


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Cover design by Maureen O'Donnell

Extract from "Proposition of 9th October 1967 on the psychoanalyst of the École."

by Jacques Lacan

In the beginning of psychoanalysis is the transference. It is there thanks to the one we will call upon from the start of this discussion: the psychoanalysand [1]. We do not have to account for what it is that conditions it. At least, not here. It is at the beginning; but what is it?

I am astonished, given certain terms of my doctrine, that it has never occurred to anyone to object to me that the transference in itself constitutes a hindrance to intersubjectivity. I can even say that I regret it, seeing that nothing is more true: it refutes intersubjectivity, it is its stumbling-block. And likewise, it is in order to establish the background against which one could see the contrast, that I initially promoted whatever aspects of intersubjectivity are implied by the usage of speech. This term was a way, a way like any other, I would say, if it had not imposed itself on me, of circumscribing the scope of the transference.

Thereupon, at the point where people deem it necessary to justify their university fate, they seize upon the term, which, presumably because I have used it, is supposed to be levitatory. But anyone who reads my work will notice the "provisional status" with which I bring into play this reference for the conception of psychoanalysis. It is part of the educative concessions I had to allow myself to give way to, in the context of incredible ignorantism in which I had to proffer my first seminars.

So now, can one possibly doubt that in bringing to the subject of the *cogito* that which the unconscious uncovers to us, in having defined the distinction between the imaginary other, familiarly called the little other, and the place where language

operates, posited as the big Other, I gave sufficient indication that no subject can be supposed by another subject - if this term, indeed, is taken from Descartes. The fact that he needs God, or rather, the truth with which he credits Him, in order to enable the subject to huddle under the same cape which covers those deceptive human shades - the fact that Hegel in taking him up posits the impossibility of the coexistence of consciousnesses, insofar as it is a question of the subject promised to knowledge (*savoir*) - is that not enough to highlight the difficulty, to which precisely our impasse, that of the subject of the unconscious, offers the solution - to him who knows how to conceive it.

It is true that here Jean-Paul Sartre, fully capable of noticing that the struggle unto death was not the solution, since one cannot destroy a subject, and that in Hegel it presides over its birth, pronounces the phenomenological sentence behind closed doors ["Huis Clos"]: it's hell. But since it is false, and in a way that can be demonstrated through structure, since the phenomenon shows clearly that the coward, if he is not mad, can quite easily come to terms with the gaze which fixes him, this sentence further proves that obscurantism has its place laid at more tables than at the feasts of the Right.

For us, the subject-supposed-to-know is the pivot around which everything to do with the transference is articulated. The effects of which escape, when we try to make a pair of pliers to grasp them with the rather maladroit pun, going from the need for repetition to the repetition of need.

Here the "levitator" of intersubjectivity will demonstrate his finesse in questioning: subject supposed by whom? if not by another subject.

We invoke a memory of Aristotle, a single drop from his categories to wash the muck off this subject of the subjective. A subject does not suppose anything, it is supposed.

Supposed, in our teaching, by the signifier which represents him for another signifier.

Let us write the supposed of this subject, as is fitting, by putting knowledge (*savoir*) in its place of contiguity with supposition:

¹ The one we ordinarily call the psychoanalysed, in anticipation.

$$\frac{S}{s(S_1, S_2, \dots, S_n)} \rightarrow S_q$$

In the first line we recognise the signifier S of the transference, that is to say of a subject, with its implication of a signifier which we will call q [*quelconque* - "any old signifier", "some signifier or other"], that is to say, which supposes particularity only in Aristotle's sense (and he's always welcome), which by this fact supposes other things, too. Just because he can be called by a proper name, it does not mean that he distinguishes himself by knowledge [*savoir*], as we shall see.

Below the bar, but reduced to the supposing span of the first signifier: the s represents the subject which results from it, implicating in parentheses the knowledge [*savoir*], supposed to be present, of the signifiers in the unconscious, signification which occupies the place of the referent which is still latent in this relation of third which adjoins it to the couple of signifier-signified.

We can see that if psychoanalysis consists in maintaining a situation agreed between these two partners, who place themselves there as the psychoanalysand and the psychoanalyst, it could only develop at the price of a third factor: the signifier introduced into the discourse which is established on its basis, and which has a name: the subject-supposed-to-know; a formation not of artifice but of luck, as if detached from the psychoanalysand.

It still remains for us to see what it is that qualifies the psychoanalyst to respond to this situation which, as we can see, does not envelop his person. Indeed, not only is the subject-supposed-to-know not real, but what is more, it is by no means necessary that the subject active in the contingent position, the psychoanalysand (the only one who speaks at first), should attribute this to the psychoanalyst.

It is in fact so far from necessary that it is usually not even true: this is shown in the first stages of the discourse by the attempt to make sure to oneself that the suit is not becoming to the analyst, - insurance against the fear that he might, if I may say so, fold the pleats too soon.

