


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Child - The Future of an Illusion

by Danuza Machado

I realised when I was writing this paper that, perhaps, the title should be the other way round, that is, Child - The Illusion without a Future. It would possibly give us a much more precise idea of what I would like to present to you here tonight.

I'll start making some comments on Freud's text The Future of an Illusion itself (which was written in 1927), but particularly concerning what he called "the helplessness of the adult" which has its roots in the "helplessness of the child". That which Freud points out in this text is, in a way, that the adult "suffers" from the continuity, from the repetition, if you like, of being a child.

I'll quote Freud in order to make this clear: "We know already how the individual reacts to the injuries which civilisation and other men inflict on him: he develops a corresponding degree of resistance to the regulations of civilisation and of hostility to it. But how does he defend himself against the superior powers of nature, of Fate, which threaten him as they threaten all the rest?...This situation is nothing new. It has an infantile prototype, of which it is in fact only the continuation. For once before one has found oneself in a similar state of helplessness: as a small child, in relation to one's parents. One had reason to fear them, and especially one's father; and yet one was sure of his protection against the dangers one knew....I have tried to show that this has to do not only with an infantile prototype but with a phylogenetic one."

Freud tackles one important concept of structure in psychoanalysis, that is to say, the neurotic structure of all speaking-beings, the so - called infantile neurosis. This has to do with the anxiety which arises as a natural consequence from the prematuration of the human being when he is born so that this anxiety becomes a structural one, structured as a lack.

Further on Freud says: "It is my duty to point out the connecting links between the father-complex and man's helplessness and need for protection. These connections are not hard to find. They consist in the relation of the child's helplessness to the helplessness of the adult which continues it... When the growing individual finds that he is destined to remain a child for ever, that he can never do

without protection against strange superior powers; he creates for himself the gods whom he nevertheless entrusts with his own protection. Thus his longing for a father is a motive identical with his need for protection against the consequences of his human weakness. The defence against childish helplessness is what lends its characteristic features to the adult's reaction to the helplessness which he has to acknowledge - a reaction which is precisely the formation of religion."

I don't intend to consider the concept of religion here because this could become another seminar. However, from the development of the text perhaps we can dare to say that the invention of the child is also an illusion as religion, politics and so on can be. Once more I'll just quote Freud: "Having recognised religious doctrines as illusions, we are at once faced by a further question: may not other cultural assets of which we hold a high opinion and by which we let our lives be ruled be of a similar nature? Must not the assumptions that determine our political regulations be called illusions as well? and is it not the case that in our civilisation the relations between the sexes are disturbed by an erotic illusion or a number of such illusions?"

Of course it is not by chance that I took this text in order to introduce our position as far as the child is concerned. I chose it because the future of an illusion is a text which considers that psychoanalysis should be concerned with the events which are being carried out in society. We know that this text came when the war was already being articulated and Freud was not a visionary but a man who made use of a discourse, the psychoanalytical one, to interpret, that is to put words on what was going on at that time. And it is in this sense that psychoanalysis can deal with the child, that is, as an invention of our world, which is, therefore, an illusion.

Phillipe Aries, who is a French historian, concerned with the social sciences, gives us a sort of a panoramic view on the development of the concept of the child, understanding that, whenever the child is considered, it is always by thinking that he is an invention of our modern culture that astonishingly still insists on our post-modernist time.

According to Aries, during the Middle Ages the "childhood feelings", denominated as such, didn't exist, that is, this particularity which distinguishes the child from the adult was not at stake. The child could belong to the adult society without being noticed as different. There was no distinction between the child and the adult. The child at the time shared with the adults both games and jobs. Since the beginning he was separated from the parents and for centuries the education was provided by the apprenticeship. Due to the relation that the child had with the adults the

child learnt what he had to know by helping the adults doing what they were supposed to do.

However at that time there was a sort of celebration of the child during his early days, where he was seen as amusing, funny, almost like a toy to be seen and touched. This characterises the "childhood feeling" of that time, that is, when the child was almost only a baby. But this period was very brief, for his passage of entering the adult society, which meant to be separated from the family, usually took place quite early. It is in this sense that the child almost lived under an anonymous condition.

But from the 17th century onwards a considerable change took place: the school replaced the apprenticeship as a way of education. The family became the place where the necessary feeling between the couple (father and mother) and also between parents and sons took place. This was particularly emphasised by the importance attributed to education. The family then started to be organised around the child. This brought the child out of the anomalous condition which he had before. The infanticide, which was a common occurrence during the Middle Ages, came to be seen as a violence and was no longer tolerated. And it is not surprising that the ensuing result was a revolution in education.

It is amongst the moralists and the educators of the 17th century that a different "childhood feeling" emerged, where the child was no longer amusing or even agreeable, that is, the affection for childhood and its particularity was no longer expressed by the entertainments, but in fact, by the psychological interest and the moral preoccupation on childhood. This new concept of the "childhood feeling" inspired the whole educational system until the 20th century.

The first "childhood feeling" which was characterised by a sort of celebration of the child began in the family milieu with very small children and corresponded to the idea of a very short childhood. The second one, on the contrary started outside the family, with the moralists of the 17th century who were preoccupied with the discipline and the rationality of behaviour. The child assumed therefore a central place in the family. This new philosophy expressed the consciousness of the innocence and of the weakness of childhood. Without the moralists the child would remain the small funny being with whom people were amused; and after the age between five and seven the child would be introduced to the adult world, without any transition. But the moralists and educators of the 17th century imposed the idea of a longer childhood thanks to the success of the educational institutions. These men are also responsible for the origin of the modern feeling of childhood and education.

The school during the Middle Ages was not only for the benefit of children but also for the youngsters and the adults. But after the 17th century the school lengthened the period of childhood, the school began to be concerned with ages.

We can imagine the modern family without love but the preoccupation with the child and the need of its presence has its roots within the family. The medieval civilisation did not know the modern education. Today our society depends and knows that it depends on the success of its educational system. New disciplines such as psychoanalysis, paediatrics, psychology and so on concern themselves with childhood problems and their discoveries are being transmitted to the parents and to society through a wide literature inevitably vulgarising some of the concepts. Our world has become obsessed by the physical, the moral and the sexual problems of childhood. This preoccupation was not known by the medieval civilisation as for this society there were no problems coming from childhood: as soon as the child left the mother's breast or soon after the child became the natural companion of the adult, his passage through childhood was accomplished. However, from the 17th century onwards, the idea that the child was not mature enough to enter adulthood and that he needed a sort of preparation to allow him to be amongst his adult counterparts became more widely accepted and consequently this was provided by the educational system, by pedagogy.

