


CENTRE
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Disorder and the Passions in Obsessional Neurosis

by Jacques Adam

Whoever says that the obsessional neurotic is an orderly and meticulous person is wrong: at most these attributes are reaction-formations in which repression, once it is completed, remains bolted in; a question of character rather than symptom. This character, which is generally bad and compelled (*Zwang*) in the direction of ill-temper, pertains only to the affects, to the passions of the soul⁽¹⁾, and does not provide a yardstick for determining the magnitude of a disorder [i].

It is by means of the passions of Being - Love, Hate and Ignorance⁽²⁾ - that one gauges the disorder of structure. The cunning of Reason masks the great disorder of the Passions of the obsessional neurotic.

Love.

With furious persistence, the Ratman tried to put some order between his sentiments of love and his desire. This was contravened by *jouissance*, the very *jouissance* he could not take it upon himself to see "soften" in the face of his pleasure⁽³⁾ (Too much pleasure, Freud said). His desire, resolved [ii] on the impossible, rendered vain any amorous success; and if he did, in fact, succeed in marrying the Lady of his thoughts, this union was broken off prematurely in death. Love and death go hand in hand, as the saying goes.

Up to that point, he would have been living the tragedy of doubt. But what about this doubt? In the architecture of contrasts which the symptoms of obsessional neurosis present, doubt - manifest model of contrast - expresses the disorder of a labyrinth in which he looks for the emergency exit of his suffering [*à sa souffrance* also conveys the idea of deferment]. Of course, the assurance of the obsessional's bad faith gives evidence of what torments him: he doubts - but at the same time "he doesn't doubt at all" [the original phrase also means "he doesn't suspect anything" and especially in this context: "he is full of self-confidence"], as is shown by the apposite picture in the fable of the frog who wanted to puff himself up to the dimensions of the ox.⁽⁴⁾

Could doubt be the fundamental index of a particular form of illness of knowledge [savoir], of a discontent which civilization echoes back now and again in the crises of the discourse of science? Would doubt be only a way of "challenging the drive for knowledge"⁽⁵⁾ occupying the foreground of the tableau of obsessional neurosis?

More fundamentally, and Freud was the first to see this, doubt in obsessional neurosis is a doubt of love. Strange paradox, the narcissistic plenitude of sentiments of love, and even more the omnipotence with which the neurotic invests them, should have neutralised this doubt addressed to love (*Zweifel an der Liebe*)⁽⁶⁾, here bound to a doubt inherent to love itself. The fragile love of knowledge [*savoir*].

This is because there is another passion, which is repressed, and which, however much it seems to be displaced (*Verschieben*) in this man of good will (man of the Good) which the obsessional is, does not any the less accentuate the fundamental disorder of his being, well beyond ambivalence.

Hate

More tragic still, the repressed hate of the obsessional ranges itself under the master signifier of death. Hate of the Father, interprets

¹ St Thomas, cf. J. Lacan. Television, P.39-41.
² J. Lacan, Ecrits, p.627, Direction of the Treatment.
³ J. Lacan, Ethics (Seminar VII) p.241.
⁴ J. Lacan, Le Sinthome 18/XI/75, Omnicar? 6. p.8.
⁵ S. Freud, Predisposition to Obsessional Neurosis.
⁶ S. Freud, The Ratman.

Freud, with Oedipus. But beyond this, is it not his subjective position of mortification (from the place of the Other in which he has installed himself) which, as the lethal factor of the drive indicates, converts his life to that little bit of existence in which he shelters the enormity of his self-hate?

It is this no doubt original disorder (prematuration of birth), encountered behind the badly positioned mask of the image of self-mastery, which allows one to ask whether the obsessional is not someone who succumbs to the wish to love death (his counterpart, his *Nebensch*) as himself.

One can see that brotherliness, were it "discreet" (?), is not his strong point: violence always emerges, proof against the imaginary *jouissance* of the other, and the omnipotence of self-hate furiously persists in demonstrating suicidally the malaise of a civilization founded on Evil. Ethical sacrifice of the obsessional (it is truly during the First World War that the Ratman encounters the illness which "makes him die") - reversal of the drive. Successful act or false subjective manoeuvre? (6)

The alibis of a disconcerted subjectivity show that in wanting to have himself represented, contraband fashion, as subject (of love) in the field of the signifier, he only succeeds in causing to appear in the field of the drive his 'being subject' (to death). Real fading of the subject, in spite of the phantasy, ensnared by the grammatical cunning of his reason: there where he thought he could thwart the imperfect tense of the drive (*Es war...there was... one who cheats death, even in his amorous exploits*), he encounters in the imperative of his symptoms the becoming of his being (*soll Ich werden*) - for death. Success of the act.

Ignorance.

Disorderly and suspicious, heroic to the point of tragedy, the obsessional neurotic is also ...a blunderer. Trying with concerted effort to interpret what questions him (love, death, his existence) and to find some knowledge [*savoir*] to put in the place of an improbable truth, he is constrained (*Zwang* again), in his actions, to put truth in the place of knowledge (his "properly unconscious homage to history written by Hegel" (?) goes as far as to make him an adept of the immanence of truth and knowledge). Can he in fact do anything other than want to verify his self-hate (compulsion) in order to evacuate the uncertainties of his knowledge (doubt)(10)? Is he not right, in the final analysis, like Freud himself in "Civilization...", to doubt love itself, if it turns out that he can perennialise "the hard desire to endure" [*dur désir de durer*](11) at the cost of the risks and exploits of the various ways of enjoying self-hate (Inhibition, Symptom, Anxiety)?

His "*jouissance* hidden from himself" does not prevent him from enjoying his ignorance, whose ciphering (so many rats = so many florins), shows, as in any dream too, the paradoxical structure of knowledge: a desire not to know ("he didn't know that he was dead, etc.."). From that moment in the cure on, the trajectory of the drive for knowledge (*Wissstrieb*, S_2), offspring of the drive for mastery

(*Bemächtigungstrieb*, $\frac{S_1}{S_2} \downarrow$ (12)) hystericises

($\frac{S}{a} \rightarrow \frac{S_1}{S_2}$) the discourse of the obsessional

when it is subordinated to the master signifier of the subject-supposed-to-know which the strategies of transference can activate (Freud's so-called indoctrination of the Ratman).

It is a desire resolved on the impossible... to know. The passion (of the signifier) of ignorance is felt as an *jouissance* which is suffered, forced, imposed (*Zwang*). The fact that his desire might be the remainder of an operation of castration, is

7 J. Lacan, *Ecrits*, p.124. Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis.

8 Lacan recalled that Freud's analysis of the Ratman did not count for nothing in the death he encountered (*Direction of the Treatment*, *Ecrits* p.598). An ambiguous homage, (as any homage always is) if it is one at all, but which, as questioning, went well beyond the kind of sordid university work in which uncalled for critiques of Freud debase themselves today (cf Mahoney: *The Ratman*).

9 J. Lacan, *Ecrits* p.811.

10 S. Freud, *The Ratman*: "Compulsion tends to compensate doubt..."

11 Paul Eluard.

12 S. Freud, *Predisposition to Obsessional neurosis*.

what he doesn't want to know anything about; but, above all, it is what he cannot know anything about: the phallic signifier, unit of measurement he gives to objects of his desire⁽¹³⁾, in his fantasy, serves to plug the leaks of knowledge in which his desire might expose itself: few slips of the tongue (to the point of mutism), as few bungled actions as possible (to the point of catatonia), the obsessional fears above all to be taken for a "sham" subject ["*sujet à la manque*" also means 'lacking subject'], fear which allows him to categorically deny the castration of the Other. By means of some endlessly renewed exploit he raises the misrecognised *jouissance* of the language of his fantasy to the level of the censured [and 'controlled'] disorder of the anagram: he is the sheltered [also 'concealed'] arbiter [*arbitre abrité* - is an anagram in the original] of a phallic menace taken literally, in the great intersubjective game of human relationships.

His polished and controlled demeanour only hides all the better the extravagant disorder of his fantasy, out of which he makes his religion. He believes in his fantasy as others do in a Supreme Being and deduces his actions from it (let us think again of the fantastic scenario in the Ratman case involving the eye-glasses to be refunded).

This passion of believing in his phantasy serves him in putting off the encounter with a certain certainty of the truth and a certain use of knowledge - "which does not entail an iota of knowing [*connaissance*], in that it is inscribed in a discourse of which the subject, as with the messenger-slave of antiquity, bearing under his mane the codicil which condemns him to death, knows neither the meaning nor the text, nor in which language it is written, nor even that it was tattooed on his shaven scalp while he was asleep."⁽¹⁴⁾ Horror of knowledge.

The fantasies of the obsessional manifest an excited *jouissance* of ignorance, contrary to the logical and closed frame of the hysterical repetition "I don't know".

And this dizzying *jouissance* of ignorance, the excess of belief in the phantasy (annulment of *Unglauben*) answers to the avoidance

(*Verschiebung*) of certainty; good faith answers to bad faith and bad faith to doubt.