What matters to us is the psychoanalyst, in his relation to the knowledge of the supposed subject which is not secondary but direct.

It is clear that he knows nothing about the knowledge supposed. The S_q of the first line has nothing to do with the S 's in the chain of the second

line among which it can only be encountered by chance. Let us emphasise this fact in order to lessen the strangeness of Freud's insistence in recommending that we approach each new case as if we had learnt nothing from his earlier decipherings.

In no way does this authorise the psychoanalyst to rest content with knowing that he knows nothing, for his business is with what he has to know.

What he has to know can be derived from the same "provisional" relation according to which any logic worthy of the name operates. This does not mean anything "in particular", but it articulates itself in a chain of letters of such rigour that, provided one does not miss out a single one, the not known orders itself as the framework of knowledge.

The astonishing thing is that one actually finds things with this, transfinite numbers for example. What was their status? At this point I would like to point out their relation to desire which gave them consistency. It is useful to think of the adventure of someone like Cantor, an adventure which was not exactly gratuitous, in order to suggest the order, one not itself transfinite, in which the desire of the analyst situates itself.

This situation, inversely, accounts for the apparent ease with which, in existing societies, what one can only call nonentities, install themselves in positions of leadership. I do not wish to be misunderstood: the important thing is not the way these nonentities garnish themselves (discourse on goodness?) for the outside world, nor the discipline presupposed by maintaining an interior emptiness (it is not a question of stupidity), it is that this nonentity ([one devoid *Ed.*] of knowledge) is recognised by all, ordinary object, if one can say so, for the subordinates and common currency of their appreciation of the Superiors.

The reason can be found in the confusion regarding this zero, confusion in which one remains in a field in which reason is not in fashion. Noone seems bothered to teach, in the , what distinguishes emptiness from nothing, when they are clearly not the same, - neither the indicator for the calculation , of the neutral element implicated in the logical group, nor the nullity of incompetence, of the non-marked of naivety, around which so many things would fall into place.

It was in order to remedy this shortcoming that I produced the internal eight and generally the topology with which the subject sustains himself.

What ought to incline a member of the École to such studies is the prevalence, which can be grasped in the algorithm produced above and which remains even when ignored, the prevalence manifest wherever it may be: in psychoanalysis in extension as in intension, of what I will call textual knowledge to oppose it to the referential notion which masks it.

One cannot say that the psychoanalyst is an expert in all the objects which language not only proposes to knowledge, but has in the first instance brought into the world of reality, the reality of interhuman exploitation. It would be better, but is in fact rather scanty.

Textual knowledge was not parasitic in that it animated a logic from which ours to its surprise has something to learn (I speak of the one belonging to the Middle Ages), and it is not at its own expense that it has known how to meet the relation of the subject to Revelation.

Just because its religious value has become a matter of indifference to us, does not mean its effect in structure must be neglected. Psychoanalysis derives consistency from Freud's texts, that is an irrefutable fact. We know what, from Shakespeare to Lewis Carroll, texts bring to Freud's genius and to the practitioners of psychoanalysis.

It is in this field that one can discern who should be admitted to its study. It is the one from which the sophist and the talmudist, the pedlar of stories and the bard have borrowed their strengths, one which at each instant we win back more or less clumsily for our use.

The fact that a Levi-Strauss in his "mythologies" gives it its scientific status, makes it easier for us to posit the limit/threshold of our selection.

Let us recall the direction my graph gives to analysis and the articulation of desire in the agencies of the subject which are detailed in it.

It is to note the identity of the algorithm specified here with what is connoted in the *Symposium* as agalma.

Who better than Alcibiades has ever said that the snares of transference love have no other end than to

obtain that of which he thinks Socrates is the ungrateful container?

But who knows better than Socrates that he only detains the signification he engenders in retaining this nothing, which allows him to refer Alcibiades back to the actual addressee of his discourse, Agathon (as if by chance): all this to tell you that in obsessing yourselves with what concerns you in the speech of the analysand you still fall short.

But is that all? when here the analysand is identical to the agalma, the marvel which dazzles us, us the third party, in Alcibiades. Is this not an occasion for us to see delineated the pure inflection of the subject as free relation to the signifier, the one from which the desire for knowledge as desire of the Other isolates itself.

Like all those particular cases which make up the Greek miracle, this one only presents us with Pandora's box as closed. Opened, it is psychoanalysis which Alcibiades did not need.

Note: The Newsletter Committee is grateful to Jacques-Alain Miller for permission to translate this extract. The translation has not been revised prior to publication.

