


Centre
for
Freudian Analysis and Research

NEWSLETTER



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Ella Sharpe and "justification for existence"

by Beatrice Khiara

"I believe", says Ella Sharpe, that "justification for existence is the very core of our problems". The variations of technique which she proposes in her Technique of Psychoanalysis (1930), are a means to deal with the "terrorising super-ego" and help the ego "face reality". Reality sense goes alongside the sublimation of omnipotent infantile wishes. The "omnipotence" is still there, but when "real" object relations have been established, it becomes an "ego adjunct" and wins the approval of the super-ego. According to her, the neuroses are "psychical miscarriages in the attempt to justify the right of the ego to exist". For example, the feat of the obsessional is a breathless justification. Since he keeps on wishing destruction he must employ endless magical operations to counter these wishes. "Like the boy with his hand in the hole in the dyke, if he takes it away for a second the water will flood through with destruction of everybody". The obsessional has no justification for existence, so great is the condemnation passed on his hostile impulses: he is responsible both for the danger and for preventing it. This feeling of guilt is far less conscious in conversion hysteria. Here the justification is in bodily pain. In the suffering the psyche finds a justification for something which means to it "existence".

Ella Sharpe is praised by Lacan in La Direction de la Cure (1958) for her perspicacity regarding "the veritable concerns of the neurotic", and for understanding that it is the want-to-be which is at the very heart of analytical procedure. In the preceding paragraph, Lacan specifies that the want-to-be is "the very field in which the passion of the neurotic unfolds itself". He then acknowledges that "only the English, in their cold objectivity, have known how to articulate this gap to which the neurotic testifies in wishing to justify his existence, and through this, implicitly, how to distinguish, from the interhuman relation, its warmth and enticements, that relation to the Other in which being finds its status". Suffering evidently gives the neurotic a purpose in life, but Lacan's point, and here he cites Ella Sharpe, is that desire is also involved. The neurotic requires a witness, an Other, to confirm his status as a subject. Like Christ on the Cross, the hysteric beseeches the Other, "Why hast thou forsaken me?"; and although the obsessional stands apart, he is nevertheless carefully watched over by his perfect Other. The constant in both cases, (in contrast to the constant of jouissance in perversion), is, says Jacques Alain Miller in his lecture of 3/12/86 "a will to justification" and the devices employed are work and love. "Being" - he explains "and the reason for being are interdependent". The subject refuses being, preferring to suffer in its want-to-be, and implores the Other to provide something to justify this want.

The neurotic continuously postpones the possibility of "having" a being. The subject of language has neither substance nor predicate: it is an evanescent subject. When it is represented by a signifier, it is instantaneously lost in the process of signification. Jacques-Alain Miller elaborates: "There it is true to say that One is One and nothing else, that is to say, the first One of Parmenides". He notes "The impotence which one finds oneself in when trying to say something valid about it". The subject aspires to the One of identification which can contain the want-to-be: an empty set, S1. This is Lacan's theory in 1960. Then in 1964 (Position de L'Inconscient), he goes on to discuss the operation whereby the subject seeks the lack in the Other, as opposed to the unary trait. The subject places his lack in the Other, and in separation the result is (a). The body is fractured, but in relation to the Symbolic. In separation the object of the drive comes to incarnate what the subject loses. The subject is then confronted with (-ϕ), a loss of Jouissance, until the signifying operation is resumed. Both (-ϕ) and (a) are equivalent to the libido. In neurosis, the subject does not recognise itself as (a) and clings to his lack. The analyst's task is to allow the subject to recognise itself in (a) for, "it being excluded that anything real whatsoever is consumed in analysis - nothing other than what is imaginary can be recognised in it" writes Lacan in La Direction de la Cure. Power distorts interpretation, replacing "the relation to being in which this action takes place, causing its means, notably those of speech, to fall from their place of superiority in truth". Further on he explains, "There is a rapport between transference and suggestion. It is that transference is also a demand for love...This demand only constitutes itself as such insofar as the subject is the subject of the signifier: that is what allows it to be misused by reducing it to the needs from which these signifiers are borrowed - something which psychoanalysts - as we know, do not fail to do".

Identification with the all-powerful signifier of demand must not be confused with identification with the object. "Identification with the object, because it starts from the demand for love, opens up the sequence of the transference, that is, the road on which the identifications can be denounced, those which, in halting this regression, punctuate it." "In order that the transference be maintained, frustration must preside over justification. A proper relation with being will only be established if one bears in mind that there are two strategies for kindling the subject's "passion".

