

# Cultural Centre for Freudian Studies and Research

23 Primrose Gardens, London NW3. Tel: 586 0992

## NEWSLETTER NO. 2 - NOVEMBER/DECEMBER, 1986

The Newsletter has received the following article by Danuza M. Machado on Lacan's 1958 paper 'La Direction de la Cure'. If you wish to comment on this text, or to contribute in any way to the Newsletter, please send your contribution (typed) before December 20th to the Centre at its London address.

\*\*\*\*\*

### ON 'THE DIRECTION OF THE CURE AND THE PRINCIPLES OF ITS POWER'<sup>1</sup>

The place of the analyst: that is what Lacan tries to deal with in his text of 1958 'The Direction of the Cure and the Principles of its Power'.

He is interested in the effects which are caused during an analysis by the analyst. His exposition goes far beyond than that which is anti-Freudian in psychoanalysis today. What he is interested in is to demonstrate that in order to support the psychoanalytical practice one is always confronted with the exercise of a power: the power of desire.

The psychoanalyst certainly directs the cure, but he must not direct the patient. During an analysis, both analyst and analysand must not forget that once there, one ought only to deal with words.

Lacan will deal with this question from the side of the analyst. The patient is not only with his own difficulties; the analyst is not outside the game.

The analyst pays with words. These words have the effect of interpretation. He pays because a word is compromised in interpretation. He also pays with his own person, since he is only a support of the transference phenomena. He pays with that which is essential in his most intimate judgement. What interests him is that which is in the core of the being and not the being himself.

Lacan refers to the analyst as such, the one who is the support of this place; the analyst whilst signifier, because there is no neutrality for subjects. The analyst, during the course of the analytical discourse. It is a discourse and, therefore, one of signifiers. There is no analyst as such. There is nobody.

This doubleness between the figure and the person of the analyst triggers the whole text. It is in the doubling of the person of the analyst that the secret of the analysis is to be found. The analyst has to play on two levels.

During a transference he is other than himself and he ought not to let the analysand know this. He places himself in the position of the subject supposed to know, which is supplied by the analysand. The person of the analyst undergoes this doubling of being a person whilst a mask and of being the support of this subject supposed to know. Due to this doubling, psychoanalysis cannot be thought as a dual relation(ship). It is not about an emotional re-education. Once a subject supposed to know exists, there is transference. The resulting effect is the production of this doubling. The analyst is not responsible for the transference - it happens. Freud demonstrated this several times. Any person can take the place of the analyst, even without being one.

Lacan presents the position of some critics who are against him, critics who say that the analyst cures less by means of what he says and does than by what he is. He is going to demonstrate that it is exactly the other way round, since it has nothing to do with metaphysics. THE BEING IS THE LETTER (L'ETRE EST L'ETTRE).

<sup>1</sup>'La Direction de la Cure et les Principes de son Pouvoir' in *Ecrits*: Ed. du Seuil, Paris, 1966

From a metaphysical point of view, that which would be at stake in a transference would be the being of the analyst. This is what Lacan is going to transform in a logical process of supposition to know - and this is the pivot of the transference.

The less sure the analyst is in his action, the more interested he will be in his (own) being. He is sure because he does not have the knowledge; this knowledge belongs to the Other(A). The analyst gathers the interpretation of the knowledge from the Other(A).

There is no meaning in that which is spoken; there is only recognition of a meaning. During an emotional re-education what exists is an assent which is the product of an imposition. In psychoanalysis, the interpretation is that of meaning and not that of signification. To displace the meaning, which is the aim of an analysis, means to limit the effects of the interpretation itself; the location of meaning is changed.


Lacan refers to some revisionists of psychoanalysis who have accused Freud of having taken into account the idea of location. And he will refute them by stating that this idea of location is linked to that of feeling, which allows the introduction of the concept of counter-transference to be presented by these analysts, concept which would be the effect of the analysis as a dual situation. The idea of situation implies two individuals confronting each other at the level of feelings. Lacan criticises this concept of transference by saying that it is one of the forms of resistance of the analyst (himself) to the analysis. He refuses the notion of counter-transference where the feeling itself is the criterium of interpretation. This will imply an impossibility to conceive the true notion of transference. Lacan states that 'it is necessary that one does not be mistaken as far as the metaphor of the mirror is concerned'. This is because this other, through which I constitute myself in a specular manner is another one in which I alienate myself and he is another one with which I am in competition for prestige. The mirroring, as in the amorous situation, leads to diversity. That is the reason why Lacan talks about 'hainamoration', that is to say that transference love is an unreciprocated love.

