

CULTURAL CENTRE for FREUDIAN STUDIES and RESEARCH  
23 Primrose Gardens, London NW3. Tel: 586 0992

NEWSLETTER

No. 3

NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 1987

The Newsletter Committee for the new year is Darian Leader, Val Hill and Marc Dury. Texts sent for publication in the Newsletter must reach us by the 20th of February or the 20th of April for the next two issues respectively. Please send contributions to M. Dury's address, 69 Foyle road, London SE3 7RQ.

## WHY SUBJECTIVITY ISN'T IMAGINARY

In Le Temps logigue (écrits, p. 197), Lacan proposes to don the cap of the 'good logician, odious to the world', and to examine a logical sophism. Briefly it is this: there are 5 discs, 3 white and 2 black, out of which 3 are fastened to the backs of 3 individuals in an unspecified combination; each individual can see the colours of his 2 adversaries, but not his own, and they are competing to be the first to leave the room where they are confined with a correct, and logically founded conclusion as to their own colour.

Lacan's intention is not to give respite to exhausted readers of écrits with an innocent 'back of a matchbox puzzle' - witness the fact that he begins by giving 'the perfect solution': they are all white - the black discs aren't used - and after a certain time they exit simultaneously with the following explanation; 'I'm a white, and here's how I know it. Given that my companions were white, I thought that if I was a black, each of them would have inferred thus: "If I was black as well, the other white, who couldn't then but realise immediately that he's a white, would have left at once, so I'm not black." And both would have left together, convinced they were white. If they didn't, it could only be that I'm white as well. At which point I left to make known my conclusion.'

I want to focus on the thought imputed here to each of the 2 whites under scrutiny: each is supposed able to conclude from the other's hesitation that he is white. At first sight there is some sense to that but not much. Anyone faced with 2 blacks could conclude, as it were, without thinking. To get his answer, he need not go further than the conditions of the game, clear to him before the game began.

Consider him a camera - the answer is there, the shutter has only to open and capture it. But shutter speeds vary: how can each white judge as to when this moment has passed without the other seizing the initiative? We can break this impasse using the notion of an 'event': an event can last a second or 100 years, all that is required is that it be unitary. For someone faced with 2 blacks the solution appears in a single event: 'A time-instance fills the interval to make the given of the protasis, "faced with 2 blacks", move to the given of the apodosis, "one is white": what's needed is the "instant of a look" ' (écrits, p.205). In the position of the 2 whites, by contrast, there are 2 events: the first is just this shift from protasis to apodosis, the second is the conclusion of each that he is white - 'If I was black, he would have left without hesitation.' (First event). 'If he stays to meditate, I must be white.' (Second event). 2 events necessarily take longer than 1 where the first of those 2 is identical to that 1. So time considerations do justify the assertion that the individual in this position is white. That a single event should be linked to an instant, and 2 events to a time, is surely good use of words; and lacan bears out the event interpretation by attributing to the 2 whites a 'time for understanding', contrasting with the 'instant of a look' attributed to an individual faced by 2 blacks.

However, by overcoming the impasse of what an instant is, we move into another impasse; and from this one Lacan doesn't intend there to be any escape. Before approaching it, let me simplify the vocabulary: Lacan calls the 2 whites considered in the 'perfect solution' above, 'reciprocal subject' - the reason will become clear later, I hope. The impasse we are landed in is this: it's now the reciprocal subject's drawing the conclusion that he's white - the second event - which enables the conclusion to be drawn that he's white. But that's absurd, a conclusion cannot be justified by its own assertion. Moreover, a theoretical justification for asserting that the reciprocal subject is white is hopeless: he must be able to justify it himself.

It's necessary here to raise the question of consciousness: to begin with, is the 'one-event individual', the one who is really faced with 2 blacks, conscious? There's a pertinent passage at the end of chapter 4 of Le seminaire, livre II: 'I ask you to consider that consciousness is something that occurs whenever there is given - and it occurs in the most unexpected places, and places distant from one another - whenever there is given a surface such that it can produce what one calls an image. That's a materialist definition.'