Nietzsche knew that what made one mad was not so much doubt as certainty. Even more Nietzschean, Freud completed: the avoidance of certainty just as much - thus giving this paradoxical and subversive side to that particular form of personal religion that obsessional symptoms constitute.

In taking the measure of his avoidances and displacements in the disordered swarming of his phantasies, the obsessional attests to the fact that, in the final analysis, he suffers from "delirium of passion" [and as in 'crime of ...']: the tragedy of self-hate conceals a doubt of love as well as the ambiguity of the surplus *jouissance* [*plus-de-jouir*] of ignorance.

The position of the analyst as *semblant* in the cure is invoked as being capable of emptying belief of the excess it admits of when it addresses itself positively or negatively to the subject-supposed-to-know, and of obtaining from the obsessional the only resignation which is valid to the only master-signifier which is suitable, the Master Word, - what Humpty Dumpty had whispered to him: The question is to know which is to be master - That's all [English in the original].

Translator's notes.

[i] - "*Désordre*", a key word in the text, has many connotations, all of which are evoked at various points: 'disorder, malaise, disturbance, irregularity, confusion, and disorderly' are all applicable.

[ii] - "*désir décidé*" is a Lacanian expression for desire which is turned into resolve, of becoming an analyst, for example.

Note: The Newsletter Committee is grateful to Jacques Adam for permission to translate this article. The translation has not been revised prior to publication.

¹³ J. Lacan, *Transference* (Seminar VIII), p.298.

¹⁴ J. Lacan, *Ecrits*, p803.

OBSESSIONALITY AND CAPITALISM

by *Gerry Sullivan*

The argument advanced in this paper is a tentative one, based on patterns of resemblance rather than on a confidence in the clarity of consequences derived from well grounded concepts. Nevertheless, the cultural and political importance of the issues involved stimulate me to gather together some ruminations on the nature of capitalism from diverse sources and to compare them with theses advanced by J-A Miller on the structure of obsessionality.

The first point I would like to look at is the difficulty which late 19th century historical sociologists found in characterising the personality traits appropriate to the human individual in the emergence and consolidation of a capitalist economy and polity. I shall take the work of Werner Sombart as indicative of the dichotomy which they attempted to reconcile. Sombart regarded the flexible opportunist qualities associated with entrepreneurship as essential to success of the capitalist form. Yet he also noted that a contrary spirit of personal qualities, the bourgeois spirit, was also required:

The spirit of enterprise is a synthesis of the greed of gold, the desire for adventure, and the love of exploration, to mention but a few elements. The bourgeois spirit is composed of calculation, careful policy, reasonableness, and economy. (Sombart, 1913:25)

He considers that the latter spirit is predicated upon the quantification of phenomena, and this in turn is intimately related to the rise of systematic book-keeping. Firstly,

... it puts order into events and shapes them into an artful system, thus one may consider it as the first cosmos based on the principle of mechanical thinking. (Sombart, in Winjum, 1973:25)

Secondly,

to penetrate the mysteries of bookkeeping, one must forget the qualities of goods and services. One must no longer think of ships or shiploads, flour or cotton, but exclusively in terms of quantities, of increasing and diminishing amounts of value. The idea of organic limitations of human needs, expressed in the livelihood principle, is replaced by the principle of acquisition as an end in itself. (ibid.)

Therefore, systematic book-keeping forms a bridge between the bourgeois spirit and the spirit of enterprise, and leads on to the emergence of the concept of capital:

the very concept of capital is derived from this way of looking at things; one can say that capital, as a category, did not exist before double entry bookkeeping. Capital can be defined as that amount of wealth which is used in making profits and which enters into the accounts. (ibid.)

However anachronistic one might consider the language of Sombart's formulations (although it is interesting to notice that they bear more than a passing resemblance to the categories which Braudel uses in his 'Capitalism and Material Life') or their content (in that the concept of capital is not fully integrated into double entry theorisation until the early 19th century, viz. Sullivan, 1982) they nevertheless register an awareness of lines of cleavage in the bourgeois persona, at a significant historical juncture.

In the latter decades of the 19th century the political project of Enlightenment was disintegrating. One might characterise this project, in its 19th century form, as the fantasy that the Sovereign Good, dethroned by Kant as an organising principle in the logic of ethical action, might be recuperated in the form of a guarantee, derived from the principles of political economy, that ethical action in the form of the prudently self-interested, rationally calculating attributes of

'homo economicus' conformed with the inevitable tendencies of social, even of universal Progress.

The waning of this fantasy coincided with the emergence of the virulence of racial nationalism as the effective counter fantasy to the utopias of the Left. However, the fantasy of nationalism failed to resonate in the micro-political arena of the social. Foucault (1979) has convincingly argued that our experience, the bourgeois experience, of the sphere of the social has been generated and moulded in a power/knowledge intimately associated with the discourse of political economy. To rephrase the formula of a sclerotic Marxist orthodoxy, economic discourse is the basic discourse of our modernity. It is this significance which warrants the endeavour to bring considerations of the economic domain within the remit of the Freudian field.

It is evident that in so doing we are following the precedent of Marx's dialectical counter-positioning of a mutated Hegelian vision to the schemas of the Classical political economists. It is this move on the part of Marx which allows Lacan to consider him as the one who discovers the symptom as social. The proletariat is the term which Marx gave to this social symptom. However, it is not this symptom which we will take as the focus of our deliberations, since the social struggles of the past century have in a significant measure brought this symptom back to the fantasy embedded in economic discourse.

It is the symptom of the bourgeois individual which we shall take as the focus of our concerns. This symptom is the process of return of that which is covered by the fantasy of Progress. We shall characterise the social field from which the return progresses as that of the historical 'vanishing mediators', following the term introduced by Fredric Jameson (1988) and further developed by Slavoj Zizek (1991). At a first pass we shall determine this historical field as that of the emergence of Protestantism, followed by its subsumption into bourgeois 'everyday life'. It is the universalising moment of Protestantism which is its initial relevance;

Luther was opposed to cloisters and Church as institutions apart, separated by a gap from the rest of society, because he wanted the Christian attitude to penetrate and determine our entire secular every-

day life. Contrary to the traditional (pre-Protestant) stance which basically limits the relevance of religion to the aims towards which we must tend, while leaving the means - the domain of secular economic activity - to the non-religious common judgment, the Protestant 'work ethic' conceives the very secular activity (economic acquisitiveness) as the domain of disclosure of God's grace. (Zizek, 1991:4)

This process propels the religious experience of asceticism into the secular domain and sets the scene for the supercession of the mediating moment of Protestantism;

Protestantism becomes superfluous and it can vanish as a mediator the moment the social reality is structured as a 'Protestant universe'. The notional structure of capitalist civil society is that of the world of atomised individuals defined by the paradox of 'acquisitive asceticism' ('the more you possess, the more you must renounce consumption') i.e. the structure of the Protestant content without its positive religious form. (ibid:5)

Lacan (1986:111) notes that Luther adds to the injunction to asceticism for all a characterisation of the status of humanity as the droppings onto the world from the anus of the devil.

The anal level is the locus of metaphor - one object for another, give the faeces in place of the phallus. This shows you why the anal drive is the domain of oblativity, of the gift. Where one is caught short, where one cannot, as a result of the lack, give what is to be given, one can always give something else. That is why, in his morality, man is inscribed at the anal level. And this is especially true of the materialist. (Lacan, 1979:104)

Aries (1981) argues that the modern bourgeois experience of the self is one of a distinctly abstract materialism. This is especially so in comparison with the sensuous materialism he uncovers in the experience of the self during those centuries immediately preceding the Lutheran initiative. He suggests that the only modern equivalent is the absorbed passion of the collec-

tor for every nuance pertaining to the chosen domain.

These traits of the bourgeois self associated with the rise of capitalism which we have isolated, ascetic acquisitiveness, an ambivalence of character traits, an abstract materialism, and even the putative presence of an anal object, all of these combine to suggest obsessiveness as the hegemonic symptomatic suture of the self under this mode of production. In exploring this notion more deeply we can draw on J.-A. Miller's synoptic account of the logic of obsessional suturing.