He is going to indicate, then, the place of the analyst as being that one (occupied by) the Dead One (Le Mort), using a metaphor of the bridge game. The analyst takes the place of the Dead One, his partner, in order that the fourth term appears, partner of the analysand, who is the subject of the unconscious.

The Dead One is the one who does not play, whose signified is barred, who does not reply. The one for which there is no signifier, where the word finds meaning. That is why the analyst is an unselfish figure. The place of the Dead One is that one which allows the transference to take place. The feelings of the analyst have no possible place, but in that one of the Dead One. The analyst occupies the place of the Dead One in order that the analysand be able to perceive his partner, the fourth term, the subject of the unconscious. The analyst alternates his position: his role is that of the 'semblant' and therefore he displaces himself. From this displacement, the analysand moves from the 'Che vuoi?' to 'Who am I?'

The Dead One is the big Other, the treasure of the signifier. There is no signifier in the field of the Other(A) - he is barred (S (A)). We then have: analyst (a') who has as a partner the Dead One (A (autre)); analysand (a - I) who has as partner the unconscious (S).

#### Schema L



That is why Lacan is going to say that the analyst is less free in his strategy than in his tactics. The strategy is that which makes it possible for one to play with the Dead One in order that the

game can continue. He cannot resist this game at all, and that is why he is less free as far as his strategy is concerned. The strategy is the continuity. His tactic is the way how he is going to make this strategy take place, and this is something which is related to style, in which the analyst is freer.

One does not know how the game is conducted. The game of the analyst has something to do with time - he does not know whether he is going to play before or after the fourth term. This is the field of tactics. His policy, however, dominates both strategy and tactics. In his policy, it would be better to be placed in the position of want to be than in that of being. The policy is the articulation between these two terms: strategy and tactics. That is what encompasses them. This articulation restricts even more the analyst's freedom than in the case of tactics.

His intervention does not bring the whole truth: it is dismembered and its action totally escapes him. The action which escapes is the product of an idea which implies a notion of signification and domination. The power operates through significations.

All action interferes in reality. There is a distinction between the analyst who sees the meaning of his action in reality as a function of the structure and the one who considers reality as something which is given. Lacan talks about training analysis and says that if the analyst went through the analytical process, if he was touched by this discourse, if he passed through the radical experience of his singularity, then he cannot set himself as (being) the standard of the reality of the other.

He is going to call the attention of those analysts who consider themselves as educators. He criticises the American Ego Psychology (the American Way of Life) of Kris and Hartman, who introduced a stable value as a parameter of the real: the autonomous ego. From this autonomous ego one can justify the feeling that the subject has always been, that is, is born a subject. This kind of psychology operates with the notion of person, not of subject. Their problem is not the lack of the being: it is the question of the being of the analyst, something to do with the ego.

Lacan is going to say that it is true that the analyst deals with resistances, but not only with them. This interpretation, however, comes from a place which is given to him, and once without it, the analysis would be nothing but a gross suggestion. This effect has to be interpreted. It is (as if) coming from the Other(A) of the transference that the word of the analyst will be heard. The transference is, then, a particular form of resistance.

The point is: who, then, is the analyst? The one who interprets, taking advantage of the transference? The one who analyses it as resistance? Or the one who imposes his idea of reality? This is a problem (which is) much more difficult to steal oneself from than that of - Who speaks? - when the tautological answer will be 'I'.

Lacan, then, broaches the effects of interpretation. Explanations, gratifications and answers to demands are not interpretations. An articulated proposition (in order) to lead to an 'insight' about (one of his) behaviours and, mainly, concerning (his) identification of resistance which can receive any other name - confrontation, for example - is not interpretation: it is a clarifying comment. We are, then, here, dealing with the difference (that exists) between material analysis and discourse analysis. Lacan is going to indicate the primacy of the signifier.

No index is sufficient to demonstrate where the interpretation took place if we are to radically admit the concept of the function of the signifier, which is apprehended where the subject is subordinated, to the point of becoming a subordinated being. (This is so because he chose the analyst.)

The interpretation (which is) to decipher the diacrony of unconscious repetitions must introduce in the synchrony of the signifiers which are produced there, something which suddenly allows translation to be possible. Lacan states in his Seminaire XI: it is in the synchronical dimension that one must locate the unconscious - at the level of the subject of the enunciation.