The 'one-event individual' is best seen like that; the answer is outside, the shutter is lifted, and hey presto, the answer is inside: 'By expressing it in the form "2 blacks :: 1 white", one sees the instantaneous value of its evidence, and its flash time, so to speak, would be equal to zero.' (écrits, p. 204). Call it consciousness if you will. A temptation to strongly resist is to picture what the image looks like: there is nobody to see it, so it doesn't look like anything.

In the reciprocal subject we come to grips with something else - self-consciousness. With that tool his 2 events can be reworked, perhaps made coherent: let the first be the '2 blacks :: 1 white' event occurring in him, and the second, his noting that it occurred in him. We have preserved the 2 event structure, and apparently made it more credible that the reciprocal subject should himself be able to conclude that he's white. First, the event occurred, second, he noted that it occurred, and in a third moment he can judge himself white by the piece of simple arithmetic above: 'There have been 2 events, of which the first alone would have sufficed for anyone really faced with 2 blacks to leave, so there can't be 2 blacks and I'm white.' There is an exact symmetry here with an argument in Descartes' 2nd Meditation: 'If I judge that a piece of wax exists, from touching it, it will follow that I am.' The issue in Descartes, as in the reciprocal subject, is discovering something about the self by introspecting one's own mental activity. The reciprocal subject discovers that he is white, the Cartesian inquirer discovers that he is a 'res cogitans' (thinking thing), as the rest of the Meditation makes clear.

Consciousness alone doesn't yield subjective awareness either of perceptions, of thoughts, nor of a self: the point Lacan is making in the Seminaire II passage above. Descartes' inquirer and the reciprocal subject both base their discoveries upon self-consciousness. An event occurred, and a self appreciated that the event occurred in it. With these 2 facts Descartes' inquirer and Lacan's reciprocal subject can make their respective discoveries: the inquirer that he is a 'res cogitans', and the reciprocal subject that he is white. But a huge difficulty arises. What agency can take note that there have been both event, and self-ascription of the event? Only consciousness can take

that role: but we then slip straight back to where we began. There is no way that consciousness of something can be more than the reflection of it on a surface, unless there is self-ascription of that consciousness. Lacan puts it succinctly in chapter 15 of Seminaire II: 'You grasp very quickly that you haven't reached any sort of second level, since you come back by oscillation to the first, as soon as you think about the third.'

Finally, in the light of the discussion so far, I'll look at a condensed summary of the reciprocal subject from the text of Le Temps Logique: 'All that can be retained is the sense of the 'time for understanding', with the form it engenders of subjects undefined except by their reciprocity, and whose action is suspended by a mutual causality to a time which vanishes beneath the very return of the intuition objectified by it.' (Écrits, p. 205-206). Not a mean mouthful.

To begin in the middle: the 'action' of the reciprocal subject is his judgement of what colour he is. The judgement depends, we have seen, upon the distinguishability of consciousness and self-consciousness as 2 events: upon the existence of a time, not just of an instant. But, conversely, the time depends upon the judgement, - (that is the 'mutual causality'). Only because we assume the judgement do we bother to suppose what I've defined as a time - the 2-event structure, (consciousness and self-consciousness). It is otherwise vain to bother extracting it from the 1-event structure, to which it inevitably springs back anyway. The 'intuition' refers again to the judgement that the reciprocal subject is white: if there are 2 events, then he is white. Unfortunately, it's the reciprocal subject himself who has to formulate this intuition, and that formulation can only be in the medium of his consciousness. But we need a point of view here, not the silent world of reflections to which Lacan rightly reduces consciousness in the quote from Seminaire II, chapter 4, above. Since there is nothing but consciousness to occupy the position of the 'intuition', the whole scheme goes to a vanishing point: the time 'vanishes beneath the very return of the intuition objectified by it.'