What happened to pedagogy is that it became the place where the emergency of the student's desire is forever delayed. This takes place as long as the teachers place themselves in the position of having the whole knowledge and are not aware that this knowledge always presents a lack in which the desire inherent in the transmitting of knowledge should be anchored. This is exactly what is not recognised.

In a word we can say that there are two functions as far as the Oedipus Complex is concerned: the first one would be the repression from which the Super Ego comes as a result; and the second one would be the sublimation, where the result is the Ego Ideal. However these notions are used normatively, that is, these notions are used as a rule, they are incorporated by pedagogy as a "sine qua non" form of social behaviour.

In the pedagogical system the student's desire for knowledge clashes with the teacher's desire, that is to say, the one from which the student should know and learn, so that it obliterates anything which could support the student's desire. Teacher and student establish a paranoid relation similar to that of the master and the slave. The student fears being deprived of his work's product, that is to say that, the teacher does not recognise the student's product as something arising from the student's desire; but the

teacher considers it as a complementation of his (the teacher) own desire.

Rene Scherer on his text "Emile Perverti ou des rapports entre L'education et la sexualite" extracts from Rousseau's Emile the idea that one cannot educate a child without betraying his nature. Everything is natural in man and therefore everything is to be considered as a supplementary, because it is in a natural lack, in a flaw which exists in nature itself, that man's perfection, which allows education to be possible, is inscribed. The possibility of mankind, the possibility of being human is at the same time the origin of perversion. This we know since Freud when he says that it is impossible to educate; education is an impossible task and any attempt to attain this can only lead to a perversion or even to an illusion, for education is to be understood as something supplementary to the failure of the natural course of the subject.

I shall now return to Freud in the Future of an Illusion in order to think about what I've mentioned before: the structural neurosis, that is, the infantile neurosis. Freud says:

"We know that a human child cannot successfully complete its development to the civilised stage without passing through a phase of neurosis sometimes of greater and sometimes of lesser distinctness... Most of these infantile neuroses are overcome spontaneously in the course of growing up... The remainder can be cleared up later still by psychoanalytical treatment. In just the same way, one might assume, humanity as a whole, in its development through the ages, fell into stages analogous to the neurosis."

The infantile neuroses is a structure which has to be crossed by every subject; every subject must go through it. This is not the same as a child's neurosis. Freud called the infantile neurosis "the Oedipal scar", that is, something which we would say to be a left over of the Oedipus resolution. It is this passage that leads the subject to the assumption of castration.

This is one of the reasons why Lacan emphasised the worthlessness of taking into account the concept of development stages, which are very precisely theorised by so-called orthodox psychoanalysis. If we just take a look at the latency period as it is commonly described we can think of it as a need of our society in delaying the assumption of the symbolic castration, by means of a postergation of jouissance.

This leads us to think about another important point, that of the myth that the adults create whenever they have to be faced with facts that they say the child is not prepared to understand. The question of Sex and Death is one of those

big myths, that must remain forbidden, must remain a taboo, even for the adult, because Sex and Death point out the assumption of the impossibility of the sexual rapport, that is, the impossibility of completeness. So even adults try some neurotic attempts to mask it.

In our culture the noun child became an adjective. There is a myth of weakness and pureness of the child that is only there to enlarge those who protect those myths, that is to say, the adult world. Psychoanalysis is here to demistify this rose-tinted view of the child.

1979 was declared by the United Nations "The International Year of the Child". Let us have a look at some of the statements made during this year by some eminent personalities of that time:

- Jimmy Carter - President of the USA, 1979: "I hope that, in this moment in which the world is turned to the children, that all of us may know better their needs, that we have the will to pay attention to them and that we can make good use of this unique opportunity working for the development and for the happiness and richness of our children."

- Leonid Brejnev - President of the USSR, 1979: "The children are our future. Their role is to continue the work of their fathers and mothers. I have no doubts whatsoever that they will build a better and happier life in the world. It is our duty to assert that all children must be kept away from wars so that they will be able to have a calm and happy childhood."

-Valery Giscard d'Estaing - President of France, 1979: "I hope that during this year the smile of the children will light the world up and that it will bring us further in our struggle for peace and progress. The childhood is the innocence of the world, the wonderful source where all nations can obtain the energy without which our world would be old and rough."

This is what can be called an illusion without any future. Those views come to replace the adult's hopeless wish of perpetuity, that means, the one which masks their own crossing through of castration, as I said before, something which has to do with the assumption of the impossibility of completeness.

This brings us to the question: what is it that makes a child analyst a child analyst? What is the desire of the child analyst? And more, what is the specificity of child analysis if we could say there is one? As we know, psychoanalysis is not concerned with the dichotomy child-adult. However, it is very easy for an adult to be placed as the one who knows whenever relating to a child. And that is why a child analysis becomes often an emotional re-education, where the analyst can easily be placed in the same position of the parents or even of school when they demand that a child be psychoanalysed. What they in fact

demand is the disappearance of a symptom which they find very difficult to cope with. For example, children who do not adapt themselves to school are treated as maladjusted. This is not to be treated since this is the field of pure behaviour which psychoanalysis has nothing to do with. When this occurs, as soon as the symptom disappears the analysis is more often than not interrupted before the natural course of the analytical cure comes to an end. The Child's analysis can often be issued as a symptom of the analyst.

The child is taken in such an imaginary way that we often have a maternal conceptualisation of the child analysis making a series: analyst-woman-child. In 1933 Freud said that the child analysis would belong to women...and he was right.

Lacan points out that in the direction of the cure the analyst is supported by his policy which is linked to his lack of being. There strategy and tactics are articulated. The strategy is the direction of the cure itself, which concerns the basic rule of psychoanalysis, that is, that the analysand can question his symptom and the analyst can be there to hear this questioning (and I rather prefer to choose the word hear instead of listen). The analyst occupies the place of the object a, that is, he offers himself as the subject suppose of knowing, which is a position given by the analysand. The tactics would then be the way the analyst is going to enable this strategy to take place. It has to do with style, a specificity as far as any subject is concerned.

The specificity of the child's analysis, as with any other subject, always concerns the tactics. The specificity then is not the child itself.

What happens to children's analysis is a huge confusion in the operation of this dialectic: policy, strategy and tactics, since the analysts can easily take themselves as a model for the child's cure.

However we can think about a specificity in a child's analysis which is not introduced by the symbolic itself but which has something to do with the Real, the Real of the Sex that envelops the fantasy. The problem for the child at this point is not the one concerning the impossibility of the sexual rapport. And here I should like to point out the fact that it is not rare for the analyst to find himself performing the same role as any adult who simply tells the child that when he grows up he can get what he wants. Should this happen this would simply lead to a false end of an analysis. For those analysts the final aim of an analysis would be the oedipination of the child which is simply linked to the remission of the symptom, that is, it has to do with the therapeutic.