This is the importance of the signifier in the location of the analytical truth. In our doctrine of signifiers, interpretation can only be inscribed as the producer of something new (the subject is that which represents a signifier for another signifier).

The interpretation is not based on divine archetypes, but on the fact that the unconscious has a linguistic structure.

Concerning the Freudian Fort-Da!, one touches the point of introduction of a symbolic order which pre-exists the infantile subject and according to which he is going to structure himself.

Thus an interpretation shows its efficacy in the material which appears later on, and not in the conviction that it brings. That is why there is no other resistance than that of the analyst.

In present day authors, interpretation began to present the characteristics of insight. Interpretation becomes a demand to the weakness which we will deal with. This has only to do with the passions of the analyst. It is not counter-transference but consequence of the dual relation which these authors take as the structure of the analytical situation. Transference, in this perspective, becomes the certainty of the analyst, and the relation to the real (becomes) the ground where the combat is decided (since there is a fight for prestige). Transference has nothing to do with the relations between the I and the world.

Freud is not very successful with his cases, and that is why they are so precious. In Dora's case, he recognised the principle of his power, which is not distinguished from suggestion; but even if this power does not provide him with a solution to the problem, unless under the condition of not being used, it gave him the whole development of the concept of transference. Not everything which is presented here and now, in dual relation, can motivate the impasse of desire. From this moment onwards, it is not towards the one who is near that he addresses himself to, and that is why he refuses the face-to-face situation.

In psychoanalysis it is (about) the direction of the cure, according to a process which goes from the rectification of the products of the subject to the real, in the development of the transference situation, and later to interpretation, that is the fundamental discovery of Freud. The problem in question, then, is if the misrepresentation of psychoanalysis is not situated there. Another topology (then) is necessary in order that no mistake is made concerning the locus of desire. Expunge it when it is already covered is not the best way to take ahead Freud's lesson. Neither it is a mean to elucidate its depth, such being the proposition of Kris, because it is on the surface that it shows itself (desire is always indicated there).

Lacan asks himself: is it the same effect of the relation to the analyst which is manifested in the primary love (enamoración primaire) which is observed at the beginning of the treatment and also in the mesh of satisfactions which makes this relation so difficult to break, when the neurosis of (the) transference seems to push to the foreground the properly analytical means? It is, furthermore, the relation to the analyst and his fundamental frustration which, at the second moment of analysis, sustains the scansion: frustration, aggression, regression, where the most fecund effects of analysis will be inscribed? How is one to conceive the subordination of (these) phenomena when they are crossed by the phantasies which openly imply the figure of the analyst?

From these questions he returns to the concept of transference, which he will use as the benchmark, as far as the partiality of the theories exposing it are concerned. He, then, criticises the analysis of defenses. Freud reorientated his theory around an unconscious I. Anna Freud goes from this (point) to the hypothesis that the mechanisms of defense would have something to do with the sensomotor development. In her opinion, psychoanalysis equals pedagogy; is (the) reeducation of this development.

To consider this transference as a game of homologous forces is, in his opinion, to betray Freud, (since) it is to consider the analytical rapport as a dual relation.

From transference, an axle taken from the object relation is replaced. The partial object was Abraham's original contribution. Lacan elaborates a whole criticism of Abraham, who considers the object in reality and not as a signifier. Abraham states (that): 'the ultimate structure of object relations shows that the participation of the object in his own pleasure is essential to the happiness of the subject. The conveniences, desires, needs, of the object are taken into consideration at the highest level. The 'I' has here a stability which does not run the risk of being compromised by the loss of a significative object. It is independent of its objects.'

Freud, however, thinks that the 'I' is always developing. We must look for the object relation in some constitutive impasse of desire as such. That which makes the object present itself as lacking can be something other than the pathological factor. It is because the sexual relation is impossible that any object relation is not dual. Abraham's perspective is explained in a purpose, which sanctioned itself as instinctual. This conception soon demonstrated its dangers in the gross dichotomy, which opposes the pre-genital character to the genital one.

Lacan indicates that it has nothing to do with the sexual anatomy, but with desire. Should the transference flow towards a reality, where the analyst is its representative, the only thing left to be analysed is an object: the analyst himself.