Neither reciprocal subject can himself perceive that he's self-conscious: the only thing which can possibly assure that each is self-conscious, is that the other is self-conscious. But in the position of the other, the only support for the 2-event structure, (self-consciousness), is recourse back again to the first subject, and so on ad infinitum. That is what 'reciprocity', and the first part of Lacan's quote above, is about. Self-consciousness is a mental phenomenon, and therefore necessarily private, but it turns out to be inaccessible to the very individual whom it supposedly defines.

What is the import of all this for psychoanalysis? Well, it is the heart of Lacan's theory of madness. In the text immediately preceding Le Temps Logique Lacan argues that madness is not something which disrupts self-consciousness: on the contrary, madness is what happens when the subject is nothing but a function of self-consciousness. I'll go no further, but I hope that my discussion has made clear that such a positioning of the subject is very undesirable.

B. Hooson.

## BETWEEN PERCEPTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS.

'Signifying Chain' is the notion I have chosen to examine a bit more closely in what follows. Its origin in linguistics is well-known. But how does it accord with Freud's ideas? And what else does it bring in its wake that has a bearing on the act of analysis? I hope at least to reach the level at which its fertility if not its necessity for the conception of this latter is indicated.

Some stages of the way in which Lacan comes to insert his concept of the signifier in the topographical schemas developed by Freud in The Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895), Letter 52 to Eliess, the essay on The Unconscious (1915) and other works, can be found in Le Seminaire, VII (1959), p. 45 - 80 and Le Seminaire, XI (1964), p. 46 and p. 197 -201.

Here is a brief summary of Lacan's reading of Freud.

We can take it as fact that the human organism is subjected in some sense to the structure of language, the notion of 'structure' in the psychic apparatus being that which regulates the process of discharge. (1) Is this the structure that organises the elements of the unconscious that Freud isolated? In accordance with his notion of 'stratification', memory as a set of layers, he distinguished at least two such elements: - VORSTELLUNGEN, that is, everything pertaining to an object that is 'quality', that can be formulated as an attribute and cathected in the  $\psi$ -system; and - VORSTELLUNGSREPRÄSENTANZEN, something of which the notion 'conceptual memory' is but an approximation, literally, something that represents as sign, a representation, as a function of perception.

The fundamental law operating on the former is Association by Simultaneity, also called Contiguity, itself an instance of the 'Pleasure Principle'. In other words, this latter regulates the function of memory as a constellation of VORSTELLUNGEN in its orientation towards DAS DING (2), the place of the fundamentally lost object. The cathexes of these VORSTELLUNGEN are precisely the THOUGHT PROCESSES.

The VORSTELLUNGSREPRÄSENTANZEN (VR, in short) are less easily described, and Lacan will only give a precise definition in 1964. In 1959 the VR is something which 'has the same structure as the signifier', that something, in fact, which makes VORSTELLUNGEN 'associative' and 'combinatory' elements, which allows them 'to be already organised following the laws of the signifier: Metaphor and Metonymy'.

The answer to the question above, then, is not straightforward, for neither VORSTELLUNGEN nor VR's are signifiers, whereas from the outset Lacan equates these latter with the WAHRNEHMUNGSZEICHEN, the indication of perception, which is a NIEDERSCHRIFT, something inscribed and equally unconscious. So if it must remain an open question here as to whether the relation between WAHRNEHMUNGSZEICHEN and VORSTELLUNG retains the attribute of mutual exclusiveness posited by Freud in the relation between Perception and Memory, which is unlikely, both being 'traces', or exactly what kind of relation obtains between them, what can be recognised at once is that both are capable of effecting a passage (BAHNUNG), of transmitting something, of representing in short (3), and as such are already elements in a signifying system.

Now, the human organism is also subjected to the operation of language as function, the notion of 'function' (see note 1) being that which retains and maintains a certain store (VORRAT) of cathexes, a minimum tension within the tendency towards homeostasis, below which there is neither perception nor effort, nor possibility, therefore, to cope with the NOT DES LEBENS, the exigency of life. These cathexes are uniformly distributed in an 'ego-system' which, says Lacan, is 'the unconscious as function'. The 'operation' here, is the moment of articulation in the preconscious.

