. Lacan related the birth of psychoanalysis to the Victorian times, since Victoria was she who knew how to impose her ideals in an era which bears her name. Lacan said in his Seminar "this kind of havoc was necessary to produce what I call a waking". In the present, do hysterics play havoc with the social field? Has hysteria displaced itself into the social field? Let's start with all these questions.

On the other hand, how do the present psychoanalysts of the IPA face the question of the existence or non-existence of hysteria? The word has disappeared as such from certain psychiatric manuals. In one of the last International Congresses of Psychoanalysis, there was a panel dedicated to hysteria, and there we find psychoanalysts of different persuasions discussing hysteria. Many of them held that hysteria is only a defensive technique to maintain at a distance and under control anxieties which are defined as "primitive", "psychotic", "non sexual". As you know, to define hysteria as a defence is not new, it is something already thought of by the kleinians, and for instance, Fairbairn. I'd like to show you how all these definitions were bound to lead to confusion, as we can see today. Generally speaking, psychoanalysts have shrunk from the challenge of hysteria.

This is what was said recently in a paper issued in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis on the subject of hysteria, where one already finds Lacan quoted alongside several authors of the so-called "French school" of

psychoanalysis", that is to say, diluted in the eclectic tradition that distinguishes the IPA. As you see, this is a proof that "Lacan is everywhere", as J.-A. Miller said in an intervention in 1979.

I. The Hysterical discourse.

First of all, the hysteric is a particular subject, one who puts his division in the place of power. In the second place, there is an ethics of hysteria, an ethics which is not in the service of the ('goods') industry. Psychoanalysis is not an ethics of goods either. The ethics of hysteria is an ethics of privation which doesn't mean an ethics of generosity (of giving), on the contrary, it is an ethics of dispossession (giving up). It is true that this position, at the very heart of hysteria - the pure hysterical position - is not usually carried out till the end, but the hysteric very often affirms her dispossession with ferocity, sometimes arriving at sacrifice.

This dispossession is presented to us as a complaint. The most fundamental complaint of hysterics is one of lack of identity, lack that Lacan wrote with a symbol, the letter \$, which means that the subject is separated from his being, and for this reason separated from identity, which is why you identify yourself easily with others. With the term unconscious Freud meant a level where something thinks, where you find articulated thoughts (Gedanken). Yet, at the unconscious level you cannot say: "I am", in fact, you are dispossessed of being. Thus, the unconscious is a level where there is no "self-consciousness", where the subject doesn't find a way of naming himself, because he lacks the fundamental referent, the "I am". By means of the \$ Lacan transformed Descartes' cogito ergo sum, a statement which meant a level where the subject would be able to think: "therefore I am", a level where, according to Descartes, you would be able to obtain the certainty of being.

What the hysterical subject intensifies and overtly manifests is this lack of a certainty, the lack of an identifying signifier. Hysteria shows up through a void of identification (S) which the subject transforms into a question presented to anyone who is in the place of master of knowledge (S1):

\$-----> S1

Hysteria is a discourse, and like every discourse it implies two partners. In the hysterical discourse Lacan isolates one of the partners as the divided subject (\$), the other as the master signifier, or the master who embodies it (S1). So you have first, occupying the place of agent, the subject addressing a demand to the Other,

the Master, commanding the Master. This place of agent is what we call a place of power. In the analytical discourse, the power is the object (a)---> S, it is the object which commands a certain task to the subject.

The first time Lacan writes his four discourses (in Radiophonie) he defined hysteria as the divided subject, that is to say as the unconscious in exercise: "L'inconscient en exercice qui met le maitre au pied du mur de produire un savoir". (The unconscious in action challenging the master to produce knowledge). What is important here is the identification of hysteria with the divided subject (l'inconscient en exercice). But, on the other hand, Lacan says clearly enough that the hysteric is also a mastering subject, that he is in the place of the agent.

Although you may easily illustrate this with any case of hysteria, I'd rather choose one which is certainly well known to you. Everyone here knows the popular conception of Florence Nightingale, the self-sacrificing woman, the maiden who threw aside the pleasures of a life of ease to help the afflicted, the Lady of the Lamp, as she was nick-named, consecrating with her goodness the dying soldier's couch. I have taken Lytton Strachey's picture of Florence Nigtingale because one suddenly recognises the portrait of a hysteric(*). He describes a hysteric, in so far as Florence's position before men consisted in putting them to work, right till her death. You know she wanted to satisfy her vocation: to be a nurse. This was her want (in the double meaning of the word), a want that not only remained fixed immovably in her heart, but grew in intensity day by day. To become a nurse implied dispossession. She had brushed aside with disdain and loathing the allurements of her aristocratic milieu. Her lovers had been nothing to her, and she refused marriage. In her thirty-first year she noted in her diary: "I see nothing desirable but death". Florence made her choice and refused what was at least a certain happiness for a visionary good which might never come to her at all. The Crimean War broke out, she was thirty-four when she arrived at Scutari, the organisation of hospitals was horrific, the conditions were indescribable: want, confusion, diseases, dysentery, misery, filth, that is to say, the very image of jouissance. Florence came into that inferno transforming it into a militarily organised hospital. A passionate idolatry spread among men, and Strachey resumes it with these words "they (the soldiers) kissed her shadow as it passed". A soldier said: "Before she came there was cussin' and swearin', but after that it was as 'oly as a church". She succeeded in emptying that jouissance, not without a certain heroism.

(*) L Strachey, Eminent Victorians, Penguin Modern Classics, 1980.

Back in England, "the Lady of the Lamp" falls seriously ill. She suffers from fainting-fits and terrible attacks, a mysterious illness which will accompany her till her death, at the age of 91. "Wherever she went...she was haunted by a ghost" - says Strachey- "It was the spectre of Scutari". I found this a nice way of saying that at last Scutary became the signifier that, in the end, represented Florence (S1/\$). Nevertheless, L. Strachey wrote that "a Demon possessed her", giving her a signifier, precisely when she had rejected every signifier and showing by this means that she was not subjected, not fixed to any master signifier, but possessed by something mortifying.

As I have told you, the hysteric puts the master to work ("au pied du mur") to produce a knowledge, says Lacan. Florence also shows this very well. Let's take, for instance, her relationship with Sidney Herbert, who later became War Minister, trying to be a man in accordance with Florence's wishes, then with Arthur Clough - her Secretary - and with Dr Sutherland. None of them were men, only false copies in Florence's eyes. Strachey resumes it very well: "she worked like a slave in a mine. She began to believe, as she had begun to believe at Scutari, that none of her fellow workers had their hearts in the business; if they had, why did they not work as she did? She could only see slackness and stupidity around her. Dr Sutherland, of course, was grotesquely muddle-headed; and Arthur Clough incurably lazy. Even Sidney Herbert...oh yes, he had the simplicity and candour and quickness of perception, no doubt; but he was an eclectic; and what could one hope for from a man..." etc. As the years passed, Florence sought consolation in the writings of the Mystics, and also in a correspondence with Mr Jowett, who acted as her spiritual adviser. But,...how could he succeed where the others had failed? Jowett was entirely devoted to her but Florence felt that she gave more sympathy than she received. "Her tongue, one day, could not refrain from shooting out at him: "He comes to me, and he talks to me", she said, "as if I were someone else". With a sentence like this we immediately realise the nature of the hysterical discourse: the subject (\$) in the position of agent addressing a demand to the Master (S1), to produce a knowledge (S2) which is impotent to say the truth of the subject (a):

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \$ & \text{-----} & \rightarrow \text{S1} \\ a & // & \text{S2} \end{array}$$

impotence

The hysteric presents herself precisely as lacking knowledge: "Cure me" "Try to know what I have". As a result, like Mr Jowett, the analyst cannot do it. He is

impotent in his knowledge of what will cure her. In this dimension hysteria is a challenge.