Ella Sharpe concludes her article with the statement that although there is a different "result" in the so-called normal from the result we see in definite neuroses, there is no difference in the actual unconscious conflict that

lies beneath consciousness. Despite the fact that
"..anything that can carry over a symbolical
significance(...)will give one a pathway to explore", yet
"the unconscious mind will never fully be analysed". This
is because neurotic justification, or in Lacan's words " la
passion du manque-a-être" is fundamental in the relation to
the Other.

"R S I in Freud's Project."

by Richard Klein

"seminar given at Ivy House on 11 Jan '89"

I will discuss the ethical status of the principles of mental functioning by way of a conversion of the theory of Freud's Project into a linguistic theory.

A key notion in the Freudian doctrine is that of conflict. In Seminar VII a brilliantly simple logical manoeuvre changes the principle of this notion of conflict, by invoking themes from Seminar II which are consistent with the later Seminar. On page 45-6 of Seminar VII Lacan takes up a traditional point of view that conflict in psychoanalysis is conflict between the pleasure principle and the reality principle. That is a traditional point of view, but the character of the conflict is not traditional. The conflict between the pleasure principle and the reality principle is traditionally equivalent to a conflict between biology in the form of the id-instinct and the cognitive sciences in the form of the ego. These propositions hide the essentially ethical character of the conflict. On p.45 the principles of mental functioning are ethical, and on p.46 the conflict is of a moral order. However, this is not so obvious without the definitions of the principles of mental functioning in Seminar II. That conflict is of a moral order was already being expressed in that Seminar. On p.84 of Seminar II the pleasure principle is defined as the principle that pleasure should cease. On p.60 the reality principle is defined as a delayed-action pleasure principle. If the action of the pleasure principle is that pleasure should cease, then the reality principle delays that action. There you have a moral conflict par excellence: pleasure should cease over and against pleasure should continue.

You will, no doubt, remark that this notion of conflict constitutes a reversal. Under the pleasure principle which governs the unconscious the principle is that pleasure should cease, and under the reality principle which governs the secondary processes the principle is that pleasure should continue. I will leave this reversal unexplained for the time being.

A clear distinction must be made between the pleasure principle and, simply, pleasure. The pleasure principle is symbolic and a Freudian discovery. Pleasure is imaginary and is not a Freudian discovery. How could it be? Pleasure is a notion that has not ceased being discussed by moral philosophers since Aristotle started the ball rolling. According to Kant pleasure is produced

by the faculty of desire which is constituted by ideas that concern the reality of objects. Pleasure would be an agreement between an object and the corresponding idea. Happiness and pleasure in his ethics fall under self-love. At this level the subject seeks his Wohl, not his Gute, but his Wohl, his well-being. On p.9 of Seminar II pleasure is defined as a search for one's good, bien, in the sense of Wohl.


The faculty of desire causes the reality of objects, and this falls into a consistent theme in this philosophy. Reality is a member of the category: quality. And quality in The Project gives an indication of reality. Insofar as this reality in Freud's work centres on the object, one suspects a Kantian category is operating in it. The indication of reality which becomes the reality principle in ch 7 of The IoD is in The Project under the influence of the Kantian category and tied up with quality. The reality principle in the orthodox movement has become something as inane as "Look out to your left, look out to your right, see if the coast is clear".

If the reality principle is equivalent to what in The Project is called an indication of reality, then the search for one's well-being is guarded by the reality principle. It implicates the specific action. Therefore, pleasure is under the rule of the reality principle and not of the pleasure principle.

In his commentary on these principles of mental functioning in Seminar VII Lacan resolved a paradox that was functioning in his teaching till then. The paradox is produced by the Hegelian thesis which bases desire on recognition. The problem it produced was in making a distinction between imaginary recognition of desire and symbolic recognition of desire. Lacan calls this Hegelian thesis the principle of identity. Under the rule of the pleasure principle this principle of identity is abolished. However, under the rule of the reality principle it continues to function. The search for one's good, for instance, which is implicated in the specific action, continues to be based on the Hegelian thesis of recognition. Desire under the rule of the reality principle is based on recognition, and under the rule of the pleasure principle is not based on recognition. The abolition of desire as recognition in so far as desire is ruled by the pleasure principle has consequences for the celebrated proposition that the subject's desire is the desire of the Other. We must draw these consequences in the future.