It is at this point that the term BAHNUNG (which in the english translation, FACILITATION, loses the important connotation of 'effort'), the relations between VORSTELLUNGEN, comes to denote also the passage from what is structured in the unconscious by means of VR's to this articulation in the preconscious. Lacan phrases it as a 'putting-into-chain'.

The importance of this operation lies in the fact that it is only because there is movement (BEWEGUNG) of speech, because, as Freud says, relations seem to be spoken, because we hear ourselves speak, that the  $\omega$ -system, perception, is 'told' that there is something of interest in the  $\phi$ -system pressing for discharge. When this spills over into the  $\psi$ -system, then the subject can perceive retroactively what is going on by means of WORTVORSTELLUNGEN.

Leaving aside the question of what passages, exactly, are effected to arrive at an articulation, we can isolate the essential point, namely, that these latter, which Lacan identifies simply as 'words', 'institute a discourse which articulates itself on the thought-processes'. In other words it is only by means of a 'psychologistic and rationalising discourse, in which we create a preconscious by separating out faculties like will and understanding', that we can glimpse something of our own thought-processes. Consciousness is nothing other than the perception of this babbling. (VII, p 76).

Such already, is the effect of language, in structure and operation, interposing itself between Perception and Consciousness, decisively marking our relation to that reality the problematic characterisation of which it was the central aim of Freud's Project to illuminate.

Once the notion of thought-processes, of a signifying system organised as a chain and capable, therefore, of articulation, Lacan's formulation for which is  $S1 \rightarrow S2$ , is established, one can see clearly that such a system, or any theory of representation, as indeed of perception, is inconceivable without the notion of a SUBJECT.

The question then becomes one of where and how, in among this babbling which so decisively interposes itself between our perception (of the world) and our consciousness, we can locate this subject which seems all too often as indeterminate as the position of the electron.

This question, which is not unrelated to the question of why we question at all, why we seem to be cut off from our knowledge (in the sense of 'savoir') in a way that angels, whose knowledge, according to the Poet, is the completeness of God as seen in a moment of desire for Him which is endlessly renewed, are not, can be rephrased to bring out the ethical dimension implicit in this questioning, namely, whether localising the subject is not the same as recognising oneself in it. (For one starts here from the observation that the existence of a subject does not entail automatically an associated 'subjectivity'. The subject of the thought-processes, the unconscious, can be inferred without any direct subjective awareness of it, as in a symptom for instance.)

One could not begin to answer this without going back in sufficient detail over what the structure and operation of language entail. From the numerous texts in which this problematic is discussed or alluded to, I have chosen the following as the basis for the summary to follow: Seminaire XI again, Instance of the Letter, Subversion of the Subject, and Position of the Unconscious, the latter all in the écrits.

Thus, as concerns the structure of language, one must take into account the privileged position the signifier holds in relation to the signified as a quite separate order, separated from the latter by a barrier which 'resists' signification. This is well illustrated by the anecdote in which a young boy and girl, brother and sister, arriving by train at a station, argue the point of whether they are now at LADIES or at GENTLEMEN. (cf. Instance of the Letter).

Secondly, one must consider the operation of language which articulates the relation of the subject to the signifying chain by means of two essential operations:

- 1. Linguistic usage shows that 'subject' is employed genitively, is always the subject of... a chain, science, the unconscious, an utterance (in both senses, 'enonciation' and 'énoncé'), is, at any rate, secondary in relation to some signifier. Hence the notation of the 'barred subject' ( $\$$ ). Hence too, that important conclusion, that the SIGNIFIER REPRESENTS THE SUBJECT FOR ANOTHER SIGNIFIER, and not the other way round.

