

CENTRE for FREUDIAN ANALYSIS and RESEARCH  
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NEWSLETTER

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Texts sent for publication in the Newsletter must reach us by the 20th of August or the 20th of October for the next two issues respectively. Please send contributions to M. Dury's address, 69 Foyle road, London SE3 7RQ.

## CHILD ANALYSIS WORKING GROUP

In this issue of the Newsletter, the CAWG publishes the first two of a series of papers given in this year's meetings: Passion of Childhood by Bice Benvenuto, a coordinator of CAWG, given last term at Ivy House, and History, the Child and... by Abdoolkarim Vakil one of the members of the group, given in the second term. The series of publications will continue in the next issue with a report on the interviews the CAWG held with various guests concerning such topics as the function of castration in children and the concept of 'holding' in the winnicottian theory and practice.

The program for next term is as follows:

1. 25 October 1988- Katharine Swarbrick : Rousseau's Émile.
2. 29 November 1988 - Bice Benvenuto : The cases of Little Dick and Little Richard - Melanie Klein and R. Lefort in Lacan's Seminar I.
3. 13 December 1988 - Danuza Machado: The Mother-child relation and the Symbolic order.

### READING LIST.

- Émile - J.J. Rousseau.
- Seminar I - J. Lacan (Available in English) in particular chapters 6, 7, 8 for 29 November and chapters 13, 14, 17, 18 for 13 December.
- Participants are advised to read M. Klein's case of Little Dick, in The Importance of Symbol-formation in the Development of the Ego, 1930, The Hogarth Press, London 1948.

## THE PASSION OF CHILDHOOD

(The Newsletter is grateful to Bice Benvenuto for permission to publish this seminar given at Ivy House on 2/12/87).

I would describe some of the work I did in my past training at the Tavistock Institute as hard and impassioned work, and by this I do not mean impassioning. It is not the charm of its style that drives one into its net, it was rather the sack of all one's own infantile passions which we got bundled into.

But let's not cry shame at this word now out of use in psychoanalytical jargon, both kleinian and lacanian, even if for different reasons. The word 'feelings' seems to suit better both the former and the British object-relations school in general as it helps to give a neuter connotation to their descriptions of wild and schizoid infantile emotions and phantasmagorias. From a lacanian perspective, passions can be dusted again as long as they are (situated in a carefully determined as opposed to determining place/relegated somewhere below the topological graph, that is, as what is left-over), an aspect of an imaginary relation to the world.

The topological formulation of Lacan is an attempt to remove the epic flesh of myths by revealing the compass-card of psychic experiences in contrast to psychoanalytical myths such as feelings, the true and false self, developmental stages and so forth.

The aim of this paper to-day is to look at this very contrast, trying to examine how it came about. In other words I want to dwell in the gap that separates the psychological flesh and the apparently unfleshed world of the conceptual solutions. The analytical concept is not like the philosophical or mathematical one, the intrinsic product springing from its own conceptual logic. The analytical concept is an interpretation, one amongst many possible ones, which has effects of truth over a spread of heterogeneous elements. After all, in spite of the right interpretation, the right guidelines, in spite of a good training, the analyst cannot avoid the long process of analysis. The final interpretation, the good solution does not have immediate or automatic consequences. The process of analysis is itself this contrast in man of inhabiting this uncomfortable place, of hovering between mother earth and the skies of father.

That's the analyst's deal and this his problematic place. A craftsman does not need to know the chemical formula of the material he is forging, although he knows the operations necessary to forge it, how to bend it, what gets lost in the process, what to curve and what to eliminate. Analysis too is a practice, but of such a kind that the craftsman is required to communicate how certain results are brought about. Very peculiar. What is not required by the artist, the scientist, the cook, is required by the analyst: he has to give the recipe, and in the most rigorous and convincing way, of the process of his work. The analyst accepts it, he never says, 'Do your business I'll do mine'. No, after all, his work consists in being plunged into the business of others, but in a very peculiar way, not in the way a doctor or a confidante happen to come across your intimacy.

The analyst is supposed to know the business of man, he is given the role of the one who is supposed to know...but what? Exactly this, the business of man. But why don't we know our business and why do we want to know it from the analyst?

And who does want to know it? The point is that if we wanted to know, we would know, we would only have to say it, it is not concealed or revealed to anybody in particular. We have only to say it. But we don't, or can't and it is the analyst who is the one supposed to say; he is the one appointed to articulate the unconscious for us. But who wants to know it? If we wanted to know there would be no unconscious, analysts themselves would not need years and years of training, analysis, practice, almost initiation, in order to have just a glimpse of it. Strange business, the analyst is supposed to know the unconscious, that is, what cannot be known by definition, as what, even after you have said everything, is still not said. That's why those who have attempted to give it a content, a system, have still not revealed its mystery. That's why we go on questioning the analyst and the analyst goes on questioning himself about the mystery of his knowledge. But that tells us also why the analyst is not knowing but rather doing, like the cook for example; it is more like a 'savoir faire', a 'knowing how' to deal with a truth which never reveals itself for what it is; the analyst presupposes it but does not define it. It is like the product of the artist which suffices itself to legitimate itself as such. Also for the analyst, the accomplishment of his work should suffice to legitimate its own.

More often than not the analyst falls into the analysand's false demand of having to account for his job beyond the validity of his product. (Hence we might wonder if such a product is good enough). Unlike the kleinian internal world, or the jungian archetypal cosmology, or unlike some american psychologists who go hunting for the unconscious with the weapon of the ego, where it/id reproduces itself indefinitely (the more it is cornered the more spaces open up beside it), Lacan tries to stop wanting to define the unconscious; he defines only what it looks like, or rather, what it sounds like...it sounds like a language, where that which cannot be said speaks all the time, more often in vain. The analyst does not have the immediate word of revelation, which should not be surprising: even the ancient augurs, or any revealed truth like the Bible or the oracle of Delphis, which by telling Oedipus the truth sends him in a direction quite the opposite of its advice, have to be given an ear and then interpreted, and often as in the case of Oedipus, misinterpreted.

When Lacan started to add his own perspectives at the moment of his divergence from orthodox freudians and Anna freudians about the function of the Ego, his legitimate and respected interlocutor was M. Klein as well as other eminent analysts of the British School of object-relations such as Winnicott, M. Balint, Macalpine, etc. It was by crossing all the thematics of the object-relations theory that Lacan came to organize his own particular vision of such a relation; his focus would shift to a relation between the subject and the world of which the question about the object is a problematic moment. Such a problematic has influenced Lacan throughout his first period of theoretical elaboration around the imaginary order, and includes his theoretical efforts to locate a structure in which the object-relation's dualism was a necessary moment but not a founding and isolated element.