We don't know much more about Florence. She died leaving nothing but a veil, that very veil she used to wear when she strolled in the park twice a month. What did she hide behind that veil? Strachey sees the visible nothingness she had converted into omnipotence all through her life: "The thin, angular woman, with her haughty eye and her acrid mouth, had vanished; and in her place was the rounded, bulky form of a fat old lady, smiling all day long. Then something else became visible. The brain which had been steeled at Scutari was indeed, literally, growing soft. Senility descended. Towards the end, consciousness itself grew lost in a roseate haze, and melted into nothingness."

Why had she sacrificed all her life? It is an "enigma". What we do know is that she didn't give up her sacrifice and also that she eluded herself as a question.

Now, thanks to Lytton Strachey and going back to Lacan's teaching on hysterical discourse, we are able to re-read not only Florence Nightingale's portrait, but also hysterical discourse as such: the hysterical subject is an agent; secondly, she is a subject who eludes herself as object (Florence died without giving her secret); and thirdly, she is a subject who sacrifices herself.

II. The particularity of hysteria in Lacan's ECRITS

Let's go now to Lacan's teaching on hysteria.

The first two features I have just given to you may seem contradictory: there you have hysteria defined as Subject (S), in the place of agent, of power, and, I have also said that hysteria is defined in the place of the object. I shall try to show you that there is no such contradiction at all.

We can organise Lacan's teaching on hysteria in four periods:

1) 1936 - 1949: The period of the Mirror Stage.


With the Mirror Stage Lacan formalises many clinical facts, with a great economy of concepts, after having isolated the imaginary relationship. In the English edition of the Ecris (p. 4-5), you find hysteria defined by means of the fragmented body: "This fragmented body usually manifests itself in dreams when the movement of the analysis encounters a certain level of aggressive disintegration in the individual. It then appears in the form of disjointed limbs, or of those organs represented in

exoscopy, growing wings and taking up arms for intestinal persecutions (...)But this form is even tangibly revealed at the organic level, in the lines of "fragilization" that define the anatomy of fantasy, as exhibited in the schizoid and spasmodic symptoms of hysteria". The fragmentation in hysteria, referred to in the Mirror Stage, is an early reference to the absence of identification with 'The Woman'.

2) 1957: the hysterical question

In "La Psychanalyse et son Enseignement" (1957), J. Lacan defines hysteria as an imaginary inversion. We already have a matheme, the SCHEMA L. This schema signifies that the condition of the subject is dependent on what is being unfolded in the Other A. What is being unfolded there is articulated like a discourse.

This Schema inscribes an opposition between the imaginary and the symbolic:



In this Schema a-a' is the relation to the partner, the relation to the body image and, also, to the partner's body, as it is developed in the Mirror Stage.

With the dotted axis, Lacan writes the symbolic relationship, from the subject to the Other, the Other as the locus of language which precedes the coming of the subject in the world. This axis implies a subject, a subject who is presented with the question of his existence, "What am I there?" A question from the subject directed to the Other, since it depends on what is unfolded in the Other. Lacan says: "La nevrose est une question qui trouve ses conditions dans cet Autre, et c'est dans l'Autre que sont poses les termes sous lesquels le sujet de l'hysterie ou de l'obsession ne peut acceder a la notion de sa facticite au regard de son sexe dans l'une et de son existence dans l'autre". ("Neurosis is a question which finds its strictures in this Other, and it is in the Other too that are posed the terms through which the subject, of hysteria or obsessional neurosis, cannot acede to the notion of his/her facticity, with respect to his/her sex in the case of the one, and with respect to his/her ~~assistance~~ assistance in the case of the Other")

bc

The Key to the understanding of this paragraph is the word facticity with its reference to 'thingness', a word which designates that in the Other, the locus of all signifiers, there are signifiers which lack, that is, there the signifiers with which to say one's sex and one's existence, are lacking and that is why Lacan writes facticity. Later in his teaching, Lacan is going to say "real".

Hysteria accentuates the facticity of sex. This translates the lack of an identifying signifier for femininity. So, when the question is "What is a woman?" this describes the neurosis we call hysteria. It is from this question - "What is a woman?" and unconsciously, "Am I man or woman?", and at the moment when there is an answer to this question - that the hysterical subject gives a privileged place to another woman, or to the other woman, the woman who would know what it means to be a woman. Nevertheless, there can be other responses, for instance, I am thinking of an analysand whose particularity is that she collects men, and that's her way to try to learn how to be a woman who would be worthy of this name.

This is exactly what Lacan writes, that the hysterical position is the imaginary inversion, a certain kind of response to her question. Every structure has its question and gives its response. Thus, the hysterical response to her question about sex, to her impossibility to say what a woman is, is creating a scene in which she identifies herself with the other sex. It is the inversion at the imaginary level: instead of identifying with her own sex, she identifies with men.

All this is due to a deficiency at the level of identification, as Freud teaches us, a lack of narcissistic identification. It is like having an anatomy that she cannot inhabit. Let's take, for instance, Dora: she cannot be at the place to which her anatomy calls her, she is fascinated by Frau K, although she identifies herself with Herr K. But you can also follow this imaginary inversion in another text: the "Intervention of Transference", presented in 1951. This article is a perfect example of a critical re-reading of Freud's texts, where Lacan re-reads the question of Dora's symptoms thanks to the mirror stage. There is, firstly, Dora's identification with her father, favoured by the latter's sexual impotence. These identifications showed through all the symptoms of conversion presented by Dora, a large number of which were removed by this discovery. Secondly, Lacan wonders why Freud failed to see that Dora's aponia brought up during the absences of Herr K was an expression of

the oral erotic drive when Dora was left face to face with Frau K, without there being any need for Freud to invoke her awareness of the fellatio undergone by the father. As you know, Lacan interprets Dora's aphonia as an effect of the identification with her father, since "every one knows that cunnilingus is the artifice most commonly adopted by "men of means" whose powers begin to abandon them". Had Dora gained access to the recognition of her femininity, she wouldn't have had to remain open to that functional fragmentation (here Lacan refers explicitly to the mirror stage) which constitutes a conversion symptom. Thirdly, in the same direction, Lacan interprets Dora's pregnancy fantasy and the transitory neuralgia as a result of her identification with Herr K, that is to say, once more, as a function of her virile identification after the rupture which followed the declaration at the lakeside, the catastrophe following which Dora entered on her illness. In short, Lacan interprets all her symptoms as the effect of virile identification. Her symptoms depended on the imaginary alienation, as it is seen in the mirror stage.