For the child it is better to leave the question of his future open-ended. It is this fantasy that will be crossed during the cure. The Oedipus effect on the fantasy is the inclusion of castration in its structure; this fantasy, as I said before, is the so-called "Oedipus scar".

A child's neurosis is not in reality an obstacle, a stopping in the Oedipus complex says Michel Silvestre, but a painful attempt to attain its effects. It may seem that the only specificity for the child's analysis concerns the specificity of the resolution of the Oedipal crisis, where the assumption of the symbolic castration could not be fully attained, that is, there is no fundamental fantasy, in the Freudian sense, before the resolution of the Oedipus complex. What would then the resolution for a child be? The fundamental fantasy corresponds to the solution found by the child in order to try and solve the impasses of its position. The child's neurosis has its axis in the infantile neurosis as a result of the castration anxiety which arises, as I said, in the decline of the Oedipus complex. This is the same structure that can be found in the adult.

The infantile neurosis is a more pathetic rather than pathological attempt to pass through the Oedipus. If a neurosis in a child takes place there is still an attempt of the Oedipus complex resolution.

A transference must be established during an analysis. However the child has not the same relation to the word as the adult has. Hence the material brought by the child in the session, such as drawings, stories, games, and so on, constitutes already the interpretation that gives a sense in which the Real focuses the light into the trauma; it is his discourse. The analyst should not therefore add his own. He gives not an interpretation but makes a constitution which aims to release the child from the symbolic coordinates of his history, from his place of object in the fantasy of the adult Other. What takes place is the reconciliation of the child not only with his mother but with his jouissance, so that the fantasy can be reached.

In an infantile cure we talk about the possible, that is, as for any subject, the crossing of his own fantasy.

(Freud said in his 34th conference that "psychoanalysis could be applied to children as long as some modifications were regarded", and he added: "What we will obtain with this is the power of confirmation in a living being of the same thing that was obtained with the adults." Freud points out the cure as being concerned with ageless subjects and not taking into account whether they are adults or children.)

If we take a look at the British psychoanalytical literature, particularly Melanie Klein, Winnicott and Anna

Freud, we can notice that the concept of the lack is considered as, a negative one. This is exactly the opposite of the Lacanian approach, where the lack, the impossibility of completeness, the object lost for ever, is the main concept.

For Melanie Klein the end of an analysis could be thought as the restoration of the lost object. She considers the relation subject-object in an imaginary way and the incorporation of the good object has much more to do with the pedagogical discourse than with the psychoanalytical one.

According to Winnicott the analyst should be identified with the lost object in order to allow the analysand the possibility of reaching it and therefore the analyst is placed in the position of the transitional object which represents the lost one.

For Anna Freud the conflict between the Ego and the Id does not take place in the child and this conflict is artificially produced by the analyst through suggestion in order to enable the cure to take place. The consequence is that a pedagogical relation takes place instead of a psychoanalytical one.

For these psychoanalysts it is an emotional re-education that is at stake.

What I would like to underline here is that, in a way, they all conceive that the child should have someone, if not the mother, who gives what he wants and needs, that is, the breast - this is the so-called motherly love. If this does not happen to the child the analyst should then place themselves in this position, that is, replacing the motherly love. One ought to be the good enough mother, that is, to be aware of the needs and demands of the child in order to enable him to be happy, healthy and safe. But what the child demands, as any other subject does, is to be loved (all demand is a demand of love) and therefore what the child wants is what the mother does not have - to love is to give what one does not have, says Lacan. So, even the excellent mother is not good enough - one is always demanding something else. And this something else is the name of desire, and any attempt to fill it would be an

to fill it up. What they don't consider is that they cannot direct the cure by trying to place something where anything will fit in, because something is supposed to be there. They have the illusion that we can replace the object and from this idea comes the Kleinian concept of reparation and Winnicott's transitional object.

However the main idea of the object relation is that the relation between the subject and the object will always be a relation without a completeness, in the sense that the object will never be the aim which the subject intends to reach, for the object is a construction build up by the subject, that is, which is linked to his desire.

The Lacanian theory of the object relation brings to us the importance of being aware that the discourse is directed to the subject who invents the object - anyone.

The whole of the psychoanalytical theory is established, is centred on the object relation and it is not by chance that we can find the most astonishing misunderstandings related to this.

The psychoanalytical discourse places the object in the locus of the lack of the object, the object a. However what we see as a result of the psychoanalytical theory nowadays is that the object is conceived as something which it is possible to reach or aim, as I said, or even restore. According to this position the cure is directed to create the possibility of this object being found out. But in fact the direction which the psychoanalytical discourse points out is the other way round, that is, that this object, this impossible object of desire is never graspable, it always escapes from any attempt to grasp it; it is always something else.

That is why the analyst is placed in the position of the object a, which means that the analyst is not supposed to be identified with it.

We can say that it is not by chance that the child is in fashion. It suffices to read the newspapers and watch the telly. The child has become the most manipulated issue by politicians. Everything concerning "child abuse", "working children", and so on, has a space and headlines on the news.

The most updated programme on the telly - Child Watch - just took place two weeks ago. In this programme they seem to present two main guidelines: 1- "to bring up children with love and security" and 2- "to put children first". I'm not sure of what this could mean but I was considering that it is now even more difficult to stick to this dichotomy child-adult, because what they made clear in this programme was that the children were suffering the same violence as we adults do. The Childline during its first year took 6000

reports from children with ages ranging from 10 to 15 years old who had been abused. They also stated that the majority of the cases of child abuse were left out of the reports. They presented a panoramic view on what British society is providing to these children and it was clear that a psychoanalytical treatment is not being provided at all. (The TV had also shown one of these days another interesting programme, a late night informal debate with the suggestive theme "Do the British love their children" and they arrived at the conclusion that they don't).

Would this lack of psychoanalysis be a symptom of this society? As a matter of fact the support for those children is provided by the so-called social workers who, according to the programme are not well trained (the social workers complain about the state funds which aren't enough to supply their training). The support is also provided by the foster parents who sometimes are just interested in the wages they receive for their jobs. The programme also considered the difficulties in which the legal mechanisms find themselves involved as far as children are concerned - they absolutely don't know how to proceed in those case and are on the verge of finding a way out (for example - how to obtain the cooperation of the child when their parents are brought to Court).