Miller (19) sees obsessiveness as a refusal of alienation,

Here the clinical motivations of Lacan's logic of alienation appear in their purest form. Lacan defines alienation as a 'forced choice', i.e. *Zwang* and *Zweifel* combined. His point is that, the obsessional's efforts notwithstanding, one cannot have it both ways. It's one or none. Thus the obsessional subject falls prey to a double alienation (the one isolated by Lacan as "I am not thinking")... Forced to choose the one or the other the obsessional does not want to lose either. Analysts have often noted the affinity of obsessiveness with retention, relating thrift and greed to anal eroticism. But despite all efforts to deny it, the obsessional cannot escape the forced choice. The necessity of loss hits the subject with particular virulence; rather than losing something, the subject sacrifices itself. (ibid.:37-38)

This characterisation of the obsessional whom we meet with in the clinic is redolent of the subjective strategy which has been noted by historians as accompanying the emergence of the modern epistemes. Michel Serres (1979) charges Descartes with the introduction of a strategy of knowledge which forecloses the possibility of loss;

Baconian physics made science into a duel, a combat, a struggle for domination; it gave it an agonistic model, proposing a form of ruse for it so that the weak one would triumph. It transformed science into a game of strategy, with its rules and moves. But Baconian reason is

a weak reason which loses at least the first round, because it first resigns itself to obedience. Descartes rejects this, and, consequently, he suppresses the loss. In the relationship of agonistic forces between ourselves and the exterior world, he seeks the means that will permit us to win at every move." The reason of the strongest is always the best." The best reason always permits a winning game. The foundation of modern science is in this word always. Science is a game, an infinite game, in which we always win. (ibid.:268)

Foucault (1970) reads this game of Classical representation in 'Las Meninas' by Velazquez, and notes the eclipse of the position of the subject in the triumph of the project of mathesis;

Perhaps there exists, in this painting by Velazquez, the representation of Classical representation, and the definition of the space it opens up to us. And, indeed, representation undertakes to represent itself here in all its elements, with its images, the eyes to which it is offered, the faces it makes visible, the gestures that call it into being. But there in the midst of this dispersion which it is simultaneously grouping together and spreading out before us, indicated compellingly from every side, is an essential void: the necessary disappearance of that which is its foundation - of the person it resembles and the person in whose eyes it is only a resemblance. This very subject - which is the same - has been elided. And representation, freed finally from the relation that was impeding it, can offer itself as representation in its pure form. (ibid.:16)

This elision of the subject is predicated upon a mechanism which is conformable with the confusion of ego ideal and Other in obsessiveness. It is the association of Reason and a truthful Deity in an ideal asymptotic identification, permitting the dissection of Nature;

To give oneself an adversary and defeat him with the help of an all-powerful and truthful associate, God Himself: this is a game between two players, between three, in which nature disappears; burned, melted, minimized, destroyed. ...

I can no longer lose at this game.... In the game of truth, error has been checkmated ; in the game of domination, all is reduced to slavery, including the body. Metaphysics is operatory, it is the strategic set without which physics and the exact sciences are nothing but partial and dispersed tactics. (Serres, op.cit.:274-275)

Lacan (op.cit.) notes the care which the man of science takes to shield himself from the operatory nature of this metaphysical domain;

It is in as much as science elides, eludes, divides up a field determined in the dialectic of the alienation of the subject, it is in as much as science is situated at the precise point that I have defined as the point of separation, that it may also sustain the mode of existence of the scientist, of the man of science. This man of science could be approached in his style, his morals, his mode of discourse, in the way in which, through a series of precautions, he protects himself from a number of questions concerning the very status of the science of which he is the servant. This is one of the most important problems from the social point of view ... (ibid.:264-265)

Lacan then proceeds to locate the point of insertion of psychoanalysis into this dynamic as bearing upon the subjective relation involved in a manner congruent with the operational, sacramental dimension of every religion, although with the religions the beyond of the foundation of this dimension is marked with oblivion. In his view, analysis proceeds from the same status as the modern science inaugurated by Descartes, in which doubt and desire characterise the subjective experience. Prigogine (1980) notes that the trajectory of this science has led towards an ever more eccentric orientation with regard to the possibility of a unifying summation or perspective. He also notes that this centrifugal moment is resisted by the man of science and that even the most advanced of the modern sciences, quantum physics, bears the disabling mark of this occultation, in the unconscious endeavour to save the microcosmic myth of Adam Kadmos.

Zizek (1988) notes a similar dynamic operative in the sphere of the relation of the bourgeois to the functioning of capitalism. He argues

that capitalism is characterised by a contradiction in its very concept, between the social mode of its production and the private mode of appropriation, which, paradoxically, is the source of its protean longevity, in that it is forced into a mode of permanent, unstable renewal, of permanent revolution;

That is the paradox of capitalism, its ultimate resource: it is capable of transforming its limitation, its impotence even, into a source of power - the more it 'putrefies', the more its immanent contradiction worsens, the more it has to make its own revolution, and the more it has to bestir itself in order to survive. (Zizek, 1988:49)

This view of the nature of capitalism allows Zizek to justify the conjoining of Marx's concept of surplus value and the objet a, considered as a remnant, a plus-de-jour, which Lacan had advanced in his Seminar 17, 'L'Envers de la Psychanalyse';

The link is now becoming clear between surplus-value - 'cause' which puts the capitalist process of production in motion - and surplus-*jouissance*, object cause of desire: the paradoxical topology of the movement of capital, the fundamental blockage which resolves itself and reproduces itself by means of frenetic activity, excessive power as the very form of a fundamental impotence, this immediate passage, this coincidence of limit and excess, of lack and surplus, is this not the same actually as the object cause of desire, the surplus, the remainder which shows a constitutive lack? (ibid.)

From this position it might be possible to argue that the bourgeois fantasy embodied in the emergence of political economy is a form of not wanting to know anything about the central lack dynamising capitalism as a social and economic system. The dream of expanding the oikos, the household, to envelop the polis, merging with the epistemological dream of mathesis, produced the project of political oikonomia, or political economy, as the guarantee of an harmonious class rapport among the diverse elements of the social formations. The social body is dreamt of as a desert of *jouissance*, where the social agents labour productively, not squandering their sub-

stance in strife or profligacy; and where value circulates fruitfully and equitably, simultaneously mediating and bearing witness to a seamless suturing of the moral microcosm and the universal, Providential macrocosm. This draining of *jouissance* is compatible with the frenzy of accumulation noted by Marx in chapter 17 of CAPITAL;

Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets! ... Therefore, save, save, i.e., reconvert the greatest possible portion of surplus-value, or surplus-product into capital! Accumulation for accumulation's sake, production for production's sake: by this formula classical economy expressed the historical mission of the bourgeoisie, and did not for a single instant deceive itself over the birth-throes of wealth. (Marx, 1965:595)

If we return to J-A Miller's paper on obsessiveness we will see that in this clinical structure, more insistently than in others,

... the suture of the subject demands the sacrifice of *jouissance*. Greed and austerity paradoxically concur for him who is willing to forego his *jouissance* for the sake of vindicating the signifier. This attitude qualifies the alienation denoted as "I am not thinking." It implies a rejection of the unconscious that can be expressed as "I am counting." Lacan followed Freud's text verbatim when reading the signifier 'rat' as *jouissance* written off to the signifier: the obsessional posts his *jouissance* like cash to the ledger. (Miller, op.cit.:38)

If we are to take Freud's 'Ratman' as an indicator of the archetypical fantasy of the bourgeois, what implications might this have for our conception of the relationship of the bourgeois to capitalism? We have seen that the capitalist mode of production is dynamised around a central impossibility, which acts as a spur to frenetic activity and engenders continual inassimilable remainders. The bourgeois fantasy, on the other hand, lending an obsessional emphasis to its character, binds itself to the project of reconciling the contradictory elements at the core of the capitalist framework in the a priori guarantee that they are seamlessly coherent in the perspective of the macrocosm. A return to the notion of

a vanishing mediator may allow us to specify a relationship between capitalism and the bourgeois which is consistent with these divergent characteristics.

Jameson presents the notion of a vanishing mediator in terms of a necessary phase of the universalisation of the form of a previous historical order in the process of transition to a new historical order. Žižek, on the other hand, presents it as a moment of irreducible openness, which has the sense of inevitability only in retrospect. A fertile moment. We might consider the universalisation of the bourgeois world order in the transition from the productive frenzy of the 19th century which Marx critiqued, to the abstractly appetitive frenzy of the 20th century consumer society, as just such a fertile moment. Just as Foucault (1981) saw the shift from the restrictive Victorian experience of sexuality to the insistent openness of 20th century trends as variations on a single power/knowledge theme, so we may regard these two forms of social experience as belonging to a single general bourgeois order.

Nevertheless, the globalisation of bourgeois values may still be viewed as centrally significant. It preserves the core of *jouissance* fixed to the suturing obsessional project, albeit displaced with respect to the 19th century experience. Yet, this very globalisation and intensification engenders instabilities which have been stabilised around a very particular polarity. This is the existence of an Other, a dark God of revolutionary transformation, which has focussed, localised, and exteriorised the anxiety stemming from the impossible at the core of capitalism. The consequences of perestroika may be seen as removing this stabilising polarity, with unforeseeable consequences. Taking perhaps the most -hopeful scenario, would it not be ironic if the act of perestroika were to have cut the core of *jouissance* binding the bourgeois order to the suturing project, leaving merely the scar of an *aufhebung* and the formal envelope of an historical experience.

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A CFAR Synoptic

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The author would like to indicate that this text is a survey of the Lacanian teaching within CFAR, which is intended to reflect the work and orientation of the Centre; and that the text be open to modifications, additions or extensions by Members of CFAR.