All this allowed Lacan, in his Seminar II, dedicated to the ego and its functions, to make a very precise variation, one which anticipated the discourse of the master, that is to say, how can a woman take the place of the master? Lacan re-reads a clinical case taken from a kleinian, Fairbairn. It is a woman who suffered from what at this time they used to call "depressive phases". It's a very nice case of narcissistic alienation which we call "the woman with the tiny vagina". After all, in this case you find something real - the little vagina - which puts that woman in the position of having to deal with the Penisneid in a very peculiar way. This example is taken by Lacan only in order to criticise the notion of "partial object" commonly used at this time, - because her symptom seemed to be the aggression and then the twisting of her own aggression - according to the kleinian classical sequence "aggression-guilt-depression". Lacan throws overboard all these references to the partial drives to say that all her difficulties with men, her dealings with men, were related to the fact that man was her own image, and that it was this that she encountered all the time in her life. Besides this, it is a very important case because we are able to see the distinction between the function of the phallus as a signifier, the penis and the imaginary genital: in the case of this woman this is marked by a feature of the anatomical reality.

3). 1960: The hysterical sacrifice

In "Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious" there is an important shift in Lacan's teaching". There we find a subtle transformation of his previous formulations. In fact, it is the consequence of having introduced the object little a, and the matheme of fantasy: ($\$ \langle \rangle a$.)

There you have two things. First, you have the subject, divided as an effect of the signifying chain ($\$$), it is no longer the biological prematuration that is at stake, following the mirror stage, but a subject who has lost a part of himself, who has been wounded by language. As a result, the subject is not a whole but a half, a half subject. Lacan's idea is that the subject who speaks is a subject who has lost a part. And fantasy depends on this. In the matheme, we have written, face to face, the subject ($\$$) and the object (a), placed in opposition.

How does Lacan define hysteria now? He defines it the following way: "Indeed, the neurotic, whether hysteric, obsessional, or, more radically, phobic, is he who identifies the lack of the Other with his demand (X) with D . As a result, the demand of the Other assumes the function of an object in his fantasy, that is to say, his fantasy ($\$ \langle \rangle a$) is reduced to the drive ($\$ \langle \rangle D$)...In the case of the hysteric, in as much as desire is maintained only through the lack of satisfaction that is introduced into it when she eludes herself as object". (Ecrits, a Selection, p.321).

Here Lacan defines the hysteric by putting her in the place of the object, where she operates by slipping away (eluding herself). Lacan also writes by and large that when she slips away she gets something, she maintains desire, she maintains the lack through a refusal of satisfaction. As a result, you have unsatisfaction. To keep desire unsatisfied would be, then, the hysterical motto. This means two things: to make the other desire and also to keep oneself in desire. This is very close to the phenomenology of the seduction's phantasy discovered by Freud, because it is the other - the father - who is placed as the agent of desire, and the subject phantasises herself as being in the place of that object which the other lacks.

On the other hand, to elude herself as object implies the presence of that other in front of whom she eludes herself. In fact, she first needs the presence of the partner, and sometimes she complains about this alienation, saying she is not autonomous. At the same time, besides this alienation there is also her triumph over the other, which gives us an

idea of what a mastering subject is. Let us remember Fairbairn's case cited by Lacan. The hysteric is a subject who tries to be the master of desire, as "The Lady of the Lamp" shows us, to make desire flame up, in the sense of the freudian equation "phallus (the signifier of desire) = fire". Sometimes, the hysteric - remember Rider's Haggard's book "She" - doesn't know for how much longer this position will hold her up (the end of the adventure in She is that the guide, instead of finding immortality for herself and the others, perishes in the mysterious subterranean fire). Thus, the hysterical position is to elude herself as object (to refuse jouissance and to cause desire).

The hysterical subject doesn't want to offer her division to the other's jouissance. This is what is shown in the intrigue (Lacan talked of 'hysterical intrigue'). Here also her sacrifice, that is to say, her intrigue, implies a renunciation of a share of jouissance: she refuses a part of jouissance to the other and at the same time, she deprives herself of jouissance. It is here where she finds her satisfaction, in her sacrifice. At this point Lacan gives us a very precise remark, in a reference to the dream of the butcher's wife: "she didn't know what Dora knew". What does it mean? Both are hysterics, but Dora was nearer to knowing that what she wanted was privation, that she wanted to leave Frau K. to men. In "La psychanalyse et son enseignement" Lacan pointed out: "The hysteric offers the woman in whom she adores her own mystery to the man whose role she takes without being able to enjoy.". What the butcher's wife didn't know was that she would find her satisfaction in leaving her husband to the other woman.

What the hysterical subject intensifies and manifests is this raising of privation to an absolute level, which can eventually manifest itself by the rejection of every master signifier. She is a subject who says no to identifying the signifier One (S1).

4) 1973: the being of the lack

In 1973, Lacan writes an introduction to the German edition of the Ecrits. There he went back to the butcher's wife's dream and takes it as the hysterical paradigm: "je ne prodigue pas les exemples, mais quand je m'en mele, je les porte au paradigme": ("I'm not lavish with examples, but when I proffer them, I elevate them to the status of paradigms"). Before this he wrote: "Il n'y a pas de sens commun de l'hystérique, et ce dont joue chez eux ou elles l'identification, c'est la structure, et non le sens,

comme ca se lit bien au fait qu'elle porte sur le desir, c'est a dire sur le manque pris comme objet, pas sur la cause du manque" (Scilicet, 5, p.15). ("There is no common denominator of hysteria, and what identification plays on in hysterics is structure, not sense, as is shown by the fact that it bears on desire, that is on the lack taken as an object, not on the cause of lack"). That is to say, the hysterical subject demands being, but not any being, she demands the being of lack. What characterises hysteria is that the hysteric identifies herself with the lack of desire, not with the cause of desire. In saying this, Lacan went back to his formulation in "The Direction of the Treatment" (1958): the butcher's wife's desire - the question in which the woman identifies herself with the man - is to be the phallus (in this text Lacan defines the phallus as the signifier of the lack, the signifier of desire). To be the phallus is not a "plus-de-jour", but on the contrary it is the signifier which indicates the lack, always present, in the Other (the slice of smoked salmon takes in the dream the place of the lack of the Other). In short, what is at stake in hysteria is to be this lack of desire, to be the nothing of desire (the nothing here is an object) The hysteric puts this void in the place of the object, she shows up through this void, transforming it into an eternal question. So the hysterical unsatisfaction is correlated with her way of supporting herself in being as 'nothing'.