CE QUI NOUS RAMENE AU PROBLEME DU DEPART

Contribution du Centre for Freudian Analysis and
Research (Londres)

avec Vivien Bar, Bice Benvenuto, Philip Boxer, Bernard Burgoyne (rapporteur), Marc Du Ry, Michael Kennedy, Richard Klein, Darian Leader, Danuza Machado, Maureen O'Donnell, Barbara Rasmussen, Alan Rowen, Gerry Sullivan, Lindsay Watson.

In Section II of "L'Instance de la Lettre dans l'Inconscient", Lacan holds that psychoanalysis alone permits us to differentiate within memory the function of remembrance, thus resolving the Platonic aporias of reminiscence. In the classical Euclidean canon, the outcome of a resolution, of finding a way through, lies halfway between the production of a solution to a problem, and arriving at a proof. The porism, the name given by Euclid to this stage of resolution, or the construction of logical pathways, was the subject of one of his lost Works, and it follows that this logical lost thematic resonates with psychoanalytic experience.

A series of poristic propositions resolve into one porism. The latter, in its most banal form, is a mere corollary or supplement to a proposition. Indeed, this seems to have been its original usage. However, in the more elaborated version reported through Pappus and Proclus, it partakes of that limbo status of an existent which has not yet had its advent. In the psychoanalytic field, the complementary phenomenon to the advent of a porism would be the emergence of an irreducible signifier in the context of an individual analysis, through the undoing of an effect of metaphor. The operative agency in this regard is interpretation. The latter might be held to belong to a suite of pathfinding mechanisms, which in a varied perspective would include parasitism, interpretation, and serendipity, this trio corresponding to the registers of the Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary. In such a context, only the pathway of interpretation offers a stable orientation.

In Hesiod the primal chaos is bounded by tekmar and poros - the fixed stars and the pathways connecting them. The formalisation of this imaginary world is brought into being both by mathematical elements, and by the secular path-finding of psychoanalysis: it is by means of this dual operation that the signifiers, the fixed stars of the neurotic firmament, are induced to appear. Yet the field itself is the product of a resolve, the sustaining of a wager that the noise of communication portends the existence of a structure implicating a subjective intention. The fundamental fiction operative and witness to this resolve is the drive. As such it is the terminal porism for all pathways in the freudian field.

Some pathways are exits. The problematic of suggestion was one which Freud himself started off with, in his work with hysterics, and in his initial use of hypnosis. Lacan, confronting the same problem, came to a very firm conclusion; "Il y a entre transfert et suggestion, c'est là la découverte de Freud, un rapport....." (Ecrits, p635). Lacan saw suggestion as a problem, and the key to its solution in an awareness on part of the analyst of the relation between demand, need, and desire. There is, as he states, a necessity for an exit from suggestion: "Là est l'exit qui permet qu'on sorte de la suggestion." And how does he construct this pathway? The resolution he determines is for the analyst to beware of responding to the subject's demand: "toute réponse à la demande dans l'analyse y ramène le transfert à la suggestion". Generally, claims Lacan, the problem remains in existence, because there are plenty of analysts who allow the misuse of the subject's demand, by taking it back to need, from which the signifiers of demand are borrowed.

Warning signs had been erected around this question of the framework of analysis in Glover's attempt to confront the question of the function of interpretation in 1931. Glover had been clearly aware of a difficulty, of the existence of a domain of doubt, regarding the efficacy of interpretation, and had formulated several ways through, which on closer inspection, showed themselves implausible: "The next view brings us (even) closer to an impasse". This aporia is not resolved by Glover's eventual proposal to identify structurally different types of suggestion, amongst them analysis; for he imagines the sub-structure that characterises analysis to be determined in terms of substance thus: "the essential substance, symbolised by words or other medium of communication, must be a friendly, curative, substance". But the relation between transference and suggestion - and with it the theory of

interpretation and desire - cannot be resolved, says Lacan, unless the problem, of these pathways "that symbolise" is formulated within the theory of the interject, of the signifier "qui saisisse où le sujet s'y subordonne au point d'en être suborné".

In the philosophising commentaries on Euclid made by Proclus, "a porism appears as it were, by chance, as a sort of windfall or bonus"; but this unlaboured appearance presupposes the previous elaboration of a proof. Such a good encounter presupposes the existence of an automaton: "ce qui se répète", says Lacan "est toujours quelque chose qui se produit....au hasard", and this Wiederholen is "tout près du hâler du sujet, lequel tire toujours son truc dans un certain chemin d'où il ne peut pas sortir". When the analysand reports something that failed to be achieved, the obstacle, the hitch, says Lacan in Tuché et Automaton, leads to the subject's relations to the signifying chain. Later in the chapter, he examines the dream encountered by Freud where the father dreams of his son saying: "Father can't you see that I'm burning?" Lacan suggests that what wakes the father is not so much the actual fire, but "in the dream, another reality". Is Lacan arguing that what the father encounters in the dream is the real of his desire - of his lack as a father? Behind the dream lies hidden the real that stretches from the porisms to the axioms that refuse to incorporate them.