Introduction

One of the pillars of CFAR's programme is its seminars which are arranged synchronically and not diachronically. The student does not progress through a series of concepts hierarchically arranged beginning in year one. The seminars are drawn from a number of concepts or from subsets of concepts and formulated in a way that takes into account the position of the class in its progress through the programme. In other words, the concept "transference" does not appear once in the programme but several times. Throughout the programme there will be several occurrences of a concept or of a subset of a concept.

A seminar is typically a commentary on a Freudian or Lacanian text, on "classical" papers from the psychoanalytical movement, or, sometimes, the entire work of a psychoanalyst outside the Lacanian movement, eg, Winnicott, or the papers of Lacanians. The Freud-Lacan axis is the central issue. The seminars are led by the founder-members of CFAR, some members and by analysts from the Freudian Field (the Lacanian international movement) of France, Spain and Italy. Occasionally, an analyst or an academic from outside the Lacanian orientation is invited to conduct a seminar. A discussion on this commentary then follows. The seminars last

for two hours and are held every Saturday afternoon.

The concepts are not treated as Holy Script. CFAR does not consider that treating these concepts as true premises is a way of what is called containing the student's anxiety about his future practice. CFAR considers that taking one's practice as based on true premises leads to a master-slave dialectic. The student occupies the position of master as a way to contain his/her anxiety as analyst. The analyst as master leads the analysis to identification.

Lacanians are accused of being insufficiently clinical and too academic. This accusation has at least three determinants. There is a paucity of case-histories in the Ecrits of Lacan. The Ecrits is not the sole utterance of Lacan. The teaching of Lacan made its appearance outside France by way of literary departments of universities. Then, the aim of Lacan was to discover a new way of transmitting psychoanalysis, the way of the matheme. One assumes that is the way of the matheme that is generating the accusation.

Assuming that this so-called accusation is, in fact, based on a good will, that it is not a symptom emerging in the psychoanalytic movement at large, another school having appeared in its midst, then it is probably understandable that those outside the Lacanian movement are perplexed by the way of the matheme. It is, of course, most understandable that they do not express a little more curiosity before making the accusation.

The matheme is the point at which theory is anchored to the practice, to the clinic, as we say. The matheme is the point at which a distinction between theory and clinic is difficult to make. They are anchoring points. That does not mean that all the Lacanian mathemes were successful. It does not mean that the mathemes are not kept under constant review. It does not mean that the mathemes cannot be deployed inappropriately. Briefly, they index what is said in a psychoanalysis and what is impossible-to-say in a psychoanalysis. And on them are indexed the passions effect of a psychoanalysis.

To put it in another way, at the bottom of this accusation there is an interesting problem. By how much is the psychoanalysis a constructed system? By how much is the clinic based in the theory? On the one hand, psychoan-

alysis is an effect of the famous talking cure. On the other, there are concepts operating in the foundations of its clinic. Is the analysand speaking the concepts, or is the analyst constructing them as the analysand speaks?

The seminars of CFAR are ultimately based on this problem. However the concepts arrive in the foundations of the clinic, the first question is whether they are operative. If they are operative, one wants to grasp their effects. One wants to know whether they can or cannot be modified, whether they can or cannot be made to cease functioning. This "theoretical" problem has to be taken just as seriously in the case-history presentation of a clinical seminar as it is in a pure commentary on a concept.

There is a distribution of responsibility between analyst and analysand in triggering concepts in the foundations of the clinic. For instance, the concepts of transference and counter-transference are not such simple issues in regard to the distribution of responsibility.

The signifier "responsibility" has ethical effects, effects of duty and rights. What is the distribution of duty and of right between the analyst and analysand?

At the level of the foundations of the clinic some of these concepts are axioms. And at the level of clinical pragmatism - if the student is addicted to just that, then he/she is unconscious of the axioms operating in the foundations of the clinic and their clinical effects. They represent the logicisation of an ethics, and the analyst is part of them. Freud was not unconscious of his responsibility. He wrote to Fliess complaining that his "self-analysis" could only advance on the basis of the material he was receiving from his patients. It was not, in fact, his self-analysis he was putting into his analyses but his desire. His practice was based on neurotic suffering which is not just any suffering, not suffering in general. Neurotic suffering is a passion. The hysteric's passion had to pass by way of Freud's desire which was a formal desire based in the Law (of the Oedipus). Her passion passed by way of his desire, and her desire was formalised. Desire is an ethics which functions in every psychoanalysis ever since Freud formalised it. There is no clinic without an ethics according to Jacques-Alain Miller. This is where it begins - in Freud's letter of complaint to Fliess about his self-analy-

sis. The case-history begins as a logicisation of an ethics of Freud's desire which is enigmatic.

At the moment the seminars cover the following concepts: language and the unconscious, topography, principles of mental functioning, the ego and the Ideal, desire, the Oedipus and castration, the subject, *jouissance* and the object, the Other's *jouissance*, the sexual relation, the object in psychoanalysis at large, transference, the four discourses, alienation and separation, the Freudian and Lacanian clinic, the end of analysis, psychoanalytic logic, psychoanalysis in the history of ideas.

In the brief summary of the concepts which follow the student will find some of the essential reading. It by no means exhausts the reading list. Nor does the summary complete the number of concepts that are studied. It is meant to provide the student who is considering entering the field with the orientation of CFAR and its esprit.

Language and the Unconscious

This concept is related to the first Freudian topography. At the time of this topography Freud's practice was organised around the conditions leading to assigning a meaning to the formations of the unconscious, called derivatives in this country. It's a definition of interpretation. If the unconscious lends itself to a semantic effect, then it must have the structure of something like a language, at least of a signifying apparatus of some kind.

In the four great texts on the unconscious, The Project (1895), The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1903) and Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious (1905), the unconscious is structured like a language. In the generation of the unconscious, condensation and displacement, are the laws of language, metaphor and metonymy. This assimilation of the laws of the unconscious to the laws of language is progressively elaborated in Seminars I, II and III, in the early papers of the Ecrits, reaching a climax in "The Agency of the Letter" (1957). The model taken is the linguistics of Saussure and Jakobson, writers of Course in General Linguistics and Fundamentals of Language respectively.

Other concepts implicated in metaphor are repression and symptom-formation and in metonymy desire.

The Ego and the Ideal

The beginnings of ego psychology are to be found in the Freudian texts themselves. If the ego is a concept and if a concept must have a homogeneous property, then ego psychology is a concept that destroys the homogeneity of a concept.

The classical texts of A Freud, Hautman, Kris and Lowenstein are read for the heterogeneity of the concept. For the homogeneity of the concept Freud's 1914 paper on narcissism is read: the ego as it appears in the psychoanalytic process and not in a general psychology has a narcissistic structure.

Lacan begins to reformulate this Freudian paper in his 1936 concept of the mirror stage and does so progressively throughout Seminars I, II and III and in the early papers of the Ecrits.

In Lacan's 1958 paper "Remarks on the Report of David Lagache" the ego ideal is formulated as the unconscious coordinate of the ego. The unconscious ego is its Ideal. The Ideal is taken as a signifier, namely, as an element of language, that enables the ego to take itself as an image. That the unconscious part of the ego is a signifier is in harmony with the unconscious as having the structure of language.

Topography

For the Freudian topographies the following texts are studied: The Project (1895), The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1903), Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious (1905), "The Unconscious" (1915) and The Ego and the Id (1923).

The unconscious is structured like a language and obeys the laws of language. Language and its laws are symbolic in the Lacanian topography.

The concept of the ego is developed in the early Freudian doctrine as a defence against effects of meaning arising in the unconscious. The ego does not want to know. "Not wanting to know" is the early Freudian formulation of repression in Studies (1895) in the two papers on

the neuro-psychoses of defence (1894-96). "Not wanting to know" is an effect of the ego's narcissistic structure and of the Ideal which supports the structure in the 1914 paper on narcissism. This Ideal manifested itself in shame, disgust and morality in his 19th century papers. Tracing the emergence of the Ideal in the Freudian doctrine is an exercise. In the Freudian doctrine an unconscious semanteme falls under the influence of the ego (or, put classically, an unconscious idea cathects a preconscious verbal residue) which reworks it, called meconnaissance by Lacan. In other words, the effect of the unconscious is always the ego. That is, the effect of the Ideal is the ego, and every unconscious signifier has an Ideal-function which makes the ego secure in the image that forms it by identification. The identifications supported by the Ideal establish the imaginary order of the Lacanian topography. That makes the imaginary an effect of the symbolic. In other words, making the unconscious conscious provides us with nothing more than the relations between the symbolic and the imaginary in which dominance is progressively given to the symbolic in Seminars I, II, III and in the early papers of the Ecrits.

The effects of meaning with unconscious determinants that appear in the speech-circuit are under the influence of the Ideal, and the value of this meaning is imaginarised. The subject identifies with the value of this meaning which also indicates that the subject identifies with the value of the analyst's interpretation.