In Ch.7 of The IoD the primary process which is governed by the pleasure principle has an aim: identity of perception, and the recording process which is governed by the reality principle has an aim: identity of thought.

But that is not what is implicated in the schema of Seminar VII:



In one aspect, in this case, along the vertical, the principle of mental functioning governs a discourse. From another aspect, along the diagonals, it has an aim. The aspect from which it governs must not be confused with the aspect from which it aims. It is the abolition of the Hegelian principle of identity which has brought out these two aspects.

The apparatus that Freud designs in The Project is an inference based on the symptom. Once again I will give a sketch of the apparatus:



Some of you will be surprised by my schematisation of the psychic apparatus of The Project. It is, in fact, a Lacanian schema from Seminar XX, not used there to schematise the notion from The Project. The label, pain, is the subject of my next seminar at Bloomsbury. You should not try to make this fit perfectly with the Lacanian schema from Seminar XX. It has an approximate fit.

ϕ , as you probably already know, receives quantity from the exterior, ϕ , exogenous ϕ , and sends most of it to ω via some straight to ω . ω translates this quantity into quality. ϕ is endogenous quantity arising from the interior of the body into ω which is also forwarded to ω for translation into quality. What passes by ω is translated into pain. Pleasure is on the side of reality. If you find that this schema represents a slight displacement in the topography of The Project, in one way that is correct. With this schema I am imposing a certain consistency on The Project.

The apparatus that Freud designs here is, as I said, an inference based on the symptom. Where he fails to keep his bearings on the symptom, he introduces flaws into the topography. Indeed, what I am saying here conforms to Lacanian practice. In the Entretiens preliminaires we get our bearings on the symptoms before entering the analysis.

It matters little if they are substitutes. And we draw the analysand's attention to them. There is, for instance, a flaw in the topography of the scenario of the hungry infant for having lost his bearings on the symptom. For this infant quantity is summing in ψ . An external intervention is called upon since a hungry infant cannot feed itself. This external intervention involves a specific action which leads to an experience of satisfaction. An experience of satisfaction entails the satisfaction of a need. Quantity is being taken as need, at least, that is the assumption, which is discharged by way of the specific action. The principle of inertia is working, and the subject is getting his just deserts, namely, pleasure in a breast-feed, again, an assumption. Quantity is being discharged by way of this breast-feed producing pleasure. However, a glance at the schema reveals that along the line he should be getting his discharge of quantity, I have put the label, pain.

This is the famous scenario of sec. 11 part I of The Project, where a pathway is formed which provides the basis of remembering and is called the primary process. This pathway is not the Bahnung that Lacan talks about. The Bahnung that is formed in sec. 11 is a Holzweg. It is a link between the mnemonic image of the satisfying object and the mnemonic trace of the motor experience of satisfaction:

------(discharge)----- i (a).

This pathway constitutes the wish, forms the basis of remembering and ends in an hallucination. That is to say, this pathway called here the primary process depends on the specific action not taking place. In order for this pathway to be activated, some assume that a need must recur. However, the flaw in this view becomes immediately apparent. If this pathway also forms the basis of remembering, then the subject would have to be in a constant state of need in order to remember anything whatsoever. That is not very practical. But Freud does realise that he cannot rely on the recurrence of need. In fact, he does not say "where the need recurs" on p.319, Sec. 2 part I, he says that when the state of urgency in wishing reappears, the pathway is activated. This implies that he is not considering this pathway as the wish but, rather, activated by the wish or by some state of urgency which leaves the wish still to be defined and located in his topography.

If this pathway is taken to be the wish itself, the assumption must be that the wish is a vector in the pathway: -----(discharge) -----> i(a). This would be the object that is hallucinated. The wish is equivalent to a vector, and the wish-fulfilment is the hallucination of the object. The problem is that the object is registered in the system, and the system is

without quality. The object must fall under the influence of the ϕ system which is given the function of translating quantity into quality. One then has to postulate that the object's quantity flows to ψ , but there is no reason to postulate that since the pathway is
 ----(discharge) -----> i (a). The hallucination is outside the ψ system and so outside this pathway. Moreover, it seems difficult to assign to a mnemonic trace of an object registered in a system without quality the property of being an image. One could consider it a potential image. One begins to slide all over the place just to keep this apparatus going. There can be no images in ψ if ψ is without quality.