Sometimes the hysterical subject carries this position very far up to the point of sacrificing her own person. We saw this, for instance, with Florence Nightingale. She sacrificed everything to be a nurse, brushed aside the charms and allurements of her aristocratic environment, refused marriage and exiled herself from her country. She was ferocious with men and her heroism was beyond any human consideration. Although her ideals were testimony to her discontent with any master signifier, she called for a new desire, allowing her to struggle against what Lacan called "la degradation communautaire de l'entreprise sociale", the blind-alleys of the Other.

Vicente Palomera, Lecture at the CFAR London, the 8th June '88

When is a sign not a sign?

by Ben Hooson

In 1953-1954 Lacan devoted some of his seminar(1) to consideration of an article by Melanie Klein, "The Importance of Symbol Formation in the Development of the Ego"(2). There Klein draws theoretical conclusions from the case of one of her patients - Dick. She introduces Dick as "a four-year-old boy who, as regards the poverty of his vocabulary and his intellectual achievements, was on the level of a child of about fifteen or eighteen months."(3) The theoretical thesis she wishes to support is that a young child becomes conscious of the external world by substituting ever more objects for the few of which he is originally aware: the substitutive process is fuelled by anxiety - the child fears and hates the original objects, (Klein lists penis, vagina, breasts), and therefore seeks substitutes onto which the fear spreads, forcing the child to seek further objects. The original objects are a reality of sorts, but one which is "wholly fantastic; he is surrounded with objects of anxiety, and in this respect excrement, organs, objects, things animate and inanimate are to begin with equivalent to one another. As the ego develops, a true relation to reality is established out of this unreal reality."(4).

Lacan centres his discussion of the Klein text around the issue of the ego, and finds an inconsistency in the role that Klein ascribes to it. On the one hand there is what she says about normal ego development, that it progresses as substitution embraces more and more of reality: on the other hand there is her discussion of Dick's case - "The ego's excessive and premature defence against sadism checks the establishing of a relation to reality."(5) This "sadism" is the dynamo of substitution, as she specifies - it is anxiety at work. So Klein says two contradictory things: that the ego becomes substantial through allowing anxiety free-play, and that by being too substantial at the outset it curtails that free-play.

Lacan's response to this is that in Dick there can be no question of the ego's excessive defence against sadism, because in his case there is no ego. To be more precise, he does not actually deny the existence of the ego in Dick's case: he is illustrating the situation by means of a simple model from the science of optics, and he says that the ego does not appear.(6)

1: "Le Séminaire, Livre 1", (Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1975)

2: p.219-232 in "Love, Guilt, and Reparation", (London, Virago Press 1988)


3: *ibid.* p221

4: *ibid.* p221

5: *ibid.* p232

6: "Le Séminaire, Livre 1", p102.

This is the Model:(1)



(When Lacan introduces the model the vase is above, the flowers below. I have taken the liberty of reversing the positions because they are reversed in all uses of the model later in the seminar: the vase is above on this first occasion because it's above in the book on optics that Lacan gets the model from, and he actually comments, "You can reverse the conditions of the experiment - the vase could as well be below, and the flowers above. You are free to make what is real imaginary, so long as you preserve the interrelationship of the signs, $++$ or $-+-$." What that second sentence is all about remains to be seen.)

The model represents the non-appearance of Dick's ego thus: if the eye is not in the cone of light "ab" then, although the real image of the vase would still be there, (reflected light from the vase would still converge around the flowers), it wouldn't appear because the eye would be out of range.

All I wish to say about that for the moment is that the real image stands for the ego and the eye for the human subject, and I'll go straight to a second use that Lacan makes of his model in discussion of Klein's four-year-old. When Dick was first brought to her he quickly took to alternately shutting himself in the dark vestibule of the consulting room, and emerging from there to handle toys and other objects. Klein takes the vestibule to represent the mother's body, which contains the "primitive objects" of the child's first "unreal reality". Initially Dick makes his sorties into the vestibule empty-handed. Some time elapses subsequent to the carefully chosen words that Klein says to him, before he begins to take toys there. Lacan remarks on the initial behaviour, "when he retreats into the dark and empty interior of the mother's body, the objects are not there"(2) His further comment refers to the optical model: "in his case the bouquet and the vase cannot be there at the same time. That is the key."(3)

They would be there at the same time if the real image appeared. So the model represents the non-coincidence of the objects and their container in just the same way that it represents the non-appearance of the ego.

- 1: *ibid.* p92
- 2: *ibid.* p97
- 3: *ibid.* p97

I complete this exegesis with a third use that Lacan makes of his model in "Seminar 1". It is a use which has nothing to do with Dick's case. Jean Hyppolite suggests that we can take the flowers to be the flesh and blood partner that the animal is faced with in the mating ritual, and the real image of the vase to be what he calls the "reflected imaginary structure" of the real partner. Lacan agrees and expands the point: we can take the real image to be "the Innenbild which allows the animal to seek its specific partner, in the way that the key seeks the lock or the lock the key, which allows the animal to channel its libido in the right direction for the propagation of the species."(1)

This third application of the model is the one I should like to investigate first: grasping how the model does this last task will shed light on its contribution to an understanding of Dick.

One interpretation of what Hyppolite and Lacan are suggesting would go like this: there is the flesh and blood sexual partner, ("the real object"), there is the animal's perception of that partner, ("the reflected imaginary structure of that real structure"), (2) and there is the "Innenbild". When what the animal perceives matches the "Innenbild", the animal mates. Such an interpretation invites the question, is there a moment in which the animal perceives its partner, but doesn't yet appreciate that what it is perceiving is identical to the "Innenbild"? The answer must be yes, for otherwise the notion of an "Innenbild" is superfluous - as superfluous as the claim that a spanner fits a nut because there is a diagram in a DIY manual which shows that it does. Spanner fits nut because they both have the same number of angles, and if the "Innenbild" is not of use in identifying the perception, then nothing is gained by its introduction.

We seem to need, therefore, a situation such that the animal first perceives its partner "simpliciter", as it were, and that only afterwards, (however soon afterwards), is the perception seen in the light of the "Innenbild" as just what the animal has been waiting for. We then have a further problem of what the difference could be between the perception of the partner as it is at first, and the perception as it is once its correspondence to the "Innenbild" has been established. It is tempting to say that there is no intrinsic change in the perception, no more than there is a change in an item of lost property at the moment when it is identified by its rightful owner.

But if there is no intrinsic change in the perception, it has to be the way the perception is taken by its owner that alters, and here again there is a problem: the concept of perception demands that whoever has a perception should be thoroughly aware of its precise identity - there can't be anything hidden about something which is defined by its "being manifest", as a perception surely is. If a

1: "Le Séminaire, Livre 1" p.168
2: ibid: p.167

perception is taken differently from the way it was first taken, is that not just to say that what is now there is a different perception from the one there at first? Whether the change is intrinsic to the perception, or consists only in how it is taken, is really irrelevant. A change in the way it looks is a new perception.