"Le cercle de la tromperie..... voila qui nous servira de porte exemplaire" for demonstration. To one side of the porism lies the "irrefutable...and complete guide" of the domain of proof; to the other, the content of another of Euclid's lost books, the *Pseudaria*, which "by way of cathartic and exercise" aims to provide antidote to deception and misrecognition of paths. It is in this domain that any problem starts; its conclusion lies elsewhere.

CQNRPD. Does this epithet mean that transference is repetition? Lacan's answer in 1951 is "no". In relating this problem to the Zeigarnik effect, Lacan objects to the solution proposed by Lagache, that transference is explained using this result. The psychology supposed by Lagache poses transference as the transference of a "fundamental signification", where signification is separated from language. This repetition of signification is without dialectic, and Lacan, in Seminar 2, says that the Zeigarnik effect cannot explain transference, and gives an explanation of the Zeigarnik effect in terms of the signifying chain. There is a joke at the start of the 1951 text: "Notre collègue B...par sa remarque"; Benassy's name is left unfinished. Here repetition is a stagna-

tion of dialectic, transference is dialectic. The relation of a subject to the captivating image is to be distinguished from the relation of a subject to a subject. And the analyst's interpretation is what keeps the process going: "Rien d'autre que de remplir par un leurre le vide de ce point mort. Mais ce leurre est utile, car même trompeur, il relance le procès". "Le point mort" refers to the stagnation introduced by the imaginary capture. The "problème du départ" in this text is the "matrice imaginaire". The "ce" is interpretation.

But both "N" and "D" in CQNRPD can change during analysis. In "position de l'Inconscient" Lacan refers to "la torsion par laquelle la séparation représente le retour de l'alienation. C'est qu'il opère avec sa propre perte, qui le ramène à son départ". Lacan says the transference is "au départ". And, many years earlier, that it involves the subject discovering "à quel Autre il s'adresse véritablement, quoique ne le sachant pas", thus leading him to "assume progressivement les relations de transfert à la place où il est, et où il ne savait pas d'abord qu'il était". CQNRPD.

Martin Stein, in his discussion of transference, talks of what is "brought into more rational, logical, organised form", and it is a little disturbing to find him describing this as "a process analogous to secondary revision". The problem he gives himself is to consider the "unobjectionable part" of the transference, or at least he thinks this is the term he is considering. Strachey's englished Freud sometimes needs a return to Freud's text if the argument is to be followed rather than lost. In "The Dynamics of the Transference" Freud uses the term "die Übertragung aufheben", and Strachey had translated this as "remove the transference"; Stein realises that this produces untoward difficulties, and proposes the term "resolve the transference" as an alternative version of events. He clearly has not realised that resolution is a term of logic, and that the difference between resolution and solution is at the heart of things. The lack of even a little logical acumen then leaves him in the lurch: "unobjectionable" is Strachey's translation of "unanstössig", and Stein never challenges this - "inoffensive" is probably more appropriate. Now, "unobjectionable" is again a logical term: "the objection ("enstasis") obstructs the whole course of the argument by appearing as an obstacle (or crying 'halt')" to either the problem or the proof. Objection is an important element of proof-procedure, is present in Euclid's *Elements*, and is retained as a technical term in Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*. Stein finds himself forced to work with it, and he can see no op-

tion but to explain it with the modern Metaphysics of the ego's conflict-free zone; his resultant problem of establishing relations between "conflict-free psychic elements" and "the manifest resultant of a complex web of unconscious conflicts" remains completely unresolved.

Anglo-Saxon analysts are all too ready to follow Nunberg's hypothesis of the ability of the strong ego to "unmask" the transference; where this is not slavishly followed, but developed, it takes forms such as that produced by Stone who, in extending Lagache's use of the Zeigarnik effect, hypothesises that the illusions of transference are worked through by Zeigarnik motivated transference onto the environment, where "the persistently adult portion of the patient's ego" can find a sphere of "perceptual (and ultimately linguistic) clarity". Ida Macalpine uses this same verb to characterise analysis: in her version psychoanalysis produces material that is "analysed, worked through, and fully resolved". But what is "fully resolved?" For an answer to this one would go to the history of logic, to the history of mathematics, and to the history of science. The lip-service paid to science by Arnold Cooper comes from an analyst who is not in the least interested in its history: "We know that all historians are biased"; hence by "psychoanalysis is anchored in its scientific base" he means anchored in the authority of the current institutions and the current culture of science. This analyst has a patient who says: "everything you do is guided entirely by your need to obey the rules of your profession", and, not being biased, he assesses her "belief" as a transference distortion. His terminology contains the recently fashionable term "model", this not in the sense of mathematical logic, but in the sense of "models of reality" - a notion that is cogent only if reality is assumed to be unproblematic. Unfortunately everything said in psychoanalysis demonstrates reality to be very problematic.