In order to illustrate this The Independent (the newspaper) published last Friday an article with the title: "A child's right not to be silent". They say: "Taking children's rights seriously seems a task of supreme optimism. In 1979, at the end of the International Year of the Child, Brian Jackson, then director of the National Educational Research and Development Trust, pronounced the year a scandalous failure". "No comparable country has a worse record than Britain" Further on trying to consider a child who has to deal with the law: a "child of 12 may wish to leave home, for instance. The parents may object. Society feels the family is sacrosanct. However, should the child argue that he is physically abused or not permitted to study, what should the decision be?" And then referring to the legal centres for children: "The Children's Legal Centre was set up in 1982 and acts on behalf of children as well as exposing injustices such as ill-treatment at detention centres and the deportation of immigrant children. The Brent Young People's Law Centre in London is the only law centre which acts solely on behalf of children. A small gain this year was the end of the use of corporal punishment in state schools". (I think it won just by one vote!).

Is it possible that we psychoanalysts or even people who operate within the psychoanalytical discourse, is it possible that we have nothing to say about this? Can we just consider this omission of psychoanalysis as a symptom of the British society or shall we start to consider it as our own

symptom as psychoanalysts? An answer or even an attempt to deal with this situation ought to be encouraged.

Ivy House 11/11/87

Demand and Act in the Psychoanalysis of Children

by Marc Strauss

TRANSLATED BY MARC DU RY

I will be speaking of 'demand and act', and as I have added 'in the psychoanalysis of children' I will also be led to differentiate, to try and situate what is particular in the psychoanalysis of the child.

There are several ways of tackling this: either to consider it as making no difference, but I don't see how I could develop this point of view, or to emphasise the differences which exist as a matter of fact. We who aim at and believe in structure may all be convinced that there is no difference from that perspective, but we also know that there is one as far as the facts are concerned, in experience, whether in its handling, its unfolding or its termination. There is certainly an effort to be made to gain precision in this direction: I hope to outline it.

I will start from the first part of my title: Demand and Act.

At its most elementary there is the statement that psychoanalysis deals with the symptom, the symptom of someone who suffers and complains about it. To formulate things thus already implies taking up a position, but it seems a minimal one: this someone who suffers and complains of it is the one analysis aims to liberate by removing the suffering. But correction, not to say mischief of psychoanalysis: it aims to liberate the subject of jouissance which is enclosed, locked up in the symptom.

Jouissance, of course, is not pleasure: that is why the symptom does not prevent the complaint: that the subject should complain of jouissance is in the nature of things. For the analyst, however, to be aware of the fact that jouissance is lodged in what makes the subject complain has some consequences.

It distinguishes this complaint, this symptom, from the medical complaint or symptom. All of us would find it hard to imagine confiding in an expert of the faculty who would start searching for our jouissance when we bring him our physical pain. What we ask of him is

To be aware of this jouissance allows us to take up, in relation to this demand for relief, for removal that the patient puts forward, a position of abeyance which is neither a refusal nor the end of non-reception.

We shall see when I come to speak to you of Winnicott, that everything I've told you up till now is already strictly lacanian, as well as freudian of course, in so far as Freud has himself insisted on the jouissance dimension of the symptom. But we will see how for that paediatrician, Winnicott, a symptom is a suffering which can be cured.

This jouissance sealed in the symptom depends on an identification, an identification of the subject which fixes desire, halts it in its metonymy, its circulation, its passage; the obligatory passage of desire through the place of the Other.

For desire to have a chance of returning as satisfaction it has to pass through the Other, except in the case where it maintains itself in auto-eroticism, that is, where the object of desire is within hand's reach. This distinguishes it from the object cause of desire which, for not being within hand's reach in this way, is precisely causal.

Why not say that psychoanalysis consists in passing from the object within reach of the hand to the causal object, the lost object, which eventually permits a hand to be held out? It is true that in order to hold out a hand it is better not to have it already filled with lots of little things. Nevertheless we believe that the object within hand's reach is the most natural thing, in the sense of the natural of structure, the natural instituted and constituted by the fantasy which is our only mode of access to reality; the fantasy as window on the world, utensil of contact and communication with reality, with the other. The auto-erotic satisfaction obtained by means of it is burdensome; it always turns out to be a fundamental hoax for the subject, an imposture which makes it unstable.

We hear it each day in the clinic: either, for certain subjects, the satisfaction of desire is stolen from them; the moment it could have been attained it doesn't work any longer; or when a satisfaction is experienced they no longer recognise themselves in it. You will have recognised obsessional neurosis and hysteria.

These are generalities which concern the subject of experience, that subject of the signifier which is not touched by chronological age but effected by the signifier. Effected doesn't only mean identified. Of course the subject is identified by the signifier, I (A) in the lacanian mathemes; it exists, it effectively allows communication, at least the belief that one communicates on the basis of language.

Lacan, however, is radical; he says that language is not useful for communicating; he illustrates this beautifully by calling upon the experience of the couple; when in a couple one wants to communicate it is because things are already bad; it is enough to make a small effort to make communication somewhat clearer, to explain oneself better, and things go from bad to worse. So language is no good for communication; it effects the subject. He also says this in another way: language creates desire - specifying further that this is precisely what is exchanged.

The desire created by language runs in parallel with the signifying chain, in parallel with Demand. To speak is to demand; even if on the occasion a bark makes itself heard, an order, or a wail, it is always demand. Now this notion of demand could serve as the first distinction between the psychoanalysis of adults and that of children.

We hear many people say: 'but after all, it's not the child who is demanding!', 'he is brought along by his parents...', 'It's at the school's request...', who has not heard or said this at some point? This leads one to think that the adult, when he demands, proffers a true demand. He knows what he is demanding; he demands in his name; one can glimpse the risky nature of the thing.

One knows from experience that, when a psychoanalysis is demanded, it, as for any other demand, is a demand for something Other. A demand is a statement, that is to say, it implies an interpretation. Desire is articulated in the metonymy of the signifying chain and cannot be articulated as such. Desire is to be heard/understood beyond and this side of the demand and one would wait in vain for desire and demand to join up. The decided desire of which Lacan speaks and which he considers necessary for starting an analysis does not refer to any joining together of desire and demand. That would be a return to the prelacanianism of the subject-as-unity. If a demand for analysis is always made 'in the name of', a demand in one's own proper name would be rather disquieting. That doesn't, then, seem to me to be an obvious distinction between adult and child analysis.

It is a fact that others point out to the subject what is not going as well as it should, for adults just as for children. The signal that something is amiss implies an utterance coming from the Other. For children it is classically the school, when they are of school-going age, which comes in to point out the hitch. But for adults too; the adult doesn't formulate his demand because there is a symptom. A neurotic symptom is created precisely so that things can function - so so, but function all the same. When the adult comes to demand an analysis it is equally because an 'it isn't right like this' has come back to him from the Other. In other words, in the contingency of an encounter (everyday, professional, amorous) something was

produced which upset the fantasy, put the homeostatic equilibrium in which the subject could move by means of his fantasy out of sorts. A shaking of the fantasy is needed, the emergence of a situation in which the subject cannot recognise himself, in order that a demand be addressed.