The importance of the kleinian contribution resides in having pointed out the problem of the 'real' and 'imaginary' status of the object in opposition to the topographic stiffening of other colleagues and in opposition to the philosophical traditional dichotomy of either the real or imaginary status of the object. The concept of psychic 'reality' sweeps away the dicotomy reality/phantasy in the constitution of the psychic object, and it is from this common premise that I would like to sketch the two different ways in which the question has developed.

Let's remind ourselves first that Klein calls psychic or 'internal reality' the organisation of the patient's phantasmatic objects, a reality, therefore, which is both analogical and in contrast with what is called the 'external reality'. The kleinian analytical process unfolds itself between these two realities through the series of mental mechanisms of projection and introjection. It is through them that the two realities both melt into each other and split from each other like in a game of distorting mirrors, e.g. between the baby and the breast, child and mother, analyst and analysand. The kleinian attempt aims at apprehending a mental object by articulating the objects of the primordial infantile phantasies. The nature of this apprehension is not properly defined by Klein but it is described as the effect of the mechanisms of interaction between internal and external. The kleinian object is an effect of re-internalisation of parts of a primordial object which the infant is gradually losing in the process of interaction with the real or external world. That is why the breast is for Kleinians the key-object, what we could call the first signifier, in relation to which the surrounding world will take on its form and meaning. Hanna Segal has confirmed in her last book on her work (A Kleinian approach to clinical practice - Delusion and artistic creativity & other psychoanalytic essays, Free Associations, 1986.) that it is symbolisation that effects the shifting of affects from the primordial objects towards new objects through equations, rather than symbols; they are symbolic equations such as breast = world. Remember Klein's case of Little Dick (Klein, The Psychoanalysis of Children, London, Hogarth, 1932 - Lacan, Le Séminaire I) in which Klein interprets according to such equations, e.g. big train = daddy, station = mummy etc. Thence, if Klein and Lacan could shake hands about positing an imaginary order, when saying that part of psychic reality is imaginary in so far as it is based on imaginary constructions, their paths separate as to the function of the symbolic order.

With her analytical work with children Klein had set herself the unique task to explore the most primordial objects of the imagination in its primordial stages. And that is why they are called objects and not people, humans; there is nothing in very early infancy which is similar to another person in its wholeness, it is a world not yet human. This pre-human world is a pre-verbal world or a pre-humanized world which Klein has caught by isolating it in her observations of children, thence making of it the mile-stone of her clinical and theoretical work.

But the problem consists precisely in the use she made of her discoveries, that is, in the way in which she brings this newly acquired knowledge into the dynamics, (the English would say), into the dialectics, (we would say), within which the subject, both child and adult, refers to a truth which is multiple. This is exactly the allurements of the imaginary which does not even spare analysts: it shows the image of objects which are not there, it positivises the absence of the object, in other words it strives for giving an image to the little object (a). We can already see here a radical difference in the function given to the phantasy, as well as a conceptual similarity.

Klein soon realized that the object she refers to and by means of which she interprets, - that is, the maternal breast, - is an object which is not there, which is lost, or which we are always losing. Unlike Lacan who considered the phantasy an element which resists signification and is therefore uninterpretable, for Klein it is rather a question of mounting the horseback of phantasies in the attempt to tame them by language, that is, by symbolic equations. Language (her copious interpretations), that is, the Symbolic, crosses the phantasy like a 'deus ex machina' and changes it.



This 'Deus ex machina', thanks to which the affect is invested in new objects and which separates the baby from the body of the mother, is also a 'Deus causa sui' because it is the origin of the psychic movement. According to Lacan too, man grows up and does not keep clinging to mother's skirts because he is introduced into new circuits, as he calls them in his seminar on the object relation.

But as we have already said, for Klein and Segal symbolisation comes to pass by means of equations. They mean that a new symbol will never be acquired if not in an equation to an image which was already there: the image is the psychic reality, the image of mother's body. The acquisition of a good object in the internal world of the patient changes its psychic quality. In practical terms the object which was lost in the real can be found again in our imagination. But Klein, no less than Lacan, realized that it is this separation from an object that characterizes the human condition. Her direction of the treatment, then, aims on the one hand at a separation from the real of the maternal body, but only to reintroduce the unity in another reality, the phantasmatic reality. A lot of needle-work is needed to repair this fundamental division, one needs to sew back what has been rent by the aggressive and sadistic phantasies of the earliest infancy.

A great abundance of cotton thread is needed for the seam to hold strongly. But it is not difficult to realize that what stitches through the imaginary material in the kleinian practice is the thread of discourse; it is the discourse about an object which was lost and then found again in an imaginary aesthetic pathos rather than in a symbolic ethos. We will see how the most eminent kleinian theoreticians such as Bion and Meltzer are more interested in the aesthetic experience of containing the pathos of beauty, while Lacan, closer to the Hegelian thought, posits the tragic pathos as a moment of the advent of an ethical symbolisation: his clinical practice rests on the ultimate priority (in the sense that what is ultimate, last, becomes prior, first, in the freudian deferred action) of an ethical urge.

Coming back to the more classical kleinians, their work could be defined in terms of giving reality to phantasies through the symbolic power of words. But it is only when you are aware of this special power of words, power which all analysts use but without knowing that they are using it, only then is one a lacanian (and would therefore make a minimal use of it).

An analyst found a pretty denomination for her description of the 'aesthetic' phenomenon which takes place in the analytical process, as when at a certain point of analysis one is faced with the emptiness both of the wall in front of the couch and the place of the analyst, the one supposed to know, the big Other. It is in front of the empty screen that all the faces, masks, characters and objects with which that place has been filled up by the subject will appear. J. McDougall called it 'theatres of the mind on the psychoanalytical stage'. The 'metteur en scene', the director, is the analysand, but the manager, the one who is directing the possibility for this to happen is the analyst with his draconian rule not to put on stage any of his own masks and characters. He does not pretend to unmask something, he is not hunting down anything, he is, on the contrary, letting the masks, the legends, fictions and phantasies appear from the place which was supposed to be filled up by an unapproachable authority. Masks and characters, then, appear and fall, only to leave another mask in this place; like Pirandello's poetics, where under a mask there is another mask, the analyst should know that there is nothing to unmask but the masks themselves for being only masks, that like an onion, the subject will find nothing in the end.