This is not a pathway on which a linguistic theory can be constructed. The basis for such a theory begins in sec. 3, part I in the notion of equality of facilitations. A facilitation is the Bahnung of Seminar VII. Facilitations are dependant on the state of the contact-barriers between ψ neurones. Contact-barriers facilitate or hinder the passage of ϕ . If all the contact-barriers in ψ were equally facilitated, then, says, Freud, memory would be impossible. This is the proposition that provides us with the basis for a linguistic theory: memory can only be represented by difference. It is not represented by some concrete notion of a pathway as an histological appearance. However, memory does implicate the central nervous system. Because language is difference, a notion that can be condensed is a little matheme, $S \neq S$, secondarily, is represented by difference. This difference must exist a priori in language on the grounds that the central nervous system would not be able to exercise its activity on a language that is a pure ie. $S = S$. In the notion of Bahnung is the Saussurian definition of the signifier which is its difference from another signifier. There is no Bahnung without a difference between signifiers, and it serves the primary process.

In Sec.9, part I Freud does pass from memory to something that functions like signifiers. Here, this Bahnung falls under the function of complication. In complication quantity is distributed to several ψ neurones: $\psi_1 + \psi_2 + \psi_3$ that is to say, complication is a process that adds signifiers to the Bahnung which is becoming recognisable as a chain of signifiers. Complication adds signifiers with the result that quantity is distributed. It is not discharged but distributed. If the pleasure principle in the guise of the principle of inertia governs the primary process which is this signifying chain, then it must do so by complication, by adding signifiers. Furthermore, the pleasure principle would be satisfied, not by discharge of quantity but by distribution of quantity.

The system of sec 10, part I does not resemble the system of sec 9, part I. In sec 9 it is a chain of signifiers in which quantity is distributed. In sec 10 the system is suffering the summation of quantity, and there are no signifiers. The system of sec. 10 is at the mercy of ϕ . sec. 10 seems to be about a preliminary system in which quantity has not been distributed. Complication changes the status of the system in so far as quantity is distributed. Shall we say, the Q - issance is distributed in by the addition of signifiers.

On p.262 of Seminar V the subject cannot tolerate libido at a certain level. At a certain level he is at the mercy of ϕ in some preliminary system. This is an old theme of too much pleasure is pain. But this level is never echoed, neither in The Project nor in Seminar VII. Libido is distributed, not reduced, by way of complication. The term libido gives jouissance its Freudian value, that is, links it to erotogenic zones. Qissance is being distributed to Erotogenic zones by the signifier. In letter 75 to Fliess Freud says that when sexual zones are abandoned, they no longer produce a release of sexuality. Jouissance is distributed and located in these zones which is a process governed by the pleasure principle. Language affects the body, or, to put it in another way, the symptom affects the body.

The scenario of the helpless, hungry infant also has a linguistic point of view in The Project. This is the infant who is going to become implicated in a specific action. The specific action of The Project is not simply some external intervention into the subject's helpless state, into a condition of physiological imbalance. The specific action is not all on the side of the mother. There is a more refined view in The Project: in sec. 1, part I the subject demands a specific action. In order to meet the demand for a specification, a store of $q\prime$ is required. This brings back the signifier into the scenario. There has to be a signifier of the demand. In other words the scenario now meets the two criteria of the symptom in The Project. This symptom has two axes, a symbolic axis in the axis of the signifier and a real axis on the axis of jouissance. Since Freud announces that The Project is an inference based on the symptom, I take the opportunity to base this scenario on the symptom.

The store of $q\prime$ that is required for the demand for a specific action is given a name in The Project. It is equivalent to nothing less than the Ich, which is located in ψ . The Ich is required to meet the demand for a specification. To put it in another way a state of urgency is implicated in the demand. We have already noted that a state of urgency is what activates a claim. If it is the claim governed by the pleasure principle, then the pleasure principle implicates this Ich. The Ich is represented by the signifier of demand. According to

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
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Taking the little delta as need, it passes by the signifier with the effect of the subject: $\frac{S_1}{\$}$. This graph specifies that the subject is an effect of language. If there is a state of urgency, that signifies the function of language.

In the next graph we find the formulation that need passes by the signifier revised:




The subject has been displaced and with it the cry which puts demand on the side of the subject. On p.303 of the English version of the Ecrits in "Subversion of the Subject" the return of need is a reality that is imagined in an ethological schema. The subject comes in the place of need. In a demand for a specific action the function of communication is involved which is, say Freud in sec 11, part I, the source of all moral motives. According to the graph the moral motive here is satisfied by the Ideal: I(A).