"If psychoanalysis poses problems" then Lacan follows their logic: more than a dozen times in "La Direction de la Cure et les Principes de son Pouvoir" Lacan formulates problems to establish direction. And this frequently involves reducing or relating one problem to another. Poristic work is at the heart of analysis: "la solution de l'analyse infinie" is preceded by resolution.

In modern times, transference has not been seen as a stranger in the field of proof. In his retrospective view of his work - in the second edition of his 1882 text set up via the interlocution of Max Dehn - Moritz Pasch describes the problem of the nature of proof in number theory and in geometry: "The

transference of the insights won in geometry to the field of number theory ... offered, in point of fact, new and considerable difficulties - the point of contact lay very concealed; however, scrutiny of the material led to it with necessity". It seems that Euclid's enterprise may have intended a domain of tromperie, a domain of resolution, and a domain of proof as represented by the books of the Pseudaria, the Porisms, and the Elements. But modern axiomatics, started by Pasch, has shown Euclid's division to be deficient. Jacques-Alain Miller has stressed the functioning of the fantasy as an axiom. The problem of shift of axioms then becomes the problem of the shift of the phantasy; and the problem of how resolution becomes solution is the problem of how impasse becomes the passe.

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Thoughts on Transference

by Maureen O'Donnell

In the opening paragraph of Seminar VIII Lacan calls the reader's attention to the 'subjective disparity' of transference, the word 'disparity' implying an inequality, difference, dissimilarity - which challenges the notion of an inter-relation, in analysis, between equal, autonomous individuals. Going beyond the idea of 'intersubjectivity' (Lacan, *ibid.*, trans. Felizardo Nakano), Lacan asserts the 'subjective singularity' (*ibid.*) of transference - as that which is specific, particular to, each subject. An experience which is, necessarily, asymmetrical (putting us in mind of objet petit (a), to which we shall return), thereby questioning any theorisation of a countertransference as an unconscious interrelation between the feelings of the analysand, and the person of the analyst. For Lacan, "In the last resort, the person is always the discourse of the master" ('God and the Jouissance of ~~The~~ Woman' in: "Feminine Sexuality", trans. Rose/Mitchell, p. 141). Sandler/Dare/Holder, in "The Patient and the Analyst" (1973) (1988, Maresfield Lib. ed.), make reference to Heinz Hartmann's 1939 paper, 'Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation', in which the notion of the autonomous ego emerges in his emphasis on the "innate development of what he called the conflict-free sphere of the ego" (p. 19), and also Anna Freud's development of "the role of the defence mechanisms in normal mental functioning" (p. 19) in her 1936 paper 'The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence' - which led subsequently to the building of a whole school around the notion of the autonomous ego - thus, according to Lacan, confusing Freud's concept of "resistance with the ego's defence" ('Variations on the Standard Treatment', CFAR trans., pp. 9/10).

Along with the notion of an autonomous ego, Sandler puts forward the idea of countertransference as a parallelism between the feelings of the analyst, and those of the analysand: "the 'counter' in counter-transference" may "indicate a reaction in the analyst which implies a parallel to the patient's transference, (as in 'counterpart') as well as being a

reaction to them (as in 'counteract')" - but what is the counterpart, other than the specular ego, referred to by Lacan in his development of the mirror phase, which is caught up in its own imaginary misrecognitions? Rather than counteracting the feelings of the analysand, Lacan's aim in analysis, as Pierre-Gilles Gueguin pointed out, is rather a "going counter to the transference of the patient" (Freudian Field Seminar, Queen Square, 17.6.89). According to Sandler, Paula Heimann (1950, 1960) was the first to develop the idea of a 'positive' counter-transference, stating that the analyst's unconscious understands that of the patient, producing a "rapport on the deep level" manifested in "the feelings which the analyst experiences toward his patient" (p. 65). For Sandler, "the essential (or should we say essentialist?) idea put forward is that the analyst has elements of understanding and appreciation of the processes occurring in his patient, that these elements are not immediately conscious and that they can be discovered by the analyst if he monitors his own mental associations while listening to his patient" - perhaps from the conflict-free sphere of his own ego?