Once all the lure-objects which had been filling that place will have exhausted their cork function that place will appear holed. At this appearance of the hole, in the Other, A, in the silence which follows we witness the most intimate contact of the subject with himself. It is from this silence that desire emerges and replaces passion. If words have helped this emptying, the silence pertains to the encounter with the Other in its purity as nothing else than the other part of us which we have disavowed, the forbidden Medusa who can petrify with her gaze is finally encountered in the form of the unspeakable, the object of our desire. All we will find in this place is the person of the analyst, a little object (a), this bodily rest left over from a big alluring bubble. We will see that it is from this position of object which causes desire that a second degree of transference emerges whose problematic is love and not passion. But let's get there slowly.

An analyst like Winnicott, for example, believes in a Self just like some analysands who look for an essence of their Self, an ultimate authenticity lost in the many layers of the world's falseness; the outside and ourselves deceive us about ourselves. But how is it possible that such pragmatist thinkers of the best english empiricist school can choose as their object of work, of science and knowledge, the Self, such an impalpable, unreachable and untouchable identity. How to demonstrate its existence, that a true self exists beyond these crusts which make a real crustacean out of the subject, a self with a tangible form?

According to Winnicott if we cannot touch the essence of the subject with our own hands like the apostle St. Thomas, we can at least feel it; the feeling is the tangible and concrete evidence of the soul, as it were.

But what St Thomas had to touch in order to be convinced that Christ was there, whole and alive, were his wounds, the openings on his body. He could believe that Christ was really there not as God, intact in his appearance, but only as a man, with the evidence of his sufferings, his blood and his passion. Poor Thomas, so engrossed in the passion of Christ, he was missing the fact that Christ was risen. He was engrossed in his own gaze, his specular reflection of humanity, wanted to see himself in the wounds of God, and in so doing he was missing God, his message of salvation, of rising from passion.

Thomas is the patient, the one who is subjected to pathos, who suffers, in the latin sense of 'patire', passion and pathology. He is the one who in front of the message of salvation, of the possibility of ceasing to bleed and of turning one's own envious gaze from the miseries of the other, does not cease to bleed, remains transfixed, morbidly horrified, pathologised in front of his own symptom reflected in the body of the other.

Why? We could also ask why the patient is fixed in his childhood's problematics the way psychoanalysis does not cease to demonstrate, whether kleinian or lacanian. Why is there resistance to going over the traumatic experience, however painful, even when it has ceased to be present? Why did St Thomas not rejoice at the sight of the risen God, and disbelieved the evidence of his presence? What is this passion for the symptom, this repetition of the suffering, of the past, of childhood?

Analysts of the object-relations school deal with it as a nostalgia which ties the subject to the lost object in an impossible repetition. The problem with this conceptual approach is that there is no way out from this object: it is an object which they believe was there once, the mother's breast, and it determined the relation of the baby to the world; the breast is the world in 'nuce' and a real, unsatisfactory relation to it makes the world bad (the relation can only be accidentally unsatisfactory because the breast is conceived as good in itself, as all the child needs and demands).

It is only by a counter experience, and analysis is ranged amongst them, that the baby is given the possibility of relating to the object-world in a better way.

The world encloses itself around the circular surface of this breast; even in analysis the analyst makes the analysand believe that he is a breast, quite literally, if he is not a nipple, a bottle or a containing potty, the analysand would not improve an inch. Maybe that's why not even Jesus could avoid Thomas' pathos, because he did not show him the breasts that even God does not have. But Thomas was an apostle, a saint, after all, Christ must have thought him something, even breastless. Or maybe because of it, by showing his holes in the body he was pointing at something else or at the fact that something was not there. In the place of the fullness of the breast Thomas found in anguish gaps of flesh. That was Christ's therapy.

Let's come back to Lacan, to the scheme he gave us in his seminar La relation d'objet. I would like to remind you of the three stages relating to a possible process of relation to the object which Lacan indicates in this early work. I would like to look at his earlier work in the light of his later development, if it is true what we read in Encore that his teaching will acquire sense only afterwards, in an apres-coup. My attempt is this reverse operation in relation to the chronology of his teaching. In the same way, I think that it is through Lacan's latest preoccupation with the Real which founds jouissance that one understands better the Symbolic which founds desire. I am trying to go back to the Imaginary, both kleinian and lacanian, in order to show that it founds passion as a correlate of the demand for love.

We have, then, a first stage:

- 1) Identification with the object of the maternal desire: desire of the desire of mother (and not her cares and contact). The child is here in a position of mirage as the object of mother's desire. Here he is subjected more than subject, subjected to the other's movements. The passionate patient gives evidence of this when he has renounced his own words and receives the message of mother's desire metonymically; he takes on himself her desire. Here we posit passion (for the object which is not it) and Winnicott's 'false Self', which speaks from the place of the other.
- 2) The father intervenes depriving the child of mother, it is the encounter of the Other of the other, of a law. Here we posit the shakespearean problematic of being or not being (the phallus) as the object of maternal desire is put in question by the father's interdiction.
- 3) Decline of Oedipus when the father has and is not the phallus, and gives it symbolically to the child; he is a donor of a law whose object is not real but symbolic. Beyond the dual relation a third term is introduced through which the subject can demand to be recognized, signified. Castration makes subjects because by subjecting to it we lose something but not our right to be recognized in our division. Castration becomes a sign of recognition like a tattoo or a circumcision, and it is not a primordial aggressive drive but the preservation of desire for what is lost.



The fact that Lacan postulates these two further phases does not exempt us from having to deal with the first one. If the lacanian analyst points at the last two this does not mean that the lacanian analysis can do without the first. Lacanian analyses also last years, get stuck like any other, exactly because it is this stage that interferes, returns, insists and makes both analysand and analyst despair, just like a passion, a real suffering. Eventually, if everything goes well, one gets over it. In this case why should we formulate only the final product and not what constitutes years of stumblings, that is, of material which resist forging? Can we try to describe this stage, as Lacan did after all, without falling into the trap of the kleinian containment and quest for this primordial object/breast or like the Italian analyst Elvio Fachinelli for the uterine clauster, and maybe like so many other researchers in this field, for pre-birth states, and why not, I should add, as far as the scattered molecules of matter before conception?