The first operation concerns this moment of articulation. For the moment the subject appears as sense by being represented for a signifier, a part of him also disappears at another level, the level of his being, as, at that moment he is nothing but that particular signifier. In Lacan's words: '[this] sense only survives deprived of that part of non-sense that is, strictly speaking, that which constitutes in the realisation of the subject, the unconscious.' (XI, p. 192).

This fading Lacan has called APHANISIS, and went on to show that a VORSTELLUNGSREPRESENTANZ is nothing other than the particular signifier which first causes the subject to disappear. In the formula of the chain, it is S2, the binary signifier.

- 2. But the subject does not remain in this position, for in the retroactive movement in which sense is made of S1, something is perceived which does not coincide with this sense, something best described as a 'desire' which seems to reside 'this side of and beyond' S1 → S2, which is unknown. In this second essential operation, in which the subject SEPARATES from the chain which alienated him by exposing its 'weak link', its gap(s), in this movement back to S1 in which 'what is found is never what was sought', this same VR, S2, is REPRESSED, thus inaugurating an unconscious, becoming a magnet for all subsequent signifiers which are 'forced underneath' (XI, p. 199). Why this should be so is best left as the subject for another discussion.

To recapitulate: the fact that a subject, in order to articulate itself, in order to come into being as sense, has to appropriate signifiers - just as the  $\omega$ -system, in order to activate itself, has to 'appropriate the period of an excitation' (SE, I, p. 310) - means that it is not already identified with a particular signifier prior to a moment of articulation. And this latter fact means that without an initial SYNCHRONY, without the fact that more than one signifier can present itself as WAHRNEHMUNGSZEICHEN at the same time (VII, p. 80), without the possibility of rejection, no signifying system could organise itself at all.

This precondition for any articulation whatsoever entails another one, namely that a subject crossing this chain in order to be represented, also has to leave it again. It is subject to a periodicity, a scansion, a moment of punctuation which could be placed alongside Freud's remarks on the discontinuity, - introduced by the organs of perception acting as 'sieves', - which characterises our subjective experience of time.

For not to leave it can be lethal in at least two ways:

- 1. Where the subject never disappears under a signifier to appear as sense, is not even subject to that periodicity, that opening and closing which marks the manifestation of the unconscious in an articulation, but is instead caught without respite in the sliding movement from signifier to signifier without an 'anchoring point'.
- 2. Or where the subject never separates from the signifier which represents him and petrifies him, like the thief who, having purloined the poisoned crown from the royal host who resembled him without the antidote which ensured a rightful bearer, could only part with it in death.

To elaborate on these points: how could a subject arrest the metonymic process described in point 1., this sliding in which signification is always deferred, if not through some metaphoric process in which for yet another signifier which concerns the subject-as-signified, as object, there is substituted a signifier which allows the subject (of the desire of the Other) to be represented in a moment of signification, which allows the subject to speak and become a subject? The provision of such a signifier is the function of the 'Paternal Metaphor' and it is called the Name-of-the-Father.



The question here, and it will remain one in this discussion, is not only whence this signifier derives its privilege (fact which cannot be dissociated from its operation as metaphor), nor only what options are open to the subject faced with the phallic signification produced, but also, if this is the signifier which allows one to make sense of the signifying world as such, what its relation is with that 'unpronounceable signifier for which all signifiers represent the subject, without which no signifier would ever represent anything, and whose operation only can be apprehended, each time a proper name is uttered.' (Écrits II, p. 181).

At this point I would like to jump and move in the direction of the analytic act. From the foregoing we can derive that the minimum needed for a subject to be recognised is when a movement of speech is perceived, and the minimum needed for somebody to recognise himself in this subject is when the thought-processes underlying this speech are articulated, when the babble is interpreted, when a subject subjects himself to this double operation of representation outlined above.