That is even the function of the preliminary sessions: to lead the subject to take stock of what has served as encounter for him and thus brought him to analysis. One day he picked up the phone; something precipitated his call. The preliminary sessions have to uncover what, beyond the first complaints immediately advanced, constitutes a symptom for the subject, in the sense in which something has come to put a spoke in the wheels of routine. For example, patients often come because of a sense of depression, a 'I can't go on like this' which can date from before yesterday. These statements bear on the relation of a subject to his image, the rapport of the Ego to the Ideal, the sense of being torn one can experience because of it. That is not sufficient to signify the decided desire which is instrumental in setting the analysis going. Effectively the symptom must appear as a question to the subject - the symptom in the freudian analytical sense, that is, one which can be deciphered.

I am thinking of a hysteric who complained of a 'malaise' in her life and with whom, finally, it came out that what really bothered her, as such uncovered by her, was that she could be with men only on the condition that she didn't know them. As soon as she knew them a bit, especially when she had them, it didn't work out at all. This realisation became for her a 'What does this mean?', in other words there was not only a narcissistic complaint but a call to knowledge (savoir), the uncovering of a symptom which was immediately complemented by a call to knowledge. Knowledge (savoir) is always included in the problem of the symptom in psychoanalysis.

On this point too there is no great difference with children. Here is a first example of a preliminary session. It concerns a little boy brought to me by his mother because at school it had been pointed out that he was a bit aggressive and agitated. The parents had realised, in the end, that at home too, things were not going so well. When I asked him, once his mother had left, what according to him wasn't working out, he said straightaway; 'There's something bothering me, it's my brother and I don't know how to deal with it'. This was more than a complaint; it was pointing out what for him constituted his question, his difficulty beyond the proliferation of problems which he might have presented elsewhere. He didn't know how to defend himself, between offering no resistance and hitting back - both equally impossible - he was paralysed. So it was enough for me to propose to speak of this for the question of demand to be settled: it was no longer the demand of the school, nor that of the parents. The analysis

got off the ground exactly in the way necessary for the treatment of adults.

The other example is an adolescent of whom I had already been told. The narcissistic question of the image of self, of what, by itself, can provoke desire in the Other, is obviously essential during that period of life. She went to see an analyst because things weren't going very well, she felt a bit sad, unhappy, unsure of what she wanted to do. The analyst proposed to her some sessions to help her. One day she constructed her intrigue by presenting the impossibility of coming to the session because she had to play sport with her father. Following which, with good analytic logic, the analyst made her understand that she had a choice, but would pay for the missed session. With that the young girl never came back.

What happened? It seems that, even implicitly, ratifying the complaint on the image, the non-particularised 'things weren't going very well', evidently hasn't put the subject to work on the signifier, has not produced transference but repetition, repetition of the hysterical intrigue. The patient has correctly sized up the demand of the 'therapist'. He had accepted to take charge of her suffering, that is to say, he had made her understand that her jouissance consisted in nursing those in bad health. Once she had understood her partner's way of doing things, it was easy to construct the montage of the repetition. In other words, in saying to her that she would have to pay for the missed session, he didn't make her understand that she had to pay the price of her desire because it had not as yet been put into play. To give her to understand that he was willing to treat her suffering, is to be more or less a doctor, and a doctor who would charge her for a medical act which hadn't been carried out would not be very deontological. Such an act signifies rather a punishment or a rivalry with the father. It does not at all have the same value as act as 'You do what you want but in any case there is a price to pay'.

With this I do not mean to say that the little one should not have been received at all for as long as she only spoke of suffering. A way should have been found to receive her while at the same time suspending for her the certainty that she was received in the name of what she believed. 'The bids' should have been 'raised' a bit, not to assure her that she would continue to be received, but to make her understand that the desire of the analyst was in on the game thus letting something become enigma for her. I suppose that to have treated her statements of suffering with a bit more disdain would have been sufficiently enigmatic for, at that moment, the act of saying 'if you don't come, you'll pay' to have had the effect of driving the subject into a corner. This was to give you a clinical example of the consequences one exposes oneself to in answering to the demand. I made a reference to ethics concerning payment;

since I spoke of act I should evoke the equivalence of footing between the analytical act and ethics. That of desire since Lacan says at the end of his seminar; 'there is no other good than the one which allows one to pay the price for access to one's desire'. This is what one makes people pay for, and not for their shortcomings.

So we do not respond to the demand. We do not satisfy it. This is amply developed by Lacan in Direction of the Treatment, Signification of the Phallus and Subversion of the Subject: we do not satisfy demand, he says, because to satisfy the demand is to miss the expected satisfaction. It might eventually produce a satisfaction, but a missed one. What it is a question of doing in analysis is to give value to and uncover the very principle of the demand the subject is a bearer of; it is to analyse the demand while deferring its satisfaction. The subject demands; he is bearer of a demand. His drama is that in the sphere of truth he isn't all that badly placed since he does not satisfy himself with the products of the commodity industry; and that is why he comes to see us. He doesn't know what his demand consists of but he is its bearer. That is the function of the fantasy.

Concerning this function of the fantasy I have spoken of its one aspect as prefabricated desire, as support of desire. It functions as support of desire because it constitutes a response constructed by the subject faced with the 'che vuoi?', with the enigma of the desire of the Other. He constructed this answer for himself on the basis of what the Other demanded of him - starting from the equivalence he establishes between what is demanded and what is lacking. The subject is thus the bearer of the demand of the Other as response to the enigma of his desire. This enigma is completely consistent, real even; it is his existence as such. That there was desire is not in doubt since he is here. There was a desire which presided over the meeting of his parents, even if this meeting has failed in other respects.

In this way we can relativise the importance given to the fact that the child either was or wasn't wished for. This real of an encounter, of a desire which was at work, is in any case caught in a signifying chain.

The child is the 'symptom of the parental couple' (Letter of Lacan to Jenny Aubry). And it is around these elements taken from the Other that the subject is going to weave what in Freud is called the family romance, that he is going to find an identity which supports his reason for being in the world and so his desire. In 1953, in trying to uncover the structure, Lacan took up the family romance again as the 'individual myth of the neurotic' and subsequently in the fantasy wherein it came to lose its romanesque aspect to become this mathematised writing: $\$ \langle \rangle a$, which one can deploy in the orders of the symbolic, imaginary and real.

The subject is a response as symptom of the parental couple; he is the bearer of the real of a jouissance taken in the sexual desire of those who brought him into the world. That is what makes the child-response, the child in each of us. Another term to designate this charge of the subject, other than the three mentioned above, is 'infantile neurosis'.