The mnemonic image is not an image in \mathcal{K} but an Ideal functioning in $\mathcal{K} : \$ \rightarrow I(A)$. The Bahnung of sec ii, part I which I called a Holzweg involves the Ideal. The vector in The Project is (discharge) $\rightarrow i(a)$. But it is not a mnemonic image since \mathcal{K} is without quality. It is a signifier, and the vector is $\$ \rightarrow I(A)$. The Ideal is a signifier. It can even be the signifier of an image, but not simply an image. What Freud called a mnemonic image should be given this formulation: $I(\mathcal{K})$. One can see from the graph that the \mathcal{K} system under the rule of the pleasure principle coincides with the field of the Other who replies with a signifier, who adds signifiers.

The preliminary \mathcal{K} system of sec-10, part I is not the Other of the signifier but the jouissance of the Other, which will be the subject of my next seminar.

The specific action implicated in demand is in Seminar II a search for one's good, and it centres on the Neben Mensch. It involves component b of the Neben Mensch. The Neben Mensch is the subject's reality according to Freud. Therefore, the Nebeu Mensch is involved in the a system,

which has one function that can be applied in three ways. Its function is to translate quantity into quality. Applied to exogenous ϕ received by ϕ , it produces on p.325, SEI an indication of reality in the manner of a Kantian category. Applied to endogenous ϕ received by ψ , it translates an increase as pain and a decrease as pleasure. But this cannot be maintained in The Project. What happens is a distribution of quantity and not a discharge. Therefore, ω applied to endogenous ϕ translates it as pain only, which would happen in the case of a defeat in distribution and/or in compensation. Pleasure is produced under the indication of reality. The third application of ω function on p.373 SEI is to speak. Applied to speech, it gives an indication of thought-reality. Two of these applications are registered in the schema of Seminar VII.




On p.41 of Seminar VII thought is an inference from speech represented by the line passing from speech to thought in the schema. The thought reality which is indicated in The Project when ω is applied to speech is the Uncs. The Uncs is a deduction made from the words the subject deploys. The uncs process of thought in the schema is without quality, so it cannot be a part of reality. Speech, on the other hand, has quality which gives an indication of reality. If the uncs process of thought, that is, the Bahnung, is without quality, uncs desire, that is, the Freudian wish, cannot be based on recognition. The schema abolishes the principle of identity from the ucs signifying chain. Desire under the rule of the pleasure principle does not function according to the Hegelian thesis. Desire under the rule of the reality principle does so function, that is, it is desire based on recognition.

In summary, the discourse at the level of the pleasure principle is on p.39 of the Seminar VII the discourse of the unconscious in which desire is not based on recognition. In other words, the discourse of the master is a discourse at the level of the pleasure principle. The discourse at the level of the reality principle is a discourse which is based on desire as recognition.

Both principles of mental functioning have along their diagonals starting out from their agent an aim. The aim of the reality principle is identity of thought. In so far as speech through the inferior diagonal takes part in that aim, one could say that the reality principle is a principle of deduction and that thought is unconscious by

virtue of a logical operation. But the aim of the reality principle is not thought, rather identity of thought. However deductive it is, it aims at giving thought - equivalence to speech, at introducing the Hegelian thesis and at basing, therefore, desire on recognition. This can be blocked by the way the analyst considers the proposition: "The subject's desire is the desire of the Other". If he considers that a symmetry exists between the subject's desire and the desire of the Other, then the aim will be achieved of establishing an identity between thought and speech. If the analyst considers that no such symmetry exists, the reality principle can be deployed as a deductive principle.

The rule of the reality principle in contrast to its aim is, according to Freud on p.366, SEI, to draw speech into the specific action which is another way of saying that demand implicates the specific action. This is registered on the graph more obviously than in the schema of Seminar VII.



If the circuit $a(a)-A-a(a)$ is taken as the speech circuit where desire is based on recognition, then one sees that it is continuous with the imaginary relation between the legs of the graph. This relation in the schema is found at the level of perception. Both speech and perception fall under the influence of ψ , and, therefore, under the rule of the reality principle. Speech, says Freud on p.366, SEI, puts thought-processes on a level with perceptual processes. Speech introduces quality which covers identity of thought which puts thought processes on a level with speech bringing desire as recognition.