The graph of Lacan can be studied for the relation between the symbolic and the imaginary.

On the other hand, the unconscious in The Ego and the Id is not based, obviously, on the structure of language. It is based on the structure of the drive. If one wishes to read The Ego and the Id in a way that amputates the preceding Freudian doctrine from the psychoanalytic movement, then the id is a boiling pot of drives.

In "Drives and their Vicissitudes" (1915) the drive is a frontier concept between the body and the mind. The only access to the mind is through language. Therefore, the drive is a psychical representative. Representation is a function of any signifying apparatus, and language is a signifying apparatus in one of its functions. The drive is the psychical representative of a continuously flowing endosomatic source of excitation. The drive has a symbolic dimension. It speaks.

And it has a dimension which exercises a constant force, a notion that can be traced by summing Q of The Project where it is assimilated to sexuality. This dimension of the drive falls under the real of the Lacanian topography.

The problem that the first Freudian topography presented to Lacan is in the relations between the symbolic and the imaginary. In the second Freudian topography in the notion of the drive the problem is in the relations between the symbolic and the real. Lacan begins to deal with this relation in Seminars VII and XI. For advances towards solving some of the problems in this relation Jacques-Alain Miller's seminar on extimacy is studied.

Jouissance and the object

It is the custom in CFAR to leave this Lacanian signifier *jouissance* untranslated. It is interpreted by way of the Freudian doctrine. For instance, it could be translated by just simply the term sexuality. It could also be translated by the Freudian term "libido". However, not every which way the notion of libido is used can translate *jouissance*. Sometimes, the term is used loosely and sometimes with some rigour.

It is most obviously implicated in some passages in The Project, namely, in sections 10, 12 and 13 of Part I. In section 10 quantity, abbreviated Q, is summing in the system. Freud captures its effects in terms from moral philosophy: the subject is at the mercy of Q which functions like a will. In moral philosophy the will falls under the concept of the symbolic. In the Freudian doctrine it falls under the concept of the real. In section 12 summing Q is assimilated to sexuality. A sexuality that has the potential of summing will haunt the Freudian doctrine from beginning to end. One can take the term *jouissance* as paying homage to whatever is haunting Freud here. It will haunt him in The Three Essays in so far as it is too bizarre to postulate a primal masochism. It must be derived from sadism. It haunts him in "Drives and their Vicissitudes" where the drive obliges the nervous system to give up its ideal intention of keeping off stimuli. The drive is already beyond the pleasure principle. It haunts him in Beyond the Pleasure Principle where he shifts the drive that is burning a path through the pleasure principle from its base in a will to a base in the inanimate. And it finishes haunting him in "The Economic Problem of Masochism" (1924) where

he finally postulates summing Q as primary erotogenic masochism as the essential property of sexuality. The signifier *jouissance* pays homage to this. It is expressed most clearly in section 13 of The Project where pain and satisfaction have in common the fact that they both increase Q tensions. Finally, pain is a satisfaction. That is also *jouissance*.

Summing Q is a mythical moment in the Freudian doctrine on neurosis. It is an actual moment, a real moment in the Lacanian doctrine on psychosis. From this real Freud is obliged to introduce a central lack in sexuality. In letters 52 and 75 he introduces a central lack in sexuality. This *jouissance* is extracted from the body and redistributed into little islands of *jouissance* that he calls erotogenic zones. The extraction of *jouissance* is tantamount to a moralisation of sexuality. The taming of the will of *jouissance*. Or in terms of the Lacanian topography, it is a symbolisation of the real: S(R). The result is a negativisation of sexuality, namely castration. But there is often something left over from this moralisation of sexuality, a little piece of *jouissance* which Lacan calls object (a). The object in this aspect of its functioning is whatever the subject can deploy to recuperate the *jouissance* it lost. It is related to the transitional object of Winnicott.

There have been only five psychoanalysts who made original contributions to the psychoanalytic notion of the object: Freud, of course, Abraham, Klein, Winnicott and Lacan. The appropriate texts of these analysts are studied.

In so far as object (a) is not symbolised, it does not belong to a signifying apparatus. It is real and not symbolic. It is part of the problem in the relation between the symbolic and the real. And it is the problem that Freud was coping with in his definition of the drive: the psychical representative of *jouissance*, of a *jouissance* that escaped symbolisation, of, namely, object (a). Freud is trying to situate an object which is outside signification in a signifying apparatus. The second analyst who attempted this is Winnicott in his topography of the transitional object which he calls transitional space. Jacques-Alain Miller is the third analyst who tries to situate an object that is fundamentally outside language in a signifying apparatus. His seminar on Extimité is studied for the topology of the object. Jacques-Alain Miller may turn out to be the sixth analyst

to have made an original contribution to the object.

Principles of Mental Functioning

Related to topography are the principles of mental functioning which are studied in The Project (1895), Chapter VII of The Interpretation of Dreams, "The Two Principles" (1911), "Drives and their Vicissitudes" (1915), Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) and "The Economic Problem of Masochism" (1924). Seminar VII.

The relation between the symbolic and the imaginary is governed by the pleasure principle. The effect of therapy that is achieved in this relation is based on homeostasis, complicated a little by having to pass through the reality principle.

These principles of mental functioning are implicated in The Project: the principle of inertia, the reality principle and the principle of complication. The principle of inertia has to be abandoned since it is given an impossible material to work with, namely, Q, the real. The *Nebenmensch* and recognising thought can be subsumed under the reality principle of The Project. The *Nebenmensch* becomes the subject's reality which is expressed in the formula $a + b$. The subject is presented with the perception $a + c$ and by way of recognising thought converts it to $a + b$ which is the earliest expression of object-refinding in the Freudian doctrine. This recognising thought whose aim is identity is the reality principle of The Project. The result is imaginary identification. The principle of complication is in the articulation of memory: $1 + 2 + 3$. Memory is based on difference between memories as signifiers are based on difference between signifiers in Saussure's Cours de Linguistique generale memory is an element of language. Chains of memories are signifying. These chains distribute Q by complication, says Freud. Quantity is not so much discharged but redistributed. Taking this in connection with Letter 75 quantity is redistributed to little islands called erotogenic zones. The principle of complication governs a relation between the symbolic and the real, between language and the body as real. In The Project one discovers that sexuality (the real) is the biological material par excellence which falls under the influence of language.

In "Drives and their Vicissitudes" the nervous system, says Freud, is obliged to abandon its

original intention of keeping off excitation. The drive burns a path through the pleasure principle. It is beyond the pleasure principle. What is beyond the pleasure principle in this paper is something - a constant force, and not something dead. Reading Beyond the Pleasure Principle from the point of view of component a of the *Nebenmensch* of The Project and from that of the drive of "Drives and their Vicissitudes" reveals a death drive based on something living and not on the inanimate.

Between the symbolic and the imaginary there is an effect of therapy, namely, homeostasis. What can one call the effect between the symbolic and the real. It is the effect of psychoanalysis.

We run out of Lacanian texts trying to grasp the issues that are emerging here. They are part of psychoanalysis or an ethic based in the real.

The Subject

There are two aspects to the subject as barred, \$: the subject as an effect of the signifier and the subject as an effect of *jouissance*.

The first appears in the teaching of Lacan as an effect of the signifier. In fact, it begins in a confusion between subject and ego. And in a progressive elaboration up to 1960 it is separated from the notion of the ego. In the early Seminars it is simply the subject who speaks. It is placed in an intersubjectivity. However, in this intersubjectivity the subject who speaks is producing an imaginary effect in a speech circuit under transference.

It is perhaps not fully realised as a subject of the signifier until Lacan postulates the operation of alienation in Seminar XI. The subject is the result of a signifying identification: the individual becomes the incarnation of a master-signifier, a first signifier, which has an Ideal function and solicits effects of meaning. From this signifying identification the subject draws the conclusion that not everything is meaning. There is the potential of non-meaning: \$. This is experienced as a gap in speech, for instance, as a derealisation, as an identity-crisis for the subject is not sexed. Any phenomenon that can be subsumed under the concept signifying non-existence creates an effect of the subject.

The subject by a process of exclusion is symbolic. It cannot be real since it is not a libidinal body. It cannot be imaginary since it has no effect of an image. It has to be symbolic. If it is symbolic, it has to be a signifier. But it is a signifier that has no value whatsoever. It is a *signifiant en moins*, it is a signifier less a signifier. There is no other way to capture this knotty problem than through the notion of the empty set for which Jacques-Alain Miller's *ce qui fait insigne* is studied.

The subject effect of *jouissance* is the result of a change in the status of the Other, written with a capital letter.

The Other written with a capital A, which follows the French *l'Autre* in order to retain the Lacanian mathemes in English: A. Lacan wrote it with a capital letter in Seminar II in order to distinguish it from the little other written as a *matheme* simply a, after the French *l'autre*. The little other is an imaginary object, the counterpart to the ego, e, in a narcissistic relation of mutual identification: e-a. The ego therefore takes itself as the other: a-a.