Freud, in his paper 'Future Prospects of Psychoanalysis' (1910: 1924 trans J. Riviere) makes a reference to countertransference which, in its wording, is somewhat similar to, but in its meaning, perhaps, radically different from, Sandler's statement: "Other innovations in technique relate to the physician himself. We have become aware of the 'counter-transference', which arises in him as a result of the patient's influence on his unconscious feelings, and we are almost inclined to insist that he shall recognise this counter-transference in himself and overcome it. Now that a considerable number of people are practising psycho-analysis and exchanging their observations with one another, we have noticed that no psychoanalyst goes further than his own complexes and internal resistances permit: and we consequently require that he shall begin his activity with a self-analysis and continually carry it deeper while he is making his observations on his patients". (SE, Vol. II, pp. 144/5.) What Freud seems to be implying here, is that the analyst should make use of the countertransference in order to analyse himself, and his own resistance, not in order to interpret the feelings of the client, which is what Sandler suggests. Indeed, Freud seems here to be in agreement with Lacan, who states that "there is no resistance to analysis other than that of the analyst himself" ('The Direction of the Treatment'; *Écrits*, trans. Sheridan, p. 235), and he goes on to say that the confusion arising out of the misinterpretations made in the name of the countertransference, raises the "question of the

consequences of the dual relation, if the therapist does not overcome it, and how can he overcome it if he sees it as the ideal of his action?" (ibid., p. 235).

In his seminar on transference, Lacan does not speak of a relation between the feelings of the analyst/analysand, but rather of a relation between the subject and his own speech - thus allowing a third term to intervene in what would otherwise be a dual relation. "In the beginning was the Word", he states, quoting from St. John's Gospel, and he goes on to say that, in the analytical experience, it is not "the value of its statement" - not what a person says, but rather "its value of statement" - the fact that the subject, in analysis, is spoken, thus stressing the importance of language as that which structures our experience of being. Lacan sees language as the starting-point for any consideration of: "this most opaque term, this core of our experience which is called transference".

Historically, he states, the starting-point of analysis was love. A "confused beginning", he says, "not of a creation but that of a formation". The meeting of a man and a woman - Breuer/Anna O. (Freud/Breuer: Studies in Hysteria, P.E. Vol 3). This meeting, which is called psychoanalysis, 'chimney-sweeping', 'the talking cure'. It is a confused beginning, because in this early stage there was indeed a confusion between what appeared to be a love relation between Breuer and Anna O., and what Freud was later to theorize as the transference. This confusion is evident in his paper on the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement (P.E. 15, p. 68), where he states: "In his treatment of her case, Breuer was able to make use of a very intense suggestive rapport with the patient, which may serve us as a complete prototype of what we call 'transference' today." (It is interesting to see how certain of Freud's words have been taken out of their historical context, and inserted into a very different theoretical framework.)

In his paper entitled 'The Dynamics of Transference' (1912, S.E.) Freud shows that in the talking-cure, it is at the point where words fail, that transference begins: "For our experience has shown us ... that if a patient's free associations fail the stoppage can invariably be removed by an assurance that he is being dominated by an association which is concerned with the doctor himself or with something connected with him. As soon as this explanation is given, the stoppage is removed, or the situation is changed from one in which the associations fail into one in which they are being kept back." (p. 101). The analysand's unconscious therefore emerges here as an effect of, as well as a resistance to, speech - the speech that will constitute him as subject, as opposed

to the constituted discourse which constructs his neurosis.

Freud states that "transference is necessarily brought about during a psychoanalytic treatment" ('Dynamics of Transference', p. 99), and explains how "each individual ... has acquired a specific method of his own in his erotic life - that is, in the preconditions to falling in love which he lays down" - a "stereotype plate", he says, "which is constantly repeated - constantly reprinted afresh - in the course of the person's life". He goes on to say that: "If someone's need for love is not entirely satisfied by reality, he is bound to approach every new person whom he meets with libidinal anticipatory ideas" (p. 100), fed by both conscious and the more infantile unconscious "portions of his libido". Thus, he states, "it is a perfectly normal and intelligible thing that the libidinal cathexis of someone who is partly unsatisfied, a cathexis which is held ready in anticipation, should be directed as well to the figure of the doctor". This cathexis, he says, "will introduce the doctor into one of the psychical 'series' which the patient has already formed". (p. 100).

'Stereotype plate' - 'psychical series' - 'libidinal anticipatory ideas' - 'held ready in anticipation'. How do these structures come about? and what do they 'anticipate'? To return to Lacan's seminar on the transference: he is highly critical of what he calls the 'creationist' view of human ethics. How the idea that something emerges from nothing - 'ex nihilo' - becomes the core of our experience of being. This ethical view, he says, supports a structural gap, an enigmatic void, around this 'ex nihilo'. A break or gap, where something is missing. What Lacan terms an 'impenetrable hiatus'. It is interesting that Lacan should use this particular phrase to describe (or circumscribe) this void at the centre of being. For the word 'hiatus' means not only a break or gap, but in anatomical terms, is defined as 'a natural opening, aperture' - a less common term for vulva - hence 'impenetrable'. Lacan also rejects the Platonic idea of a 'sovereign good', as a fantasy which, in his view, is the result of having projected (like a stereotype plate?) onto that "impenetrable hiatus the sovereign idea of goodness". A 'sovereign good' which plugs an unbearable hole - an ideal substituted for a nameless void - "sovereign goodness occupying the locus of our being", a 'Being' intimately related to nothingness, thus proving that there is "no whole without a hole" (J.A. Miller: *Ornicar?* 47).