Speech is part of the aim of the reality principle, but thought is not part of the aim of the pleasure principle. The aim of the secondary process is identity of thought. In so far as speech is a secondary process, it has that aim. But thought as a primary process does not have the aim of identity of perception. In the schema the principle of identity is abolished from thought-processes. There is no line directly connecting thought to perception. The chain itself has no aim. This aim of identity of perception is the aim of the pleasure principle, of its agent, which in the schema is the good,

which is the Ideal. On p.274 of Seminar VII the power to do good is the function of the Ideal.

According to Lacan the specific action as well as drawing speech into it involves object-refinding. The object which provides the perception and whose exogenous Q is translated into quality by W giving an indication of reality in the Neben mensch. The Neben mensch is the subject's reality. The subject does not understand component a, and he understands component b from his own body according to The Project. Component a does not vary whereas component b does vary. The subject imitates the varying attributes of component b in order to understand them. Component b is an imaginary object with which the subject identifies. It is not the body as affected by the signifier but the body as image which is, however, supported by a signifier, namely, the Ideal. The Ideal supports the image in the line pressing from the good to perception in the schema, to the perception otherwise known as my counterpart, the little other. This makes the Ideal the agent of the aim of the pleasure principle: identity of perception. Along this line can also be situated object-refinding in a specific action, that I have also called a search for one's good. If the Ideal has the power to do good, it is to support the subject in his search for the good.

Two mathemes are functioning in the schema: $\frac{I}{S}$ and \$ <> a. In the first matheme the schema is consistent with the graph, and the graph is consistent with The Project. The matheme of the phantasy is functioning in the diagonals. The object in the theory of phantasy still has an imaginary status. On p.119 of Seminar VII the elements (a) are imaginary elements of the phantasy and cover over the subject at the point of the thing. These elements fill in the state of urgency on the side of the subject. Filling in this state urgency is what Freud calls the experience of satisfaction, that is, it is a part of the reality of pleasure.

In the schema both principles of mental functioning are operating in the phantasy. On the side of the subject the pleasure principle applies, the principle that pleasure should cease, and on the side of the object it is the role of the reality principle which delays pleasure ceasing. The conflict between the pleasure principle and the reality principle is inherent in the phantasy itself. Phantasy is a conflict. It is also the focus of the jouissance of the Other in so far as complication distributes jouissance to the erotogenic zones. In the neurotic jouissance is localised to the phantasy.

PERVERSION STUDY GROUP

In preparation for the 6th International Encounter of The Freudian Field (6 - 9 July 1990 - Paris) a study group is being formed working on the theme of Perversion.

The provisional meeting dates are:

6 May 1989

10 June 1989

25 June 1989

There will be further meetings after the summer break. Anyone interested in participating should contact The Centre at its London address.

THE CARTELS COMMITTEE

Several people have expressed their wish to study areas of Lacan's thought in detail and, with the availability now of a greater number of texts, these people would like to study Lacan together with others who are interested in a specific topic or text. This kind of work-group has a name in the Lacanian teaching: CARTEL.

Note that Cartels are offered to all subscribers of the CFAR. Therefore, all those who are interested in taking part in a Cartel and who are not yet subscribers should ask the CFAR for further details.

All information (whether related to Cartels already in existence, those being formed, or people interested in forming one) should be sent to Danuza Machado, 14 Eton Hall, Eton College Road, London NW3 2DW, tel; 722-7383. Information can also be given to or received from the other members of the Cartel Committee:

F Nakano 54 Queens Road, Waltham Cross, Herts EN8 7HP
Tel: 0992-763435

B Hooson 28 Melbreak House, East Dulwich Estate SE22
Tel: 738-7194

B Phillips 36 rue Mauconseil, 75001 Paris, France
Tel: 010331 42211417

The following Cartels have been formed since the last Inter Cartel meeting in December 1988:

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| 1. <u>The Ego</u> | 2. <u>Seminar 1</u> | 3. <u>In Search of
Das Ding</u> |
| Hara Pepeli | Angela Hassiotis | Chris Hill |
| Danuza Machado | Mehrdad Seyf | Misha Twitchin |
| Tine Norregaard | Jens Elbo | Graham Davies |
| Jens Elbo | Gwion Jones | +1 unannounced |
| +1 unannounced | Bernard Burgoyne | |