What kind of subject is perceived in a discourse where absolutely nothing comes to disturb what Lacan describes as 'the function of the Pleasure Principle [which] is in effect to carry the subject from signifier to signifier, by placing as many signifiers as are needed to maintain at its lowest level the tension which regulates the total functioning of the psychic apparatus' (VII, p. 143), in a babble which is simply ignored, tolerated or taken as gospel but never put into question? Not the subject uncovered in analysis it seems. That subject can precisely only come into being as a question.

Here we can note that if there is no question without the perception of an articulation of the signifying chain as registered in a 'movement of speech', some discourse, whether one's own or another's, such a discourse is only perceptible because it is in some sense exterior to both oneself and another, is found in another place, the place of the Other as public storehouse of signifiers. In this sense already the question of the subject comes to him from the Other.

It would seem that the question put to the perceived discourse - 'What does it mean?' - underlies even questions purloining that beguiling verb 'to be' in order to articulate themselves. When I say: 'What am I?' or 'Why am I not this, that or the other?', I am saying: 'How do I know that when he says I am... or when I hear myself saying I am..., that that is true, that there isn't something else implied?' And it could then be shown that this question - 'What does it mean?' - is a question about how and why something passes from one signifier to another, meaning: 'Is that really what is wanted?', or, in a more pressing form, 'What (signifier, and so signified) is wanted (missing and desired) next?' It would seem as if the one irreducible question is a CHE VUOI?

This seems to corroborate the notion that desire, seen as the desire of the Other, is perceived only in the gap between signifiers, or more precisely, as what is lacking in what is signified when this gap is bridged in a moment of articulation.

To elaborate this gap somewhat, to show that what matters leaps from an interval when it is being articulated, we can glance at another signifying system which, for being judged on the extreme effects it can produce in giving body and form to desire, in the abstract as it were, has often been denied its place in the symbolic pantheon. This system, which offers few or no footholds for identifications, which is only when articulated, is music.

Why is it that a single note, when sounded, does not affect the listener in any way unless he himself imagines at least one other note to set against it, unless he places it in a synchronous framework, like a scale? Because the primary unit with which music works, that which is heard as meaningful or not, is not the note but the interval. Thus, metonymically, it is the chain as a succession of intervals which creates a melody, and, metaphorically, it is a superimposition of intervals which constitute a chord and all effects of harmony.

But to return to our home-key, the subject-as-question, what can he expect in the way of an answer in the analytic situation? Nothing that cannot be reformulated as a question; reply in which the gap between answer and response may become apparent. For an answer in this sense is what allows the subject to rest content with his babbling, is what feeds identifications, is precisely what closes the gap. There are answers which neither answer the question of what the subject has to answer for or whom he answers to when he tries to recognise himself in them, nor address what leads him to question in the first place.

For if a question originates in the Other as a Che Vuoi?, the answer, paradoxically, is already with the subject, in so far as it precedes the question, in so far as this latter is perhaps only an attempt to evade the act which this answer constitutes: a response to the desire of the Other. Perhaps this is what is meant in a later formulation which says the subject is the response of the Real to a question posed by the Other, the subject here becoming the subject of the unconscious as object little (a).

In any case, it will be recognised that the subject's elaborations and responses to the first Che Vuoi he perceives are not without import for his destiny, if we are to take seriously the formulation that 'the subject's desire is the desire of the Other'.

M. Dury

#### Notes.

1. There seems to be a tension brought out in Lacan's reading of the Freudian terms AUFBAU and FUNKTION in Seminaire VII. On page 51, AUFBAU is what retains a minimum quantity, where FUNKTION discharges it. On page 64, it is the other way round. I retain the second reading. (cf SE, I, p. 297).

Notes (continued) -->

2. Regrettably, no time has been found for even a minimum discussion of the notion of 'object' in relation to the VORSTELLUNG, nor for the SACHVORSTELLUNG, that problematic notion concerning which Freud asks himself in The Unconscious why, deriving as they do, like WORTVORSTELLUNGEN, from sense perceptions, they cannot become conscious on their own as WORTVORSTELLUNGEN do.

3. Even if this is nothing more than a pure difference in quantity. The computer shows that no more is needed to build a signifying system.