I see a link between what Lacan is saying about transference, and what he says elsewhere, about female sexuality. Between the idea of a 'sovereign

good', and the notion of 'Divine Being'. For Lacan "The Supreme Being ... is situated in the place, the opaque place, of the jouissance of the Other - that Other which, if she existed, the woman might be". (A Love Letter': Feminine Sexuality, Rose/Mitchell, p. 153). Here, Lacan designates the place of Supreme Being as the place of feminine jouissance, the place of an Other - which does not exist. Thus Lacan makes a separation between the notion of Supreme Being and the place - the empty place - designated as God. But he also says: "it is in so far as her jouissance is radically Other that the woman has a relation to God". (ibid., p. 153). Which means that, for Lacan, "while this may not make for two gods, nor does it make for one alone". (God and the Jouissance of ~~the~~ Woman': Fem. Sex., Rose/Mitchell, p. 147).

What supports the fantasy of a relation between the sexes is what Lacan terms the objet petit (a); that which remains, as cause of desire, after the acquisition of subjectivity through symbolic castration. But the object little (a) is what comes to be confused with the Other as Divine Being - as unbarred, Absolute Other: "That the symbolic is the support of that which was made into God, is beyond doubt. That the Imaginary is the support of like to like, is certain. And yet *a* has come to be confused with the S(A) ... and it has done so under the pressure of the function of Being. It is here that a rupture or severance is still needed". (A Love Letter': Rose/Mitchell, p. 154).

So it would seem, for Lacan, that the concept of God refers strictly to a symbolic place, and not an Imaginary Being, and it is his analytic objective to separate the two: "to dissociate the *a* and the A, by reducing the former to what belongs to the Imaginary and the latter to what belongs to the Symbolic". (Love Letter', p. 153/4). So the analyst, in the course of analysis, falls from the place of A to *a*. The Other must be barred, even though the analysand will do everything he can to make the Other exist. Into the vacuum created by the analyst's failure to satisfy the libidinal demands of the analysand, are drawn the unconscious cathexes with which the analysand attempts to fill the place which is both occupied - and vacated - by the figure of the analyst. This empty place, which is confused, in the analysand's mind, with the Being he attributes to the Other. What is thus transferred unconsciously, is then reinforced by the ego's misrecognitions with regard to the shift - from One place - to an other, which has occurred.

SNIPPET ON TRANSFERENCE

by *Gerry Sullivan*

Where does the Lacanian current within the psychoanalytic flow, stemming from and still fed by the well spring of Freud's discoveries, locate the significance of transference? A seemingly cryptic response might indicate its role as exemplary indicator of the unity within diversity characteristic of the analytic movement. A unity determined by the ubiquity of the experience of transference as a phenomenon produced by analytic procedure. A diversity indicated by the plethora of conceptualisations of the process and consequent complementary procedural innovations.

However, while the ubiquity of the phenomenon of transference bears witness to the unity of the analytic experience, it cannot be considered the ground of that unity. This ground is produced by the fundamental rule of analysis, the injunction laid on the analysand concerning the non-omission of material. A burden quite as heavy is laid by Freud upon the analyst in the obverse of the fundamental rule, concerning the non-systematisation of the signifying material to which the analyst is the sink.

It is this policy of the fundamental rule which permits the Freudian unconscious to emerge in the faltering and overdetermination of the conscious communication. Therefore Lacan characterises the status of the Freudian unconscious as ethical rather than ontic. It is the continued adherence to this policy which provides the a posteriori unity to the group of Freudian analysts.

This unity is one of experience, both of the phenomena emergent from the application of the fundamental rule and of the curative automatism associated with it. This latter is a consequence of the phenomena of repetition and transference. These emerge close bound both conceptually and phenomenologically in the inaugural moments of psychoanalysis. Conceptually, Freud introduces transference in the *Traumdeutung* as the process of path finding whereby repressed unconscious thoughts are enabled

to repetitively insist on communicating by means of an overdetermined adherence to otherwise anodyne signifying material. Phenomenologically, Freud names transference in the case study on Dora as the renewed experience of ultimately archaic love relations produced by the artifice of the analytic relationship. This obstacle to the easy production of signifying material in which Freud's insight detected the greatest potential benefit to the curative process is transference as signifying repetition. It is a staging of the reality of the unconscious. Lacan's doctrine of the signifier, developed during the 1950's, is an upholding and clarification of this schema and this experience. It endeavours to defend the curative automatism of the transference against the dilutions of innovative procedures. Hence the critique of any attempt to shatter the illusory effect of transference in bringing it back to the here and now of an interpersonal relationship; or to complement transference with a counter transference experience on the part of analyst. Hence also the emphasis on interpretation within the transference as directed towards freeing the signifying material to resume its metonymic journey, rather than towards the generation of meaning.