We should distinguish infantile neurosis from the neurosis of the child. The infantile neurosis is nothing other than the process of formation of the family romance, of the individual myth, and that is indeed what Lacan says in the letter to Jenny Aubry as well as in Direction of the Treatment, Ecrits p. 628: the subject has to find the constitutive structure of his desire in the very gap which is opened by the effects of the signifier, in those who come to represent for him the Other in so far as its demand would have subjected him.' This will become in the letter 'the child a symptom of the parental couple'.

In the same vein another sentence of Lacan, in Signification of the Phallus, Ecrits p. 693, seems capital to me: 'it is in the dialectic between the demand for love and the test of desire that development organises itself'. You all know to what extent Lacan de-emphasises the notion of development, of maturation. It is a pearl in his teaching, which very effectively situates the problem burdening many anglo-saxons occupied with children. What is this test of desire? He tells us a few lines on: 'The test of the desire of the Other, in so far as the Mother does not have the phallus, is decisive'. Here we are once more in the register of structure: castration. The fact that Mother does not have it reserves the place for Father.

'It is not enough that the mother does not have the phallus; she must also have been deprived of it.' He puts the accent on the operation of the signifier. This is because the mother is not a person of another species than the masculine, but it is the masculine affected by a sign. This structure of intervention by a third is specific to the speaking being, it is Lacan taking up Freud on the castration of the mother.

The text of Freud in which the function of the father is developed furthest and to which Lacan accords major importance is The Splitting of the Ego, of 1938. Lacan goes so far as to say at the end of Direction of the Treatment that this text gives the solution to the preceding text: Analysis Terminable and Interminable. What is striking is the place given to the father in so far as it is he who comes to function as the one who deprives. Freud employs the notion of the reality of castration throughout his text: the child admits the 'reality', believes in the 'reality'. The reality of the mother's castration is not at all a biological real. Psychic reality is not the access of the sensory apparatus to an objective world; it presupposes on the contrary an obligatory passage through the father. That

the mother does not have the phallus is thus the decisive test and it is truly because the mother does not have it that the subject desires. He can desire very well from that point on. And why should he not suppose, with some reason, since the mother speaks to him, demands, that it is the phallus she desires? With respect to this demand, the father is faltering. Not only is the father the one who deprives the mother of the phallus but, what's more, he is not even capable of giving it back to her.

This is what is evoked in the daily complaint of the neurotic with the result, in the hysteric, of sustaining the father's faltering desire, and in obsessional neurosis, of idealising a father who is master of his desire.

The subject desiring that the mother has the phallus, desiring to do what the father cannot do, forgets precisely that it is because the father exists, because there is a paternal function, that he can throw himself blindly into this quest of complementing the Other. He wants, in financial terms, to settle the account from whence he was issued, put differently, to have done with the lack, to rid himself of castration, not without knowing all the same that it is himself he would balance. Hence the limit called defence, defence of going beyond a certain limit; hence too the development Lacan effects of desire as a defence, defence against the castration of the Other, with all the strategies of defence that form a junction from that point on: it is the famous passage in Subversion of the Subject on the strategy of hysterical and obsessional desire. They are strategic choices in response to the desire of the Other, whereas the enigma is not characteristic of one of the neuroses.

Desire as defence does not hinder jouissance, that jouissance of the living, as Lacan expresses it, a real on which the signifier establishes itself, on which the paternal function establishes itself, but which this signifier does not annul. One doesn't balance the account of jouissance; it is precisely what makes bodies of us, despite everything. In the 1975-76 seminar, the Sinthome Lacan says that it is 'jouissance which echoes in the body the fact that there is a speaking'. This echo is the drive. This echo resounds in the body, says Lacan, 'because the body has some orifices' It is, in the compact way Lacan states it, the structural formulation of the signifying equipment of the drive. The drives take on a phallic signification because, by means of the signifying operation, it is the sexual organ which creates the difference of the sexes. It can be there, or it can not be there.

If it is there, it is present against a background of absence; if it is not there it is absent against a background of presence; 'the echo in the body', from the fact that there is a speaking, is the living being caught in the net of the signifier around those

orifices which make up the reason - in all senses of the word - for exchange with the Other.

When the other speaks, speaks to the subject, this can be interpreted as easily from the angle of the demand for love as from the angle of the drive object, the object of exchange: breast, anal object, look, voice which make up the reason, the cause of the demand or the desire of the Other. The anglo-saxons have enlarged on this: every demand, every articulation of the subject with another, can be interpreted, because it is grammar itself, in terms of object exchange. It is around these objects which are the reason for exchange that the function of jouissance gets caught, that comes to gather and so to negativise itself this function of jouissance which animates the body, which burdens it as well. This is what Lacan says in Sinthome p. 6: 'the phallus is the conjunction of this parasite, this little bit of appendage, with the function of speech. 'What is not parasitical are the lost objects of exchange' (the breast, etc). The observation of Hans says nothing else: there is a little bit or organ which functions and follows its own inclination; it goes, it comes in any old way and yet it joins itself with the function of speech.

This is why for us the principle of a psychoanalysis is to highlight the function of lack which from which demand as such takes its origin. Whether in the neurosis of the child or that of the adult, the function of lack no longer operates, the lack lacks. Because the subject is too well identified with what the Other expects of him for having the phallus, to be what the Other lacks. He is too well identified, from the point of view of the signifier, but also, what is on a par with it, from the point of the drive object. The upholding of this identification by the fantasy allows the repetition of the jouissance sealed in the symptom.

Let us take up again the example of the hysterical adolescent. She has her demand which is to satisfy her fantasmatic position, an unconscious demand to be sure. If the psychotherapist, the analyst responds to it with his too precise demand to help, to cure, a veritable confrontation is produced and it is an open question which of the two demands will gain the upper hand, without issue for the analysis. Lacan has also shown that one shouldn't force things on the side of the father, inform the subject that he has a father. It is precisely because the father functions that the subject is encumbered, with something exceeding the father, with which the father supports himself but which the father cannot reabsorb: jouissance. Forcing things with respect to pacification, the respect for the law (were it symbolic) falls on deaf ears as regards the effective question of the subject and leads to an unhappy issue for the treatment.

An example: an adolescent girl whose parents had separated.

The father had the peculiar habit of following his daughter wherever she went. He was there, a kind of petrified commandatore, mute, at the school gates, on the sports field. He would look at her without saying a word. Imagine the disturbing aspect of the scene and at the same time, the burden of rape this girl could experience in feeling herself the container of the agalma. In her treatment she complained of her father's behaviour. Her annoyance was such that she produced an acting out: she went to the police station, lodged a complaint against her father and demanded that he be stripped of his paternity. The therapist answered as a 'lacanian', he told her that in any case, whether she liked it or not, one didn't touch a father. He wanted to prevent this acting out but instead of interpreting it, he invoked a master's discourse, albeit a common sense one. By throwing the father back at her he pushed her to respond with the ultimate 'passage a l'acte': she stopped coming.