If the little other is imaginary, then the big Other is symbolic. It is given the structure of language and taken as the keeper of signifiers. Its office is supported by the mother and by the analyst. This is the complete Other of structuralism. But the complete Other of structuralism is anyone's Other. In psychoanalysis a particular Other is involved. The subject must subtract itself from the signifiers that are there. They cannot be just any signifier but Oedipal signifiers. The establishment of the subject of the signifier relies on the attachment to the Other, and it is also a first step in decompleting the Other in a particular way.

The decompletion of the Other supports a lack in the Other. Freud put this as anatomy is destiny. The subject puts it as her anatomy is his destiny. That is to say, the subject finds an equivalence in its lack with the lack in the Other. The subject is beginning to formulate castration.

The object that has been lost becomes its object which is an object from the Oedipus, a piece of left-over *jouissance*, which since it is from the Oedipus divides it creating the second aspect of the subject: the subject effect of *jouissance*.

Alienation and Separation

The subject of the signifier is the result of the operation Lacan called alienation. It reformulates Freudian identification, of understanding that it also implicates non-meaning and of demanding effects of meaning which conceal the want-to-be. The subject is concealed by meaning whose value is imaginary since this signifying identification is idealising. The operation is based on an attachment to the Other. Demand which arises in any psychoanalysis emerges from the point of the subject as lack, as want-to-be. It will be a demand for love whose aim is to keep subjectivity concealed and to prolong the phase of alienation.

The subject effect of *jouissance* is the result of the operation called separation. It covers more or less what Freud called the drive. In this operation the subject is divided by an object which is a left-over *jouissance*. It implicates the point at which sexuality is negativised, at which *jouissance* is lost. When the subject is in play the subject is demanding from the point of negativisation of sexuality in a symbolisation of the real. As this demand becomes ever purer, a term is isolated by way of which the subject's aim is to recuperate *jouissance*, namely object little a. In a psychoanalysis phantasy emerges. There is a point in the analysis at which drive becomes phantasy.

The Four Discourses

These appear in the Seminars, *l'Envers de la psychoanalyse*. They formulate at least four possible discourses that can become established in psychoanalysis.

The discourse for the master in the first discourse. It is based on the operation of alienation, that is, on signifying identification, and all it entails. The symptom is taken as the signifier motivating this discourse. The subject incarnates a master-signifier which also has idealising effects. The analyst incarnates a second signifier that is simply a paradigm for his/her base in knowledge. The discourse of the master becomes a discourse of accumulation of knowledge about the symptom by way of so-called free association and of interpretation. Interpretation is the meaning whose effects the subject is soliciting. The value of this meaning is imaginised since this discourse is ruled by the Ideal, which supports the ego in its efforts to identify with the

meaning which is converted into images that have identificatory effects: $a + c \rightarrow a + b$. Demand in this discourse arises on the subject of the signifier, and it is a demand for love. The object which divides the subject remains concealed. This discourse approaches the original Oedipal signifiers from which the individual subtracted itself as subject, and those effects of objectivity begin to motivate the discourse, acting as agent. The discourse is now mainly based on demand which approaches the drive and the operation of separation. Lacan calls it the discourse of the hysteric. Before separation can trigger, the status of the Other must change. A signifier must be extruded from the set of the Other, whereupon two aspects of the object enter the play: the object as lost and the object as a means of recuperating *jouissance*. In other words drive becomes phantasy in a discourse Lacan called analytical.

Desire

The first theory of desire in the teaching of Lacan begins in 1936 in the paper on the mirror stage where desire is desire as recognition. Desire in the narcissistic relation is based in recognition.

The second theory of desire is derived from linguistics. In this linguistics metonymy is the trope which motivates a linear discourse. Metonymy is the articulation of signifiers. In the second theory desire is metonymical. The metonymisation of desire begins in the operation of alienation. Taking the subject as barred, from this lack which it creates desire sets out. It is articulated in the demand to the Other for meaning. Desire as metonymised is implicated in signifying identification.

Desire that is a metonymy of lack is desire that itself implicates a law. At the frontier between the Ideal and the subject the subject is reprehensible. It speaks about him as reprehensible. The object's desire is already regulated in the discourse of the master, and the anguish it creates is due to an object concealed but having its impact anyway.

The third theory of desire is based on the desire of the Other. It makes itself felt as the demand of the Other, not the demand to the Other. The effects of this demand are enigmatic and related to the change in status of the Other. The third theory of desire is desire as enigmatic. In

the changed status an object is lost, and this object is causing the desire of the Other. But the function of the object that the subject must bring into play is the one by way of which *jouissance* is recuperated. In the desire of the Other an object has been lost, and from another angle the Other's desire sets out from it. Lack, from the lack in the Other. The desire of the Other is an expression of this lack. This lack is the equivalence that the subject as want-to-be discovered at the start of the operation of separation.

The Other's *jouissance*

For Freud libido is an effect of masculine sexuality. For Lacan the issue is more complicated. There are forms of *jouissance*. The Other has its own *jouissance*, which is in contrast to phallic *jouissance*. Phallic *jouissance* is both a prohibited *jouissance* and a limited *jouissance*. It is what is permitted upon a negativisation of sexuality. Phallic *jouissance* is a concept that appears in "Subversion of the subject and dialectic of desire" (1960). The Other's *jouissance* is a *jouissance* that escapes negativisation, namely, castration. This issue is elaborated further in Seminar XX. The Other's *jouissance* is not limited.

The problem is whether this form of *jouissance* is the Other's *jouissance* or whether this form of *jouissance* indicates a lack of the Other, not in the Other, but of the Other. This problem is experienced in the analysis as an inconsistency of the Other. The inconsistency of the Other is expressed by a subject who says no to the phallic function which is always taken as a castrated function. Saying no to the phallic function indicates feminine *jouissance*.

On the other hand, desire is masculine. It incarnates the law and sets out from a want-to-be. And, as Jacques-Alain Miller says, it is not a matter of penis-envy for the woman but of envy of masculine desire.

The Sexual Relation

The sexual relation is a broader concept than the sexual act. For instance, Little Hans is in a sexual relation with his mother. The Oedipus is based on a sexual relation. The sexual relation is an axiom in the teaching of Lacan in that it has an effect of a non-rapport. In the sexual relation between the man and the woman there is no sex-

ual rapport. Where the Other is decompleted and/or inconsistent a rapport is impossible.

Transference

The pivot of transference is the subject supposed to know. It could be taken, in the first instance, as the subject who has been deemed fit to practice psychoanalysis by his/her organisation. Of course, it's up to him to demonstrate this in his particularity to the analysand. If he or she goes too far, then the analyst becomes a subject who does know. There are schools in which the analysis is based on a subject who does know which creates pseudo-paranoid effects eventually - if deployed systematically.

The subject supposed to know is partly responsible for the discourse of the master. The analysand shares responsibility for this discourse by way of his/her symptom. The result of this shared responsibility is the accumulation of knowledge. So, transference is implicated in the operation of alienation, in the discourse of the master.

The analyst in so far as he/she occupies the place of the Other is part of the concept of the unconscious. The articulation of the symptom and knowledge is based in desire as metonymy. In so far as the analyst articulates symptom and knowledge, it is his desire in the analysis. The analysand's desire is the desire of the Other. In order to articulate this discourse the analyst must be established as subject supposed to know. The effect of transference is love, the love of meaning provided it has a value with which the subject can identify. This value, which is phallic value, is created in that the subject supposed to know embodies the Ideal.

Having solved, let's say, the withholding of knowledge, the accumulation of knowledge drags to an end. Or, even the analyst runs out of interpretative capacity. Whichever way the various schools of psychoanalysis take it from there, the Lacanian analyst hopes for a change of discourse, and begins to support a discourse of demand. In fact, he may do that before knowledge runs out.

Crossing of the plane of identification

The desire of the analyst whose pivot is the subject supposed to know is a desire based in metonymy since the analyst is in the place of the

Other of the signifier. Interpretation from this position can be of two types: relieving and anguishing, however their other qualities may be classified. Some schools lean to the side of producing nothing but anguishing interpretations whilst others tend to produce relieving ones.

Relieving interpretations create effects of love (in the absence of the negative therapeutic reaction) with whose value the subject can identify, albeit love always implicates narcissistic aggressivity. Relieving interpretations are on the side of homeostasis, of the pleasure principle. It is called psychotherapy. Anguishing interpretations are directed beyond the pleasure principle. Up to the analyst's judgment about a distribution between these two types, up to the analyst to give an effect of psychotherapy as an effect of psychoanalysis since beyond the pleasure principle is to cross the plane of identification. Going from alienation to separation is to cross the plane of identification.

The Clinic

Psychoanalysis is a deduction that Freud made from the psychiatric clinic. In fact, he contributed to the psychiatric clinic from which he made the deduction that resulted in psychoanalysis.