It is in this confrontation and this critique that Lacan begins to realise that the analytic stasis and disruption evoked by these inappropriate innovations cannot be eliminated simply by proper analytic technique. He comes to a realisation, as Freud had before him, that the negative aspects of the analytic domain, the gain from illness, the negative therapeutic reaction, the inertia of the symptom and the range of actions from acting out to fleeing analysis are intrinsic potentials and even productions of the analytic process in its own right.

It is in this context that the two stage model of transference introduced by Lacan in *Seminar XI* ought perhaps to be understood. In the first phase, that of alienation, the analytic subject finds relief from anguish or its symptomatic replacements through identifying with a trait of the analyst which causes the latter to function for the analysand as a signifying master. The functioning of the analyst as a subject supposed to know the truth of the analysand's distress locates and binds the unconscious knowledge through an automatic suggestive mechanism. The successful vacation of this position by the analyst abolishes the functioning of this trait and leaves the subject exposed to an experience which may, and ultimately will if the analysis proceeds sufficiently far, be that of an unshielded confrontation with the anguish of his being. This latter phase of transference

ence, which Lacan called separation, should be experienced in the early phase of analysis as a pleasurable increase in the autonomy, although technical mishandling of the cycles of transference and the gradual deepening of the analytic process will increase the burden of this autonomy, sometimes unbearably.

Lacan's development of the notion of an object cause of desire, the object "petit a", operating in the place of the analyst should be seen as an attempt to find a pathway through this analytic impasse. It opens upon an altered transferential role for the analyst as the analysis proceeds as a location for the construction of an object distilling the disgusting rapture proper to the being of the analytic subject. The question of transference thus debouches upon that of the end and ends of analysis in the possibility of a final cutting of the analytic symptom from its inertial moorings in unconscious pleasure. In this trajectory Lacan is not so much returning to Freud as returning with Freud to the dilemmas and impasses of a possible successful termination of an individual analysis. Freud left us the heritage of this problem at the close of his career. Towards the close of Lacan's career he began to conceptually and procedurally innovate in search of solutions.

A review of 'Women', a novel by Philippe Sollers

*(translated by Barbara Bray and
published by Quartet Books at
£14.95 hb).*

"A novel is like a magnet, all the rest is iron filings...", so opines the famous French writer "S.", in conversation with the narrator of 'Women'. "S." describes himself as the object of "ironical or pitying" interest amongst his readers: "Little S., still writing his Joycean gibberish without any punctuation?" He appears to be readable only under another name - that of the great, dead, James Joyce!

In 'Women', however, punctuation has its revenge, constituting at least a third of the text... Iron filings fall everywhere in a pattern of three dots (save for the one occasion where they appear between quotation marks as a 'reported silence', augmented by one). For "S.", the dead, great, novelist to cite is Celine: "pioneer of the three dots...". So, he remains readable only under another's name! (Soller's father's name was Joyaux.)

"I" ask "S." about the history of the novel and, besides the great names, about "language... nudging writers, prompting them, colouring them according to their various capacities? And they merely modulating it? Punctuating it?" "That's it [he replies]... Exhalation rather than inspiration..."

'Women' offers the thoughts and actions of the writer, during his work on the novel, whilst he is not actually writing. The novel ('Women'), around which the text is centred, therefore constitutes its own disappearance. So much for the iron filings - but what is so magnetic about 'Women'?

Its attraction, for the reader interested in Lacan's punctuations, may be the character of "Paul Fals". "Fals was rather severe to begin with... Aristotle, Heidegger, linguistics, topology... But I saw him gradually sink into a dark passion: the black pitch rose higher and higher, and the eye increasingly reflected the heavy tide. All his life he was amusing

most of the time, and he got more amusing as time went by; but in a disturbing way, profoundly altered and broken. That's what you get for messing about with castration..."

Besides descriptions of meetings and reported conversations with Lacan, Barthes and Althusser also appear (under other names, of course) - and Kristeva too. (She and Sollers were married for a while.)

In the text "S." is credited with the translation into French of the American narrator's novel. What he says about his work conveys my experience of reading 'Women' in English... and at least the dots survive well...

"I ask him if he isn't overdoing the dots in the French translation... I know, Celine, but can someone go that far?... Yes, he says, anybody can do it now... You have to move fast, and lightly. Either no punctuation at all, or that. You have to show that it's all in the voice hovering airily, dynamically, over the page... 'It has to come off the page'... Be snatched up..."

by Mischa Twitchin

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