The analytical experience takes its strength from the particular. The coherence of Abraham's theory is its guarantee of cure, in spite of the error in which it is based on. It is how the privileged function of the phallus signifier presents the subject to desire that is illustrated in Abraham, but in an experience which we could classify as blind: it lacks a true orientation concerning the rapports of the analytical situation which, as in any other situation, in which we speak, cannot be inscribed in a dual situation, unless crushed, expunged. Since the nature of the symbolic incorporation is unknown, it expunges that which is real in the analysis, so that only the imaginary can be recognised in that which is produced. It was demonstrated to Abraham that should one link objects in an imaginary relation, the only thing left is the dimension of the distance to order them. To consider this distance as the only dimension where the neurotic relations to the object take place is to engender contradictions. Too much or too little distance from the object causes confusion. Possibly it is not the distance from the object, but the subject's deep intimacy with it, that seems to Ferenczi to characterise the neurotic. One must not fix oneself in the elasticity of the object relation.

What is this object which the analyst is interested in? Lacan is going to distinguish the phobic object as a signifier and not as a real object, as is the case with Abraham. He makes allusion to the little of reality that characterises the signifier. This occurs neither with Abraham nor with other analysts, since they try to direct the patient back to a real situation.

The problem that is revealed is that of the limit between analysis and re-education, which is guided by a prevalence of real incidents, unlike psychoanalysis. These analysts replace the relation to the being, where this action takes place, declining its means, those of words, of its veracious eminence. That is why it is a kind of return of the repressed, to resort to the being, as a proviso of the real.

The question of being of the analyst appears very early in the history of psychoanalysis. Ferenczi, in his 'Introjection and Transference' (1909) conceives transference as the introjection of the person of the doctor. We are not dealing here with this person as the support of a repetitive compulsion of an unadapted conduct or as the figure of phantasy. He understands by this the absorption, in the economy of the subject, of everything that the psychoanalyst presents in the duo, as here and now, of an emanated problematic. It does not include the want to be of the subject as the core of the analytical experience, the field itself where the neurotic passion unfolds.

According to Lacan, only the British, with their 'cold objectivity', were able to articulate this hiatus, from where the neurotic finds the justification for his existence and, consequently, implicitly distinguishing from the interhuman relation, from its warmth and its allurements, this rapport with the Other(A), in which the being finds his statutes. Lacan defines the Ego as an object, and the object relation thus accepted is a relation from Ego to Ego, which characterises a form of pedagogy but not psychoanalysis.

The end of an analysis is defined by the British as the identification of the subject to the analyst; it varies according to whether it is a relation of his Ego or his Super-Ego. The dialectic of the phantasmatic objects in the practice of Melanie Klein tends to be translated in the theory in terms of identification. These objects, whether partial or not, are certainly significant ones: the breast, the faeces, the phallus. The subject wins them or loses them, but above all he is these objects, according to the place where they function in his fundamental phantasy. The needs of the subject are reduced, then, to exchangeable values. It would, then, seem that the psychoanalyst, in order that he helps the subject, ought to be saved from the pathology of not being happy.

It is in the relation itself to the being that the analyst must place his operational level and the chances that are, for this purpose, offered to him by a training analysis are not only to deal with the already supposedly solved problem of the analyst who guides him. Hence the importance of taking into consideration the desire of the analyst. The ethics of psychoanalysis is in not conceding on desire.

The analysts imagine that once understanding is attained it puts an end to the 'itself'. They would do better if they were not to understand in order to think. This was indeed the beginning of the behaviourists: the renunciation of understanding. The only but is that they were applying, without understanding it, that which we do. They learned with the psychologists.

The analyst is the man to whom one speaks freely. He is there for this purpose. The subject who is invited to speak in the analysis does not show in that which he utters a great freedom. His associations allow him a free words a full word, which will be painful to him. Would the course of analysis represent a progress of the truth? One listening accommodates itself beyond the discourse. What I listen is of the order of 'listening itself'. The 'listening' does not force me to understand. To that what I hear there is nothing to be said, since I understand nothing. I thwart the one who speaks. If I thwart him is because he demands something from me: exactly that I reply to him. But he knows that they will only be words. And these words are not the ones that he demands from me. His is an intransitive demand; it does not carry any object. All demand is for love. There is an implicit demand, a reason for it to be there: that he be cured, that he be revealed to himself, that he be able to know psychoanalysis, that he become an analyst. But this demand, he knows, can wait. His present demand has nothing to do with that one, is not even his, because it is I who am offering him the speech. With this offer I created the demand. The subject's request is that his demand be left open in order that his desire be able to glide. It is a radical demand.

Mme. Macalpine is right to search in the only analytical rule the motor of transference. The subject only lives to demand. It is through it that the analytical regression can be made in which it presents itself. We speak as if the subject were to behave like an infant. Because regression only shows the return to the present, of signifiers inserted in the demands through which there is a prescription. This situation explains primary transference and the love in which sometimes it declares itself.