In the end we know that this object is lost in the meanderings of time, of all times, it is the mythical object, always already lost, and all these other objects into which we try to fix the original one are nothing else but substitutes, representatives, at various levels, of the object which does not exist. But they are taken for this lost object, whose memory, according to Winnicott, keeps us sane. This is the background of the transitional object.

But for the lacanians it is the opposite, it is the stubborn memory, this fixation that drives us mad, it is this being drawn back that does not make us progress, this passion for the past, this passion of childhood.

But if this passion is, for the British school, a matter of fact, which only a psychic education can alter, it is not less so for Lacan who, on the other hand, tries to understand why and in what this psychic education consists. Lacan explains the fundamental dependence on the Other through the prematuration of birth which marks us not only as inadequate beings but also our relationship to the Other as dependent. The Other makes us exist but only at the cost of making our survival depend on itself/other. Thus the problem is turned upside down, it is not a question of primordial object but of a vital dependence on the existence of the Other on which our own depends. At such a primordial stage one cannot speak of object as one cannot even speak of a subject: this is the transitive phase of non-distinction from the other. An image of one's own distinction from the other is constituted at the mirror stage which from insufficiency pushes us to anticipation. The other becomes, therefore, the specular double, the little other, as little as me.

But the doubling is triple as the other still retains his essence of big Other, that is, the one without whom we do not subsist. Yet at the same time it is also the other, like me, dependent, a support of another like me and, therefore, redundant, excessive. It is difficult to come out of this excess. The other remains the one who does not lack and for whom I am only an object, his slave, and at the same time, like me, he needs me because he lacks, and what is worse, it is not me he lacks, (in case my function of support should fail), in the end he lacks in spite of me.

This doubling of the other is not to be undervalued, for any relation to the other, not only to the analyst, hides this duplicity, the absolute A is challenged and implored, it is idealized but only in order to create a radical resentment towards another like me for having such a stature in relation to me. The big Other is always potentially a little other, it is always to be dethroned. This is neurosis, and that is why psychoanalysis works.

The more the other tries to mask this reciprocal lacking the more the anguish emerges and the more too, does the awareness of an inadequacy without a way out.

Here the link which ties Lacan to Hegel's object relation, (1) especially in the master and slave dialectic and the one between passion and pathos is clear. We will come back to it soon.

To come back to my attempt to describe such a dialectic: we have the other who has become one's own prison; often, a folie à deux. In other words it is the addiction to the object of the other, that which confirms one's own lack of independence and the consequent desire to make it disappear in order to affirm, thus, one's own completeness and unity, this famous Self. We want, then, to be more than half, primarily because there is no other half which holds, the other being irreducibly Other at this point of the process. Lacan has pointed out to us how to come out of this impasse, this chaos with the other, and to re-establish or encounter an order. In this passion for the other to be placed, then, in the passage from alienation to separation from the other (mother) the symbolic order is encountered in the father who transcends the dual relation without exit and marks a subjection in which a name, a place and a law is given to the child.

But let's ask ourselves what happens to the mother in this second stage. And let's be aware also of the fact that this is a problem that the most intelligent kleinians, or better say theoreticians of kleinism, pose also. According to them too, what reconciles the subject to the world is a gift: the good internal object for them, the phallus for the lacanians.

But what happens to this mother who was so passionately loved? According to D. Meltzer, but also to Bion and Segal, a profound nostalgia for something which was lost remains. For Hegel too, there is no stage of the phenomenology of the Spirit which is not real and rational, there is always opposition which is the *conditio sine qua non* for the 'in-itself' and 'for-itself' to exist. What was there before is still there afterwards, but in a different level of consciousness. Therefore the absent mother, the one who frustrates, who does not respond to her child's demands if not when she likes, becomes real; she decays from the imaginary big Other and becomes real power, she is the sphinx, the two-headed monster, the cannibal witch, Medusa. What has happened to that wonderful lost object?

For Meltzer this object was never so much a good object as much as a beautiful one, it is the tragic beauty of the breast and of the lost maternal body that we seek in art and in the aesthetic experience in general. It seems to be close to what Hegel called Tragic Pathos, which is a dialectic return to the originary passion through the human law. It is through consciousness that for Hegel the primary passion, the under-world, realises itself on earth as positive and not destructive existence. But Hegel does not stop there: if passion, through the human law, has become pathos, that is, the sense (as sensual and felt experience) of love for an unreachable real, this is possible only thanks to a passion, the ethical passion. This ethical passion makes of the absent mother, not a monster but a donor; the object, from being the object of satisfaction becomes a gift, the objects, from being real, become symbolic gifts of love. It is at this point that the symbol is introduced together with the ethical quality of the subject. This is the power of absence where the object, the signified, does not signify anything if not marked by a signifier; this is the ethical power of absence which turns love, from what we are always demanding, into a gift.

This is also where the ethics of desire resides, this desire which is never evident in analysis, unlike passion, for it is immediately alienated in the demand. Desire is discovered in analysis as a residue between need and the demand to be loved by the other. Desire springs from a passion, what Lacan called 'passion of the signifier' thanks to which we can subject ourselves to a law which transcends passions. Transcended passion is pathos which is passion's dramatisation, the Greek tragedy, it is the material of desire. The relationship to the other is mediated by desire as it is the remainder of a separation, the space which was left empty between the subject and the other. This empty space makes it possible to disalienate oneself from the other, to come out of the specular and pre-specular alienation in an abolition of the prevalence of the other who then becomes irreducible, and not complementary.

This, of course, does not mean getting rid of the other, but on the contrary, from a relation subject-object, that is, from an object relation which I think I have described as inevitable also in lacanian terms, we can pass on to a relation between subject and subject.

If our demanding is there from the beginning and if demand is always demand for love, then love is implicated in the passionate state.

We could roughly call it love-passion in opposition to love-desire. Love-passion is the hate underlying any good resolution, any idealisation of the other who keeps us dependent, this is the love of the slave, of the imaginary relation to a master who is always resented.

Love-desire is knowing that you love what is not there, what the other does not have, to give what we have not got, if we don't want to deceive our beloved. All we can do is to resort to a pact of love, like actors who rehearse this glueing of love, rehearse this original demand to be the object as the limit of the other's desire, to be the object in which the other alienates his own freedom. Sartre in his phenomenology of the gaze, calls it "engagement libre", free engagement, in other words, love is this attempt to refuse one's own freedom for the sake of the object to be loved, but knowing that this is not always possible. A bond is possible, the one which keeps men together in society, the social bond, and the one which keeps two people together, a mother and her children, or two friends together, a man and a woman. But this bond is possible only with another subject, it comes in the place of an impossible unity with the other as object. It bonds two people who cannot be united together, between whom the possibility of hate, of a fracture and division is always possible.