The problem of how the "Innenbild" could carry out its work on a single perception is, then, a prickly one. Lets reiterate what we supposed the "work" to consist of. In order that the "Innenbild" have a role, the sexual partner has to be perceived at first in a manner not dictated by the "Innenbild" - for the latter can only operate on what is already there in the animal's perception, it cannot leap out from between his ears (or wherever "Innenbild's" are situated) to put its mark on the other animal before that other falls under the first animal's observation. If we put this point another way it may be clearer exactly what the problem we have encountered is: the "Innenbild" plays the part of answer to a question - the perception is questioned, and the answer is that it is like the "Innenbild". But what are the terms of the question? Surely nothing other than the "Innenbild", in the light of which the perception is interrogated. And the problem with this is somewhere between psychology and metaphysics: can the identity of a piece of experience really be questioned in some particular terms by the individual who experiences it, or wouldn't such a manoeuvre really be no different from his experiencing it in those terms? Wouldn't the supposed putting of the question actually already be the answer to the question?

There seems no way of getting apart the possibility that what is there could be just like the "Innenbild" and its being just like the "Innenbild". The intention is to have a moment which is characterised by the question "is it like that?", and a subsequent moment characterised by the conclusion "it is/is not like that". But the question here is essentially "do I or don't I see it like that?" which is not a question that can be asked about something that's just a "being seen a certain way" - the item's very existence excludes the possibility of that question.

Perhaps these difficulties are really ontological. It has to be one and the same item of experience that is questioned and that is conclusively labelled in the answer; but, to use scholastic terminology, the way an item of experience looks is not its attribute, but its very substance, so that if the way it looks changes, then we aren't dealing with the same item - what is there is no longer "it", but "something else". If we now return to the text of "Seminar 1" we find that Lacan has more to say about animal sexuality and images. What he says effectively blocks our interpretation of the "Innenbild"'s functioning. He says this:

"The male or female animal subject is as if captured by a Gestalt. The subject literally gets identified with the trigger stimulus. The male is caught in the zigzag dance

through the relation that is established between himself and the image which commands the unleashing of his sexual behaviour cycle. The female is likewise caught in this reciprocal dance...At that moment the subject is completely identical to the image which commands the total unleashing of certain motor behaviour, which itself produces and sends back to the partner, after a certain fashion, the command which makes him/her take up the other part of the dance...Let's say that, in the animal world, the whole sexual behaviour cycle is dominated by the imaginary."(1)

This seems unsatisfactory in that Lacan doesn't really address the problem we have been grappling with at all: in this passage the "Innenbild" is not mentioned. For a clue as to how Lacan does nonetheless offer a solution here, we must for a moment consider the problem in yet another guise - that of judgement.

The concept of judgement is pretty broad, but I hope it would be agreed that judgement, in its most common acceptation, is to be found in the subject-predicate structure: "x" (subject) is "y" (predicate). Now, the notion of "subject" came into the discussion above, and there it arose in conjunction with the notion of "attribute". Translating that point into one about judgement has the effect of making the issue a linguistic one - subject and predicate are grammatical terms. Thus translated, then, the point is this: where the grammatical subject an experience, whatever predicate is judged to attach to it will already attach to it prior to the judgement. That might seem no problem at all, but a mere stating of the obvious: naturally, we may say, the predicate was true of the subject before the judgement - the judgement was intended precisely to bring out that hitherto unobserved fact. But the problem remains, for if that fact was hitherto unobserved, then the judgement had no "raw material" which it could be about. It is of the essence of an experience to be completely patent, completely manifest, and that it should contain anything hidden is an impossibility built into the concept of what an experience is: any judgement that tries to recruit an item of experience as subject is doomed to fail, because whatever predicate it thinks to attach to such a subject will already be there in the subject.

That the requirement, which seems indispensable if the "Innenbild" is to have a role, can be expressed as the requirement that there be a judgement, should do a lot to console us: what is needed is a judgement, judgement is linguistic, and animals don't talk. So maybe there is good reason why we can't fulfil the requirement.

Consider the opening of the above passage from "Seminar 1": "The male or female animal subject is as if captured by a Gestalt. The subject literally gets identified with the trigger stimulus."(2) It puts in a nutshell the reason why

1: "Le Séminaire, Livre 1", p.158

2: ibid

we cannot construct a coherent account of the "Innenbild" functioning. The individual who has some experience is actually in that experience, and being an essential ingredient in its fabrication, he cannot be at the same impartial judge of its nature: when we try to present him as testing to see if his experience is of a particular character, we quickly find we can only really mean that his experience is of that character.

The upshot of all this is that what we take to be an impasse in our effort to understand the "Innenbild" is actually the furthest we can hope to get in understanding it: we take it to be an impasse through failing to note that the situation is one where language simply does not figure.

For there to be judgement, it has to be possible to hold apart subject and predicate: otherwise the judgement is not about anything. Lacan's phrasing in terms of identification with trigger stimulus carefully accounts for that; but when he speaks of this identification, it is not quite the same as what a philosopher is noting when he says, as I said above, that an individual who has an experience is actually in that experience - in the mating animal's case, being identified with the trigger stimulus involves action, "The male is caught in the zigzag dance through the relation that is established between himself and the image..." (1)

In "Seminar 1" Lacan distinguishes two roles for what he calls the "moi": here is the place to introduce the first of them. He calls the "moi" in this role an image which performs for the subject, (in the sense of human or animal individual), the following service: "it gives its form to his Umwelt, in so far as he is a man and not a horse." (2) The functions of this first "moi", "play for man as for all other living beings a fundamental role in the structuration of reality." (3) This "moi", then, is something animal, and relates to man only in as much as he too partakes of the bestial nature: a horse's "moi" gives its form to the horse's "Umwelt" in so far as he is a horse and not a man. The use of the word "moi" ("me") strongly suggests that the animal is identical to whatever the "moi" is. Not in so far as the animal is simply living tissue, of course: to take a word from the above passage, let us say that the animal as subject is a "moi". Lacan calls this "moi" an image. There are good grounds for asserting that the image which is the "moi" is none other than the "Innenbild": the "moi" gives its form to the animal's "Umwelt" in that it dictates the choice of sexual partner - "in so far as he is a man and not a horse" he mates with a human, not with a horse - and the "Innenbild" in like fashion "allows the animal to seek its specific partner."

"Innenbild" and "moi" being one and the same, we have the result that everything Lacan says of the trigger stimulus also holds of the "Innenbild": the animal is identified to the stimulus, (as "moi" he is identified to the

- 1: "Le Séminaire, Livre 1" p.158
- 2: ibid
- 3: ibid

"Innenbild"), and by being thus identified he embarks upon mating behaviour, (the intervention of the "Innenbild" in the animal's experience provokes mating behaviour).

We are driven to the conclusion that trigger stimulus and "Innenbild" coincide. It is a conclusion that stretches credulity: the "Innenbild", alter all, is with the animal not for a moment, but for life, and the "Innenbild" has to identify the trigger stimulus, which it couldn't do if they were the same thing.