Someone who responds lightly to demand, to the point of having invented a treatment called: 'treatment on demand' - it is not treatment of the demand - is D Winnicott. Little Piggie is the famous illustration of this treatment on demand. I will only take some points from it to mark the difference. It is Winnicott's testament, his last active treatment, the notes on which he supplies in extension, together with his commentaries. There is no doubt that he considers this text as the testament of his practice. Lacan has paid tribute to Winnicott for his invention of the transitional object which served him as forerunner of the object (a), which was useful to him in advancing towards the uncovering of that lost object of jouissance which is recovered, dressed by $i(a)$, the object of the drive, the object of the demand of the Other. On the other hand Lacan qualified his invention of the 'self' as a 'slip of the act'.

Winnicott poses some good questions, especially in his concern to define the analysis of children. He gives answers on various points.

-1st point: It is a mastery of anxiety, in the bosom of that total experience which is analysis, with the ability to take pleasure in the game.

-2nd point: Technique is always adapted to each particular case. Winnicott shows a side which is sympathetic to us in opposing himself to standards, to the point of saying that the length of a session is a function of what happens therein.

-3rd point: On the question of deciding whether or not to take the words of the parents into account, he insists on 'sharing' with them.

-4th point: One shouldn't practise family-therapy but proceed in such a way that the parents have confidence in

the analysis and do not interfere. He cites nevertheless the letters of the mother and uses them to construct his interpretations for Piggie.

Concerning the treatment on demand he asks himself: is it a psychotherapy or a true analysis? Courageous, he puts his own opinions into question, then reassures himself on that score. That is moreover what characterises Winnicott, he has an answer for everything but not abrasively, like M Klein; he doesn't have her 'tripe-dealer of genius' aspect as Lacan qualifies her. His answer is thus that it does not depend on the way one practices but on the formation of the therapist. If one handles the transference and interprets the unconscious it is psychoanalysis. As for Lacan, he challenges the notion of formation of the analyst: the only formation is that of the unconscious. This justifies his invention of the analytical act as quite different from the know-how acquired from a good formation. The act is an invention of the analyst on the basis of what constitutes his desire as analyst in response to what a subject says. This is not the same thing as knowing the ropes because one has had the adequate training. Training does not evoke an ethic but a technique with all that, at any moment, it can have of value.

It evokes too, the question of the end of analysis, being there, as always, very pragmatic: how far should one go? Up to the indispensable minimum: when it works, it works; one shouldn't go too far but one shouldn't stop too soon either. I don't think Winnicott has done any texts on didactics. When he speaks of the formation of the therapist is it a question, there too, of not going too far?

Let us look at Piggie. Winnicott shows us that it is a treatment which hasn't reached an end because the development is not finished. The treatment uncovers the subject of the identification who represses desire and, at the moment in which the analysis begins to issue in something, the normal processes of development take over. He guides himself with the help of a simplistic representation of a developmental chronology. Should there be an accident in the continuous chain of development the analyst will lend his hand and bring the broken-down subject back onto the right road, after which the thing goes by itself. There is a convergence between nature, not that of the signifier but that of development, and the analytic therapy.

The lacanian proposition is strictly the contrary: what is natural is to be subjected to the signifier, that is, animated, ruled by one's fantasy; what is not natural is the crossing of one's fantasy. As regards the natural, Winnicott calls attention to how the clinical evolution in relation to the 'constitutional health of the child was evident' to him. He grasped straightaway what her 'constitutional health' was to Piggie and from that point on he can judge the clinical

evolution; it is a naturalistic and medical position, biologising the subject.

Winnicott also insists a lot on the confidence which increases the impetus of the treatment: Winnicott is somebody who has a phobia, it is the word to use, of anything that can stir things up a bit. At one point he says 'No' to Piggie and on the side he calculates the aggressivity and negative transference he can provoke, simply by saying 'no' to Piggie. He insists too, on the collaboration, the reciprocity which makes adult and child join hands in marching towards a better future. He says: 'I saw at once when she entered my rooms that she had come to work; she needed to resolve a problem.' There is no putting in abeyance of the demand here; Winnicott knows beforehand that the other needs to resolve a problem; that in this problem there might be a jouissance to which the subject clings is not envisaged.

All the same there is the appeal to knowledge (savoir), but not at all one that is supposed, which is a knowledge found with the mother since it is she who proposes to little Piggie to go and see Doctor Winnicott who knows all about 'Black mama' and 'babacar', these being the signifiers which crystallise the terror of this little girl and of which she cannot say what they represent. Doctor Winnicott, on the contrary, is said to know all about it and confirms this knowledge lent to him.

Let us begin with a few comments on interpretation in Winnicott. Everybody knows that a lacanian interpretation should be equivocal. It aims at putting the certainties of the subject in abeyance, to set metonymy going again. Here it is quite the contrary: it is a question of offering a knowledge which is not even the subject's, is not the one of his family romance. It is not a question here of bringing to light, of crossing, by constructing it, what makes her unconscious fantasy, but rather of telling her the meaning of what it says. The winnicottian interpretation begins quickly and forcefully, as we shall see after having recalled who Piggie is, and was sustained for fourteen consultations when she was between two years four months and five years old.

Piggie begins to feel bad when, at a little under two years, she has a little baby sister. Her parents are absolutely convinced - they are people who no doubt work in Winnicott's environment - that this birth is traumatic for Piggie. They feel guilty for having given this child a sister too soon. They think that love is like a cake, take away one slice and the others are left with less. This is an economy which is not that of the ethics of desire, but that of the ethics of commodities, and commodities, in effect do not exist in infinite quantities...One could suppose that to see another arrive, produced by one's parents, has an effect: it awakens the question of the

desire of the Other, the test of the desire of the Other. But really, to call this traumatic and to understand that it is by diminution or lack of love that this has symptomatic effects is to miss the essential point. The essential point is precisely that the subject poses a question concerning the desire of the Other. Piggie does not complain that she has too little because she has precisely too much. It is striking to see how she is gorged with understanding. Her parents understand absolutely everything she does. As they have hurt her they have to make good and so both take a hand in trying to understand...