But what would happen at the end of an analysis, should we stop hating? Maybe Winnicott gives us a good example in his case 'Piggle', when at the end of the little girl's analysis he takes his leave, communicating his hate for her. Is this love? Is the analyst supposed to love and hate? I don't know, but, like anybody else, Winnicott does. It is love, however, that "undoes again and severs what psychoanalysis alone recognise as this knot of imaginary servitude", as Lacan puts it in his scritta. We can't help loving and hating, and this is what at the end of an analysis we will be able to do. The analyst is not an ascetic and nor does he teach others to be. "We place no trust in altruistic feelings," - I will conclude with Lacan in his Mirror Stage, - "we who lay bare the aggressivity that underlies the activity of the philanthropist, the idealist, the pedagogue, and even the reformer. In the recourse of subject to subject that we preserve, psychoanalysis may accompany the patient to the ecstatic limit of the "thou art that", in which is revealed to him the cipher of his mortal destiny, but it is not in our power as practioners to bring him to that point where the real journey begins."

NOTES.

1. G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, Harper Torchbooks;  
(Self-consciousness - Part B, pp. 215-240; Religion - Part C,  
pp. 731-749 on the 'Spiritual work of Art').

## CONNECTIONS

The paper History, the Child and... by Abdoolkarim Vakil marks the start of a new section in the Newsletter, Connections, which aims to publish work relevant to the place of psychoanalysis in a wider cultural field. We encourage further contributions to such debates and will be pleased to receive any texts you have written.

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## HISTORY, THE CHILD AND...<sup>(\*)</sup>

In newsletter No.8 the schedule for the child analysis working group announced a theme for the 10th of March:

Observing the past: a hystorical approach<sup>(1)</sup>

Hystorical with a 'y':- as much as I tried I couldn't get away from the association with 'hysterical' - (the slip of the *i* left the *e* facing the *o*) hysterical wrote itself into (every reading of) the historical. (The Relay:) So I looked up my notes from an undergraduate course on *Women and Violence in the Western World* - one of those grand American lecture titles for a multi-layered analysis of the marginalization of women - and found a couple of pages on hysteria in history; at the top of the second page the name of Pinel caught my eye. For those of you who were with the child analysis group last term the name of Phillipe Pinel will perhaps, as it did with me, immediately bring to mind 'Victor', *L'Enfant Sauvage*<sup>(2)</sup>, whom Pinel (for the *Societe de les Observateurs de l'Homme*) diagnosed as an "idiot"<sup>(3)</sup>. (History, Marginalization:) With the classificatory labels of 'Hysteric' and 'Idiot' a dichotomy is formalized between the rational Observer (of the *Ideologues*; of scientific discourse; of the gaze) and the irrational, the savage (the less than human) - in other words the excluded from history.<sup>(4)</sup>

And so here I was, now in the role of the observer (of the past) recovering from history the excluded from the historical:- to *undo Pinel*. (hystorical-hysterical-Pinel-'Wild-boy'-savage-exclusion-ideology-recovery-History:) Not surprisingly these themes were to recur throughout my readings.

The task soon appeared less daunting, however, when I found the letter from Danuza Machado and Bice Benvenuto: my title was in fact

Observing the past: an historical approach

Strictly speaking, however, it was not my title - both halves of the sentence made me nervous: 'observing' carries too passive a connotation, and how does one observe the past anyway - that which by definition is no longer; on the other hand what is an *historical approach*? I wanted to 'inscribe' the rest of what I would have to 'say' onto the title; onto the cracks opened by these questions:

I will start with a caricatured scheme to order some thoughts:

- 1) History as 'What actually happened' in the past (the *res gestae*): the 'innocent observer's history' long associated with the positivistic mistranslations of the Rankean '*wie es eigentlich gewesen*'.
- 2) History as the 'past' we live with in the present: the myths, the shared representations, the collective memory, and, in a more restricted sense, what emerges from historical works: the *history written by historians* (the *historia rerum gestarum*)
- 3) History as the discipline, the methodology, the practice, the institutions: the *history which writes the historians*.

Playing along with this scheme (1) drops out of sight; and, as they concern us here, (2) and (3) will be re-written as:

- 2) What emerges from the past - by reading various -books, see what emerges in other words THE CHILD AS A HISTORICAL SUBJECT.
- 3) In the discipline of history - by reading the manuals for historians, see what is constructed, in other words THE CHILD AS A SUBJECT OF HISTORY.

2) The child as a historical subject emerges from:

2.1) Lloyd Demause's *The History of Childhood*<sup>(5)</sup>, is, in my opinion, the kind of reductionism that gives both history and psychoanalyses a bad name - (I will return to it later).

2.2) Phillipe Ariès' text on the other hand is probably the best known and most influential book on the subject. In *Centuries of Childhood*<sup>6</sup>, Ariès traces the emergence of the 'idea' or 'social category' of the child in the complex interdependent areas of language, literature, iconography, and, correlatively, through clothes and toys. "In medieval society the idea of childhood did not exist. ...as soon as the child could live without the constant solicitude of his mother, his nanny or his cradle rocker, he belonged to adult society."(p125) "Medieval art until about the 12th century did not know childhood...There was no place for childhood in the medieval world."(p31) From the Ottonian miniatures of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, in which children were depicted as adults in a smaller scale, until the child becomes the centre of the family portrait in the seventeenth century, a slow emancipation of the figure of the child must take place: first in religious iconography, from the adolescent agent of the Italian Quattrocento, to the infant Jesus, the Virgin Mary, and finally a generalization to depictions of other holy childhoods; and in lay iconography, from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries crowd and group scenes to the single infant.