Freud maintains a differential clinic: neurosis, psychosis and perversion. Freud's monographic innovations to the clinic of neurosis are made from a phenomenological perspective in a number of short papers in the last decade of the 19th century, which are studied.

Lacan maintains Freud's differential clinic and deploys it in one of the functions of the preliminary interviews: diagnosis. The preliminary interviews have two further functions: the mapping of the subject's symptoms and the confirmation that transference is suspended from the subject supposed to know.

The Freudian clinic does not involve just the phenomenology of the monographic entities but the structure of neurosis, psychosis and perversion. In Freud's case histories of neuroses the structure that is displayed usually is based on relations between the symbolic and the imaginary. In one instance, he pinned down a relation between the symbolic and the real in the Rat

Man case-history and one in the Wolf Man. The structure of his case-histories are studied.

Case-history presentation has become a part of CFAR's programme. They involve case-histories published by other analysts as well as Lacanian analysts. And the analysts of CFAR also present their case-histories, as well as the students if they are beginning to practice.

The question of structure of neurosis is a problem of the way the subject negotiates the Oedipus and castration. It is a problem of the relation between the symptom and the phantasy that emerges from the sexual relation on which the Oedipus is based, between the symbolic and the real.

The structure of hysteria mainly rests on a decompleted Other but which is consistent, and of the obsessional neurosis as a complete but inconsistent Other. These structures are elaborated in the seminars.

The general form of neurotic structure is, according to Freud, dependent on repression. Repression brings into play relations between the symbolic and the imaginary. This form of structure is re-worked in the teaching of Lacan by way of the paternal metaphor. Lacan pays homage to Totem and Taboo and to Moses and Monotheism in the concept of the Name-of-the-Father, which acts on the desire of the mother creating a substitution of signifiers having the effect of phallic signification.

But this does not take into account a particular neurosis nor the relation between the symbolic and the real.

--If psychotic structure is not based on repression, then the Name-of-the-Father as an operation is defective. On this point Lacan elaborates on the Freudian concept of *Verwerfung*, foreclosure. This has several effects, one of which is that Q summates.

Lacan like Freud did not think that the psychoses were amenable to psychoanalysis. He thought that at the most the analysis could function as a compensation just sufficiently to maintain the psychotic in a more effective life than he had previously. This notion of compensation may have something in common with the notion of holding in British psychoanalysis. However, for the Lacanian it is a compensation for some

serious paternal flaw. In Britain it is a holding as a compensation for some serious maternal flaw.

In the relation between the symbolic and the imaginary transference by way of the subject supposed to know leads demand back to identification, leads it back to the metonymical desire of the Other, leads it away from the desire to identification, away from the discourse of the hysteric to the discourse of the master, away from separation to alienation, away from the phantasy to the symptom as a message which varies according to who is listening to it.

Under the heading clinic falls the problem of technique. If transference takes demand back to identification, the problem for technique is what takes demand across the plane of identification. The desire of the analyst takes demand across the plane of identification to the Lacanian fourth discourse, to the fundamental phantasy. This desire cannot be based on metonymy since metonymical desire operates within identification.

The technique of Lacanian analysis is closely allied to the triggering of concepts, and it is a complex affair.

The End of Analysis

Castration is essentially the effect of a negativisation of sexuality (which is not a denegation). Freud gradually became convinced that it cannot be denegativised. Castration is a once and for all event. In Analysis Terminable and Interminable it cannot be cured. Castration is incurable. The Freudian text implies that the analysis ends on something incurable, on castration. This is signalled in the Lacanian fourth discourse, the discourse of psychoanalysis.

There we have one distinction between psychotherapy and psychoanalysis. The homeostasis of the discourse of the master gives an effect of psychotherapy. The fourth discourse of Lacan gives an effect of psychoanalysis.

Then, there is the question of dissolution of symptoms. Symptoms are signifiers. The problem is whether signifiers can be dissolved or not. Can the elements of language be dissolved? It means that we would have to postulate the notion of a controlled aphasia at the end of analysis. Symptoms cannot be dissolved. the symptom is put in the place of production which turns *jouissance* over to castration. The phantasy cannot be

crossed unless the symptom is in the place of production, that is unless it is given the function of producing the object of the phantasy. The phantasy of the neurotic is an object which conceals the point at which sexuality is negativised. The direction of the phantasy of the neurotic is away from castration to the object. In the fourth discourse the direction is away from the object to castration, to the subject effect of *jouissance*. The analysand having crossed the plane of identification is crossing the phantasy. The symptom remains less its object.

Logic and Topology

In the description of CFAR's seminars few mathemes were deployed. The mathematisation of these concepts have a certain effect. It signals the existence of function that may have been only dimly perceived before, it was bound to have a sequence which is the mathematisation of space called topology. These are research issues in CFAR.

The Lacanians have developed a formalised way of speaking about psychoanalysis which also has the effect of revealing contradictions more glaringly in the system giving the analyst the duty to discover the reasons.

Irigaray: Re-placing the social. A review of 'The Irigaray Reader'

(ed. M. Whitford, Blackwell, pbk, 12.95).

The Irigaray Reader demonstrates the extent to which the movement in her work is primarily to do with the question of human social order. Some people now see the social as a masquerade. From this point of view, the era of the social is over, its representation is no longer possible, it has imploded rather into electronic modes of information which go beyond its logic and its limits. But Irigaray wants to argue for the identity of women as social persons, and is critical therefore of the whole idea of masquerade. Indeed, she is right to see it as the reversion of any social.

These essays consequently place the emphasis on admiration and astonishment (the non-substitutability of one kind for another) instead of fascination and spectacle. Hence the ethical nature of Irigaray's thinking, placing the emphasis on the self's encounter with alterity, and in particular the erotic relations between two sexually different beings. Re-placing the social, then, means putting back speech and meaning against "the many forms of destruction in the universe", from consumer society to scientific or technical imperialism, which Irigaray groups under the heading of nihilism.

As these essays make clear, Irigaray's approach to the social involves linking the question of place to Heidegger's notion of the place of being as "the house of language". Thus she presents what amounts to a topology of being along

the lines of the elemental, ethics, and the divine. More precisely, place is presented here in the context of: (i) the cosmic or celestial order, which includes a rereading of pre-Socratic and alchemical notions of the four elements; (ii) an ethics of the passions, and in particular as a condition for (re)touching and the "amorous exchange"; and (iii) a utopian and poetic vision on the coming of the divine, or divine-becoming, it being provided that all law, including the juridical concepts and codes of positive law, derives from an eternal law (the pure and eternal exemplar in the mind of God) only insofar as it is first embodied in natural law.

To take the jurisprudence of place. The embodiment of the place of being in the context of divine law is conceptualised as the 'sensible transcendental'. Thus: "Immanence and transcendence are being recast, notably by that threshold which has never been examined in itself: the female sex." According to Irigaray, this sex takes place in and through "the most intimate mucous membranes," that is, feminine sexuality is presented as a threshold, not so much unto voluptuousness (she questions Levinas at this point) but unto mucosity. The "in itself" of the place, of entering, designates a permeable space, based on "the porous nature of the body", in accordance with the love of God or, at least, "a love so scrupulous that it is divine".

Irigaray insists that there is no break between her earlier and later works when it comes to the question of the difference between the sexes. Now, insofar as this is the case, it means that the threshold-unto-mucosity is at once legal and ethical. Furthermore, besides astonishment and mucosity, the ethics of sexual difference articulates that which endlessly passes through the feminine envelope of the masculine imaginary (i.e. the thing 'she' is in the order of patriarchy), in terms of a class of intermediary beings: the shimmering middle. Irigaray treats the angels as messengers of a sexual or carnal ethics, coming-and-going between heavenly and corporeal worlds, and hardly reducible to the theoretical speculation of philosophers and theologians.

However, this last point, in which Irigaray adds the decisive proviso that the divine law of God's commandment (i.e. Gospel Law, or the reign of grace beyond the rule of law) is inseparable from the act of carnal love and the God of nourishment, demonstrates an interesting link with the medieval theologians, particularly Aquinas.

nas and the natural-law doctrine of the *Summa*. In this respect, the most recent essays here address the rights of women as a legal question including the right to human dignity and identity, as well as the right to equal exchange in systems of language and equal representation in religion, etc. - which Irigaray defines as the domain of 'sexuate law'.

The jurisprudence of place is particularly important, then, in that it brings into focus a tension running throughout the essays between equal rights and sexual difference. For instance, in the first essay (which actually dates from as late as 1986), Irigaray makes the point that Simone de Beauvoir's project of social justice can only be realised by approaching equality as difference, or, if you wish, by articulating the sociology of rights (the right to contraception and abortion, the legal protection of women's work and maternity leave, etc.) and a sexuate ethics (a law which respects the fact that women are not equal to men) as a 'double demand'. The essays on sexuate rights consolidate this. Thus Irigaray insists that the need for equitable jurisdiction is not a matter of parity, or equal laws for all. On the contrary, the strategy of equality, she argues, should aim at the recognition of difference. The point is that there are different rights for each sex, and a sexuate law, insofar as it contains the inscription of the feminine genre, means the codification of these differences.