The second of these scruples, however, is put paid to by the considerations we most lately formulated in terms of judgement: the coalescence of trigger stimulus and "Innenbild" is precisely the coalescence of a judgement's subject and predicate, which forced itself upon us under circumstances. As to the second scruple, that an "Innenbild" is for life whereas a trigger stimulus is momentary, I think that we have to concede it but say that it passes our point by: the scruple depends upon seeing the situation from an ethologist's-angle the coalescence of "Innenbild" and trigger stimulus is from the angle of the animal itself. The whole life of the animal is just the judgement that a certain image has a certain character: we shouldn't think of the tiny proportion of that life devoted to spying and mating with the partner as involving an extrinsic perception which needs matching against the "Innenbild". Instead we should think of the "Innenbild" as having a significance which is the animal's life-cycle. Lacan urges that approach by introducing the passage quoted above, (p.5), with the comment, "Lets simplify, and only consider this functioning (that of the image) at a given moment." (1)

The difference between what Lacan is saying and what a philosopher might say recurs here: in saying that the animal is identified with the image, Lacan is not just reminding us that whoever has an experience is inside that experience. The animal's relation to the image is not cognitive at all, but consists in action. The assertion that an image should have a significance which is just doing something is so unmanageable that the only possible response to it seems to be an incredulous shaking of the head. However, we shall press on and hope the idea looks better in retrospect.

Saussure suggests that, in the symbol, sign and sense are like two sides of a sheet of paper, in order to underline their inseparability. (2) That same simile is appropriate here. The image does not need interpreting: its significance is fixed in such a way that the possibility of interpreting the image does not arise - a certain significance is integral to the very existence of the image. There is no stage in the manufacture of a sheet of paper at which its underside has yet to be manufactured, at which a number of possible sorts of underside are yet to be chosen among: its getting both top- and underside is simultaneous

1: "Le Séminaire, Livre 1" p.158

2: "Cours de Linguistique Générale" (Duckworth, 1988)

with its entry into existence as a sheet of paper. Of course, Saussure intended his simile to express the working of the linguistic symbol, not the natural symbol - the image. Lacan and Saussure are in fundamental disagreement on that: the line in Saussure's $\frac{S}{s}$ (sign over sense), is for Lacan not like a piece of paper, but like an uncrossable bar. The sheet of paper simile fits the natural symbol, not the linguistic one. There will be more to say about that when we get back to Dick.

I want to take a route back to the case of Dick via a short text from "Ecrits", "Le Temps Logique". (1) What is in question there is a logical sophism: Lacan gives both its conditions and its solution at the beginning of the text. The conditions, in outline, are that there exist 5 discs, 3 white and 2 black, and 3 individuals: 3 out of the 5 discs are fastened to the 3 individuals, and the aim is to be the first to work out what colour one is wearing merely from observing what colours are worn by the other 2. The reasoning used to reach a conclusion has to be strictly logical. It is clear that the only chance of reaching a conclusion by use of logic would be in the case where one was faced with 2 blacks: in that case one couldn't but be a white. The reality, though, is that all 3 individuals are wearing white discs. Lacan offers the following "perfect solution" from the point of view of any one of the 3: "I am a white, and here is how I know it. Given that my companions were whites, I thought that, if I was a black, each of them would have been able to infer this: "If I was black too, the other white couldn't but recognise immediately that he was a white, and would have left at once." And both would have left together, convinced of being white. If they didn't leave, I had to be white like them. Upon which I made for the door, to declare my conclusion."(2)

Now this has nothing to do with logic. Nor would it be much help to someone taking part in the realisation of the sophism as a party game. The Lacanian solution assumes that anyone faced with 2 blacks would be that alone have the answer - but what if he had to spend a moment recalling and applying the game's conditions to what he saw? Wouldn't that mislead someone faced with a black and a white into concluding that he was white? That is one problem. Another is the assumption that each of the players would take an identical time to think a given thought, for such an assumption underlies the reasoning of the player into whose mouth the solution is place.

The first of these problems concerns a player faced with 2 blacks, who appears in the "perfect solution" between double parentheses. ("the other white" who "couldn't but recognise immediately that he was a white"). It is a problem with much relevance to what we have been wrestling with in the discussion of the "Innenbild". The very conditions of the game lay down that if there are 2 blacks, the third is a

1: "Ecrits", (Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1966) p.197-213

2: *ibid*: p.198

white: it makes no difference whether we say the 2 blacks are flesh and blood players in the game, or a perception of the third player, or a part of the game's conditions - 1 white is as indissolubly tied to 2 blacks as the underside of a sheet of paper to its topside. What Lacan wants to get across in making the presence of 2 blacks telescope together with the third's assertion that he's white is exactly what he wants to get across in the phrase, "The subject literally gets identified with the trigger stimulus". Just as the animal's life-cycle, its nature, is the significance of the "Innenbild", so the player's nature is the significance of 2 blacks - his nature is to be a white. Just as the "Innenbild"'s significance is action, (the animal enters the mating dance), so the significance of 2 blacks is that the third player comes to his feet and leaves the room in which the game takes place - it is thus, in Lacan's presentation, that a player is to signal his reaching a conclusion.

Lacan here quashes our qualms in the same way that he would do later, in the "Seminar 1" discussion of images. There the terms he uses encourage the effort to build a scheme in which a perception, (the trigger stimulus), would be matched against the "Innenbild" to yield the conclusion that the perception was of a nature to make mating behaviour appropriate. We ran through a few formulations of a problem which always thwarted our effort to figure the situation that way, finally lighting upon the idea that what we were aiming at essentially involved language, and it was because the "Innenbild" was characteristic of unlanguage animal life that our effort couldn't succeed.

Next lets look at the players in "Le Temps Logique" who are in single parentheses in the "perfect solution", the players faced with a white and a black - they are 2 in number. It will be helpful, first, to make yet one more formulation of the problem we keep coming back to: to do so will bring out what was implicit both in looking at the problem in terms of question and answer, (p.4) and in looking at it in terms of judgement, (p.6). The new formulation I have in mind is in terms of simultaneity and succession. An agent who questioned his perception in the light of the "Innenbild" would be doing something like putting the two side by side, mentally comparing them - from having them there at once, he could decide whether or not they were alike. That is the simultaneity. Consequent to the simultaneity, there would be the perception as it emerged from the comparison - as acknowledged to be identical in character to the "Innenbild". In such a formulation our problem becomes this: the perception becomes like the "Innenbild" by the very act of putting it alongside the "Innenbild", so that we have what should be the final stage - the second item in the succession - just by undertaking the first stage - the comparison of perception and "Innenbild". Simultaneity and succession are thus both abolished.

The terms "simultaneity" and "succession" are reminiscent of a couple of terms to which Lacan makes frequent recourse - synchrony and diachrony. The way Lacan uses this latter pair derives from Saussure. They refer to the behaviour of "signifiers", the currency of Lacan's symbolic order. If we can establish that the issue which our simultaneity-succession model has to do with is the same as the issue which elicits from Lacan his synchrony-diachrony, we will have an interesting result. We already have a clue which points in that direction: "Let's say that, in the animal world, the whole sexual behaviour-cycle is dominated by the imaginary". Simultaneity-succession is excluded in precisely the field which excludes the symbolic order altogether - in the field of the Lacanian imaginary order.