Not only a reference term had to emerge to designate (and constitute) the child as a segmented stage in a continuum, first in opposition to the adult, and then as separate from youth, but that continuum itself had to become specifically formulated in terms of a (visible) biological aging process (and later perhaps as a purely numeric phenomenon) as distinct from a social hierarchical classification - such as dependency. At the same time, the interest and endearment of children's jargon and habits, the specialization in children's dress, the amusing child of the seventeenth century middle class firmly establishes its ground as the model for gradual dissemination. With "the revival, at the beginning of modern times of an interest in education... Henceforth it was recognized that the child was not ready for life, and that he had to be subjected to a special treatment, a sort of quarantine, before he was allowed to join the adults."(p396)

2.3) Peter Coveney who deals with the image of the child in English literature<sup>7</sup>, writes of: "The emergence of 'Childhood as a major theme... with the generations of Blake and Wordsworth.'"(pix) For him this turning to the child was directly linked to the dissolution of culture and desintegration of the artists' audience which led him in reaction to make the child "A symbol of the artist's dissatisfaction with society...In a world given increasingly to utilitarian values and the machine, the child could become the symbol of Imagination and Sensibility, a symbol of nature set against the forces abroad in society actively dehumanizing humanity"(pxi), moreover, in his insecurity and isolation, the artist of this crisis period found in the child the image of his own experience, and "a symbol of the greatest significance for the subjective investigation of the Self..."(pxii). In more general terms, the child was the product of the conflict between the rationalist seventeenth century and the romantic eighteenth century. Unlike Ariès, Coveney writes in an older tradition of biographical emphasis determinant of authorial meanings, and his book is therefore structured around individuals in which Rousseau (as the original demand for the recognition of the child as an entity in its own right with specific educative needs) and Wordsworth (at the turning point of the two worlds) are given considerable recognition. In emancipating the child from the Christian centuries of Original sin, however, romantic literature delivered her into the opposite mythical status of 'original innocence' which became an equal "impediment to an objective assessment of the nature of the child...(and the renewed emancipation was now) very much the product of the new techniques discovered by psychoanalysis for the observation and investigation of the child's nature"(p240). In drawing the link between Wordsworth and psychoanalysis: "The romantic sensibility had often concerned itself with childhood as an agent in the quest for psychological insight and awareness... Across the century Wordsworth's prelude and Freud's essay on Infantile Sexuality may be said to join hands"(pxiii); and in quoting "The

child is father of the man"(p30) Coveney in fact reaches more specifically into the Lacanian text.

2.4) Joseph Kett<sup>2</sup> sees the autonomization of stages of the life cycle as indeed correlative with the rise of romanticism but in need of precisely the kind of detailed specification which such blanket terms do away with. Both Kett and John and Virginia Demos<sup>3</sup> in their studies of 'youth' and 'adolescence' tie the phenomenon of their emergence of these concepts in America with the wider social context. Thus, although both discuss the work of G. Stanley Hall who 'created' the modern concept of adolescence in the 1890s, the Demos' focus on "the long term transformation of the United States from an agricultural into an urban and industrial society"(p636), and in strict contrast to the rural world argue that "with the new, typically urban family structure childhood as such is 'discovered'", and that it is in the absence of a formal ritual to mark the transition from childhood to adulthood that 'youth culture' develops. Kett on the other hand emphasises the impact of "rural and village Calvinism and the revivals of the Second Great Awakening...from the 1790s onward (when) Teenagers became truly conspicuous for the first time in American history, and evangelists...noted time and again the singularly important role of children and youths..."(p289) By the 1850's religious conversion had ceased to be a resolution of religious doubts in late adolescence and had become instead, a kind of Victorian initiation rite, a capstone of childhood and a prelude to youth."(p298)

3) The child as the subject of history: as the child was written into history, so the child was written in history. Necessarily as historians were carving out the emergence of the idea of childhood in time, so also they were carving out the concern for the child as an object of study by the discipline of history.

3.1) In one sense the child was already present to the historian: but as a manipulative concept - and so perhaps not as a concept at all. In the 'great man school of history' with its biographical method the child already focused the historian's attention; but only for what it would become: not as an entity in its own right. Then again, the use of the category *child* was already common, but as a parallel for thinking of the non-European races, of women, of the less than fully human: in other words it was child because the attitude was paternalizing. And finally the concept was also current in the metaphors of growth - the theme of *Bildung* - in the obsession with the ontogeny/phylogeny relation which was central to 19th century science and culture<sup>4</sup> - it was, in other words, an ideological label; but this is a point we will return to.

3.2) Returning to the question "When did the child emerge as a concern for the historian?" We are forced to abandon our schematic ordering: in a random glance through the literature<sup>5</sup>, from the International Handbook of the Historical Sciences to the survey essays of the American Historical Association, the edited collection of the journal of Interdisciplinary History, to *Faire de l'histoire* and an introductory manual for students of Higher Historical Studies, there is no entry under history of childhood, in other words in the discipline of history there is no acknowledgement of an autonomous subject space for childhood.

3.3) On a closer reading, however, the history of the family always represents a cluster which includes primarily women and children as specific research nodes. Let us return momentarily to Ariès, if instead of my edition entitled *Centuries of Childhood* I had the first edition, I would have found it to be *Centuries of Childhood: a social history of family life*, or in French, *L'Enfant Et La Vie Familiale Sous L'Ancien Regime*. And in fact we only have to read the first line of the introduction to see that Ariès came to write his book having been "struck by the original characteristics of the modern family (thus feeling) the need to go back into a more distant past to discover the limits of this originality."(p7) - (This presentist concern should be kept in mind).

3.4) Pursuing for the moment the development of the historiographical concern with the family, it is clear from Lawrence Stone's quantitative study of publications in the field<sup>12</sup> that the major jumps occurred in France and England at the beginning of the 1950s, and of the 1960s (the United States following with a lag, but now producing more studies than the other two countries). A consensus view of this development can sketchedly be traced here from: 1) the Demographic studies of Louis Henry in France in the 1950's to Peter Laslett and the Cambridge group in England and from there to John Demos in the U.S.; 2) From Aries' original demographic concerns and *Centuries of Childhood* in 1960 to George Duby's call for "A study not only of the family but - under the suggestion of Aries' example - of the role of children in the family as well, of the work and play groups through which the socialization of children and youth was achieved, of a society's collective representation of its children and youth, and of the relationship between the flourishing legends in Western Europe of the child Jesus and the collective representation of children" (1961)<sup>13</sup>; 3) the feminist studies of the family from the late 1960's onwards; and 4) The specifically psychoanalytical material, in studies like Alice Miller's and Dorothy Dinnerstein's; the explosion of studies of Nazi children; and the studies of psychohistorians (among whom ranks, of course, Lloyd DeMause.