If love is to give what one has not got, it is true that the subject can wait that we give it to him, because the psychoanalyst has nothing else to give him. But even this nothing is not given to him. The analyst pays with this nothing in order to show that this is not that worthy. The demand is to be empty. The analyst gives his presence, but it is only his listening, which is the condition of the word. The most acute feeling of his presence is linked to the moment in which the subject can only remain silent, that is, where he recedes when confronted with the demand. The stronger the transference the stronger the resistance. The analyst, therefore, is the one who supports the demand, not to thwart the subject, but in order that he be able to repair the signifiers in which a frustration has been retained.

We must remember that it is in the oldest demand that primary identification is produced, that which not only raises the satisfaction of needs to the signifying chain but which also dismembers them, filters them, moulds them according to the structure of the signifier. This identification will always be an identification to the signifiers. The analysts who are fascinated by the frustration sequelae only have a position of suggestion, which induces the subject to repress his demand. That is what we understand to be an emotional re-education.

One ought to take desire to the letter, that is, as the word. It is about desire (Wunsch) and not drive (Trieb). Suffice to read the Traumdeutung to know what Freud describes desire to be. There is a distinction between desire and want. Desire is registered in the signifying chain. Freud, as far as the desire in the dream of the hysteric is concerned, speaks of the desire of having an unsatisfied desire, which points towards the real of sex and death. A desire of desire, that is, the desire signified by a desire. There is a substitution of a signifier by another signifier, which directs the relation of desire to language, which specifies the Freudian unconscious.

It is important to remember the fundamental opposition between two signifiers. There are laws in the signifying chain: (a) the substitution of a term by another in order that the metaphoric effect be produced; (b) the combination of a term to another, in order that the metonymic effect be produced.

Freud posits the dream as metaphor of desire (the dream of the hysteric). The dream reveals the metaphoric effect which is the passage of the subject to the meaning of desire. The desire of the subject is that which is implied in the discourse. Freud tells us that the dream is not the unconscious, but the voice of the real. It is the metaphoric effect, then, that the dream reveals, that is, metonymy, where the want to be is anchored. Metonymy is the faint meaning that exists at the bottom of desire, and confers to it the character of perversion. Desire is the metonymy of the want to be. The dream, for Freud, points towards the structure of language.

To find oneself again as desiring is to constitute oneself as subject. Desire subjects that which analysis subjectivises. The dream is a recognition of desire because it attaches itself to the interpretation. The dream is subjected to the desire to sleep, where there is a narcissistic investment of the libido. A dream is only a dream.

A cure is not produced because we remember, but we remember because we (are) cure(d). The symptom is considered by some analysts as a compulsion to repetition. In reality it is the reproduction of the analysts and not that of symptoms.

The dream is the production of the Ego. In the dream of the hysteric, the point which is dealt with is that of her identification. The search for the desire of the Other(A) is the secret of the ego. How is it, then, that the dream is the realisation of desires? The analysts do not answer this question anymore, since they reduce desire to demand.

Let us articulate what structures desire. Desire is that which is manifested in the hiatus which the demand opens beyond itself. As the subject articulates the signifying chain, it brings to light this what to be (manque a être), hoping to receive the complement of the Other(A) (the treasure of the signifiers). The Other(A), locus of the word, is also the locus of this lack (A).

There is, however, a discrepancy between need and demand. The fulfilment of need appears as allurement, where the demand of love is quenched, sending the subject back to sleep.

The being of language is not the one of the objects. For the infant, however, the Other(A) becomes part of the other, he mingles his cares with the gift of his love. The means which the infant lacks in relation to desire is that his mother has a desire outside her, in order that he constitute himself as a desiring subject. Desire is an effect in the subject of this condition which is imposed on him by the fact that he has to pass his need through the signifying glide. Desire has to be expressed in words. On the other hand, the Other(A) is the locus of the unfolding of the word, and that is why it is the partner of the analyst. That is why man's desire is the desire of the Other(A) (desire of unsatisfied desire).

This marks another different function of primary identification. It is not about the promotion of the insigne of the other, but the condition in which the subject has to find the constituting structure of his desire in the same hiatus created by the effect of the signifiers in that which comes to represent (to him) the Other(A) whilst his demand is subjected there.