So far we have found that an individual playing "Temps Logique" who is faced with 2 blacks provides a model of what goes on between the animal and its images. Coming on now to the players faced with a black and a white we will find problems that concern the symbolic order. We will also find a model of the situation in the case of Dick.

We have seen above that, given the rules or the game, it follows as a matter of logic from the existence of two blacks that the third player is a white. From the existence of a white and a black, of course, the conclusion that the third is a white does not follow logically. But an individual faced with a white and a black could get that conclusion logically if he had one further piece of information - that there are not 2 blacks. In that case he couldn't but be white. The premises, that there is a white and a black, and that there are not 2 blacks, together make a package which entails the conclusion "2 whites" just as securely as "2 blacks" entails "1 white". We might suppose that an individual faced with 2 blacks needed to compare what he saw with "2 blacks" in the rules in order to discover whether what he saw had the same significance as "2 blacks" in the rules - the significance, namely, of "1 white". But we would be wrong: if what he saw didn't have that significance, it wouldn't be 2 blacks. Existence and meaning coincide so that the simultaneity-succession operation is dissipated - to have the raw material for the operation is already to have its end result. That is why the situation where there are 2 blacks models the animal's situation vis-a-via the "Innenbild". Now, if the individual who sees a white and a black saw, in addition, the absence of 2 blacks, then the simultaneity-succession operation would be dissipated in like fashion: if what he saw did not have the significance of "2 whites" he would not see it. But the individual does not see the absence of 2 blacks; or, at least, he does not see it in the way that he sees the white and black before him. The "perfect solution" suggests that he sees it indirectly: what he perceives is his own thought, "If I was black too, the other white couldn't but recognise immediately that he was a white, and would have left at once". To perceive the existence of that thought is

supposedly to perceive that there are not 2 blacks because, for the thought to have time to occur, the other white has to stay put for a stretch of time: that other would leave immediately just if there were 2 blacks facing him.

Now, to the question "what guarantees that the thought occurred?", we are liable to respond that the thinker himself infallibly knows whether or not it occurred. Fair enough. But what guarantees that it amounts to "not 2 blacks", and therefore has the significance of "2 whites" attached to it in the inseparable way that we imaged with the sheet of paper simile?

There is no question of the animal wondering whether what he perceives has the same significance as the "Innenbild": if it does, then he is already in the mating dance. There is no question of an individual faced with 2 blacks wondering whether they have the same significance as "2 blacks" in the rules: if they are really 2 blacks, he is already coming to his feet. But with regard to the thought of an individual faced with a black and a white, there is no reason why the thought's existence and its having the significance "not 2 blacks" should coincide: the thought's having the significance of "not 2 blacks" is, if you like, not an "a priori" issue (as was the significance of the "Innenbild" and of 2 blacks) but an "empirical" one. Under the circumstances the banished simultaneity-succession format returns to make its claims. There needs to be a paradigm, something that is identical to the thought in all respects except that of the attachment to it of the significance "not 2 blacks": whereas the attachment of that significance to the thought is in question, its attachment to the paradigm has to be beyond doubt. The thought has then to be compared to the paradigm, (in a simultaneity), and consequently seen definitively as having or not having the relevant significance, (the thought before and after constituting the succession).

So where is there an item which is just like the thought of our individual faced with a black and a white, but which necessarily has the significance of "not 2 blacks"? It is in the other white: if he thinks the same thought as the first white, then there cannot be 2 blacks - if there were 2 blacks he wouldn't have thought anything at all, he would have left immediately.

But here the Lacanian sophism reveals its subtlety. The solution we have suggested is no solution, because the other white is in a quandary that is congruent to that of the first: his thought only has the significance of "not 2 blacks" if the first individual has that same thought. For him it is the first individual's thought which, if it occurs, must signify "not 2 blacks", and which is therefore the paradigm - but we came to him in search of a guarantee that the first individual's thought meant "not 2 blacks". So in search of a paradigm against which to measure a

sample, all we find is another sample which looks to the first for a paradigm.

It could seem that we are ignoring something here. Namely this: just as an individual would not see 2 blacks unless he was a white, so an individual faced with a black and a white would not think his thought unless he was a white: if he was a black, the other white would see 2 blacks, and by leaving at once, cut him off before he got to thinking anything.

The thought so the objection goes, merits comparison with a sheet of paper just as much as "2 blacks" does: as signs, both are inseparable from their significance, and the significance in both cases is that the individual who relates to these signs is white. The simultaneity-succession format is undermined by the thought just as much as it is by "2 blacks".

But this objection is an error. It rests upon the claim that "2 blacks", and the thought of a player faced with a black and a white, both partake of the Saussurean inseparability of sign and significance. An that is false. Where did we find this notion of inseparability useable? We found it useable in describing the natural sign, the image. The Saussurean idea helped us to understand how Lacan answered the question which puzzled us: how can we explain the relation that obtains between animal and sexual partner at the moment when the partner is a signal to the animal that mating behaviour is in order? We found that with our scheme, formulated above as simultaneity-succession, we were trying to force a square peg into a round hole: it cannot be by use of such a scheme that the animal grasps the significance of what is presented to it, because if what is presented lacks significance before the scheme is applied, it is not presented at all; and the suggestion that the first significance might not be final is no help - to find a new significance is to find a new presented item.(1) This is the situation that Saussure's sign-significance inseparability expresses so well, and it is a situation in which a subject, an animal subject, gets access to a sign signification.

It is the issue of that access which makes a disymmetry in "Le Temps Logique" between 2 blacks and the thought of a player faced with a black and a white, a disymmetry which the objection above overlooks. A perception of 2 blacks makes the individual in whom it occurs white. But the thought does not make the individual in whom it occurs white: instead it makes the other of the individuals involved white, because its existence guarantees that from when it is located there is not a view of 2 blacks - if there were, it would not get thought. The thought's significance does not keep the thought company but is alienated. Worse still, this alienated significance is of no use to the other where it resides: the only significance which could be of use to him would be that of his own

1: above p 3-4

thought, and that significance is alienated in the opposite direction, back to the first individual.

We have seen the Lacanian use of $\frac{S}{s}$, when the line bars all possibility of sign and significance coinciding. The thought of each individual stands for the linguistic sign, the signifier. To appreciate the economy with which Lacan's sophism crams in crucial points, consider the content of the thought,(1): its content can be condensed into the hypothesis "not 2 blacks". "2 blacks", we have seen, stands for the natural sign: so that which stands for the linguistic sign in the sophism, the signifier, is the negation of that which stands for the natural sign. At the beginning of his teaching Lacan manages to illustrate what he will maintain throughout - that the function of the symbolic order is a negating one.