The way the essays are set out means that by the time we get to this relationship between legality and the divine, the book has already mapped the place of being according to an ethics of the passions: astonishment, the threshold-onto-mucosity, and the angels. This helps to clarify the fact that Irigaray's concept of God (to be sure, a law-giver) and the divine is structured in accordance with ethical responsibility. God is, for Irigaray, the other affirming the human, the horizon and context of both subjective identity and social community. She insists on this whilst, at the same time, subscribing to the idea of eternal law. Of course, one wouldn't expect to find a single theme in a collection as diverse as this. But in fact it seems to me that the various sections on patriarchy, psychoanalysis and linguistics and ethics, trace the movement towards a sexuate law with a remarkable degree of consistency concerning the question of place.

To simplify Irigaray opposes the maternal-feminine house to the silent and involutive

display of cosmetics. In an essay on the limits of the transference, for example, she argues that, faced with her own sense of dereliction, and the desperate need to cover herself, the woman enacts an "immediate mimetic gesture" which strips the other woman of her skin. Whereupon the paths to nourishment going from the one to the other are closed. For Irigaray, the mimetic exchange comes to nothing. Hence the notion of cosmetics as the dereliction of beauty, or the representation of a woman's place for men, in which women simply make themselves the gift of nothingness. The implication is that, as the regulation of deficiencies on the side of beauty, cosmetics reduces 'kosmos' (order) to 'kosmeein' (adornment). Which is what I think Irigaray means when she describes adornment as the introjection of maternal desire and the institutionalisation of the father's view of femininity.

In opposition to this passion for cosmetics and clothes, Irigaray presents the sexuation of the place of speech, and more particularly the place of "speaking (as) woman". Here, the mother's chamber ("the bodily encounter with the mother"), and indeed, notwithstanding the hierarchy of breath and paternity, "the chamber of Maiden-thought", is reckoned to found a space which remains open to the other, listens to the other, without either the will to mastery or the threat of fusion. It's important to note in this respect that Irigaray explains homelessness (if not strangeness), i.e. "the absence of the woman-mother's identity", in terms of the unmediated relation between speech and body. Which shows, I think, that she isn't arguing for some sort of biological determinism, and that her idea of a "shelter" isn't a "regressive retreat to the anatomical". Rather, through a series of rereadings of Greek myth (the emphasis is on daughters, Clytemnestra, Antigone), and the philosophy of family rights (the reference here is to Hegel), Irigaray refigures the being of place, firstly, as an acknowledgement of the debt to the mother - in which respect she discusses the scar of the navel as the irreducible trace of identity; and, secondly, as a critique of "sacrificial breaks" more generally.

She demonstrates how the latter is tied in with the horizon of mother-son incest, and the taboo on it - and argues instead for the more gentle, tender modulations of a maternal genealogy. Incidentally, with regards to the 'British School' of psychoanalysis, the allusions here to

Klein's notion of the internal world and mother's insides, Bick's primary skin sensations, or Bion's theory of the container-contained, are, at most, extremely obscure. Probably the most likely associations is with Winnicott, but again it's more of an implicit link than an acknowledged influence.

In one way or another, law and cosmetics are the opposing forces at the heart of most of these essays: a law-abiding corporeality ("the flesh of our passions"), on the one hand; and the fetishism and cruelty of glamour, on the other. Now I suppose things wouldn't be so difficult if the call to the other was always clear-cut. Or if one could be quite simply a woman. But there is no easy opposition to the veil. On this point I find it instructive that Irigaray chooses to emphasise the nature of the masquerade. She doesn't accept that the contest over elegance is politically legitimate. It wouldn't matter to her to find that the obsessional touch of cosmetics, and all the ritualistic activities of fashion, actually challenge the social itself. Indeed, she is reminded by one of her interviewers that women have expressed their "lack of interest" in the law. But her answer, that the law is an "essential dimension of social organisation", indicates the sociological foundation, not only of her revaluation of psychoanalytic values, but also of her more general attempt to avail the metanarrative of feminism with an ethics.

This leads me to conclude that Irigaray is unequivocally committed in principle to the symbolic order. Her whole argument in these passages is with a certain symbolic order and law of social functioning, i.e. the structuration of relations amongst women as relations of rivalry. The effort behind many of these essays, on the other hand, is to make symbolic exchange between the sexes work. For instance, when considering what she calls love's "total risk" (and especially woman as subject in the act of love - l'amante), Irigaray insists that the exchange between the sexes takes place. To be sure, it's a taking place without shelter. Hence an open place, no longer afraid of being left out(side). She alludes to a place which is not the place of confinement, a place not yet taken by separation and its anxiety, not cut off from the open. The suggestion is that, as long as risk takes place, it is its own protection. Irigaray says it: "protected by risk".

It's interesting to compare for a moment the phrase, "he risks who risks life itself", with, say,

the jurisprudence of place. The former signifies something at once disastrous and protective: the ruin of any place, then, except risk. Note that, for Levinas, the encounter with the other as other is always said to run a *beau risque*. This is the risk of the other in place of me, which Blanchot, for one, reads as the turning aside "from all orders and from order itself". So long as the call to the other is the approach to listening; that is, the approach to the outside which calls up listening; the response to this call, to alterity, indeed, responsibility itself, is a giving that continues responding, and continues as response in and through the withdrawal of any order. In other words, it's only the 'gift' that doesn't take place (as mimesis, symbol, telling, etc.) that is in everyway excessive, in short, a risk. Which is to say, there can be no response on the grounds of a (meta)narrative. For responding becomes ethical saying precisely when it becomes impossible to narrate. From this point of view, he risks who risks listening to the future approach and remains responsible for that future as the sound of wonder.

by Steve Groarke

A Review of 'Immortality' by Milan Kundera (Faber & Faber, hbk. £14.99)

"What is essential in a novel is precisely what can only be expressed in a novel, and so every adaptation contains nothing but the non-essential". Thus Kundera - a character in his own novel - remarks about his work, warning the reader against the betrayals of reviewers (amongst others)!

The novel begins and ends with 'Kundera' (beside the same swimming pool to meet 'Dr. Avenarius') observing the gesture of a woman - the gesture through which we are introduced to the characters of the author's latest work. The novel itself - as part of its content - is thus what 'happens' between the opening and closing chapters, waiting for 'Avenarius'. The narrative is constituted through the repetition of gesture to which the characters are subject - as 'variations on a theme'. It is upon this narrative framework that Kundera then hangs commentaries on aspects of what he identifies as 'European Culture'.

Essential to Kundera's notion of the 'European' - not confined to what is expressible in a novel - is the being or becoming of an image which is beyond any mortal being itself. This image is both intoxicating and unbearable. When an image really comes to life; of course, is after the death of the being who has borne it: hence the 'European' obsession with immortality. Kundera presents most of his remarks on immortality through a retelling of the relationship between Bettina von Arnim and Goethe - but this is not then the 'Immortality' of the title!

Finally: odd sentences in the novel read unerringly like paraphrases of the 'Mirror Stage', and Kundera refers the reader to 'the dark words of Lacan, poorly translated into Czeck' (!). Indeed, the title of Lacan's early work appears - in a chapter entitled 'Ambiguity'.

by Mischa Twitchin

A Review of 'The world as I found it' by Bruce Duffy (Penguin, pbk, £6.99)

The 'I' of Duffy's title is Ludwig Wittgenstein, author of those words. In a passage from the 'Tractatus' - quoted as an epigraph by Duffy - Wittgenstein refers to a hypothetical book which could be called 'The world as I found it'. He concluded this suggestion of autobiography with its impossibility, with mention of what 'could not be mentioned' therein. Here one has the paradox of what can only be mentioned by way of negation. The world is found by the limits of language. Death, however, crosses those limits - which Duffy's fiction brings to life.

The 'discontents' within Wittgenstein's Viennese patrimony are described early in the novel - through the suicide of Ludwig's elder brother Hans. 'Life was the fold into which Hans could not assimilate, but then Hans was hardly the only one in that fomenting city to fail at this task. Like caged canaries sunk in a mine shaft, other raw and excitable souls were beginning to smell the fumes of that futurity'. (Suicide is also the theme of 'Correction', one of Thomas Bernhard's 'Wittgenstein novels'.)

The possibility of 'assimilation' - to a world in which the subject seeks to, but cannot, find itself - questions the uses of language. Truth, secrets, lies; these are linguistic forms that haunt Wittgenstein in Duffy's novel. They implicate him in a world of impossible assimilations: of his father's ambitions to his own, his homosexuality to the desire for paternity, logic to dialogue. These oppositions become manifest through the frustration of relations with others - principally Karl Wittgenstein and Bertrand Russell - a frustration manifested, paradoxically, in the fluency of Duffy's own uses of language.

by Mischa Twitchin