4) The specificity of a space of the 'history of Childhood' which, having taken for given, I set out to delineate, would now seem rather an objectification extrapolated from the literature by that very assumption; it can be argued, then, to emerge as an effect, rather, of the intersection of studies on population and family structure, the role of women, fertility, contraceptives, illegitimacy, social status, industrialization, class hegemony, colonialism, religion, private life, sensibility, education (manuals) etc...each of which generates and is generated by its own debate within inter-disciplinary sub-specializations. Moreover, in anthropology, sociology, literary and art history and criticism etc...-by the methods of which those studies are constituted- specific sets of relations to the question of the child are already implicit in each<sup>14</sup> and will not leave History unaffected in the act of borrowing. The application of sociological theories, for example, cannot fail to take account of Chris Jenks' criticism<sup>15</sup> that "most social theories, through their emphasis on a taken for granted adult world, signally fail to constitute 'the child' as an ontology in its own right.(p14)...In a strong sense the possibility of difference inherent in childhood, considered either as a course of action or as a community, presents a potentially disintegrative threat to sociological worlds. Childhood constitutes a way of conduct that cannot properly be evaluated and routinely incorporated within the grammar of existing social systems."(p14-5)

5) The presentist concern noted in Aries' study should now be recalled, as we note further the fact that wherever historical studies of the child (read: the child, the family, child rearing, etc) are to be found, the context is almost certainly either explicitly critical (to support the proposal of alternative social relations) or, for lack of a better word, Ideological (in the sense of an implicit defence of the status quo practices of a certain group of society with aspiring universalizing intentions) - I am thinking here of Lloyd DeMause and the evolutionary scheme of his 'psychogenetic theory of history' with its (implicit substitution of the Marxist concept of a mode of production by a) 'mode of child rearing' which is "The very condition for the transmission and development of all other cultural ~~method~~ elements, and place definite limits on what can be achieved in all other spheres of history."(p50) What is the telos of this evolutionary model of modes of child rearing? - Well, unsurprisingly enough, it turns to be the 'Helping mode' which emerged in the middle of the twentieth century, and which "involves an enormous amount of time, energy, and discussion on the part of both parents, especially in the first six years, for helping a young child reach its daily goals means continually responding to it, playing with it, tolerating its regressions, being



its servant rather the other way around, interpreting its emotional conflicts, and providing the objects specific to its evolving interests." As I said, unsurprisingly enough, it turns out to be a mode of child rearing which seems possible only for a comfortably well-off leisure class!!

6) It is in opposition to this sort of history that the 'Annales'<sup>(16)</sup> recovery of the silent in history, of its history from below gains special value, and that a historical approach becomes valuable in providing us with a basis for critical understanding of the images of childhood prevalent in our society. For, the reason/sensibility dichotomy of the adult/child relation is still very much with us: For us, it is still very much a child's voice that cries out that the Emperor isn't wearing any clothes: the child is still 'the Soul', the Truth and the Innocence of Man. Thus we find on the one hand arguments such as in Paul Feyerabend's<sup>(17)</sup> radical epistemology project that "what we need here is an education that makes people contrary, counter-suggestive, without making them incapable of devoting themselves to the elaboration of any single view. [This] can be achieved by protecting the tremendous imagination which children possess (from their teachers' emotional bullying) and by developing to the full the spirit of contradiction that exists in them"<sup>(p7)</sup>. And on the other, we are bombarded by images of 'children' at war<sup>(18)</sup> (Palestinians, Contras, Iranians, Afghanis) which play on our emotions for a greater sense of outrage, and on our reason for doubting their genuineness ('how can these kids possibly know what they are fighting for?) throwing their cause and their leaders into question ('its all indoctrination!'). A historical perspective should throw into question the 'naturalness' of our received assumptions about childhood, and the images society manipulates us with.

7) That ideology in the sense of mystification was established by Napoleon's accusation of the Ideologues for forsaking the lessons of history<sup>(19)</sup>; that the Ideologues were a major influence on the thought of the Observers of Man and on Pinel; and that this discussion began with some thoughts around Pinel as a theme of exclusion, and as the opportunity to break away from the bind of the title - all this should have left as no surprise that the parameters of this talk turned out to be, in fact, none other than those of that very title. To claim that the child was the not-yet-rational excluded (along with the 'savage' and the 'idiot') from history as a rational process; to claim further that its domain historiographically coincident with that of the family and of Women was therefore excluded from his story, is only one side of the coin; perhaps in light of such works as Jacques Donzelot's *The Policing of Families*<sup>(20)</sup> with its Foucaultian if not Deleuzian critique of psychoanalysis and child counselling, we should self-reflexively consider the efforts of the Child Analysis Working Group in a society "obsessed by the physical, moral and sexual problems of childhood" (Ariès, p395).

(\*) The written-down version of a talk given to the Child Analysis Working Group on March 15 1988.

(1) This title appeared in Newsletters no.s 8 and 9, and in an individual letter giving notice of up-coming events.

(2) François Truffaut's film *L'Enfant Sauvage* was shown to the group on December 10 1987.

(3) See for example Paul Hirst and Penny Woolley, *Social Relations and Human Attributes* (Tavistock, London, 1982) pp.49-52.

(4) It would not be unwarranted to keep in mind Michèle Duchet's comment that history being thought of as "la science du devenir universel", the so called 'savage', 'cold' or a-historical societies were then not "un objet possible pour une ethnologie théorique, ou même pour de simples 'Observateurs de l'homme'". *Le Partage des Savoirs; discours historique, discours ethnologique* (La Découverte, Paris, 1985) p.21.

(5) Lloyd DeMause, "The Evolution of Childhood" in Jenks (Ed) pp.48-59 [See note 15]

(6) Phillipe Ariès, *Centuries of Childhood* (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1979)