The desire in the dream is articulated at the locus of the Other(A). It is this existence (not a distorted Ego) of desire in relation to the dream that explains the signification of the dream and masks desire. Unconscious desire is the desire of the Other(A), desire of signifying insistence, real, branded. The dream satisfies the desire of the patient beyond his demand. Unconditional demand of both presence and absence, which evokes the lack of being. Desire is the signifying mark of the speaking subject. It is more an action of the signifier than that of the signified. The phallus is the signifier of the signifiers and, as such, impossible to be reintegrated in the imaginary body. The accomplishment of desire in dreams is in not having satisfied them. We, therefore, do not analyse the dream, but the effects in our patient. The function of the dream is to satisfy the desire of the patient beyond his demand. It is time to indicate to the patient the signifying function which the phallus has.

It is not enough to have the phallus in order that an object position, which is appropriate to a fantasy, be restituted to it, because, to maintain this desire in an impossibility is what preserves its condition of metonymy. Desire is not possessing the phallus, but being it. There is a lack of being beyond his desire.

Desire is placed in the counter-band, which is always on the other side. The importance in preserving the locus of desire in the direction of the cure is connected with the effects of demand. In analysis, one is not there to satisfy demand; this is his fundamental discovery. Demand comes from the locus of the Other(A). Desire is the impossibility of the word. The subject is subject whilst he speaks and because of this he is  $\$$ . He is the subject of the signifier.

To consider transference as suggestion is to listen to demand. One ought not to mistake identification with the signifier and identification with the object, which originates from the demand of love and, therefore, opens the transference. It is the identification with the object, accepted as regression, that allows us to free ourselves from suggestion. It is desire that sustains the direction of the cure outside the effects of demand. The subject's resistance, when in opposition to suggestion, is the desire to maintain his desire.

Let us think about the formation of the symptoms. They are over-determined. This over-determination is conceivable in the structure of language. The over-determination in the neurotic symptoms is sustained in the effects of a specific demand of the Other(A) in the subject, which supports it whilst subject. He is a poppit in the imaginary capture. Fantasy is an illustration of this original possibility. A different position from that of the Kleinian School, that is to say, fantasy is not imagination.

Fantasy is that (locus) where the subject sustains himself at the level of his desire. The paradox of desire is not a privilege of the neurotic. It is, however, the position of the neurotic in the locus of desire, in order to shelter fantasy, which comes to register, with its presence, the subject's response to the demand. But this fantasy has nothing to do with the signification, which is inferred to him. This signification comes from the Other(A).

The analyst indicates, then, the fallacious signification of the real, which is a mystification. The power always points towards a blind direction. It is already renounced once castration occurs. One is dealing with truth. The power is in the word. It has the special powers of cure. We are to allow the subject free so that he tries his power. Resistance is the incompatibility of desire with the word.

Desire has to be reduced to the letter, in order that it produces metaphor. that is why the analyst must be lettered.

What is the being of the analyst as far as his own desire is concerned? The desire is supported by death. It is this that is denied by clinicians.

Concerning the phallus, receiving it or giving it, is equally impossible for the neurotic to do, since he knows that the Other(A) has not got it; or has got it; anyway, his desire is somewhere else: it is from the being that one has to accept to have it or not, from the moment one discovers that he is not (it).



Once this last split (Spaltung) is inscribed, the subject articulates himself with the Logos and it is there that Freud gives the solution to the interminable analysis. It is interminable in function of this lack of being. It is the difference between being (manque a être) and Ego (object). One has to become aware that one is not the phallus and that the question has nothing to do with being it or not. Psychoanalysis is directed towards this being and not to the Ego.

Danuza M. Machado  
translated by F. Nakano

\*\*\*\*\*

#### EVENTS

Robert and Rosine Lefort, psychoanalysts of the Ecole de la Cause Freudienne and authors of 'Naissance de l'Autre', will give a seminar on child analysis on Saturday, January 17th, from 1 p.m. to 5 p.m. at Queen Square. Admission prices will be announced soon.

\*\*\*\*\*

Friday, 28th November 7.30 p.m. at the ICA: 'The Social Imaginary' a debate between Cornelius Castoriadis and John Forrester.

\*\*\*\*\*

Wednesday, 3rd December, 13.30 - 2 p.m.: University of Cambridge Group for the History of Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis and Allied Sciences. Deborah Thom will speak on 'The Concept of Maladjustment in Britain, 1920-1970. Seminar Room, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Free School Lane, Cambridge.

\*\*\*\*\*

Thursday, 4th December, 7.30 p.m. at the ICA: 'Sexuality in the Field of Vision', a discussion with Jacqueline Rose and Sally Alexander.