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## EVENTS

We would like to remind Newsletter readers of the following events:

1. IVY HOUSE SEMINARS (Middlesex Poly, North End road, NW3)

These are the seminars for this term, starting 7 pm.:

20 January 1988

- Bernard Burgoyne: Metapsychology

27 January 1988

- Darian Leader: Non Finito

3 February 1988

- Katherine Swarbrick: Lacanian approaches to Rousseau's Confessions

10 February 1988

- Dan Gunn: Psychoanalysis and Fiction

17 February 1988

- Bice Benvenuto: "You are that."

24 February 1988

- Carmen Gallano: How neurosis disguises the absence of the Other sex

2 March 1988

- Claude Léger: The black jacket: a case of transitory fetishism

9 March 1988

- Bruce Fink: Formulas of sexualization

16 March 1988

- Richard Klein: Winnicott and object (a)

2. CHILD ANALYSIS WORKING GROUP (14 Eton Hall, Eton college road, NW3)

There are three meetings this term, from 8.30 pm to 10.30 pm:

26 January 1988

- Observing the baby: the kleinian evidence.

18 February 1988

- Observing the schoolchild: the pedagogic experience.

10 March 1988

- Observing the past: a hystorical approach.

The subscription rate for one term is £10 (£5 for subscribers to the CCFSR).

Coordinators: Danuza Machado (722-7383) and Bice Benvenuto (586-0992).

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## INTRODUCTORY SEMINARS

## ON THE PSYCHOANALYTICAL WORK OF

## JACQUES LACAN

To be held in the Club room of the October Gallery, 24 Old Gloucester Street, London WC1, every Monday from 8 pm. to 10.30 pm., including a tea-break, and beginning on Monday, 11 January 1988.

The seminars are given by the founder members of the CULTURAL CENTRE FOR FREUDIAN STUDIES AND RESEARCH.

## PROGRAM:

JANUARY	11 -	The Functioning of the Image: Lacan 1932 to 1948.	B. Burgoyne
	18 -	Structuralism and the Dominance of the Symbolic.	R. Klein
	25 -	The Introduction of the Capital Other.	R. Klein
FEBRUARY	1 -	Lacan's view on Psychosis: 1932 to 1958.	B. Benvenuto
	8 -	The Structuring of Desire: Lacan 1950 to 1960.	B. Burgoyne
	15 -	The Father and the Real.	R. Klein
	22 -	Symbolic, Imaginary and Real.	D. Leader
	29 -	Transference and Desire in the Direction of the Treatment.	B. Benvenuto
MARCH	7 -	Lacan's Seminar XI.	D. Leader
	14 -	The Woman's Sexuality and Sexual Difference.	B. Benvenuto
	21 -	What Language is Psychoanalysis written in?	B. Burgoyne
	28 -	Interpretation.	D. Leader

The seminars will include comparisons and contrasts with Anglo-Saxon psychoanalysis and a discussion time of one hour will follow on each one.

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I enclose a cheque for £60-00. (Made out to CCPSR)

ERRATA

We apologise for the following errors in D. Leader's text A Note on Child Analysis, in the last issue:

- Page 1, last paragraph, line 9, for REDUCED read RENOUNCED.

- page 2, paragraph 2, line 7, should read '...which takes the structure of language as a preliminary TO ONE WHICH TAKES JOUISSANCE AS A PRELIMINARY.'

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THE PSYCHOANALYST'S ENTERTAINMENT No. III

SOLUTION.

I	O	E	D	I	I	P	U	S	X	X	I
I	R	X	X	X	X	X	U	X	X	I	
I	A	X	X	P	H	O	B	I	I	A	I
I	L	X	X	X	X	X	J	X	X	I	
I	X	I	D	E	A	L	E	G	I	O	I
I	X	X	X	X	N	X	C	X	X	I	
I	M	A	N	I	A	X	T	X	X	I	
I	X	X	X	X	L	X	X	X	X	I	