- (7) Peter Coveney, *Poor Monkey: The Child in Literature* (Rockliff, London, 1957)
- (8) Joseph F. Kett, "Adolescence and Youth in Nineteenth-Century America", *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* II:2 (autumn 1971).
- (9) John Demos and Virginia Demos, "Adolescence in Historical Perspective", *Journal of Marriage and the Family* XXXI (November 1969).
- (10) See Stephen Jay Gould, *Ontogeny and Phylogeny* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1977) especially chapter 5; see also the Ilse Grubrich-Simitis edition of Sigmund Freud, *A Phylogenetic Fantasy* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1987).
- (11) Georg G. Iggers and Harold T. Parker, *International Handbook of Historical Studies*; Michael Kammen (Ed. for the A.H.A.) *The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1980); Theodore K. Rabb and Robert I. Rotberg (Eds), *The New History: The 1980s and Beyond* (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1982); Jacques Le Goff and Pierre Nora, *Faire de l'histoire* 3 vols (Gallimard, Paris, 1974); Allan J. Lichtman and Valerie French, *Historians and the Living Past: The theory and practice of historical study* (Harlan Davidson, Illinois, 1978); Bernice A. Carroll (Ed), *Liberating Women's History: Theoretical and critical essays* (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1976); Arlene Skolnick, "The Family Revisited: Themes in Recent Social Science Research", *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* V:4 (Spring 1975).
- (12) Lawrence Stone, "Family History in the 1980s: Past Achievements and Future Trends", in Rabb and Rotberg (Eds), [see note 11]
- (13) Quoted in Traian Stoianovich, *French Historical Method: The Annales Paradigm* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca) p.173.
- (14) See Margaret Mead, "Theoretical Setting - 1954", in M. Mead and Martha Wolfenstein (Eds), *Childhood in Contemporary Cultures* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1955).
- (15) Chris Jenks, "Introduction: Constituting the Child", in Jenks (Ed) *The Sociology of Childhood: Essential Readings* (Batsford Academic, London, 1982).
- (16) Besides Stoianovich [see note 13], see Hervé Coutau-Begarie, *Le Phénomène 'Nouvelle Histoire': Stratégie et idéologie des nouveaux historiens* (Economica, Paris, 1983)
- (17) Paul Feyerabend, "How to Defend Society Against Science", *Radical Philosophy* 11 (Summer 1975).
- (18) In the Seminar I used the cover design of the book *Des Armes Pour L'Iran*, by Walter de Bock and Jean-Charles Deniau (Gallimard, Paris, 1988).
- (19) See David McLellan, *Ideology* (Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1986) p.6
- (20) Jacques Donzelot, *The Policing of Families* (Hutchinson, London, 1980)

Abdoolkarim Wakil

## THE CARTELS COMMITTEE

Several people have expressed their wish to study areas of Lacan's thought in detail and, with the availability now of a greater number of texts, these people would like to study Lacan together with others who are interested in a specific topic or text. This kind of work-group has a name in the lacanian teaching: CARTEL.

The Centre has set up a Cartels Committee whose main role is to announce all new Cartels which are being formed, put all those interested in one topic or text in touch with each other and facilitate the exchange of information amongst all existing Cartels. The Committee is to be understood as a 'Liaison Committee' which will be responsible for the organisation of the Cartels and meetings will be scheduled for Cartels to exchange the results of their work: Inter-Cartels, which will meet three times a year.

In both his Founding Act of 1964 (1) and his Dissolution in 1980 (2) of the Ecole Freudienne de Paris, Lacan emphasises the importance of the Cartel, which he describes as a 'basic unit'. A Cartel is not to be understood as a small group whose main aim is an exchange of ideas, and much less a small teaching group. Its aim is the commitment of all members to carry out a task, that is to say, the production of individual work which, in turn, will, ideally, guarantee an exchange amongst other Cartels, exchange which can take the form of, for example, a meeting, where an oral or written presentation takes place.

A Cartel is, therefore, both the basis and the structure itself of a lacanian institution. The directive of a Cartel is, as stated, the production of an analytical text. The  $4 + 1$  equation ('this small group', states Lacan in his Founding Act, 'will be composed of at least three individuals, five at most, four being the proper measure') indicates the necessary structure which should lead to this individual production. The quaternion meets at regular intervals (decided by members during the first session) to read and discuss a chosen text or topic of the analytical doctrine. The Cartel has the autonomy of choosing the text or theme they would like to work with. This could be one of Lacan's seminars, or any of his other texts, or Freudian texts; a Cartel can also be formed around events that take place in the CFAR, such as conferences, lectures, seminars (Ivy House, Monday seminars, Child Analysis Working Group).

The important point in the Cartel is, however, the individual production, in order that the so-called 'effet de colle' (also to be read as 'effet d'école') be avoided, effect which, unavoidably, is that of complacency. For this reason the figure of the Plus One is named. The role of the Plus One is, on the one hand, to provoke the desire of the other, whilst, concomitantly, making sure that the Plus One role has the effect it ought to produce (for the Cartel, which is sustained in the transference, is a step forward in the theoretical elaboration) and on the other hand, as an 'outsider', to be called upon to clarify any point which the members of the Cartel cannot agree with or understand, or even to solve any impasse the group might find itself in. As Jacques-Alain Miller has said, the role of the +1 is an 'élaboration provoquée'.

The members of the Cartel are expected to produce the necessary conditions to generate debates. This means that each member has a place and a function linked to the other three - and the +1. The participants will decide on how they are going to work eg. reading a text chapter by chapter, or concentrating on a theme. The text or topic is read and discussed for a specific period of time which should not exceed two years (exceptionally, with the approval of the Plus One, it can be extended for a further period) - the average period being about one year, at the end of which each member will produce something, either to be presented orally or to be published by the Newsletter or both.

The time limit here functions to curb the consolidation effect of group processes, as Lacan says, 'after a certain period of functioning, the elements of the group will be invited to shift to a different group', in order that the members of the group, as we said before, do not get stuck amongst themselves.

Note that Cartels are offered to all subscribers of the CFAR. Therefore, all those who are interested in taking part in a Cartel and who are not yet subscribers should ask the CFAR for further details.

All information (whether related to Cartels already in existence, those being formed, or people interested in forming one) should be sent to Danuza Machado, 14 Eton Hall, Eton College road, London NW3 2DW, tel: 722-7383. Information can also be given to or received from the other members of the Cartel Committee:

F. Nakano	54 Queens Road, Waltham Cross, Herts EN8 7HP tel: 0992-763435.
B. Hooson	28 Melbreak House, East Dulwich estate, London SE22 tel: 738-7194
B. Phillips	25 Heathcroft Hampstead Way, London NW11 tel: 458-1780

D. Machado

NOTES.

- (1) For the full text see, for example, issue 40 of October (Spring 87) MIT Press pp. 95-106.
- (2) D'écologie. 11 March 1980. Séminaire Dissolution. Ornicar? 20-21.

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The following Cartels have been formed this term:

1. Transference

F. Nakano  
Maureen O'Donnell  
Francesco Lunardon  
Aline Katz  
+1 Bernard Burgoyne

2. The four discourses

Bill Phillips  
Tom Baker  
Ben Hooson  
Marc Dury  
+1 Danuza Machado

3. The Symptom

Val Hill  
Katharine Swarbrick  
Graham Davies  
Philip Hill  
+1 Darian Leader

4. Mirror Stage

Kadan Sarup  
F. Nakano  
Maureen O'Donnell  
+1 Bice Benvenuto