But no-one understands better than Winnicott, who, from the first session on, gives an interpretation. Piggie begins to play - she picks up some objects one by one to see for herself what they are and she repeats; 'and here's another one, and here's another one, and yet another one...' For us, who are more attentive to the formal envelope of the symptom, it is the dimension of repetition, what returns in the signifier. Winnicott understands something else. Those objects were chiefly merchandise wagons and locomotives but, it seems, the objects she used for her *mise-en-scene* mattered little to Winnicott, which rather goes in the direction of our perspective. 'I took this for a message' says Winnicott, 'and I said: "another baby, baby Suz" (it is the name of the traumatising sister); it was obviously the thing to say! for she then proceeded to tell me how baby Suz had arrived, how she remembered it'. Winnicott, and this is systematic, considers the interpretation to be correct because of the agreement of the subject. This attitude is not freudian: Freud said on the contrary, that one needed to take the denegation of the subject into account in order to assure oneself of the correctness of an interpretation. What for Freud founds the certainty of the correctness of an interpretation is 'that's not it', 'I never thought of that'. Winnicott says on the contrary: 'I tried many interpretations until she accepted and confirmed one of them. What does Piggie do then? She responds to the demand. He speaks to her of her little sister and she tells him what she remembers, he calls on the chat, on communication.

The second interpretation of the same session bears on how to make babies. At one point Piggie is anxious and Winnicott writes: 'I feel the anxiety mounting' - because she speaks of the mother at one point - 'there was anxiety and it had to be seen to'. He says to her: 'you are afraid' and he articulates what is happening, the subject has no chance whatsoever of escaping this omniscience. She begins to speak again, he obtains a boost and she plays at the same time. She puts some toys into a box, piles them up at random and Winnicott at once comes out with 'you are making babies as if you were cooking, you mix everything together'.

One could say, by imaginaring the affair, that all 'why's' can be subsumed under a final 'how children are produced and why'. But this is a question on the how and why of desire

and not anatomy, whatever Winnicott seems to think. Piggie then proceeds to take a little man and forces it through the window of a car. Winnicott speaks of the man who puts something inside the woman to make a baby, a kind of automatic translation into the terms of sexual physiology of everything the child is doing. At another time Piggie is playing and piles up objects in a box with always at least one of them falling out; we could evoke the subject who deducts himself from the Other. Winnicott interprets this as an oral pregnancy: Piggie gives the box to eat and the box always vomits out an object, it is ill.

To be pregnant is to be ill; this is well-known. He then gives her a lecture on what her fantasy of an oral pregnancy might be. It does her such good that Winnicott thinks the essentials of the session has been achieved: he notices in her a kind of oral appeasement through sucking: 'we experienced, both of us' writes Winnicott 'an intense satisfaction through non-verbal communication'. And yet, Winnicott doesn't end the session. Piggie goes to fetch her father, climbs on top of him and comes out between his legs, which Winnicott interprets as a birth. The father occupies the place of the mother which allows Winnicott to occupy the position of the father. The poor father sweats, being party to a game he doesn't understand.

Despite the response to the demand, desire insists in the actings-out, and Piggie precisely produces actings-out in a row. There things take a more disquieting turn. Piggie says to her mother 'when you had little Suz you let me fall on the floor' to which she answers with a 'no, I never let you fall!'. The mother doesn't understand - how could she - that the question of the subject is the question of identification with the object of the Other's jouissance, with its value of loss, of falling. The mother reassures her that she shouldn't worry at all. Little Piggie answers to this: 'But I want to worry!'. The mother insists, trying to convince her that she shouldn't worry about a thing, in opposition to the ethic of the neurotic which is to want to preserve the place of desire. The mother is astonished at Piggie's incessant demand for things which are not denied to her, without recognising therein an appeal for something to form a limit. Winnicott answers in the same way: to a 'Look! the window is closed' from Piggie, Winnicott responds by getting up and opening it, thinking that she feels too hot!

To uncover this insistence of the desire of the subject let us look at the actings-out:

- She takes an axle which has lost a wheel and puts it in her mouth. Winnicott is astonished that amongst all this hotch-potch she finds the only dangerous object. He interprets it in terms of a suction of the paternal penis.
- The mother is astonished that in a letter to Winnicott

little Piggle throws a stone in her face and then cries saying: 'I can't mend you, you are too hard, or that the time she speaks of cooking, she says: 'I can only cook dead things'.

This shows, in the clearest way possible, the disarray of this child confronted with the satisfaction this Other gives her all the time, which is nothing other than a satisfaction by means of the signifier to which a mortifying function is attached.

In wanting to satisfy the desire of the Other by satisfying the demand, one obtains a mortification: it is to consent to the will to death which inhabits the Other of the signifier, the death drive. Things come to a head with Piggle's insistent demand to suck her mother's breasts. The mother accepts and is amazed to see that Piggle cries her heart out, to the point where nothing can console her. As for me, I interpret that as a passage to the suicidal act. There is no limit whatever to this trampling, this snubbing of desire in the satisfaction of demand with the result for the subject of demanding the worst only to be satisfied still.

Right up to the end of the treatment the steps are identical; even death can be played: they throw a small object at each other and when Winnicott is hit he plays dead, Piggle hides herself, Winnicott revives, he remembers vaguely that somebody was there and discovers the little Piggle who jubilates with delight. This repetition game is supposed to mark the recovery of the natural process of development. Even death is the object, at bottom, of radical annihilation. It calls to mind Winnicott's fantasy at the end of his life, of which I spoke in Ornicar?, when he imagines his death and thanks God for having been alive at the moment of his death.

Nothing is lost and everything is cashed in on at a profit! Nothing could be more opposed to the ethic of analysis. One couldn't find a better example than this of the ego's meconnaissance, the refusal of subjective division, the alienation in the demand.

Let us conclude: what is particular to the analysis of children, concerning their end? The end is that moment, one could say so, with Winnicott, when the putting into motion of the economy of infantile neurosis is achieved. Then this Other in the place of the cause, the subject supposed to know no longer has any use; one lets go of him. Children always know when to stop. In the case of Stephen of which I spoke some years back, one can locate the matheme of the separation of the cause and phallic signification. With the reservation that at the level of the cause, if the place of the real is situated, reserved, the realisation of the encounter with Other jouissance has not taken place for the child. He remains caught in the signifying order and

exposed to the contingency of the encounter, that is, to the eruption of this jouissance, to puberty, to the encounter with the Other of sexuality.

This is what Freud says in a small text, in Results, Ideas, Problems - : he speaks of the intellectual inhibition of the child, the dissatisfaction which infantile onanism provokes. There is always something missing for discharge and satisfaction to be complete while waiting, while always waiting for something which never came - and this missing part, the reaction of orgasm, manifests itself as equivalent at another level: fits of laughter, absences, tears. 'Infantile sexuality has here once more a fixed prototype.' That the experience of orgasm is the revelation that not all jouissance is phallic is what the child lacks. The question of the options on jouissance remains in abeyance for him, that is, what he is going to make of the object (a).