We can now return to the optical model with which we began. When Lacan and Hyppolite together concoct an application of the model to the animal's situation, they do not mention the eye which sees the real image of the vase enveloping the bouquet.(2) It is not hard to grasp why that is so. Lacan declares when he first draws the model that "the eye is here, as it frequently is, the symbol of the subject." We have already cited his account of how the image operates in mating, in which account he remarks that "the subject literally gets identified with the trigger stimulus". The eye does not have a place in the model's animal-life application because the eye, as standing for the subject, is there identified to the significance of the trigger stimulus: the subject is "the reflected imaginary structure", the significance, of the "real structure", the sexual partner as sign. Being identical to the significance of the the trigger stimulus is the same as being identical to the trigger stimulus itself, because in the non-linguistic animal world sign and significance are inseparable.

We may note in passing that this explains what Lacan meant when he said that the respective positions of vase and flowers are reversible(3): because the natural sign operates through inseparability of sign and signification, it does not matter in which of the two we locate the natural sign's functioning. There is no motivation for preparing to say that the animal is identified to the significance rather than to the materiality of the sign when he is related to it, nor for the converse.

Now, we have already remarked(4) that the identification of subject to sign in which significance consists is, according to Lacan, not cognitive at all - it is action. Thus, in "Le Temps Logique", the identification of the individual to the significance of "2 blacks" is not his being white, but his asserting that he is white. The same law, of the coincidence of significance and action, holds in the situation of the player faced with a white and a black, but

1: above p (wherever the Sig "Ecrits" quote is)

2: above p.3

3: above p.2

4: above p.7

its demands cannot be met there. They cannot be met because significance has been cut away from the sign and alienated. Like a natural sign, a signifier cannot exist unless it has a fixed significance, but that significance is not merely separable from the signifier - it is necessarily separated from it. This is illustrated in "Le Temps Logique" by the thought of a player faced with a black and a white: if the thought exists it necessarily has the significance of someone being white, but that someone is not the carrier of the thought. It is a thought which is just like the first, but carried by the other individual, which acquires the significance offered by the first thought.

The objection which we cited above, though false, contains a large grain of truth. Unless an individual was white, he wouldn't have the thought: but, (and this is a big but), he has no access to the thought's significance. He is identified to the sign, not to the significance, and therefore he cannot act, while the individual faced by 2 blacks can act because he is identified to the significance of his sign.

By now we should be able to provide an exploration of Lacan's comments on Melanie Klein's 4 year-old patient. To come straight to the point, the situation of an individual faced with a Black and a white in "Le Temps Logique" represents the Lacanian mirror stage, and Dick is caught in the mirror stage. We have mentioned() Lacan's distinction between two sort functions of the "moi" and examined what he said of the first sort. The first functions consist in the "moi" being the significance of natural sign, a significance which is the animal's life-cycle. These functions are purely animal. The second functions are exclusively human: they are what became of the first, animal, functions from the fact that "they have to pass, in man, through this fundamental alienation constituted by the reflected image of the self." This fundamental alienation is the effect of the intervention of the symbolic order, the order of language, upon the natural sign: the significance produced by the sign in which the subject resides is inevitably attached to another sign, just like the first, in which the subject does not reside, and so he misses the significance.

It is this which concerns Lacan when he uses the optical model to theorise Dick's predicament. To recap: he makes the non-appearance of the ego, or the failure of the mother's body and the objects it contains to coincide, map with the "bouquet-in-vase" illusion's dependence upon the positioning of the eye. The point about the ego, and the point about the mother's body and objects, are one and the same. In the animal sign and significance, (the bouquet and the image of the vase), were there at once: the signifier has destroyed that harmony, and the "moi" (significance) does not appear.

I shall end the discussion at this point, but there is more to be said. The solution to Dick's problem does not consist in turning him into an animal: the solution of "Le Temps Logique" does not consist in accepting that the situation of an individual faced with a black and a white is a dead end, and that only where there are 2 blacks is an answer possible. Melanie Klein helps Dick by, in Lacan's words, grafting on to him the Oedipal myth, and in "Le Temps Logique" it is not an individual faced with 2 blacks but the individual faced with 2 whites who has the answer.

To make something of these further steps through comparison between them, as we have done so far, seem to me difficult but feasible.

Ivy House Seminars

8th February Hourik Zakarian: 'The symptom - to speak is to suffer'

15th February Danuza Machado: 'Not all about women'

22nd February Richard Klein: 'Freud with Kant'

NB. All meetings start at 7.00pm and end promptly at 9.00pm.

CFAR:

PSYCHOANALYSIS SEMINARS

- a) A Series of six INTERMEDIARY LACAN SEMINARS will take place in the room of the company of Astrologers (3rd floor, Art Workers Guild, 6 Queen Square, Bloomsbury) on January 14, 21, 28, February 4, and then again on March 4 and 11: the last two will involve multiple presentations of Lacan's text: DIRECTION OF THE TREATMENT; the first four will be on the themes of female sexuality, interpretation, formalisation, and the relation of Lacan to Freud. The seminars will last from 2.00pm until 4.30pm; the fee for the series is £36 (£24 for students of Middlesex Polytechnic). Individual seminars cost £7.50 each.

For further information contact Bernard Burgoyne on 889 5925

- b) On Saturday April 1, a dual seminar will take place in the ground-floor Lecture Room of the Art Worker's Guild. In the morning, from 10.30am to 12.30pm, Bernard Burgoyne will speak on: EROTIC ETHICS: FOUR YEARS OF LACAN'S WORK. In the afternoon, from 2.00pm to 4.00pm Slavoj Zizek of the University of Ljubljana will speak on: LACAN'S GRAPH OF DESIRE. There will be a discussion period from 4.30pm to 5.30pm, following a tea-break. The fee for both sessions is £10 (£7.50 for students of Middlesex Polytechnic); the fee for one session only, is £6. There is a reduction of 20% for bookings made before 1 February.

- c) FREUDIAN FIELD SEMINARS
Lacanian psychoanalysts from France and Spain will present a series of five four-hour sessions on theoretical and clinical problems of psychoanalysis in the Lecture Room of the Art Worker's Guild, 6 Queen Square, London WC1, as follows:-

Feb 18	Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris)
April 29	Carmen Gallano (Madrid)
May 27	Colette Solèr (Paris)
June 17	Eric Laurent (Paris)
July 1	Marie-Helene Brousse (Paris)

All the seminars will start with a theoretical session, and lead on to discussions of clinical material. They will all address issues to be found in Lacan's article: VARIANTES DE LA CURE-TYPE - a translation of this article will be distributed FREE to anyone registering for the whole series. The seminars last from 2.00pm to 5.30pm (including a tea break), and will be followed by a half-hour question period. The cost of the whole series is £45; the cost of individual seminars is £10 each, plus a further £10 for a copy of the Lacan paper. There is a reduction of 20% for bookings made before 1 February, and a separate reduction of 10% for students of Middlesex Polytechnic.

Cheque for ALL THE ABOVE seminars should be sent to the centre for Freudian Analysis and Research, 23 Primrose Gardens, London NW3 4UJ.